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ABSTRACT 
 
Historically, sentencing courts have found it appropriate to take into account the 
impact of an offender’s sentence upon their dependants. This mitigating factor in 
sentencing has been described as ‘family hardship’.  However, in Australia family 
hardship is a controversial sentencing factor with some sentencing judges denying 
that it is a mitigating factor at all. This dissertation is a study of the family hardship 
as a mitigating sentencing factor and a study of the sentencing principle that has 
developed in respect to this sentencing factor up to the landmark decision in 
Markovic v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 510.  The overall purpose of this 
dissertation has been to trace the way that courts have approached family 
hardship and to contribute to current knowledge. The research for this 
dissertation involved a study of the case law on family hardship within Australia. 
This consisted of a series of jurisdictionally based studies of sentencing remarks 
and appellate judgments to reveal how judicial officers have approached family 
hardship at sentencing.  
 
Drawing upon an extensive and systematic analysis of the case law, this 
dissertation sheds light upon the practical operation of common law, including 
where there has been legislative enactment of sentencing factors, and presents a 
critical analysis of the operation and development of Australian sentencing 
principles. The dissertation first outlines the Australian sentencing landscape 
before looking at the tensions that have arisen in respect to this contentious 
sentencing factor. In addition to an extensive and unique review of Australian state 
and territory jurisprudence on family hardship the dissertation also draws upon 
secondary research literature to contextualise these tensions. This dissertation 
also presents the results of a study into federal sentencing practices on family 
hardship. These results are examined alongside state and territory sentencing 
practices and the original research conducted for this dissertation. The findings 
presented define and develop a new agenda for research on mitigating factors, 
sentencing principles and Australian federal sentencing laws and practice. 
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1. PUNISHING PARENTS 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In Australia, there are currently no official statistics kept on the number of children 
affected by the imprisonment of a parent.1 The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(‘ABS’) does not collect these data nor do Australian prisons. In Australia, since the 
1980s attention was drawn to the difficulty of estimating the number of children 
affected by the incarceration of a parent.2 Over the years, Standing Committees and 
numerous reports to government have recommended data collection.3 However in 
30 years, no change has occurred in recording such information. For example, 
Susan Dennison was awarded an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship to 
estimate the number of children affected by an imprisoned parent.4  
 
A failure to keep official statistical information on the number of children affected 
by incarcerated parents is not unique to Australia. For example, Renny Golden has 
 
                                                          
1 The data which is available from surveys and academic studies will be discussed below. 
2 Betty Hounslow, Annie Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, Children of Imprisoned Parents 
(The Family and Children’s Services Agency, Ministry of Youth and Community Services of New South 
Wales, 1982) 1; Gloria Larman and Ann Aungles, 'Children of Prisoners and their Outside Carers: The 
Invisible Population' (Paper presented at the Women and the Law, Canberra, 24-26 September 1991) 263; 
Ann Aungles, The Prison and the Home: A Study of the Relationship Between Domesticity and Penalty, 
The Institute of Criminology Monograph Series No 5 (1994) 86; Anti-Discrimination Commission (Qld), 
Women in Prison (Report, Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, 2006) 30. 
3 See Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, A 
Report into Children of Imprisoned Parents, Report No 12 (1997) iii (Key Conclusions); Women’s Legal 
Service (SA) Inc, Taken In, When Women with Dependent Children Are Taken Into Custody: Implications 
for Justice and Welfare (2000) 2, 28-29 (recommendation 6); South Australian Government Attorney-
General’s Department, Children of Prisoners Project, (Steering Committee’s Report to the Justice 
Cabinet Committee, Justice Strategy Division, July 2005) 9-10; Simon Quilty et al, ‘Children of 
Prisoners: A Growing Public Health Problem’ (2004) 28(4) Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Public Health 339; Legislative Assembly Standing Committee on Community Services and Social 
Equity, Parliament of the Australian Capital Territory, The Forgotten Victims of Crime: Families of 
Offenders and their Silent Sentence, Report 6 (2004) xv-xvi (recommendation 16), 65-66; Rosemary 
Woodward, ‘Families of Prisoners: Literature Review on Issues and Difficulties’ (Occasional Paper No 
10, Australian Government Department of Family and Community Services, 2003) vii-viii, 6; Nicola 
Tudball, Doing it Hard: A Study of the Needs of Children and Families of Prisoners in Victoria 
(Victorian Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, 2000) xii and 78; Anti-Discrimination 
Commission (Qld), Women in Prison (Report, Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, 2006) 123 
(Recommendation 56); Terry Hannon, Children: Unintended Victims of Legal Process (Action Paper, 
Victorian Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, March 2007) 27. 
4 Jill Rowbotham, Unlocking Lives of Prisoners’ Children (16 September 2009) The Australian 
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26078249-27703,00.html>; Australian 
Government, Welcome to the ARC’s Archive Website, Australian Research Council <archive.arc.gov.au>. 
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noted that in the United States of America (‘USA’), ‘most prisons do not even 
request information about a woman’s children when she is sent through 
classification’.5 In Australian and overseas research literature the families of 
offenders have been branded as the: ‘hidden victims’, ‘invisible victims’ or 
‘forgotten victims’ of crime.6 In recent years, the work of researchers such as Pat 
Carlen, Helen Codd, Susan Easton, Renny Golden, and Christine Piper have stressed 
that the impact of imprisonment upon offender’s dependants remains a serious 
problem for criminal justice systems.7  
 
                                                          
5 Renny Golden, War on the Family: Mothers in Prison and the Families They Leave Behind (Routledge, 
2005) 29. 
6 Australia: Gloria Larman and Ann Aungles, 'Children of Prisoners and their Outside Carers: The 
Invisible Population' (Paper presented at the Women and the Law, Canberra, 24-26 September 1991); 
Ann Aungles, The Prison and the Home: A Study of the Relationship Between Domesticity and Penalty, 
The Institute of Criminology Monograph Series No 5 (1994); Ann Cunningham, ‘Forgotten Families: The 
Impacts of Imprisonment’ (2001) 59 Family Matters 35; Simon Quilty et al, ‘Children of Prisoners: A 
Growing Public Health Problem’ (2004) 28(4) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 
339; Betty Hounslow, Annie Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, ‘Children of Imprisoned 
Parents’ (Report, Ministry of Youth and Community Services of New South Wales, 1982) 1; Legislative 
Assembly Standing Committee on Community Services and Social Equity, Parliament of the Australian 
Capital Territory, The Forgotten Victims of Crime: Families of Offenders and their Silent Sentence, 
Report 6 (2004); Dot Goulding, Severed Connections: An Exploration of the Impact of Imprisonment on 
Women’s Familial and Social Connectedness (Murdoch University, 2004) 12; Shine for Kids Co-
operative Ltd, Putting Your Child First, A survival guide for carers of children of prisoners, their families 
and workers (SHINE for Kids, 2007); South Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, 
Children of Prisoners Project, (Steering Committee’s Report to the Justice Cabinet Committee, Justice 
Strategy Division, July 2005); Catherine Flynn, Bronwyn Naylor and Paula Fernandez Arias, 
‘Responding to the Needs of Children of Parents Arrested in Victoria, Australia. The Role of the Adult 
Criminal Justice System’ (2016) 49(3) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 351. 
International: Roger Shaw, Children of Imprisoned Fathers (Hodder and Stoughton, 1987); Roger Shaw, 
‘Prisoners’ Children and Politics: An Aetiology of Victimisation’ (1990) 4(3) Children & Society 315, 
351; Roger Shaw (ed), Prisoner’s Children: What Are the Issues (Routledge, 1992) xiii-xvi; Helen Codd, 
‘Prisoners’ Families: The “Forgotten Victims”’ (1998) 45(3) Probation Journal 148; Helen Codd, 
‘Prisoners’ Families: Issues in Law and Policy’ (2004) 55 Amicus Curiae 2, 3; Helen Codd, In the 
Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment and Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, 2008) 12-16, 169, 
172-173; Brenda McGowan and Karen Blumenthal, ‘Children of Women Prisoner: A Forgotten Minority’ 
in Laura Crites (ed), The Female Offender (Lexington Books, 1978) 121; Karen Mason, ‘They Do Time 
Too: The Effects Of Imprisonment On The Families Of White-Collar Offenders’ in G.L. Fox and M.L. 
Benson (eds), Contemporary Perspectives In Family Research Volume 2: Families, Crime and Criminal 
Justice (Elsevier Science, 2000) 325, 325; Jacquelyn Sandifer and Suzanne Kurth, ‘The Invisible 
Children of Incarcerated Mothers’ in G.L. Fox and M.L. Benson (eds), Contemporary Perspectives In 
Family Research Volume 2: Families, Crime and Criminal Justice (Elsevier Science, 2000) 361, 361; 
Roger Shaw (ed), Prisoner’s Children: What Are the Issues (Routledge, 1992); Nigel Walker, Why 
Punish? (Oxford University Press, 1991) 106; Janet Walker, ‘Silent, Forgotten and Vulnerable: 
Examining the Risks for Children with a Parent in Prison’ (2007) 69 Amicus Curiae 10, 12; Gwyneth 
Boswell and Peter Wedge, Imprisoned Fathers and Their Children (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002) 
11; Joseph Murray and David Farrington, ‘The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children’ (2008) 37 
Crime & Justice 133, 133. 
7 Renny Golden, War on the Family: Mothers in Prison and the Families They Leave Behind (Routledge, 
2005); Pat Carlen (ed), Women and Punishment: The Struggle for Justice (Willan Publishing, 2002); Pat 
Carlen and Anne Worrall, Analysing Women's Imprisonment (Willan Publishing, 2004); Helen Codd, 
‘Prisoners’ Families: Issues in Law and Policy’ (2004) 55 Amicus Curiae 2; Helen Codd, ‘Through the 
Looking Glass? Prisoners’ Children and Penal Policy’ (2007) 69 Amicus Curiae 3; Helen Codd, In the 
Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment and Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, 2008); Susan 
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A. Rising Imprisonment Rates in Australia 
 
Consistent with worldwide trends, prison populations within Australia are 
increasing. For example, from 1991 to 2001, the Australian prison population 
increased by 50%.8 The most recent statistics report further growth in 2016 the 
number of sentenced prisoners in ‘adult corrective services custody’9 in Australia 
was 38, 845 prisoners.10  In 2017, this figure had grown by 6% to be 41, 202 
prisoners.11 The highest distribution of sentenced prisoners within Australia are in 
the eastern states. These states hold 70% of the country’s prisoners: New South 
Wales (32% or 13,149), Queensland (20% or 8, 476) and Victoria (17% or 7, 
149).12  
 
Rising rates of imprisonment within Australia also includes rising rates of 
imprisonment for female offenders. In 1991, just under 5% of the Australian 
prison population were female.13 By 2013, the female prison population had 
increased to 8%14 (where it currently sits15). A dramatic shift in the imprisonment 
rates for women within Australia was highlighted by the ABS in the Australian 
Social Trends Report for 2004.16 What was unique about this reporting series was 
that it specifically examined the issue of women in prison.17 It reported that 
 
                                                          
Easton, 'Dangerous Waters: Taking Account of Impact in Sentencing' (2008) 2 Criminal Law Review 105; 
Christine Piper, 'Should Impact Constitute Mitigation?: Structured Discretion Versus Mercy' (2007) 2 
Criminal Law Review 141; Christine Piper, 'Safeguarding and the Sentencing Courts' (2007) 37 Family 
Law 337; Susan Easton and Christine Piper, ‘‘What’s Sentencing Got to Do with It?’ Understanding the 
Prison Crisis’ (2006) 8(4) Contemporary Issues in Law 356; Susan Easton and Christine Piper, 
Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 348-349; 
Susan Easton and Christine Piper, Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 302. 
8 See Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, Prisoners in Australia, 2001, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
9 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016, Prisoners in Australia, 2016, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
10 These statistics are from 30 June 2016, see Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016, Prisoners in Australia, 
2016, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
11 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017, Prisoners in Australia, 2017, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Media Release: Over half of Australia's prisoners are 20-35-year-old 
males, 20 February 2003, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/4517.0Media%20Release12002?opend
ocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4517.0&issue=2002&num=&view=2002,> 
14 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2014, Prisoners in Australia, 2013, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
15 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017, Prisoners in Australia, 2017, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
16 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, Australian Social Trends, Other areas of social concern, Women 
in Prison 2004, cat. no. 4102.0, ABS, Canberra. 
17 Ibid. 
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‘[b]etween 1995 and 2002, there was a 58% increase in the imprisonment rate for 
women in Australia.’18 This highlighted significant change, but it was also 
noteworthy because the rate of imprisonment for male offenders in the same 
period revealed only a 15% increase.19 This showed that the rising imprisonment 
rate for women almost quadrupled the rate for men. In 2012, the ABS reported 
that female imprisonment rates in Australia were still increasing at a faster rate 
than male imprisonment rates.20 
 
The statistical changes in female imprisonment rates presented in the 2004 
‘Women in Prison’ report was even more alarming in respect to female indigenous 
offenders. In this period, the ABS reported that ‘the number of indigenous women 
prisoners increased by 124%.’21 The overall indigenous imprisonment rates in 
Australia are shocking. Recent ABS statistics show that the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait imprisonment rate is ‘13 times greater than the age standardized 
imprisonment rate for non-Indigenous person[s].’22 In terms of the impact on 
children of offenders, it is estimated that one in four indigenous children are 
affected by parental imprisonment before they reach 16 years of age.23 
 
The change in the official number of female offenders being dealt with by courts in 
Australia is being felt at all levels of the court hierarchy. For example, Patrizia 
Poletti’s study of sentencing of female offenders New South Wales courts found 
that from 1995-1998 there was a 16.3% growth in the sentencing of women in 
 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Media Release: Women Prisoners Increasing at a Faster Rate Than 
Men (6 December 2012), Australian Bureau of Statistics < 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/4517.0Media%20Release12012?opendoc
ument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4517.0&issue=2012&num=&view=>  
21 Ibid. 
22 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016, Prisoners in Australia, 2016, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
23 See, eg, Shine for Kids Co-operative Ltd, Putting Your Child First, A survival guide for carers of 
children of prisoners, their families and workers (SHINE for Kids, 2007) 4. See also Betty Hounslow, 
Annie Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, Children of Imprisoned Parents (The Family and 
Children’s Services Agency, Ministry of Youth and Community Services of New South Wales, 1982) 
111-117; Susan Dennison, Anna Stewart and Kate Freiberg, ‘A Prevalence Study of Children with 
Imprisoned Fathers: Annual and Lifetime Estimates’ (2013) 48(3) Australian Journal of Social Issues 
339, 341; Susan Dennison et al, ‘“My Life is Separated”: An Examination of the Challenges and Barriers 
to Parenting for Indigenous Fathers in Prison’ (2014) 54(6) British Journal of Criminology 1089, 1090. 
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local courts.24 During the same period the growth in sentencing for male offenders 
in the local courts was only 7.6%.25  
 
All of this data indicates that rising rates in female imprisonment is part of a 
changing landscape rather than a one-off anomaly. Importantly, rising female 
incarceration rates in Australia suggests an underlying social problem with respect 
to the effect of the incarceration of primary caregivers upon dependent children. 
Rising female incarceration rates also means we are at a time when greater 
attention must be paid to sentencing law and principles as they apply to female 
offenders.  
 
B. Unknown Numbers of Affected Dependent Children 
 
It is not known how many imprisoned women in Australia have dependent 
children. In its 2004 Report, the ABS identified that ‘67% of female prisoners were 
aged 18-35 years at June 2002’.26 The Report then posited that many of these 
women will have dependent children. It stated:  
This age distribution means that many women in prison have dependent 
children at the time of entering prison: around 60% of women in prison had 
children aged less than 16 years of age according to recent state surveys.27 
This statement in a report on ‘Women in Prison’ is illustrative of the paucity of 
information within Australia on this important social phenomenon. It is based 
upon an inference that women who are of child-bearing age are likely to have 
dependent children and then, the estimated numbers were sourced from state 
surveys.28 
 
In Australia, because of the limited data, it is common for surveys and projections 
to be the source of information. For example, in 2006 the Legislative Council 
Standing Committee on Law and Justice in its report on Community Based 
 
                                                          
24 This study looked at sentencing across local, district and supreme courts see Patrizia Poletti, 
‘Sentencing Female Offenders in New South Wales’ (Sentencing Trends No 20, Judicial Commission of 
New South Wales, May 2000). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, Australian Social Trends, Other Areas of Social Concern, Women 
in Prison 2004, cat. no. 4102.0, ABS, Canberra. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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Sentencing Options,29 cited figures from community based organisations (Uniting 
Care and Beyond Bars) when addressing the problems faced by female offenders.30 
The Report stated, ‘around 60% of women in prison are parents, with 30-40% 
being sole carers.’31 Research literature from the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and the 
USA has reported that generally 65% to 80% of incarcerated female offenders have 
dependent children.32 The spread of these figures suggests a wide margin of error 
in the estimates. 
 
Ann Farrell has predicted that the percentage of incarcerated women in Australia 
with dependent children is actually closer to 85%;33 drawing upon data from a 
Queensland combined community agencies report (1990) and the New South 
Wales Women’s Action Plan (1994).34 Patricia Easteal also accepts the 85% figure 
for imprisoned women with dependent children (in Victoria, New South Wales and 
Queensland).35 The most recent figures available on women serving a term of 
imprisonment in Australia are set out in the ABS Publication ‘Prisoners in 
Australia, 2017’.36  On 30 June 2017 there were 3, 299 women serving a term of 
imprisonment within an Australian prison.37 This would mean that 1, 979 – 2, 804 
 
                                                          
29 Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Parliament of New South Wales, 
Community Based Sentencing Options for Rural and Remote Areas and Disadvantaged Populations, 
Report 30 (2006). 
30 Ibid 57-59. 
31 Ibid 58. 
32United Kingdom: Vanessa Munro, ‘From Mothering Behind Bars to Parenting Beyond Barriers? The 
Right of Family Life and the Politics of Imprisonment’ (2007) 69 Amicus Curiae 6, 6; Belinda Brooks-
Gordon and Andrew Bainham, 'Prisoners' Families and the Regulation of Contact' (2004) 26(3) Journal of 
Social Welfare and Family Law 263, 264; Helen Codd, In the Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment 
and Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, 2008) 61-62. 
United States of America: Renny Golden, War on the Family: Mothers in Prison and the Families They 
Leave Behind (Routledge, 2005) 1; Karen Casey-Acevedo, Tim Bakken and Adria Karle, 'Children 
Visiting Mothers in Prison: The Effects on Mothers' Behaviour and Disciplinary Adjustment' (2004) 37 
The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 418, 418; Merry Morash, Timothy Bynum, and 
Barbara Koons, ‘Women Offenders: Programming Needs and Promising Approaches’ (Research In Brief, 
US Department of Justice National Institute of Justice, August 1998) 1; Brenda McGowan and Karen 
Blumenthal, ‘Children of Women Prisoner: A Forgotten Minority’ in Laura Crites (ed), The Female 
Offender (Lexington Books, 1978) 121, 125; Susan Sharp and Susan Marcus-Mendoza, ‘It’s a Family 
Affair: Incarcerated Women and Their Families’ (2001) 12(4) Women & Criminal Justice 21, 29; Barbara 
Myers, et al, ‘Children of Incarcerated Mothers’ (1999) 8(1) Journal of Child and Family Studies 11, 12. 
33 Ann Farrell, ‘Mothers Offending Against Their Role: An Australian Experience’ (1998) 9(4) Women & 
Criminal Justice 47, 56. Cf. Sheehan estimates it at closer to 75%, see Rosemary, Sheehan, ‘Parental 
Imprisonment and Child Protection: A Study of Children Presented to the Melbourne Children’s Court’ 
(2010) 63(2) Australian Social Work 164, 165. 
34 See New South Wales Department of Corrective Services, Women’s Action Plan Report (Planning 
Unit, 1994). 
35 Patricia Easteal, Less than Equal: Women and the Australian Legal System (Butterworths, 2001) 90. 
36 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017, Prisoners in Australia, 2017, cat. no. 4517.0, ABS, Canberra. 
37 Ibid. 
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of these female incarcerated prisoners were likely to have dependent children. 
Dennison estimates that ‘5 per cent of non-Indigenous and 20 per cent of 
Indigenous children would experience parental imprisonment in their lifetime.’38 
This is a serious social issue for Australia. 
 
C. Impact of Parental Incarceration upon Offender’s Children 
 
The limited available data also have ramifications for understanding and 
appropriately addressing the impact of parental incarceration. For example, it is 
not known where children are housed prior to and for the duration of the primary 
care giver’s sentence. In 2012, the New South Wales Department of Family and 
Community Services reported that:  
… the children of male prisoners are most likely to be cared for by their mother 
(84 percent). By contrast, only 28 percent of children of female prisoners are 
likely to be cared for by their father while their mother is in prison. A greater 
percentage is cared for by grandparents (34 percent), and 12 percent are cared 
for by other relatives.39 
Other Australian research literature also suggests that where the mother is the 
primary caregiver of dependent children the children are likely to be displaced 
from the family home by her incarceration.40 Whereas when the father of 
dependent children is incarcerated, the children are likely to remain in the family 
home and be cared for by their mother.41  
 
                                                          
38 Predicted figures based on Quilty’s et al research and Dennison et al’s research, see Susan Dennison, 
Anna Stewart and Kate Freiberg, ‘A Prevalence Study of Children with Imprisoned Fathers: Annual and 
Lifetime Estimates’ (2013) 48(3) Australian Journal of Social Issues 339, 354; Simon Quilty et al, 
‘Children of Prisoners: A Growing Public Health Problem’ (2004) 28(4) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Public Health 339. 
39 NSW Government, 4.2 Women in Prison (2012) Family & Community Services Women NSW < 
http://www.women.nsw.gov.au/women_in_nsw/current_report/safety_and_access_to_justice/topic_4_off
ending/4.2_women_in_prison>. 
40 See Maureen Miner and Angela Gorta, Changing Conditions in a Women's Prison 1972-1984, 
Research Publication No 11 (NSW Department of Corrective Services, 1986) 25; Legislative Council 
Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, A Report into Children of 
Imprisoned Parents, Report No 12 (1997) 98; Ann Farrell, ‘Mothers Offending Against Their Role: An 
Australian Experience’ (1998) 9(4) Women & Criminal Justice 47, 59, 62; Karen Casey-Acevedo, Tim 
Bakken and Adria Karle, 'Children Visiting Mothers in Prison: The Effects on Mothers' Behaviour and 
Disciplinary Adjustment' (2004) 37 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 418, 423; 
Legislative Assembly Standing Committee on Community Services and Social Equity, Parliament of the 
Australian Capital Territory, The Forgotten Victims of Crime: Families of Offenders and their Silent 
Sentence, Report 6 (2004) 38-39.  
41 See also Susan Dennison, Anna Stewart and Kate Freiberg, ‘A Prevalence Study of Children with 
Imprisoned Fathers: Annual and Lifetime Estimates’ (2013) 48(3) Australian Journal of Social Issues 
339, 350-351. 
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Research literature in the UK and the USA has reported similar findings. For 
example, research from the US Department of Justice has found that children of a 
female offender were living with the other parent (post the mother’s 
imprisonment) in only 25% of matters, compared with children of male offenders 
who lived with their mother in 90% of matters (post the father’s incarceration).42  
In the UK, the Corston Report stated ‘only 9% of children are cared for by their 
fathers while their mothers are in prison …  80% of women in prison lose the 
support of their partner while in prison.’43 Therefore, there is a gendered 
dimension to the imprisonment of women and the impact upon children.  
 
Rising female incarceration rates have resulted in greater interest in the impact of 
parental imprisonment upon children in the fields of criminology, sociology, 
psychology and public health.44 However, there is currently no research (in 
Australia, nor internationally) that can ‘confirm [a] direct influence of parental 
imprisonment on [a] child (emphasis added)’ 45.  There are patterns in the data 
 
                                                          
42 Merry Morash, Timothy Bynum, and Barbara Koons, ‘Women Offenders: Programming Needs and 
Promising Approaches’ (Research in Brief, US Department of Justice National Institute of Justice, August 
1998) 1. See also Christopher Mumola, ‘Incarcerated Parents and their Children’ (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Special Report, US Department of Justice National Office of Justice Programs, August 2000) 1; 
Renny Golden, War on the Family: Mothers in Prison and the Families They Leave Behind (Routledge, 
2005) 34-44. 
43 Baroness Jean Corston, The Corston Report: A Report by Baroness Jean Corston of a Review of 
Women with Particular Vulnerabilities in the Criminal Justice System (Home Office, 2007) 20. See also 
Liza Catan, ‘Infants with Mothers in Prison’ in Roger Shaw (ed), Prisoner’s Children: What Are the 
Issues (Routledge, 1992) 13; Jane Woodrow, ‘Mothers Inside, Children Outside: What Happens To The 
Dependent Children of Female Inmates?’ in Roger Shaw (ed), Prisoner’s Children: What Are the Issues 
(Routledge, 1992) 29; Janet Walker, ‘Silent, Forgotten and Vulnerable: Examining the Risks for Children 
with a Parent in Prison’ (2007) 69 Amicus Curiae 10, 11; Vanessa Munro, 'The Emerging Rights of 
Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children' (2002) 14(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 303, 304; Helen 
Codd, In the Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment and Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, 2008) 
19-20, 120-121, 124. 
44 Susan Sharp and Susan Marcus-Mendoza, ‘It’s a Family Affair: Incarcerated Women and Their 
Families’ (2001) 12(4) Women & Criminal Justice 21, 22; John Hagan and Holly Forster, ‘Children of the 
American Prison Generation: Student and School Spillover Effects of Incarcerating Mothers’ (2012) 
46(1) Law & Society Review 37, 38; Pat Carlen and Anne Worrall, Analysing Women's Imprisonment 
(Willan Publishing, 2004) ix-x. 
Australia: Kirsten Besemer and Susan Dennison, ‘Social Exclusion in Families Affected by Paternal 
Imprisonment’ (2018) 5(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 221; Ann Farrell, 
‘Mothers Offending Against Their Role: An Australian Experience’ (1998) 9(4) Women & Criminal 
Justice 47; Rosemary Sheehan, ‘Parental Imprisonment and Child Protection: A Study of Children 
Presented to the Melbourne Children’s Court’ (2010) 63(2) Australian Social Work 164; Simon Quilty et 
al, ‘Children of Prisoners: A Growing Public Health Problem’ (2004) 28(4) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Public Health 339. 
45 Stefan Suhling and Werner Greve, 'The consequences of legal punishment' in ME Oswald, S Bieneck 
and J Hupfeld-Heinemann (eds), Social Psychology of Punishment of Crime (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 
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which support common difficulties experienced by these children and causal links 
with the incarceration of a primary caregiver. For example, financial hardship is 
widely identified in the research literature as a consequence of the imprisonment 
of a parent.46 Behavioural difficulties in children are another widely-recognised 
risk factor when a child’s primary caregiver is imprisoned.47   
 
Stefen Shuling and Werner Greve have reviewed the psychological research and 
identified a list of documented impacts of parental imprisonment upon children.48  
Their analysis identified that economic problems within the family unit and 
behavioural problem in children were accepted and well-known consequences of 
parental imprisonment. Other identifiable impacts in the literature included: 
 
                                                          
405, 420. See also Helen Codd, In the Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment and Criminal Justice 
(Willan Publishing, 2008) 62-65; Barbara Myers, et al, ‘Children of Incarcerated Mothers’ (1999) 8(1) 
Journal of Child and Family Studies 11, 20; Danielle Dallaire, ‘Incarcerated Mothers and Fathers: A 
Comparison of Risks for Children and Families’ (2007) 56(5) Family Relations 440, 440; Joseph Murray 
and David Farrington, ‘The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children’ (2008) 37 Crime & Justice 
133, 134-135. 
46 See, eg, Stefan Suhling and Werner Greve, 'The consequences of legal punishment' in ME Oswald, S 
Bieneck and J Hupfeld-Heinemann (eds), Social Psychology of Punishment of Crime (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009) 405, 418; Johnna Christian and Leslie Kennedy, ‘Secondary narratives in the aftermath of crime: 
Defining family members’ relationships with prisoners’ (2011) 13(4) Punishment & Society 379, 398; 
Gloria Larman and Ann Aungles, 'Children of Prisoners and their Outside Carers: The Invisible 
Population' (Paper presented at the Women and the Law, Canberra, 24-26 September 1991); Legislative 
Assembly Standing Committee on Community Services and Social Equity, Parliament of the Australian 
Capital Territory, The Forgotten Victims of Crime: Families of Offenders and their Silent Sentence, 
Report 6 (2004) 11; Susan Sharp and Susan Marcus-Mendoza, ‘It’s a Family Affair: Incarcerated Women 
and Their Families’ (2001) 12(4) Women & Criminal Justice 21, 25, 31-34; Myers, Barbara, et al, 
‘Children of Incarcerated Mothers’ (1999) 8(1) Journal of Child and Family Studies 11, 11. 
47 See, eg, Johnna Christian and Leslie Kennedy, ‘Secondary narratives in the aftermath of crime: 
Defining family members’ relationships with prisoners’ (2011) 13(4) Punishment & Society 379, 398; 
Stefan Suhling and Werner Greve, 'The consequences of legal punishment' in ME Oswald, S Bieneck and 
J Hupfeld-Heinemann (eds), Social Psychology of Punishment of Crime (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 405, 
418; Ann Cunningham, ‘Forgotten Families: The Impacts of Imprisonment’ (2001) 59 Family Matters 35, 
37; Rosemary Sheehan, ‘Parental Imprisonment and Child Protection: A Study of Children Presented to 
the Melbourne Children’s Court’ (2010) 63(2) Australian Social Work 164, 172-174; Brenda McGowan 
and Karen Blumenthal, ‘Children of Women Prisoner: A Forgotten Minority’ in Laura Crites (ed), The 
Female Offender (Lexington Books, 1978) 121, 127; Susan Dennison, Anna Stewart and Kate Freiberg, 
‘A Prevalence Study of Children with Imprisoned Fathers: Annual and Lifetime Estimates’ (2013) 48(3) 
Australian Journal of Social Issues 339, 340; Rebecca Wallis and Susan Dennison, ‘Out of the Shadows: 
Republican Criminology and the Children of Prisoners’ (2015) 32 Law in Context: A Socio-Legal Journal 
86, 93; Legislative Assembly Standing Committee on Community Services and Social Equity, Parliament 
of the Australian Capital Territory, The Forgotten Victims of Crime: Families of Offenders and their 
Silent Sentence, Report 6 (2004) 12; Susan Sharp and Susan Marcus-Mendoza, ‘It’s a Family Affair: 
Incarcerated Women and Their Families’ (2001) 12(4) Women & Criminal Justice 21, 25, 39-42. 
48 Stefan Suhling and Werner Greve, 'The consequences of legal punishment' in ME Oswald, S Bieneck 
and J Hupfeld-Heinemann (eds), Social Psychology of Punishment of Crime (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 
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 health problems both mental and physical (ie. post-traumatic stress 
disorder);49 
 displacement and instability;50  
 educational failures;51 
 older children assuming parental responsibilities (ie. child rearing, 
employment);52 
 less support and supervision in the family unit and missing role models;53 
 a turning point in life for these children that may lead to other negative 
consequences (ie. criminal activity) and lead to a less happy life.54 
 
These significant societal impacts are widely supported by the research literature; 
they are a potential justification to take these matters into account at sentencing. 
They are also the types of impact that might be expected to be reported in the 
cases raising family hardship as a mitigating factor. 
 
D. Family Hardship as a Mitigating Sentencing Factor 
 
As this dissertation reveals sentencing courts have found it appropriate to take 
into account the impact of an offender’s sentence upon their dependents. This 
mitigating factor in sentencing has been described as ‘family hardship’.  In some 
Australian jurisdictions, family hardship has even been recognised in sentencing 
legislation. It is a gender-neutral sentencing factor under both statute and common 
law constructions; it is potentially applicable to male or female offenders. 
However, as this dissertation will highlight it is a highly-gendered sentencing 
factor in its application and acceptance. 
 
This dissertation is the first comprehensive Australian study of ‘family hardship’ 
and its operation as a mitigating factor in sentencing throughout Australia. It will 
 
                                                          
49 Stefan Suhling and Werner Greve, 'The consequences of legal punishment' in ME Oswald, S Bieneck 
and J Hupfeld-Heinemann (eds), Social Psychology of Punishment of Crime (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 
405, 418-419. 
50 Ibid 419. 
51 Ibid 418. 
52 Ibid 419. 
53 Ibid 418. 
54 Ibid. 
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identify Australian sentencing principles and Australian sentencing practices that 
have emerged in respect to this factor. It will explain that legal scholars need to 
become more versed in sentencing jurisprudence, the role of sentencing factors 
and study of sentencing principles.  
 
 
II BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
 
In 2007, I was lead researcher at the National Judicial College of Australia on the 
development of the Commonwealth Sentencing Database (‘CSD’). 55 This work was 
the impetus for this dissertation research. My role at the National Judicial College 
of Australia (‘NJCA’) was to develop a concise online text for judicial officers and 
practitioners on the federal legislative provisions set out in pt 1B of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth). This text makes up the ‘Principles and Practice’ component of the 
CSD.56  
 
A. The Commonwealth Sentencing Database 
 
The ‘Principles and Practice’ component of the CSD accompanies the other part of 
the database which is the ‘Statistics’ component. The Statistics component is 
maintained by the NSW Judicial Commission and is the publication of federal 
statistics, provided by the Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (‘CDPP’), on federal sentencing outcomes. The purpose of the 
‘Principles and Practice’ component of the CSD is to promote federal sentencing 
 
                                                          
55 The Federal Government of Australia funds this sentencing information system. The Commonwealth 
Sentencing Database is housed on the website for the National Judicial College of Australia at 
http://njca.com.au/sentencing/. 
56 There are two components to the CSD. The first component is the ‘principles and practice’ developed 
by the National Judicial College of Australia (with support from the ANU College of Law) and is 
maintained and updated by the National Judicial College of Australia. The second component of the CSD 
is the federal sentencing statistics. The office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and 
the Judicial Commission of New South Wales develops the statistics component. The office of the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions provide the data and the Judicial Commission of New 
South Wales provide the software, technological expertise in presenting the statistics and they also 
maintain the statistics component of the CSD. 
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law.57 This component describes the federal provisions and draws attention to 
unique features of the federal sentencing regime. 
 
The CSD project and funding arose because of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (‘ALRC’) inquiry into federal sentencing and the publication of the 
Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders (‘Same Crime, Same 
Time’).58 The ALRC expressly noted that a significant problem it faced in 
conducting its inquiry (2004-2006) was a lack of public information and data on 
federal sentencing.59 This included a lack of academic research into federal 
sentencing laws and practice.60 The establishment of a ‘publicly accessible’61 
resource on federal sentencing law developed by the NJCA was one of the 
recommendations in the ALRC’s Same Crime, Same Time Report (Recommendation 
19-5).62  
 
The CSD was therefore one of the first steps taken in Australia to begin to address 
a lack of resources in the field of federal sentencing. The CSD was developed by the 
NJCA, CDPP and the New South Wales Judicial Commission.63 It has been wholly 
funded by the Commonwealth Government and is currently operating under a 
short-term grant from the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department. 
 
B. Inconsistencies in Federal Sentencing 
 
Inconsistent treatment of federal offenders throughout Australia is a long-standing 
problem which has been recognised by the Government.64 One of the principal 
 
                                                          
57 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No 103 (2006) 47. 
58 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No 103 (2006). 
59 Ibid 14. 
60 The ALRC had to commission its own reports. See, eg, the study carried out by the Australian Institute 
of Criminology, ‘An Analysis of Federal Fraud and Drug Cases, 2000–2004’ in ALRC, Same Crime, 
Same Time, Report No. 103 (2006) Appendix 2, 801.   
61 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No 103 (2006) 48 (Recommendation 19-5).  
62 Ibid 48. 
63 The role each body played is explained in footnote 45 above. 
64 See Philip Ruddock, ‘Terms of Reference Review of Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914’ in Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No 103 (2006) 
9-10; Peter Drew Durack, ‘Terms of Reference’ in Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal 
Offenders, Interim Report, Report No 15 (1980) xvii. 
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aims of the CSD was to promote consistency in the sentencing of federal offenders 
by providing greater guidance to judicial officers on federal sentencing laws, 
principles and practice.65 The ‘Principles and Practice’ component aids in this 
process by providing judicial officers and practitioners with quick links to relevant 
case law. This component also identifies, via academic commentary, developing 
principles, established federal sentencing practices and inconsistent federal 
sentencing practices across Australia.  
 
Inconsistent practices in federal sentencing had also been recognised as a problem 
by the judiciary. In 2001, in Wong v The Queen (‘Wong’),66 Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ identified that to achieve consistency in federal sentencing throughout 
Australia, all courts sentencing federal offenders needed to ensure that they 
applied the federal sentencing provisions in pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).67 
Judicial officers giving effect to the legislative command of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth) sounds uncomplicated, but, it had proved to be challenging in practice. One 
reason for this was that federal sentencing law in Australia was still in its infancy.68  
 
1. The Emergence of a Federal Sentencing System 
In the keynote address to the Federal Crime and Sentencing Conference 2011, 
Justice Weinberg,69 who was the Director of Public Prosecutions for the 
Commonwealth at the time pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was introduced in 
1990,70 reflected on his experiences. He stated: 
It is a curious feature of our federal system, that for the first 90 years after 
federation, it was never thought necessary to develop any separate body of 
federal sentencing law. That all changed on 17 July 1990, when Pt 1B of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) came into force. Before that date, all federal offenders 
were sentenced in accordance with the law that applied in the particular state 
or territory where their offences were committed. Given that there existed 
almost no state or territory sentencing legislation of general application, or 
indeed of any real importance, federal offenders were, for the most part, 
 
                                                          
65 See, for e.g., National Judicial College of Australia, User Guide (23 October 2013) Commonwealth 
Sentencing Database <http://njca.com.au/sentencing/principals-practice/user-guide/>. A deeper 
discussion of the concept of consistency in sentencing will occur in Chapter Two. 
66 (2001) 207 CLR 584. 
67 Wong (2001) 207 CLR 584, 609-610. 
68 This claim is justified in the proceeding paragraphs and is discussed further in Chapter Two. 
69 Judge of the Victorian Court of Appeal. 
70 In his keynote address, Weinberg J stated, ‘I remember the events leading up to the introduction of Pt 
1B quite well. I happened to be the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions at the time.’ See 
Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Labyrinthine Nature of Federal Sentencing’ (Keynote address presented at 
Federal Crime and Sentencing Conference 2011, Canberra, 11 February 2011). 
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sentenced in accordance with the common law principles that governed 
sentencing in that particular locale.71 
There are two aspects to Weinberg J’s comments (above) that deserve greater 
consideration. First, a separate body of federal sentencing law emerged in 
Australia only in 1990. Second, there have been localised differences in sentencing 
practices. The Australian federal sentencing regime is a little over twenty-five 
years old. Prior to the introduction of pt 1B, judicial officers applied the law in the 
state or territory in which the offender was being sentenced.72 These early 
sentencing processes of drawing upon common law and local sentencing practices 
are firmly entrenched within Australia.  
 
In conducting my research of the case law for the CSD it was not uncommon to find 
sentencing courts post 1990 relying on state and territory sentencing provisions in 
the sentencing of federal offenders in apparent naivety to the existence of a 
separate and distinct body of federal sentencing provisions. A lack of attention to 
federal sentencing law is one of the of the key explanations behind inconsistencies 
in federal sentencing. Another reason why the consistent application of the law in 
pt 1B had proved challenging was because of the complexity of its provisions. 
Justice Weinberg also identified this problem in his keynote address on federal 
sentencing in Australia. He stated: 
Most judges that I have spoken to, and almost every barrister who practices in 
the criminal law, has at some point been highly critical of the drafting of Pt 1B. 
The provisions contained therein are complex, and unnecessarily so. A number 
of them are also internally inconsistent. 
Even normally mild-mannered judges have been known to fly into fits of 
incandescent rage when required to sentence offenders under this sentencing 
regime. Some examples will suffice. 
In R v Paull, [(1990) 20 NSWLR 427] Hunt J first attacked the very notion of 
codifying73 sentencing principles. His Honour then went on to say of Pt 1B: 
 It is to be hoped that the Federal Parliament will quickly come to 
 realise the difficulties caused by this unnecessarily complicated and 
 opaque legislation and that it will give urgent reconsideration to its 
 provisions. At the present time, the question of sentence will take 
 
                                                          
71 Ibid. 
72 See, eg, R v Paull (1990) 20 NSWLR 427, 429 (Hunt J). 
73 The use of the term ‘codifying’ in these judicial comments is used in a colloquial sense. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the federal sentencing provisions have not been codified in the true sense. 
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 longer to deal with in the average trial than the question of guilt 
 itself. 74 
The widespread criticism of pt 1B by the profession has also been emphasised by 
the ALRC in Same Crime, Same Time.75  
 
Consistency in federal sentencing is also difficult to achieve across Australia 
because of a lack of proficiency in federal sentencing. An opportunity to develop 
expertise in this area has been limited for judicial officers as historically there 
were a very small number of federal offenders that came before state or territory 
courts.76 Even today, after the landscape of federal sentencing has changed due to a 
rapid expansion of federal offences,77 judicial officers are still predominantly 
engaged in the application of their local sentencing regime to offenders convicted 
under local (ie. state or territory) laws. Therefore, very few judicial officers in 
Australia are experienced at federal sentencing. Specialised lists for federal 
offences, for example, have only begun to emerge in some of the larger 
jurisdictions.78 Overall, throughout Australia, knowledge and expertise in the field 
of federal sentencing is still emerging.  
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IB of the Crimes Act 1914’ in Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing 
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2. The Importance of the CDPP 
The CDPP is the body prosecuting federal offences around Australia and it is the 
single biggest resource on federal sentencing law and practice.79 Prior to the 
implementation of the CSD, the statistics and data on federal sentencing that this 
body collected was kept in-house. The CSD captures the CDPP’s statistics on 
federal sentencing enabling judicial officers and legal practitioners’ access to data 
on federal sentencing outcomes across Australia. The CDPP also share resources 
on federal sentencing with the NJCA. 
 
The statistics component of the CSD and the availability of quantitative data on 
federal sentencing enabling users to access a ‘pattern of sentences imposed by 
courts’80 for federal criminal offences is a significant development in this field.81 
Comparisons of federal sentencing outcomes can now be made using the federal 
sentencing statistics. However, due to differences in individual cases, to assess 
whether there is consistency in federal sentencing and in the application of federal 
sentencing principles, systematic qualitative studies of the federal sentencing 
provisions and their application by state and territory courts are still required. 
 
 
III THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As described above, the research topic for this dissertation was identified and 
arose out my work on the CSD. I was particularly interested in the sentencing 
principles that applied to federal sentencing. Research for the CSD involved 
examination of the federal sentencing provisions set out in pt 1B of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth). Within pt 1B is s16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Section 16A(2) 
contains a list of sentencing matters ‘the court must take into account… as are 
 
                                                          
79 This point is discussed further in Chapter Two. 
80 Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Statistics, Judicial Information Research System 
http://jirs.judcom.nsw.gov.au/menus/pens.php. The federal statistics are maintained by the Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales see http://njca.com.au/sentencing/statistics/. 
81 But see recent statements from the High Court of Australia on the role and usefulness of statistics: Hili 
v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 535 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); R v 
Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550, 559 and 561(French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ) and 565 (Bell and Gageler JJ). 
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relevant and known to the court’.82 Contained within this provision were 
conventional sentencing matters that one would expect to find located within such 
a provision. For example, the first listed matter under s 16A(2) was ‘the nature and 
circumstances of the offence’.83 Other listed matters included the fact that the 
offender has entered a guilty plea,84 the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation,85 
and a number of matters relevant to the offender such as ‘character, antecedents, 
age, means, physical or mental condition’.86  
 
Listed in s 16A(2) at paragraph (p) was a sentencing matter that had not received 
much scholarly attention. Section 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) listed: 
the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have 
on any of the person’s family or dependants.87  
This federal section provided unqualified recognition of hardship to third parties 
as a sentencing factor for consideration in federal sentencing. In developing the 
commentary for the CSD, I found that some courts saw s 16A(2)(p) as a ‘novel’ 
sentencing matter.88 I discovered that both ‘on the record’ (in the form of judicial 
dicta) and ‘off the record’ (in informal conversations) judicial officers were 
hesitant about the legitimacy of this matter as a sentencing factor despite its 
appearance as a listed legislative sentencing factor.  
 
Despite the apparent legislative intent to give prominence to this matter in federal 
sentencing,89 the courts have read down paragraph (p) so that it did not expand 
upon what was said to be the existing common law doctrine of family hardship.90 
Therefore, a court could consider the potential impact of the sentence upon a 
federal offender’s family or dependants only where ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
had been established.91 The result was that family hardship was seen as a matter 
 
                                                          
82 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2). 
83 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(a). 
84 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(g). 
85 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(n). 
86 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(m). 
87 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p) 
88 See, eg, El Karhani (1990) 51 A Crim R 123, 135. 
89 How this matter came to be listed in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) is examined in Chapter Three. 
90 The traditional common law practice will be examined in Chapter Three. Judicial practices throughout 
Australia will be set out in Chapters Four and Five. 
91 See, eg, R v Togias [2001] 127 A Crim R 23; R v Carmody (1998) 100 A Crim R 41; R v Matthews 
(1996) 130 FLR 230; R v Sinclair (1990) 51 A Crim R 418. 
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that would rarely be taken into account as a mitigating factor. While this was the 
end of my research in terms of the commentary for the CSD it was the beginning of 
my research into this controversial sentencing factor.  
 
A. Literature Review: Identification of the Problem 
 
In one of the earliest Australian legislative catalogues of sentencing factors, 
‘character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the person charged’92 
were listed. These factors are archetypal examples of widely accepted mitigating 
sentencing factors and today they routinely appear in legislative lists of sentencing 
considerations and in jurisprudence on sentencing factors. Unlike these sentencing 
factors, family hardship (ie. the potential impact of a sentence upon an offender’s 
dependants) has an unstable history and it has not consistently been recognised as 
a mitigating sentencing factor in the research literature.  
 
This dissertation will draw attention to the fact that the impact of a sentence upon 
an offender’s dependants is not a modern, nor rare, sentencing consideration 
within the common law legal system. Family hardship and the impact of a sentence 
upon innocent others is something the criminal justice system has accommodated 
in a variety of practices.93 This dissertation maintains that family hardship is a 
valid sentencing factor and that historically judicial officers have had a practice of 
taking family hardship into consideration when passing sentence.  A weakness of 
mainstream discourse has been the marginalisation of such sentencing practice, 
and in some cases the mere ignorance of family hardship as a sentencing factor.  
 
This dissertation will suggest that one of the reasons behind the marginalisation of 
family hardship is that sentencing models, such as ‘just deserts’,94 have constructed 
a framework that does not recognise hardship to anyone other than the offender 
and does not favour recognition of potential future harm.  Australian criminal law 
professor David Brown has described this phenomenon stating: 
 
                                                          
92 Offenders Probation Act 1913-1963 (SA) s 4(1). 
93 See Chapter Three. 
94 Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and J Roberts (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on 
Theory and Policy (Hart Publishing, 3rd ed, 2009) 102-109. 
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…just deserts sentencing policies attempt to restrict the issues to those of 
culpability and prior record there is little recognition that punishment does not 
only affect the offender.95  
It is important to remember that such theories or sentencing frameworks are not 
ahistorical. They are also normative constructions of the system.96 In light of the 
current rates of imprisonment and rising rates in female imprisonment, it is 
essential that more attention is paid to family hardship as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing. 
 
Within the discipline of sentencing there has actually been little scholarly attention 
given to aggravating and mitigating factors. Taking into account sentencing factors 
is an essential part of the process of determining an appropriate sentence. In both 
Australia and overseas, this role has been significantly under-researched.97 A 
leading scholar of sentencing in the UK, Andrew von Hirsch observed that, in 
common law legal systems: 
… curiously, little attention has been paid to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances affecting the sentence.98  
He noted further, that ‘[s]entencing theorists and scholars have… been… neglectful 
of the subject’,99 with ‘the first major book devoted to the topic’100 only published 
in 2011.101 Ashworth has observed that aggravating and mitigating factors have 
 
                                                          
95 David Brown et al, Criminal Laws Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New 
South Wales (The Federation Press, 5th ed, 2011) 1105. 
96 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2017) 
8-32. 
97 See, eg, Julian Roberts, 'Aggravating and Mitigating Factors at Sentencing: Towards Greater 
Consistency of Application' (2008) 4 Criminal Law Review 264, 265; Julian Roberts ‘Punishing, More or 
Less: Exploring Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing’ in Julian Roberts (ed), Mitigation and 
Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1,1; Austin Lovegrove, ‘Putting the 
Offender Back into Sentencing: An Empirical Study of the Public’s Understanding of Personal 
Mitigation’ (2011) 11 Criminology and Criminal Justice 37, 38; Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough, 
Mitigation: The Role of Personal Factors in Sentencing (Prison Reform Trust, 2007) 1; Jessica Jacobson 
and Mike Hough, ‘Personal Mitigation: An Empirical Analysis in England and Wales’ in Julian Roberts 
(ed), Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 146, 146; Joanna 
Shapland, ‘Personal Mitigation and Assumptions about Offending and Desistance’ in Julian Roberts (ed), 
Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 60, 60, 62; Andrew 
Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2005) 151; Andrew 
Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 163; Mirko 
Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2016) 462. 
98 Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Foreward’ in Julian Roberts (ed), Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) xiii, xiii. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 This book was Julian Roberts (ed), Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
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‘often been thought to be uncomplicated and uncontroversial’.102 This dissertation 
highlights that this mainstream view of sentencing factors is not accurate. 
 
Julian Roberts, the editor of the first text devoted to sentencing factors, said that 
one of the reasons for a lack of attention to these factors is that aggravating factors 
and mitigating factors are often taken for granted by the public and the legal 
profession.103 Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough’s research has found that there 
have been only a few empirical studies that have focused on the role of mitigating 
factors in sentencing.104 Jacobson and Hough identified studies by Shapland; Flood-
Page and Mackie; Hedderman and Gelsthorpe; and Parker et al.105 Their own work 
can now be added to this list106 and the pioneering work of David Thomas107 (in 
the 1970s) should be included.  
 
In part due to this lack of scholarly attention, there is no well-defined explanation 
of what a sentencing factor is. Australian sentencing scholar, Kate Warner has 
observed that ‘general considerations’108 at sentencing were traditionally 
categorised as ‘mitigating’ or ‘aggravating’ but that court practice was 
unsystematic and contradictory.109 As their name implies, aggravating factors and 
mitigating factors are simply ‘circumstances that may justify imposition of a 
harsher or more lenient sentence.’110 Moreover, under the common law hundreds 
 
                                                          
102 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 163. 
103 Julian Roberts ‘Punishing, More or Less: Exploring Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing’ in 
Julian Roberts (ed), Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1,1. 
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Freiberg’s Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2014) 219-222. 
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of aggravating and mitigating factors have been identified in the research 
literature.111  
 
In the most recent edition of Fox & Freiberg’s Sentencing,112 Arie Freiberg has taken 
an expansive consideration of sentencing factors.113 Freiberg has observed: 
Historically, these factors have been regarded as matters of “common sense”, as 
Brooking JA explained: 
Long before the Sentencing Act rose above the horizon judges drew on 
their common sense and their moral sense, as representing that of the 
community, in deciding what things about a crime could be said to make 
it more or less serious. They still do; nothing in the Act stops them doing 
this. Common sense and moral sense… are and must ever be the 
essential foundation of sentencing principles and practices…114 
Importantly, Freiberg has observed that sentencing factors encompass 
considerations of harm caused by the offence, culpability of the offender and 
‘pragmatic reasons’ which have a bearing upon the operation of the criminal 
justice system.115 
 
1. Denial of family hardship 
A review of the field shows that the denial of family hardship as a sentencing factor 
is not uncommon in the research literature. For example, Richard Volger, a legal 
contributor to one of the leading texts on the impact of punishment on offenders’ 
families, opined: 
Historically, the parents of children have been given no special treatment by 
sentencing courts… At best, the impact of a sentence on a child of the defendant 
is a peripheral consideration. It is a ‘matter of mercy’ (Laurie, [1980]) within 
the discretion of the court, but to be exercised only in extreme cases.116  
 
                                                          
111 See, eg, Joanna Shapland, Between Conviction and Sentence: The Process of Mitigation (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981) 55.  
112 Arie Freiberg, Fox & Freiberg’s Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Thomson Reuters, 3rd 
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113 Ibid 219-224. 
114 Ibid 222. 
115 Ibid 223. 
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In his commentary, he reviewed several cases from the UK (such as Ingham117, R v 
Haleth118 and R v Vaughan119) and found that: 
In all cases it is apparent that issues of deterrence and retribution outweigh all 
other considerations. Since the children are not party to the proceedings, may 
well not appear at court, and feature only in the small print of social enquiry 
reports, their future and welfare assume an insignificant role in sentencing 
policy.120 
Volger contended in his piece that family hardship has played an insignificant role 
in sentencing.  
 
(a) Hardship to third parties 
There is a deep-rooted claim in the literature that hardship to third parties falls 
outside of appropriate sentencing considerations. Volger draws attention to family 
members not being party to proceedings in his commentary. Furthermore, the 
influential just deserts sentencing discourse121 has endorsed a narrow focus of 
judicial attention in sentencing to matters related to the offender or the offence. 
The argument that family hardship falls outside the scope of ‘legitimate’ sentencing 
considerations will be discussed further in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
 
(b) An act of mercy not a mitigating factor 
Volger’s comments, set out above, also highlight another common justification for 
the rejection of family hardship as a sentencing factor. This is that family hardship 
is a merciful consideration (ie. an act of mercy) rather than a proper sentencing 
consideration.122 The relationship between family hardship and mercy is an 
important one and it will be explored further in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
 
2. Family Hardship as a Routine Sentencing Consideration 
A close review of the literature on sentencing and sentencing practices, however, 
reveals that other sources such as Judge Marvin Frankel’s well-known scathing 
 
                                                          
117 Cited in David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 211. 
118 (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 178. 
119 (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83. 
120 Ibid 104. 
121 See Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles 
(Oxford University Press, 2005) 1-7. 
122 See further Chapter Six. 
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comments on the scope of judicial discretion in the 1970s, stress that ‘family 
circumstances’ have been a routine consideration at sentencing.123 Judge Frankel 
stated: 
… guilty pleas, prior record, defendant’s age and family circumstances – are 
considered every day by sentencing judges, but in accordance with 
uncontrolled and divergent individual views of what is, after all, the “law” each 
time it applies. Every factor of this kind calls for a judgement of policy, suited 
exactly for legislative action and surely not suited for random variation from 
case to case.124 
While Frankel J’s point in this piece was that discretion leads to inconsistent 
sentencing, his comment inadvertently highlights the ‘every day’125 consideration 
of family circumstances in the act of passing sentence upon an offender. 
 
Empirical studies have also identified family hardship as a type of mitigation 
routinely considered by sentencing courts. For example, Jacobson and Hough’s 
study of personal mitigating factors in the UK identified that family hardship was a 
mitigating factor that courts ‘paid particular attention to’126 when sentencing.127 
While not convinced of the appropriateness of taking family hardship into account 
as a mitigating factor, Andrew Ashworth acknowledges its role as a mitigating 
factor in the United Kingdom’s ‘Court of Appeal’s precedents’.128 Loraine 
Gelsthorpe and Nancy Louck’s 1995 study (interviewing 200 magistrates in the 
UK) found that 80% of the magistrates interviewed believed primary 
responsibility for the care of children was a mitigating sentencing factor.129 
Gelsthorpe and Louck reported that the ‘powerfulness’ of family hardship ‘as a 
mitigating factor was unmistakable’.130 Looking beyond the research literature in 
the field of law, the presence of judicial consideration for family circumstances at 
 
                                                          
123 Marvin Frankel, ‘Lawlessness in Sentencing’ in Andreas von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian 
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sentencing has been identified in empirical studies in the fields of sociology, 
psychology and criminology. This research literature will be explored further in 
Chapter Six. 
 
B. The Research Questions 
 
My aim was to conduct a detailed study of the role of family hardship in Australian 
sentencing. Therefore, this dissertation examines the operation of a single 
mitigating factor in Australian sentencing. A detailed study of this nature had not 
been undertaken before in Australia. At the outset of this study my research 
questions were: 
a) How have courts historically dealt with family hardship under the common 
law?  
b) Was the listing of family hardship as a sentencing factor in legislation 
deliberate and intended to change judicial sentencing practice? 
c) Has legislative recognition of this factor affected judicial sentencing 
practice? 
d) What are the influential cases on family hardship in Australia and what 
influence have these had on sentencing principles or practice? 
e) Is there a consistent approach to family hardship under s16A(2)(p) of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) in the sentencing of federal offenders? 
 
C. Development of the Research Framework 
 
This dissertation presents a holistic picture of the role of family hardship in 
Australian sentencing. Influenced by my work on the CSD, the scope of my research 
was to identify and document, not only, the use and development of sentencing 
principles on family hardship within state and territory sentencing jurisprudence, 
but also, to understand emerging federal sentencing jurisprudence and the inter-
relationship between these frameworks. As this study has not been conducted 
before in Australia, this dissertation presents highly original research into family 
hardship as a mitigating factor.  
 
Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack have described that, ‘[s]entencing studies 
often rely on official statistics to compare sentencing outcomes across different 
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offence categories… This is a very large literature.’131 The sentencing research for 
this dissertation takes a different approach and focus. The methodology adopted 
by this dissertation is a multi-method approach.132 This study draws upon 
traditional doctrinal legal analysis, legal history research techniques and socio-
legal analysis.  
 
Doctrinal legal analysis is often employed by legal researchers but not frequently 
explained. Jan Smits describes: 
[i]t is suprising that, while the nature of comparative, economic and empirical 
research in law is widely discussed, this is not the case for doctrinal work. 
Although any jurist has some idea of what legal doctrine is about, it is more 
difficult to define it… It is probably best described as research that aims to give 
a systematic exposition of the principles, rules and concepts governing a 
particular legal field or institution and analyses the relationship between these 
principles, rules and concepts with a view to solving unclarities and gaps in 
existing law. This doctrinal approach is largely identical among the various 
subfields of the law.133 
This dissertation involves a systematic exposition of family hardship as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing. 
 
The research conducted for this dissertation seeks to address a gap in the field of 
research on sentencing principles in relation to family hardship as a sentencing 
factor. However, this dissertation addresses more than just what the law is in 
respect to taking into account an impact upon dependants at the sentencing stage. 
It is concerned with the reality of current sentencing practices. For example, with 
respect to the study of federal sentencing case law, it explores whether courts 
throughout Australia adopt a common approach to the sentencing of federal 
offenders. The method developed for the study of the case law in the Australian 
states and territories and study of the case law for courts sentencing federal 
offenders is explained below.  
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Another issue identified by the study is the problematic alignment of family 
hardship as a sentencing factor with gender bias. This point of tension is analysed 
via a socio-legal lens in Chapters Six drawing on the research literature in the fields 
of criminology, feminist legal research and legal philosophy. Therefore, my 
research observes and explains the derogations between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in 
action’.134  
 
In conducting the study of family hardship in Australia, the limitations of the 
primary resources (ie. the sentencing remarks and judgments) was an important 
consideration. Because of this contextual landscape, this study is not premised on 
the assumption135 that the weight attached to a discrete sentencing factor can be 
measured. In Australia, the ‘individualization of sentencing’136 continues to operate 
and, as will be explained further in Chapter Two, the instinctive synthesis 
approach to sentencing expressly acknowledges that sentencing factors rarely 
have measurable discrete properties. The process of arriving at an appropriate 
sentence is an intuitive ‘synthesis’137 of all relevant sentencing factors.138 
 
The study of the case law could not address research questions such as: 
 How much weight does family hardship carry in sentencing decisions? 
 How is family hardship generally balanced against other sentencing 
considerations? 
These questions are impossible to address for studies conducted only on 
sentencing remarks and judgments because judicial officers do not reveal, due to 
the instinctive synthesis method, how they have balanced particular sentencing 
factors against others. Nor does the study of the case law seek to track the relative 
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impact of family hardship, compared to other factors, upon the overall sentence 
imposed upon the offender. However, this study of the case law is premised on the 
position that acknowledgement of sentencing factors can be identified in cases. 
Further, it is argued that sentencing principles and practices in respect to 
individual sentencing factors can be analysed.  
 
As will be seen in Chapters Four and Five, in the consideration of family hardship’s 
place within sentencing, courts have frequently imposed various requirements 
based around a threshold test of ‘exceptional circumstances’. Whilst this 
dissertation looks at the role of exceptional circumstances in the treatment of 
family hardship within sentencing, it is not an analysis of the types of matters 
courts have found to be ‘exceptional’. Nor does this dissertation engage in a 
detailed discussion of what the courts across Australia have considered to be 
‘exceptional circumstances’.139 
 
Additional limitations of the primary materials were that a study of the sentencing 
remarks and judgments do not reveal whether family hardship was, in fact, raised 
before the court in a plea of mitigation. For example, when it has been raised 
before the court and considered by a judicial officer, this may not always be 
recorded within sentencing remarks. The evidence put before a court in respect to 
family hardship is also not required to be set out in sentencing remarks and 
judgments. Occasionally the sentencing remarks and judgments will disclose 
evidence put before the court or highlight problems the judicial officer has 
identified with the evidence put before the court, but in Australia there is no 
requirement for sentencing remarks to acknowledge or describe all material put 
before the court in a sentencing hearing. 
 
The Scottish sentencing scholar, Cyrus Tata has noted that ‘[s]cholars of legal 
doctrine have been concerned to describe and explain the use of sentencing 
 
                                                          
139 For a recent analysis of what Australian courts have seen as ‘exceptional circumstances’ see Tamara 
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discretion by analysing Appeal Court Judgments.’140 Tata has identified limitations 
to the traditional doctrinal method’s ability to ‘explain and enhance the structure 
of sentencing discretion’.141 The first limitation he has identified is the ‘weak 
impact of Appeal Court judgements on first instance sentencing.’142 The second 
limitation was a ‘deficiency of principled coherence of Appeal Court behaviour.’143 
 
The research conducted for this study, does not engage with the first limitation; to 
do so would require the observation of lower court proceedings and/or review of 
court transcripts. The gap between the operation of the law in higher courts to first 
instance sentencing courts is not the focus of this research. Therefore, this study 
does not examine how family hardship is taken into account in the lower and 
intermediate courts of Australia. The study is premised on the position that 
exploration of sentencing principles and policy, exposed in sentencing decisions of 
superior courts and courts of appeal is relevant and valuable research. The 
advancement of the understanding of sentencing principles, in the context of 
individualised justice, is assisted by an understanding of the reasons for decisions 
rather than how the facts of an individual case impacted upon an individual 
reasoning process. 
 
The critical review of the case law in Chapter Four and Chapter Five exposes the 
range of ideas and assumptions at work in current sentencing practices. Further 
research in this field should explore Tata’s claim and study the impact of superior 
court judgments on courts lower in the court hierarchy. Although, within the 
current instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing, it would be difficult to 
establish an objective measure of the compliance or non-compliance with 
sentencing principles in first instance sentencing remarks. 
 
In respect of the second limitation, this study does address the question of the 
‘deficiency of principled coherence of Appeal Court behaviour’.144 The study of the 
 
                                                          
140 Cyrus Tata, ‘Institutional Consistency: Appeal Court Judgements’ in Andrew Von Hirsch, Andrew 
Ashworth and J Roberts (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (Hart Publishing, 
3rd ed, 2009) 276, 276. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
 38 
Australian case law seeks to isolate sentencing principles and identify if there is 
diversity in sentencing practices. Tata contends that one key difficulty in respect to 
this second limitation is the ‘inherent interpretability of legal ‘facts’’.145 He has 
observed that:  
Appeal Courts in common law jurisdictions have tended to stress the limits of 
extrapolation of the judgment to other cases. Either it is argued that the 
judgement cannot be compared with other cases; or, in ‘leading’ or ‘guideline’ 
judgements the court has said that a tariff can be established but that it can 
only apply when cases share the specific combination of ‘facts’.146  
This is true, if one is referring to the transferability of sentencing outcomes. 
However, this dissertation posits that it is possible to analyse sentencing remarks 
and judgments and extrapolate common law (and statute-based) sentencing 
principles.  
 
This study advocates for greater attention towards and increased study of 
Australian sentencing principles. It is important to shift the focus in sentencing 
jurisprudence away from sentencing outcomes to the sentencing principles which 
are applied by sentencing judges to determine those outcomes.147 It is suggested 
by this research that greater judicial and academic attention to sentencing 
principles in Australia should occur. Moreover, in Australia, a focus upon principles 
rather than outcomes, best accommodates individualised justice and instinctive 
synthesis which the High Court has consistently emphasised to be the 
cornerstones of sentencing in Australia.148 
 
This dissertation will explore the emergence of ‘family hardship’ as a mitigating 
factor within the common law legal tradition. This study makes an important 
contribution to scholarship in sentencing. Reflecting upon the deficiencies in 
sentencing scholarship identified by von Hirsh, Roberts and Tata, this study begins 
to remedy significant gaps in the field by undertaking a substantive analysis of the 
use and significance attached to family hardship as a sentencing factor within 
Australia. Through an original study of the case law, it will examine the way that 
 
                                                          
145 Ibid 277. 
146 Ibid. 
147 See also Barbara Hudson, ‘Doing Justice to Difference’ in Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (eds), 
Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch (Oxford University Press, 
1998) 224, 229. 
148 See further discussion of this in Chapter Two. 
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Australian courts have approached this sentencing factor and will engage closely 
with the role of family hardship in federal sentencing. 
 
D. Terminology 
 
1. ‘Sentencing Principles’ 
Sentencing jurisprudence has adopted the terms ‘sentencing principles’ or 
‘principles of sentencing’ to describe rules which guide the exercise of judicial 
discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. Sentencing principles under 
the common law have emerged as a result of appeals against sentence in superior 
courts.149 Sentencing principles can be identified in appellate court judgments. 
Sentencing principles can also be identified in the reasons for sentence. These 
reasons are called ‘sentencing remarks’ (see below). There is a common law duty 
to provide reasons for sentence,150 and often a statutory duty arises to provide 
reasons for specific decisions.151 This dissertation adopts the term sentencing 
principles. 
 
 
2. ‘Family Hardship’  
There are legislative provisions in Australia that direct a court to have regard to 
‘the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on 
any of the person’s family or dependants’.152 This sentencing factor has been 
described in numerous ways. Common descriptions include: 
 Hardship to others;153 
 Collateral consequences;154 and 
 Third party hardship.155 
 
                                                          
149 Ralph Henham, Criminal Justice and Sentencing Policy (Dartmouth, 1996) 1. 
150 R v Duffy [1999] NSWCCA 321 (13 October 1999) [11]. 
151 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 5(2), 45(2) 
152 See, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1)(o). 
153 See, eg, Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 301; Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 
2002) 115; Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 342; Arie Freiberg, Fox & Freiberg’s Sentencing: State and Federal Law 
in Victoria (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2014) 420. 
154 See, eg, Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 301; Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 194. 
155 See, eg, Stephen Odgers, Sentencing: The Law of Sentencing in NSW Courts for State and Federal 
Offences (Longueville Books, 2nd ed, 2013) 364-368. 
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This dissertation adopts the term ‘family hardship’ as a shorthand to cover all 
three dimensions in reference to this sentencing factor.  
 
Under the common law and statute (where applicable) the hardship raised in 
mitigation of sentence need not only affect a ‘family’ member before it can be taken 
into account in sentencing. The study of the case law revealed that the principle 
has rarely been applied to third parties who are not family members of the 
defendant. This dissertation acknowledges that the legislative statement of the 
principle has the potential for broader application, but such potential has not been 
the focus of this study which is focused upon on sentencing ‘parents’.  
 
3. ‘Court’, ‘Sentencing Court’; ‘Judge’, ‘Sentencing Judge’ and ‘Judicial Officer’ 
The terms ‘court’ and ‘sentencing court’ are used to refer to the body responsible 
for imposing a sentence upon the offender. Some authors working in this field have 
adopted the term ‘sentencer’ to accommodate that it may be a magistrate or judge 
who is responsible for imposing a sentence.156 This practice has not been adopted 
in this study. Throughout this dissertation, the terms ‘judge’, ‘sentencing judge’ and 
‘judicial officer’ are used interchangeably. 
 
4. ‘Sentencing Remarks’ and ‘Judgments’ 
This dissertation looks at both ‘sentencing remarks’ and ‘judgments’. Some 
scholars may use these terms interchangeably, but they can also be understood as 
defining two distinct processes. ‘Sentencing remarks’ are the remarks of the 
judicial officer made on sentencing the offender for an offence. Samantha Jeffries 
and Christine Bond provide: 
Sentencing remarks are verbatim transcriptions of the comments made by the 
judge at the time of sentencing. In general, the remarks have a three-part 
structure: a summation of the context of the offence, a discussion of the 
different factors of mitigation or aggravation, and the imposition of a 
sentence.157 
Therefore ‘sentencing remarks’ are first instance sentencing decisions 
 
 
                                                          
156 See, eg, Walker’s critique in footnote 5 in Nigel Walker, ‘The English Sentencing System*’ [1971] 
Criminal Law Review 576, 579. 
157 Samantha Jeffries and Christine Bond ‘Narratives of Mitigation: Sentencing Indigenous Criminal 
Defendants in South Australia’s Higher Courts’ (2010) 46(3) Journal of Sociology 219, 224. 
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In contrast, ‘judgments’ can represent appellate court decisions on sentence where 
appellate courts may be making findings on principles of law and on the 
appropriateness of the sentence imposed at first instance. As described by George 
Zdenkowski in this role the appellate judge is ‘a reviewer of sentences and a 
reviewer of sentencing.’158 In some circumstances the appellate judge is permitted 
to make a new ruling on the sentence to be imposed upon an offender. Therefore, 
an appellate court can make a decision on sentencing and hand down its 
‘judgment’ and there may be ‘sentencing remarks’ captured within the judgment. 
 
 
IV METHOD FOR STUDY OF THE CASE LAW 
 
As outlined above, this study does not examine the extent to which family hardship 
is raised in pleas of mitigation throughout Australia. The study acknowledges that 
in some matters the sentencing factor may have been raised in a plea in mitigation 
of sentence and may have been the subject of some discussion between the parties 
in the courtroom, but the sentencing factor is not recorded in the sentencing 
remarks.159 This study is not a study based on court transcripts. The primary 
source materials are the sentencing remarks and judgments. Therefore, if the 
sentencing judge in the sentencing remarks or appellate judge in the judgment 
does not discuss the factor then this case would not be considered by this study.  
 
In conducting the research for this study, rather than simply accepting and then 
analysing the purported ‘leading cases’, which tends to marginalize ‘outlying’ 
cases, a unique quantitative and qualitative method of tracking cases has been 
adopted (discussed below). The purpose of the examination of the case law was to 
identify and trace the changing way that Australian courts have approached family 
hardship. Through a legal research practice of ‘chaining’160 the legal principle on 
 
                                                          
158 George Zdenkowski, 'Sentencing’ in Freckelton, I and Selby, H (eds), Appealing to the Future: 
Michael Kirby and His Legacy (Thomas Reuters, 2009) 751, 751. 
159 This feature was clearly born out in the study of the case law where the sentencing factor was raised 
for discussion in the sentencing remarks of an individual judge but not mentioned at all by other members 
of the bench.  
160 See David Ellis, ‘A Behavioural Approach to Information Retrieval System Design’ (1989) 45(3) 
Journal of Documentation 171, 182. 
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family hardship was pursued from its earliest identified formation through its 
‘growth’161 in ‘case-by-case common law method’162.  This study also considers the 
impact of the legislative consolidation of sentencing principles in the late 1980s 
upon sentencing practice. 
 
The study of the case law on family hardship conducted for this dissertation 
spanned from the earliest identifiable case law through to 31 December 2011. This 
end date was selected to capture the case law surrounding the landmark case of 
Markovic v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 510.163 The end point was selected 
because of the special significance accorded to the ‘final’ determination of the issue 
within Victoria by the convening of a Full Court of five justices to determine when 
family hardship could be taken into account. Whilst, the exhaustive shepardizing of 
the case law ended at this point, subsequent significant cases reopening the 
question of the role and place of family hardship in sentencing have been 
discussed. It is now apparent that following Markovic the differences in position 
are now entrenched within intermediate appellate courts.  As will be seen in 
Chapter Five, at the time of submission of this dissertation, these differences 
remain to be determined by the High Court. Only a decision of the High Court could 
provide binding authority on the applicable principles to the approach of family 
hardship. 
 
The research for this dissertation surveyed sentencing remarks and judgments 
handed down by superior courts in Australia. Decisions from inferior courts were 
not included in this study. Therefore, study of the case law examines sentencing 
remarks and appellant decisions from state and territory supreme courts, the 
Federal Court of Australia (in the context of the early case law for the Australian 
Capital Territory) and the High Court of Australia. The research revealed that there 
has been very minimal engagement with the sentencing principles surrounding 
family hardship by the High Court. As mentioned above, case law in 2017 has 
 
                                                          
161 Samuel Linn, An Analytical Index of Parallel Reference to the Cases Adjudged in the Several Courts 
of Pennsylvania, With an Appendix Containing a Collection of Cases Overruled, Denied, Doubted or 
Limited in their Application (1857) ‘Preface’ cited in Patti Ogden, ‘“Mastering the Lawless Science of 
Our Law”: A Story of Legal Citation Indexes’ (1993) 85(1) Law Library Journal 1, 22. 
162 Warner describes how Australian courts have ‘evolv[ed] sentencing principles through the case-by-
case common law method’ see Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 1. 
163 The case and its significance are discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Six. 
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identified the judicial interpretations of family hardship under s 16A(2)(p) as a 
‘live issue’164 and a recent line of cases suggest the issue is likely to come before 
the High Court.165 
 
A. Sentencing Principles as Authoritative Precedent 
There has been ongoing deliberation about whether sentencing principles have 
precedential value.166 Eminent sentencing scholar Thomas, writing in the 1970s, 
described the judicial practice of shaping the discretion exercised by sentencing 
judges as ‘sentencing policy’.167 Thomas found that the development of sentencing 
policy, in England and Wales in the 1970s, was entrusted to the judiciary and was 
made up of ‘authoritative determinations of principle and policy’168. He observed 
that the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) ‘treated its own previous decisions on 
matters of general sentencing principle as authoritative precedents.’169 These 
sentencing principles were treated as binding upon courts lower in the court 
hierarchy.170 Moreover, Thomas identified that earlier case law setting out 
sentencing principles had continuing relevance until an overruled by a full court of 
the Court of Appeal.171 
As explained further in Chapter Two (and then explored in greater detail in the 
study of the case law in Chapter Four and Chapter Five), modern Australian courts 
have been prepared to identify appealable error when a sentencing judge has 
erred in the application of sentencing principles. This dissertation, therefore, 
 
                                                          
164 Kaveh v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 52 (24 March 2017) [6]. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter Five. 
165 R v Zerafa [2013] NSWCCA 222 (4 October 2013); Elshani v The Queen (2015) 255 A Crim R 488; 
DPP (Cth) v Pratten (No 2) [2017] NSWCCA 42 (17 March 2017); Kaveh v The Queen [2017] 
NSWCCA 52 (24 March 2017). 
166 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 4; Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law 
in Victoria (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 31-32; Martin Wasik, ‘Going Around in Circles? 
Reflections on Fifty Years of Change in Sentencing’ (2004) Apr Criminal Law Review 253, 259; Mary 
Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in Western Australia (The University of Queensland Press in association with 
the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1977) 88; Ralph Henham, Criminal Justice and Sentencing 
Policy (Dartmouth, 1996) 4. 
167 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 3. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid 4. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid 4-6. 
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proceeds on the basis that sentencing principles can be identified and extracted 
from sentencing remarks and judgments and that these principles are binding. 
 
B. Chaining 
 
The concept of chaining emerged in 1989 through the work of David Ellis. Ellis 
conducted a study of the ‘information seeking patterns’172 of social scientists and 
scientists and he developed a behavioural model of their research patterns.173 One 
of the processes he identified as ‘chaining’.174 Ellis defined ‘chaining’ as 
‘characteristics of patterns of searching for information which involve following 
citation connections between material’.175  
 
Within this process, he identified a practice of ‘backward chaining’ which involved 
the researcher ‘following up references or footnotes’176 within a text. He identified 
that this was the predominate information seeking pattern adopted by social 
scientists. Ellis also identified a practice of ‘forward chaining’, which was widely 
used in the law, and involved checking to see ‘whether further work had been done 
which cited material already known’.177 These terms are very useful for describing 
the processes involved in legal research. 
 
1. Legal Research Patterns of ‘Chaining’ 
Stuart Sutton has mapped Ellis’ behavioural models of research patterns to legal 
research.178 He found that in legal research ‘chaining’ is a ‘context sensitive 
exploration.’179 Sutton described the operation of chaining in the law as the lawyer 
‘armed with one or more seed cases’180 working both through a process of forward 
chaining and backward chaining until ‘satisfied that all cases useful to modelling 
 
                                                          
172 David Ellis, ‘A Behavioural Approach to Information Retrieval System Design’ (1989) 45(3) Journal 
of Documentation 171. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid 182. 
175 Ibid 183. 
176 Ibid 183. 
177 Ibid 183. 
178 See Stuart Sutton, ‘The Role of Attorney Mental Models of Law in Case Relevance Determinations: 
An Exploratory Analysis’ (1994) 45(3) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 186. 
179 Ibid 193 (see Figure 8). 
180 Stuart Sutton, ‘The Role of Attorney Mental Models of Law in Case Relevance Determinations: An 
Exploratory Analysis’ (1994) 45(3) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 186, 194. 
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the subsector have been found.’181 Sutton offered the following figure (Figure 1) to 
illustrate the process of chaining in legal research:  
 
Figure 1: Citation Tracking 
 
 
Source: Stuart Sutton, ‘The Role of Attorney Mental Models of Law in Case Relevance Determinations: An Exploratory 
Analysis’ (1994) 45(3) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 186, 195. 
 
 
In Figure 1, Sutton has marked the forward chaining process as ‘shepardizing’. 
‘Shepardizing’ is a term employed in the USA research literature to describe the 
use of a legal citation index (developed by Frank Shepard).182 ‘Shepards citators’ 
are employed by Lexis Nexis and Westlaw. Sutton explained that his figure (see 
Figure 1 above) represents: 
…twenty-seven cases in a citation network. The passage of time is denoted by 
movement from the left to right. The numbering of the cases represents the 
chronological order in which they were decided and reported by the courts. 
The arrows represent the direction of the searcher’s chaining.183  
The research process of shepardizing is not currently available on commercial 
legal databases for tracing family hardship as a sentencing factor. 
 
2. A Research Process of ‘Exhaustive Shepardizing’ 
 
                                                          
181 Ibid. 
182 Patti Ogden, ‘“Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law”: A Story of Legal Citation Indexes’ (1993) 
85(1) Law Library Journal 1, 27-36. 
183 Stuart Sutton, ‘The Role of Attorney Mental Models of Law in Case Relevance Determinations: An 
Exploratory Analysis’ (1994) 45(3) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 186, 194. 
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There is a research process called ‘exhaustive shepardizing’184. Stephen Marx has 
described this, in respect to legal research practices, as follows: 
Exhaustive shepardizing is the process of (a) selecting a case relevant to the 
legal problem which faces the lawyer and designating that case as the root case; 
(b) selecting all cases which cite the root case; (c) selecting all cases which cite 
the cases in (b), etc. until no more citations can be found; (d) selecting all cases 
which are cited in the cases collected in steps (a), (b), and (c); and (e) repeating 
steps numbered (b), (c), and (d) until no more cases are found.185 
He commented that, 
the process…is so time-consuming that most lawyers do not follow it to its 
logical conclusion…a lawyer will often only do a partial shepardization rather 
than follow all of the possible cross-citations to their logical end.186 
The study of the Australian case law on family hardship conducted for this 
dissertation used the process of ‘exhaustive shepardizing’.  
 
For this study of family hardship, initially a ‘seed’ list of cases was identified for 
analysis based on researching the secondary research literature and general 
searches of legal databases: Casebase (LexisNexis)(‘Casebase’), Westlaw 
International (Thomson Reuters)(‘Westlaw’), Legal Online (Thomson 
Reuters)(‘Legal Online’) and the Australasian Legal Information Institute 
(‘AustLII’). This resulted in the compilation of an index of cases for each 
jurisdiction. All the cases collated via this process were read and any further cases 
identified in the judgments as relevant to the principle of family hardship were 
located and included into the compilation of cases for each jurisdiction (backward 
chaining). ‘Note up’ processes available within the databases were also used to 
identify any new or previously unidentified case law (forward chaining). This 
process took several cycles and the end result was a body of case law where no 
gaps were identified by the researcher. 
 
This process of exhaustive shepardizing was conducted to identify cases with a 
high juristic status on family hardship as a sentencing principle. ‘Juristic status’ is a 
term used by Sutton and explained in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2: Juristic Status 
 
                                                          
184 Stephen Marx, ‘Citation Networks in the Law’ (1970) 4 Jurimetrics Journal 121, 124. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid 122. 
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Source: Stuart Sutton, ‘The Role of Attorney Mental Models of Law in Case Relevance Determinations: An Exploratory 
Analysis’ (1994) 45(3) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 186, 192. 
 
Cases with a ‘high juristic status in the… jurisdiction…[are] more likely to influence 
the outcome…than would a case with a lesser juristic status’.187 This is useful 
terminology to adopt for this study of sentencing principles as it is not associated 
with the doctrine of stare decisis.188 The research process of shepardizing is not 
concerned with whether a ‘judge has erroneously cited a case’189 but is focused 
upon identifying highly cited cases (cases with high juristic status) and any cases 
which are irrelevant or which have little or no precedential value are removed 
from the research.190 Sutton has described cases with low juristic status which get 
dropped from the research process as ‘noise’ cases.191 
 
In this study, the case analysis conducted for each jurisdiction examined cases on 
family hardship identified through the research process of exhaustive 
shepardizing. Cases that significantly addressed the issue of family hardship as a 
sentencing factor, where the judicial officers expressly addressed the probable 
impact of the sentence upon the offender’s dependants in a meaningful way in 
their sentencing remarks or judgment, were included in the study. Cases that had 
been identified through the research process but that did not meaningfully engage 
at all with family hardship, such as those which simply noted that family hardship 
was taken into account but did not set out judicial reasons or any reference to 
sentencing principles, were classified as ‘noise’ cases and were dropped from the 
study.  
 
C. The Study of the Australian Case Law 
 
                                                          
187 Stuart Sutton, ‘The Role of Attorney Mental Models of Law in Case Relevance Determinations: An 
Exploratory Analysis’ (1994) 45(3) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 186, 187. 
188 As explained by Marx, see Stephen Marx, ‘Citation Networks in the Law’ (1970) 4 Jurimetrics 
Journal 121, 122. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Stuart Sutton, ‘The Role of Attorney Mental Models of Law in Case Relevance Determinations: An 
Exploratory Analysis’ (1994) 45(3) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 186, 192. 
191 Ibid. 
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1. State and Territory Jurisdictions 
The study of the case law focused upon identifying current sentencing principles 
and the prevailing practice, as expressed by superior courts, in each Australian 
jurisdiction in respect of family hardship. Using the process of exhaustive 
shepardizing (described above) the state and territory study located 295 cases. 
Table 1 sets out the number of cases that were examined for each Australian 
jurisdiction and identified whether they were first instance or appellant court 
matters. 
 
The study focused upon the work of superior court or ‘higher courts’192. Lower 
court sentencing remarks (ie. district court and magistrates court) have not been 
included in this study. The decision to exclude sentencing decisions by lower 
courts was made to contain the parameters of the study and because, throughout 
Australia, lower courts should give effect to sentencing policies and sentencing 
principles expressed by superior courts in their court hierarchy. 193  First instance 
supreme court decisions and appellate decisions were surveyed. The decision to 
include first instance superior court decisions (picked up by chaining) was made 
because of the weight those decisions can carry. 194  There were not many first 
instance supreme court decisions identified by the process of exhaustive 
shepardizing (see Table 1 below).   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: State and Territory Case Analysis 
 
Jurisdiction Total Number 
of Cases 
% 
Sentencing Court 
(First instance) 
Appeal 
Court 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
12 4% 2 10 
New South Wales 70 24% 7 63 
 
                                                          
192 Further described in Chapter Two. 
193 See R v Jackson (1972) 4 SASR 81, 91-92. 
194 See discussion of precedent and the binding statements of sentencing principles in Wong v The Queen 
(2001) 207 CLR 584, 605 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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Northern Territory 16 5% 1 15 
Queensland 23 8% 1 22 
South Australia 52 18% 0 52 
Tasmania 13 4% 3 10 
Victoria 55 19% 4 51 
Western Australia 54 18% 0 54 
      
 
The collation process undertaken for the state and territory study can be divided 
into two phases: 
 
(a) Detailed case analysis 
A detailed case analysis of each case within the study was conducted. For each case 
within the study, the sentencing remarks were read carefully, and information 
collected and recorded in customised tables. For each case examined ten features 
of the case were recorded. These were:  
 
 case name and court (i.e. case citation); 
 judicial officers;  
 offence and sentence;  
 offender’s gender;  
 whether the sentencing factor was favourably received (ie. whether family 
hardship was recognised in this case as a relevant sentencing consideration 
that carried weight in the act of sentencing. Here the information recorded 
was based on the ultimate finding of the court.); 
 classification of the sentencing factor (i.e. how the factor was described by 
the court in sentencing remarks); 
 evidence noted by the court in respect of the sentencing factor; 
 precedent trail;  
 purposes of sentencing where noted in the sentencing remarks as relevant; 
and 
 any relevant broader issues raised in the sentencing remarks that provided 
important context to the findings of the court. 
This extensive examination of the identified case law made up the first phase of 
data collection. Cases with little or no meaningful engagement with family 
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hardship as a sentencing factor (‘noise cases’ as described above) were removed 
from the study in the second phase. If a case was cited as being relevant to family 
hardship it was included into the study (provided it fulfilled the criteria of 
meaningfully engaging with the factor) and any cases cited within it, were picked 
up and included (if they had not already been captured by the chaining process). 
 
(b) Identification of cases with a high juristic status 
The second phase of data collection was to record the number of citations for each 
case. Information collected from the sentencing remarks under the precedent trail 
was used during this phase. The ‘precedent trail’ is a list of all the cases cited as 
relevant authorities within each case in respect of this sentencing factor. 
Information was recorded based on the sentencing remarks or judgments for each 
case identified.  
 
Dissenting judgments were included in this phase of data collection. The decision 
to include these judgments and record the references to case law within them was 
because this study was interested in identifying influential cases, those with a high 
juristic status, on family hardship as a sentencing principle; identifying which 
earlier judicial statements of principle were the most influential by a process of 
forward and backward chaining. Dissenting remarks are also sometimes influential 
in subsequent cases. In this respect, the study departs from classical doctrinal 
analysis, which would privilege formally binding case law.  
 
LawCite195 (an international legal case citation) identifies influential cases for its 
readers by placing stars next to some cases. A case will get one star on LawCite for 
each 50 citations.196 The stars, therefore, highlight the frequency of citation (or 
popularity of the case).  Features such as these on legal databases can measure 
how frequently a case is cited overall by other cases but they cannot drill down to 
the level of measuring how frequently a case is cited by other cases on the 
principle of family hardship. In focusing solely on one sentencing factor and by the 
manual collection of case citations (ie. a process of exhaustive shepardizing 
 
                                                          
195 AustLII, LawCite (December 2008) Australasian Legal Information Institute 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/austlii/help/lawcite_announce.html>. 
196 AustLII, LawCite Search Results Help (December 2008) Australasian Legal Information Institute < 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/LawCite/doc/results.html>. 
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conducted only on the issue of family hardship) the study identified cases of high 
juristic status for this mitigating factor.  
 
This study identifies cases with a high juristic status (influential cases) as 
distinguished from authoritative cases (ie. precedential cases). As explained above, 
my intention in undertaking this collation of data was not to measure the formally 
binding status of a case. My concern was to identify and document how the law in 
this area has developed (in practice) and to reveal what sentencing courts 
regarded as sentencing principles within each jurisdiction.  Chapter Four, 
therefore, demonstrates how judicial consensus has been forged. Appendix A 
provides a table with the number of hits for each case within the study.  
 
2. Federal Jurisdiction 
The study of the federal case law (‘the federal study’) traced the development of 
the principle and judicial practice in the sentencing of federal offenders. The 
outcomes of the study (presented in Chapter Five) reveal how the principle has 
developed and highlights what matters have influenced the courts in their 
approach to taking into account the potential impact of the sentence upon 
dependants. This research demonstrates that there is no consistent approach to 
sentencing federal offenders in respect of the use and operation of this sentencing 
factor.  Drawing on the conclusions in Chapter Four, I show that there is a strong 
correlation between state and territory practice and the sentencing of federal 
offenders by courts in a particular jurisdiction.  
 
The federal study located 92 cases. Table 2 (below) provides an overview of the 
number of federal cases arising from each jurisdiction. In contrast to the state and 
territory study, in the federal study only appellate decisions of superior courts 
were included in the study.197 The reason for the different in approach taken 
between the two studies of the case law was because a central purpose of the state 
and territory study was to map out jurisdictionally-localised sentencing practices 
in respect of family hardship (see Chapter Four). The federal study was a narrower 
study as each jurisdiction’s sentencing practices had already been identified. The 
 
                                                          
197 First instance sentencing remarks were not included. 
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primary purpose of the federal study was to identify if there was a national 
consistency gap in federal sentencing. Therefore, this study was concerned with 
what the superior courts thought were the principles guiding consideration of 
family hardship in federal sentencing.  A comparison of what appellate courts in 
each Australian jurisdiction found were governing principles were then examined 
in light of their localised sentencing practices (which was set out in Chapter Four). 
 
 
Table 2: Federal Case Analysis 
 
Jurisdiction 
(State and Territory Courts 
exercising federal 
jurisdiction) 
Number 
of Cases 
% 
Australian Capital Territory 2 2.17% 
Northern Territory 2 2.17% 
Queensland 9 9.78% 
New South Wales 33 35.87% 
Tasmania 5 5.43% 
Victoria 19 20.65% 
South Australia 6 6.52% 
Western Australia 16 17.39% 
Total 92  
         
 
Table 2 demonstrates that much of the case law arises from New South Wales and 
Victoria. This corresponds with the relative size of these jurisdictions and their 
dominance in the hearing of federal offences. Within this body of case law there 
were four cases that dealt with both federal offences and state or territory offences 
in the sentencing process. These four cases had already been subject to detailed 
case analysis in the state and territory study and are identified in Table 3 (below). 
                 
Table 3: Combined Cases Within Study 
 
Case Jurisdiction 
Tan Hai Huat (1990) 49 A Crim R 378 WA + CTH 
Carmody (1998) 100 A Crim R 41 VIC + CTH 
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Markovic v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 510 VIC + CTH 
R v Hancock [2011] NTCCA 14 NT + CTH 
 
 
The compilation of the federal cases mirrored the process adopted for the state 
and territory study. The seed list of cases was created by searching the legal 
databases for cases citing the federal provision or ‘hardship’. The legal databases 
consulted were Casebase (LexisNexis), Legal Online (Thomson Reuters) and 
AustLII. Federal cases were also been identified from citations within the state and 
territory study. ‘Note up’ processes available within the databases, were utilised 
for the leading federal cases addressing this sentencing factor. Once an index of 
cases had been identified and all relevant cases collated via this process, all of the 
cases were then read, and any further federal cases identified in the judgments as 
relevant to the principle of family hardship were located and included into the 
compilation of cases.  Once again, this process took several cycles and the end 
result was a body of federal case law where the researcher identified no gaps (ie. 
exhaustive shepardizing was employed). 
 
A detailed case analysis was undertaken for each of the 92 cases mirroring the 
practice undertaken for the first collation phase of the state and territory study. 
The second phase of the data collation was also conducted (based on the 
methodology set out above). Consistent with the state and territory study, the 
purpose was to determine the cases that were the most frequently referenced by 
judicial officers (ie. cases with a high juristic status) rather than measuring 
formally binding case law. The results of this study of the federal case law are 
presented in Chapter Five. Appendix A provides a table with the number of hits for 
each case within the federal jurisdiction. 
 
 
V OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS TWO TO SEVEN 
 
This study of family hardship as a mitigating factor explores how the principle 
came to be embedded within sentencing law and practice in Australia. Chapter 
Two will set the scene for the study of family hardship in sentencing by providing 
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an overview of the Australian criminal justice system and the Australian 
sentencing landscape. Chapter Two will also build on the context provided in this 
chapter to elucidate how this research is the product of a period of growing 
recognition of federal sentencing law and practice within Australia.  
 
Chapter Two will describe how sentencing factors sit within a system of broad 
judicial discretion. It will describe the prevailing ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach to 
sentencing in Australia and the nature of sentencing appeals. Chapter Two outlines 
the state and territory sentencing frameworks and will provide an overview of the 
sentencing regime in operation in each jurisdiction which necessarily precedes the 
study of the case law (in Chapter Four and Chapter Five).  
 
Chapter Three will explore the evolution of the principle of family hardship in the 
common law. It will then look closely at its recognition in sentencing legislation 
within Australia. This chapter will demonstrate that the inclusion of family 
hardship into a list of sentencing factors was a deliberate and a clear articulation 
that the effect of a sentence upon third parties was to be a legitimate consideration 
in sentencing.  
 
Chapters Four sets out the findings of the study of the case law on family hardship. 
It traces the development of family hardship as a sentencing factor across the 
Australian states and territories. The study identifies the tensions that exist and 
discusses the influence of cases with a high juristic status. The chapter engages 
with the concept of a unified common law in Australia as set out by the High Court 
in Lipohar.198 This chapter will examine whether there was a perceivable 
sentencing pattern within or across jurisdictions.  
 
Chapter Five then examines how family hardship and, in particular, its legislative 
expression in s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) has been taken into account 
in federal sentencing. It will reveal that localised practices of taking family 
hardship into account, uncovered in Chapter Four, influence federal sentencing 
practices. This chapter draws together the findings from the study of the state and 
 
                                                          
198 Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485, 505. 
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territory cases and federal cases to comment on the Australian landscape as a 
whole.  
 
Chapter Six explores the ongoing concern that a consideration of family hardship 
imports gender bias into sentencing. The analysis of the case law shows that family 
hardship as a mitigating factor can operate to the advantage of female offenders. 
This chapter looks more closely at those findings alongside the broader research 
literature and challenges the claim that taking family hardship into account in 
sentencing is gender-biased leniency. This chapter will engage with the problems 
of incorporating experiences outside the male norm. Chapter Six rejects both the 
claim that mothers are being granted too much leniency in sentencing, and the 
claim that taking family hardship into account at sentencing is an act of judicial 
mercy. The relationship between family hardship and gender is reinterpreted in 
this chapter.  
 
Chapter Seven draws the dissertation and highly original study of family hardship 
in Australia together and provides concluding remarks. It explains the significance 
of this study and the value of its findings for judicial practice and for further 
research into the role of sentencing factors, the development of sentencing 
principles and jurisprudence in Australia and also into federal sentencing law 
within Australia.  
 
 
 
VI CONCLUSION  
 
This introductory chapter has explained how and why this study came about. This 
chapter has set out the research questions and emphasised the significance of the 
research conducted for this dissertation. The research methodology designed for 
the detailed study of family hardship is highly original. This study makes an 
important contribution to Australian sentencing scholarship in two fields. First, 
this dissertation presents a critical analysis of the operation and development of a 
single mitigating factor in Australia. This detailed study of a single mitigating factor 
drawing upon an extensive and systematic analysis of the case law, sheds light 
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upon the practical operation of common law, including where there has been 
legislative enactment of sentencing factors, and upon the role of Australian 
sentencing principles. Second, as a study on federal sentencing practices examined 
alongside state and territory sentencing practices the research conducted for this 
dissertation and the findings presented define and develop a new agenda for 
research on Australian federal sentencing laws and practices. 
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2. THE AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING LANDSCAPE 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This background chapter provides a general overview of Australian sentencing law 
and its key components. Throughout the 1980s and 90s textbooks on Australian 
sentencing were rare and the topic of sentencing was generally addressed as a 
single chapter within mainstream criminal law textbooks (if at all199). The works of 
Mary Daunton-Fear,200 Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg201 and Kate Warner202 
represented the few specialized texts on sentencing. The field was so limited that 
even though Fox and Freiberg and Warner’s textbooks were localized,203 they were 
widely read and referenced.   
 
In 2007, Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney published Australian Sentencing: 
Principles and Practice.204 This was the first textbook on Australian sentencing law 
covering all jurisdictions, and it led to a loose-leaf service.205 Bagaric and Edney’s 
original text was only the fifth textbook on sentencing written in Australia but it 
heralded the beginning of a wave of publications in this field. In the last five years, 
the landscape has changed and there is now a variety of textbooks addressing 
 
                                                          
199 See, eg, Colin Howard, Criminal Law (The Law Book Company, 4th ed, 1982). 
200 Mary Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in Western Australia (The University of Queensland Press in 
association with the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1977); Mary Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in South 
Australia (The Lawbook Company in association with the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980). 
201 Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford University 
Press, 1985). 
202 Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 1991). 
203 Fox and Freiberg’s text addressed federal and Victorian sentencing law and practices see Richard Fox, 
Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford University Press, 1985); Richard Fox and Arie 
Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 1999); Arie 
Freiberg, Fox & Freiberg’s Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 
2014).Warner’s text addressed federal and Tasmanian sentencing law and practices see Kate Warner, 
Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 1991); Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation 
Press, 2nd ed, 2002). Note that Daunton-Fear’s texts did not attract significant judicial attention. 
204 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
205 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing Online, 
vol 1 (25 November 2011, Thomson Reuters <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com.au/australian-sentencing-
online/productdetail/112062>). 
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sentencing.206 The material set out in this chapter builds on this body of work and 
contributes to scholarship on Australian sentencing principles and practices.  
 
This chapter outlines the Australian criminal justice system. The Australian 
criminal justice system is made up of nine jurisdictions; these are the six states, 
two territories and the federal jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction is unique. This 
chapter describes the legislative frameworks that have been established 
throughout Australia and explains the role of mitigating factors in each; attention 
is placed on the scope for consideration of family hardship as a sentencing factor 
within each jurisdiction.  This material provides essential background context for 
Chapters Three, Four and Five. 
 
The importance of judicial discretion in Australian sentencing is explained in this 
chapter. Concepts introduced in Chapter One will be revisited and this chapter will 
describe the ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach to sentencing. This chapter also 
explains the practice of individualised justice which operates throughout Australia, 
and discusses the tensions present between broad judicial discretion and the 
desire for consistency in sentencing. Important aspects of Australian sentencing 
jurisprudence are addressed in this chapter and this material is important context 
for the examination of the case law in Chapters Four and Five.  
 
 
II CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
There is no single body of criminal law governing Australia, but rather, nine 
separate bodies of criminal law based upon the Commonwealth, states and 
territories. New South Wales (‘NSW’), South Australia (‘SA’) and Victoria (‘Vic’) are 
 
                                                          
206 Melissa Bull, Punishment & Sentencing: Risk, Rehabilitation and Restitution (Oxford University 
Press, 2010); Geraldine Mackenzie and Nigel Stobbs, Principles of Sentencing (The Federation Press, 
2010); Stephen Odgers, Sentencing: The Law of Sentencing in NSW Courts for State and Federal 
Offences (Longueville Books, 2nd ed, 2013); Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia 
(Thomson Reuters, 2014). Alongside these publications there has been recent editions of Kate Warner, et 
al, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) and Arie Freiberg, Fox & Freiberg’s 
Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2014). Bagaric and Edney’s text 
is now in its fifth edition see Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia (Thomson 
Reuters, 5th ed, 2017). 
 
 59 
known as ‘common law jurisdictions’.207 This means that criminal offences in these 
jurisdictions are creatures of the common law or are created by state or territory 
parliaments through statute.208 In these jurisdictions statutes generally ‘build upon 
the common law’209 and, accordingly are often ‘interpreted in light of settled 
common law principles.’210  
 
The remaining jurisdictions within Australia are known as ‘code jurisdictions’:211 
these are the Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’), Northern Territory (‘NT’), 
Queensland (‘Qld’), Tasmania (‘Tas’), Western Australia (‘WA’) and the federal 
jurisdiction. Criminal offences within code jurisdictions are set out in Criminal 
codes.212 Criminal codes are read on their ‘own terms’213 and are not interpreted 
under the presumption that they ‘re-state pre-existing common law.’214 The ACT is 
not a fully codified jurisdiction as the code is in partial operation.215 This means 
that the ACT is currently a blended, or hybrid, system where there are some 
codified offences and some common law offences.216  
 
In the federal jurisdiction, the range of criminal acts that may be subject to 
Commonwealth law is limited in scope by constitutional heads of power217 and 
subject to the incidental power set out in s 51(xxxix) of the Australian 
 
                                                          
207 Kenneth Arenson, Mirko Bagaric and Peter Gilles, Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law 
Jurisdictions Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2014) 2; Simon Bronitt, ‘The 
Criminal Law of Australia’ in Kevin Jon Heller and Markus Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative 
Criminal Law (Stanford University Press, 2011) 49, 50. 
208 Updated by W Kukulies-Smith, LexisNexis Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 9 (2 
November 2010) 130 Criminal Law, ‘I Principles of Criminal Liability’ [130-5]. See also Simon Bronitt, 
‘The Criminal Law of Australia’ in Kevin Jon Heller and Markus Dubber (eds), The Handbook of 
Comparative Criminal Law (Stanford University Press, 2011) 49, 50. 
209 Updated by W Kukulies-Smith, LexisNexis Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 9 (2 
November 2010) 130 Criminal Law, ‘I Principles of Criminal Liability’ [130-5]. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid.  
213 Stevens v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 319, 340. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 5, 8, 10(1). 
216 See Updated by W Kukulies-Smith, LexisNexis Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 9 (2 
November 2010) 130 Criminal Law, ‘I Principles of Criminal Liability’ [130-5]. 
217 See, eg, Fox and Freiberg point out that unlike the Canadian model, in Australia there is no express 
power for the Commonwealth to legislate with respect to criminal law. For more on the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction with respect to criminal law see Fox and Freiberg, Sentencing State and Federal Law in 
Victoria (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 42-44. See also Simon Bronitt, ‘The Criminal Law of 
Australia’ in Kevin Jon Heller and Markus Dubber (eds), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law 
(Stanford University Press, 2011) 49, 51. 
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Constitution.218 Criminal offences against the Commonwealth are found not only 
within the Criminal Code (Cth), but also, within a wide range of other 
Commonwealth statutes.219 Indeed, in its latest enquiry into federal sentencing the 
ALRC observed that ‘there are now over 500 Commonwealth statutes containing 
criminal offences.’220  
 
The Annual Report 2011-2012 of the CDPP describes tax and social security fraud, 
drug importation and commercial prosecutions as the traditional ‘backbone of 
CDPP prosecution practice.’221 However, in recent years, Australia has seen 
substantial growth in the federal arena. The CDPP now prosecute across a broad 
range of crimes including cybercrime, environmental crimes, terrorism, people 
trafficking, serious and organised crime, and identity and fraud offences.222  The 
number of federal offences being committed within Australia is also increasing.223  
 
A. Criminal Court Hierarchies 
 
The Australian criminal court hierarchy also consists of nine court hierarchies. 
There are the six state court hierarchies, two territorial court hierarchies and a 
federal court hierarchy. There is a consistent basic structure to the state and 
territory court hierarchies which is depicted below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
218 Section 51 (xxxix) of the Australian Constitution provides ‘Matters incidental to the execution of any 
power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government of 
the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth.’ 
219 See, eg, ‘Table 1: Legislation under which charges were dealt with in 2012-2013’ in Commonwealth, 
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions Annual Report 2012-2013 (2013) 34-36. 
220 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No 103 (2006) 95. 
221 Commonwealth, The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions Annual Report 2011-2012 
(2012) 3. 
222 Ibid. See also discussion of the expansion in federal criminal offences by the ALRC in Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No 103 (2006) 
94-97. 
223 See, eg, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011, Federal Defendants, Selected States and Territories, 
2009-2010, cat. no. 4515.0, ABS, Canberra. 
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Figure 3: Australian State and Territory Court Hierarchy  
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013, ‘Criminal Courts in Australia’ figure, Criminal Courts, Australia, 2011-12, cat. no. 
4513.0, ABS, Canberra. 
 
The structure represented in Figure 3 operates in each state and territory in 
Australia, except for the smaller jurisdictions that do not have intermediate 
courts.224 This figure depicts the court hierarchy with two tiers. These are 
identified on the figure as ‘Higher Courts’ which include intermediate courts and 
supreme courts and ‘Lower Courts’ which include magistrate’s courts (and their 
equivalents) and children’s courts. Specialist courts, such as drug courts and family 
violence courts, do exist within Australia and generally operate within the ‘Lower 
Court’ tier.225 The study of case law on family hardship conducted for this 
dissertation has engaged only with the work of ‘Higher Courts’.226 
 
1. Autochthonous Expedient 
Australia has not established a federal criminal court. Section 80 of the Australian 
Constitution provides that federal offenders are to be tried in the state or territory 
‘where the offence was committed, and if the offence was not committed within 
 
                                                          
224 For example, the Australian Capital Territory court hierarchy consists of a Magistrates Court and 
Supreme Court. 
225 Family violence courts throughout Australia are all local or magistrates’ courts see Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Family Violence – A National Legal Response, Report No 114 (2010) [32.33]; Drug 
courts in Victoria for example are magistrate’s courts see, Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 4A Cf. 
Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW) s 24. 
226 see Chapter One. 
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any state the trial shall be held at such place or places as the Parliament 
prescribes.’227 The result has been that ‘[s]ince 1903 the Commonwealth has relied 
heavily on state courts to exercise federal jurisdiction, and continues to do so in 
both civil and criminal matters.’228 This has been called the ‘autochthonous 
expedient’.229 The ALRC states: 
Under what has been described as the ‘autochthonous expedient’ of the 
Australian Federal system the Commonwealth Parliament clothed State courts 
with power to adjudicate and determine cases involving federal criminal 
laws.230 
Therefore, within Australia, the majority of federal criminal offences are heard in 
state and territory courts and federal offenders are sentenced in state and territory 
courts. 
 
Judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in state and territory courts under s 
77(iii) of the Australian Constitution. Australian state and territory courts have 
been vested with federal jurisdiction in criminal matters by s 68(2) of the Judiciary 
Act 1903 (Cth). Thus, the federal jurisdiction is made up of state and territory 
courts throughout Australia hearing federal matters and imposing federal 
sentences upon federal offenders. As explained later in this chapter,231 the law 
governing sentencing in each state and territory varies. The sentencing of federal 
offenders in state and territory courts therefore raises the issue of consistency in 
the sentencing of federal offenders and the issue of whether unique federal 
sentencing principles are to apply in federal cases heard in state and territory 
courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
227 Australian Constitution s 80. See also Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Federal 
Sentencing in Victoria (22 January 2014) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions Publications 
and Policies <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/publications/>. 
228 Australian Law Reform Commission, The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth, Report No 92 (2001) 
19. 
229 R v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268 (Dixon J). 
230 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Interim Report, Report No 15 (1980) 5. 
231 See below ‘Sentencing Legislation’. 
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2. The High Court of Australia 
Australia is a unified common law legal system232 and the High Court of Australia 
(‘High Court’) sits at the top of the Australian court hierarchy.233 Section 73 of the 
Constitution grants it jurisdiction ‘to hear and determine appeals from all 
judgments… and sentences.’234 The section expressly states that ‘the judgment of 
the High Court in all such cases shall be final and conclusive.’235 Appeals from the 
High Court to the Privy Council were abolished by the Privy Council (Appeals from 
High Court) Act 1975 (Cth).236 And all appeals from an Australian court to the Privy 
Council were abolished with the enactment of the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth).237  
 
The High Court will only hear appeals from a Supreme Court of an Australian state 
or territory where special leave is granted by the High Court.238 In the context of a 
system with nine separate court hierarchies and sentencing frameworks, the role 
played by the High Court is very important in achieving consistency. Justice Rares 
has observed, 
the role of the High Court, at the apex of the Australian judiciary, is to provide 
uniform interpretation and to espouse, authoritatively, the unwritten law of 
Australia.239  
Special leave to appeal to the High Court is generally only available from Supreme 
Courts, but, where judgment has been ‘given or pronounced in the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction’,240 the High Court may grant special leave to other courts 
(lower in the court hierarchy). 
 
The High Court has pronounced many times that a ‘…sentence itself gives rise to no 
binding precedent.’241 What this means is that the sentencing outcome does not 
 
                                                          
232 Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485, 508-509 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and 551 
(Kirby J). 
233 Ibid 507. 
234 Australian Constitution s 73. 
235 Ibid. 
236 James Stellios, The Federal Judicature: Chapter III of the Constitution (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
2010) 49. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 35 and 35AA. 
239 Justice Steven Rares, ‘Role of the Intermediate Appellant Court after Farah Constructions’ (Paper 
presented at the 4th Appellate Judges Conference of the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 
Melbourne, 7 November 2008). 
240 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 35(1)(b). 
241 Wong (2001) 207 CLR 584, 605 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 
CLR 520, 545 (Heydon J); Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 596 (French CJ, 
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give rise to binding precedent, as stated by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, in 
Wong, in sentencing decisions:  
[w]hat may give rise to precedent is a statement of principles which affect how 
the sentencing discretion should be exercised, either generally or in particular 
kinds of case.242 
The High Court, therefore, does play an important role in developing sentencing 
principles which ‘bind all courts in the country’.243 The importance attached to 
‘principles of sentencing’ in Australia in achieving consistency in sentencing is a 
central focus of this dissertation. 
 
The High Court did not traditionally take an active role in sentencing appeals. For 
example, Bagaric and Edney have found that, ‘[a]n examination of the decisions of 
the High Court from 1936 until 1976 reveals a limited involvement in the 
development of sentencing principle.’244 They pinpoint 1977 as the beginning of 
the ‘first wave’ of development of Australian sentencing principles by the High 
Court and have identified a significant increase in the caseload of the High Court on 
sentencing matters in this period.245 The second wave of High Court sentencing 
jurisprudence was identified during the years of 1990-2006,246 and ‘in 
aggregate…[these periods] have provided a coherent body of Australian sentencing 
principles.’247 The Annual Reports show the High Court in the current era 
frequently grants special leave to hear sentencing matters.248 During this period of 
active engagement in sentencing matters, the High Court has developed a robust 
jurisprudence on principles of sentencing.249 
 
                                                          
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550, 560 (French CJ, Keane 
and Nettle JJ). 
242 Wong (2001) 207 CLR 584, 605. 
243 Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485, 507. 
244 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 73. 
245 See Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 73, 86 – 92; Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia 
(Thomson Reuters LawBook Co, 2014) 120-136. 
246 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 88. 
247 Ibid. 
248 See, eg, High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2011-2012 (2012) 10; High Court of Australia, 
Annual Report 2010- 2011 (2011) 9. 
249 See generally Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia (Thomson Reuters LawBook 
Co, 2014) 120-136; Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 4, 73 – 92. See also Geraldine Mackenzie and Nigel Stobbs, 
Principles of Sentencing (The Federation Press, 2010) 274- 275; Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania 
(Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 8. 
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B. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
 
Throughout Australia, police and public prosecutors generally prosecute criminal 
offences. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in each state and 
territory routinely institute and conduct the prosecution of indictable criminal 
offences against state and territory laws.250 Offences heard in summary 
jurisdictions in all Australian jurisdictions, except for the ACT and the federal 
jurisdiction, are prosecuted by police prosecutors.251 The Offices of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions in all Australian jurisdictions are independent agencies 
created by statute.252  
 
While it is generally police and public prosecutors who prosecute criminal offences 
within Australia, other bodies are vested with prosecutorial powers such as the 
RSPCA253 and the Roads and Maritime Service.254 However, the Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘may take over a proceeding that was instituted or 
is being carried on by another person ...’255 for proceedings dealing with summary 
or indictable offences against the Commonwealth. In respect of federal criminal 
offences, it is the CDPP who is generally responsible for the prosecution of federal 
offences.256   
 
                                                          
250 Christopher Corns, Public Prosecutions in Australia: Law, Policy and Practice (Lawbook Co, 2014) 
85. 
251 See generally, Christopher Corns, Public Prosecutions in Australia: Law, Policy and Practice 
(Lawbook Co, 2014) 224. See, eg, NSW where ‘Police Prosecutors prosecute about 95% of criminal 
cases on behalf of the NSW Police Force and various other government agencies in court of summary 
jurisdiction, enjoying a success rate of 90% or above’ New South Wales Government, Police 
Prosecutions Command (12 January 2015) New South Wales Police Force  
<http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/structure/specialist_operations/police_prosecutions_command>. 
For more on police prosecutors see, generally, Christopher Corns, Public Prosecutions in Australia: Law, 
Policy and Practice (Lawbook Co, 2014) 223-244. 
252 See Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (ACT); 
Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW); Director of Pubic Prosecutions Act 1991 (NT); 
Director of Pubic Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld); Director of Pubic Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA); Director 
of Pubic Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas); Pubic Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic); Director of Pubic 
Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA). 
253 An organisation for the protection of animals which also investigates allegations of animal cruelty see 
http://www.rspca-act.org.au. 
254 See, eg, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s 34AA; Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW) s 
129. 
255 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 9(5). 
256 Commonwealth, The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions Annual Report 2011-2012 
(2012) 3; Christopher Corns, Public Prosecutions in Australia: Law, Policy and Practice (Lawbook Co, 
2014) 229; Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 5. 
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The growth in the number of federal offences has meant that there is greater 
potential overlap between state or territory offences and federal offences.257 The 
consequences of this was subject to some discussion in the Judicial Commission of 
New South Wales’s 2014 report on sentencing federal drug offenders.258 The 
Report stated that:  
…now a number of Code offences, including those involving the trafficking or 
manufacture of controlled drugs or precursors, do not require proof of a 
connection with an importation. While previously such conduct was solely 
dealt with as a State or Territory offence, prosecuting authorities now have a 
broader range of options in terms of available charges and may choose between 
Commonwealth and State or Territory offences prohibiting such conduct.259 
There is emerging judicial consideration of the possible consequences of the 
prosecutorial election of charging, for example there may be significant differences 
between the sentencing regimes and the penalties attached.260  
 
C. Sentencing Legislation 
 
The consolidation of sentencing provisions into a single statute was first adopted 
in Australia in the state of Victoria in 1985.261 Currently each state and territory of 
Australia has its own sentencing statute.262 Prior to this, sentencing laws and 
procedures could be located within local Crimes Acts, Court Acts, Administrative 
Acts and in a number of other statutes dealing with procedural matters.263  
 
                                                          
257 Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Commonwealth Drug Offenders, Research 
monograph 38 (June 2014) 19. 
258 Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Commonwealth Drug Offenders, Research 
monograph 38 (June 2014). 
259 Ibid 19. 
260 See, eg, R v Cheung (2010) 203 A Crim R 398. See also Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 
Sentencing Commonwealth Drug Offenders, Research monograph 38 (June 2014) 19-21. 
261 Penalties and Sentences Act 1985 (Vic). 
262 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), Sentencing 
Act 1995 (NT), Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas), Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). The ACT, NSW and WA have also enacted 
separate statutes dealing with the administration of sentences within their respective jurisdictions. See 
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT); Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 
(NSW); Administration Act 1995 (WA). 
263 See, eg, New South Wales- Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Bench Book (7 
March 2008) Judicial Information Research System 
<http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/sentencing/application_of_the_act.html>; 
Queensland– Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 November 1992, 150 (D M 
Wells, Minister for Justice and Attorney-General); Victoria - Arie Freiberg and Stuart Ross, Sentencing 
Reform and Penal Change: The Victorian Experience (Federation Press, 1999) 21. 
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When specific separate statutes on sentencing were enacted throughout Australia 
(in the mid 80s to the early 90s) they were recognised as consolidating Acts. The 
process was one of collecting all provisions dealing with the sentencing powers of 
courts and then housing them within a single stand-alone statute.264 In doing so, 
this shift was to facilitate the process of sentencing, promote understanding of the 
sentencing laws and, in some cases, reform the sentencing provisions 
themselves.265   
 
Importantly, the process was not one of codifying the law of sentencing. Therefore, 
the legislative provisions set out in these sentencing statutes consolidating the law, 
operate concurrently with common law sentencing principles. Sentencing law 
throughout Australia can be described as being underpinned by the common law 
and overlaid by legislation, with the proviso that the legislature by express 
intention, can repeal and effectively codify, all or some of those principles. 
 
Overall the Australian sentencing landscape is growing increasingly more complex. 
The principles and practices of sentencing do vary across Australia. Remarkably, 
how the jurisdictions converge or diverge on various sentencing matters has not 
been the subject of detailed analysis either in empirical or doctrinal research. This 
dissertation begins to address this gap in the field. 
 
1. Sentencing Models 
A review of the sentencing statutes, in operation in all the states and territories of 
Australia,266 demonstrates that it is common for the legislature to enunciate 
sentencing policies, purposes, guidelines and principles. State and territory 
parliaments have adopted varying approaches to sentencing and unfortunately 
inconsistent terminology is used throughout Australia. But while each sentencing 
statute is unique, there are broadly two sentencing models in operation. 
 
 
                                                          
264 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 6, Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 3(a), 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) ss 3(a) and 6, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 1. 
265 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 6, Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 3, 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 1. 
266 The federal jurisdiction does not have a dedicated Sentencing Act (see Chapter One). 
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The first type of model can be described as the ‘traditional minimalist model’. This 
term describes legislative frameworks which may set out localised procedural 
powers and processes but have limited legislative guidance and continue to rely 
primarily on the common law. Early sentencing legislation in Australia can be 
described as falling into this model. Tasmania remains the only jurisdiction within 
Australia to maintain a traditional minimalist model.267   
 
The second type of model is the ‘guiding model’. Jurisdictions which have legislated 
more extensively providing within their statutes detailed sentencing frameworks 
that include clearly expressed sentencing policies, sentencing principles and 
nuanced sentencing laws can be described as employing a ‘guiding model’. This 
approach operates in all Australian jurisdictions, other than Tasmania. In the 
guiding model the common law remains as a source from which sentencing 
principles may be identified. This model retains a large role for judges to fashion 
new principles or extend or adapt sentencing principles when the statute is silent. 
 
In the federal jurisdiction, the principal body of law governing sentencing is found 
in pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The federal parliament has not enacted a 
single stand-alone sentencing statute.268 Despite this, the federal provisions do set 
out a detailed sentencing framework including clearly expressed sentencing 
policies, sentencing principles and nuanced federal sentencing laws. Therefore, the 
federal provisions, rejecting the traditional minimalist approach, fall within a 
guiding model of sentencing. As an added complexity, the federal sentencing 
provisions are not complete. In the sense that local sentencing law does govern 
federal sentencing where the federal provision expressly picks up the law in the 
state and territory in which the offender is being sentenced.269 However, this 
 
                                                          
267 See Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). 
268 The ALRC has repeatedly recommended that the Federal Government review the provisions in Part 1B 
and enact consolidating legislation to locate all federal sentencing provisions within a single statute. See 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No. 15 (Interim) (1980), 
Rec 39; Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No. 103 (2006), Rec 2. 
269 See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16E(2). Section 16E(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides that 
where the law of a State or Territory enables a sentence or non-parole period to be ‘reduced by the period 
that the person has been in custody for the offence’ or the date of commencement to be fixed as ‘…the 
day on which the person was taken into custody for the offence’ then ‘the law applies in the same way to 
a federal sentence imposed on a person in that State or Territory or to a non-parole period  fixed in respect 
of that sentence.’ This means that the law governing the commencement of federal sentences differs 
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characteristic does not detract from the overall operation of a guiding model in the 
federal jurisdiction. 
 
Some jurisdictions such as New South Wales have highly-regulated frameworks. In 
New South Wales, the legislature has, via statute, created a sentencing council,270 a 
system of guideline judgments271 and mandatory minimum penalties.272 These 
processes have sought to constrain judicial discretion appreciably, however, it has 
not reached the point where it could be identified as operating under a different 
model. New South Wales could be seen as pushing towards a ‘prescriptive model’ 
where the role for judges to develop new sentencing principles is curtailed. The 
High Court has been resistant to legislative efforts to restrain judicial sentencing 
discretion.273 Currently, New South Wales sentencing courts and appellate courts 
continue to play a vital role in developing common law sentencing principles.   
 
2. Purposes of Sentencing 
The purposes of sentencing are recognised in Australian sentencing statutes. The 
practice of providing a discrete legislative list of purposes for which a court may 
impose a sentence has been adopted in the ACT, NSW, NT, Qld, SA, Tas and Vic.274 
The federal jurisdiction also lists the purposes of sentencing but these have been 
incorporated within a provision addressing sentencing factors.275 Western 
Australia is unique in that it does not have a dedicated purposes section, nor are 
the purposes of sentencing located with sections of the Act that deal with 
‘principles of sentencing’,276 ‘aggravating factors’,277 and ‘mitigating factors’.278  
 
                                                          
depending upon which jurisdiction the offender is being sentenced. Importantly the federal provision, s 
16E(2), does not provide an approach that applies to all federal offenders but rather permits a court to 
pick up and apply local sentencing provisions where they fall within the two categories outlined in s 
16AE(2). 
270 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) pt 8B. 
271 Ibid pt 3, div 4. 
272 See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss19B and 25B. The move towards mandatory minimum penalties 
commenced with the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 
2002 (NSW). 
273 See, eg, Wong (2001) 207 CLR 584. 
274 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A, 
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1), Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 3 and 9, Sentencing Act 
2017 (SA) ss 3 and 4; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 1 and 5, Sentencing 
Act 1995 (WA) s 6. 
275 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2). 
276 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6. 
277 Ibid s 7. 
278 Ibid s 8. 
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The current formulation of legislative lists of sentencing purposes has been subject 
to significant criticism because they ‘incorporate a mix of utilitarian and 
retributive sentencing objectives.’279 As a result the listed purposes of sentencing 
conflict with each other; a practice which has been described by Andrew Ashworth 
as a ‘cafeteria style’280 or ‘pick-and-mix’281 approach to sentencing.282 Table 4, 
below, shows the purposes of sentencing and their recognition in the Australian 
states and territories.  
 
Table 4: Purposes of Sentencing in Australian Legislation 
 
Purposes ACT CTH NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC 
Adequately punished in a way that is just 
 
Y Y* Y* Y Y N N Y 
Deterrence (both specific and general 
recognised) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Rehabilitation 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Denunciation 
 
Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Make the offender accountable 
 
Y N Y N N Y N N 
Incapacitation (expressed as protect the 
community from the offender) 
Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Recognise harm done to the victim of the 
crime and community 
Y Y** Y N N Y Y N 
* The provision states that there is a need to ensure that the defendant is adequately punished for the offence, however, 
there is no express mention that this be ‘in a way that is just’ which is the language adopted in elsewhere in Australia. 
** Section 16A(2)(ea) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) requires recognition of the harm suffered as a result of the offence upon 
any individual who tenders a victim impact statement however there is no broader recognition of harm done to the 
community within s 16A(2). 
 
                                                          
279 Kenneth J Arenson, Mirko Bagaric and Peter Gilles, Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law 
Jurisdictions Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 11. 
280 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1995) 331. 
281 See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2005) 
74; Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 77.  
282 Other prominent and outspoken critics of conflicting purposes of sentencing include: Mirko Bagaric, 
'Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere' (1999) 21(4) The Sydney Law Review 597; Mirko Bagaric and 
Richard Edney, 'What's Instinct Got to do with it? A Blueprint for a Coherent Approach to Punishing 
Criminals' (2003) 27 Criminal Law Journal 119; Marvin Frankel, ‘Lawlessness in Sentencing’ in Andreas 
von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and 
Policy (Hart Publishing, 3rd ed, 2009) 237; Cyrus Tata, ‘Institutional Consistency: Appeal Court 
Judgements’ in Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts (eds), Principled Sentencing: 
Readings on Theory and Policy (Hart Publishing, 3rd ed, 2009) 276, 278. 
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The High Court has acknowledged that sentencing purposes do point in different 
directions, however, it has endorsed their role in the process of determining an 
appropriate sentence. In Veen v The Queen [No 2], Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and 
Toohey JJ stated: 
The purposes of criminal punishment are various: protection of society, 
deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend, 
retribution and reform. The purposes overlap and none of them can be 
considered in isolation from the others when determining what is an 
appropriate sentence in a particular case. They are guideposts to the 
appropriate sentence but sometimes they point in different directions.283 
Generally, the purposes of sentencing are located in Australian statutes within 
division of the Act dealing with general principles.  
 
In the Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria the statutes expressly provide 
that a court may impose a sentence upon an offender only for the purposes listed 
within the statute.284 The Victorian statute further proscriptively ties the listed 
purposes of sentencing into the process of determining an appropriate sentence 
via the operation of s 5(3) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). This section provides 
that ‘A court must not impose a sentence that is more severe than that which is 
necessary to achieve the purpose or purposes for which the sentence is 
imposed.’285  
 
The Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales provisions are not 
expressed in this restrictive manner. Section 7(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 
2005 (ACT) states that ‘A court may impose a sentence on an offender for 1 or 
more of the following purposes…’. Similarly, in New South Wales section 3A of the 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) states ‘The purposes for which a 
court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows…’. The language 
adopted in these legislative provisions does not constrain the courts to only those 
 
                                                          
283 Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476. 
284 See Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1); Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic) s 5(1). 
285 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(3). 
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purposes of sentencing listed as it adopts permissive language (ie. may impose);286 
there is an absence of an express legislative restriction to the listed purposes.  
 
Unlike the other Australian jurisdictions, in Tasmania, the listed purposes of 
sentencing are captured under a provision dealing with the ‘Purposes of the Act’.287 
This may permit resort to other purposes of sentencing beyond those recognised 
in the Act. But the placement of the purposes of sentencing within the purposes of 
the Act is an interesting approach. This placement and its potential for statutory 
interpretation analysis has not been addressed before the courts. It is unknown 
whether it would restrict courts sentencing Tasmanian offenders to these 
purposes only. Warner is of the view that courts would regard the list as non-
exhaustive.288  
 
The protection of the community could be classified as a purpose of sentencing 
encapsulating the purpose of ‘incapacitation’. As shown in Table 1 above it is 
widely recognised in this context in legislation throughout Australia. A noticeable 
shift in sentencing policy is the explicit articulation of ‘protection of the 
community’ as a primary consideration in sentencing. For example, in Tasmania, 
the protection of the community is expressed as a ‘primary consideration’.289 In 
Queensland the legislation provides that the ‘protection of the Queensland 
community is a paramount consideration’.290  
 
In 2007, the South Australian Parliament passed the Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
(Dangerous Offenders) Amendment Act 2007 (SA) which introduced paragraph (1b) 
into s 10 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). The new paragraph 
stated: ‘A primary policy of the criminal law is to protect the safety of the 
community.’291 This ‘policy’ of the criminal law was placed within s 10 which 
placed it alongside other sentencing factors (and purposes of sentencing).  
 
 
                                                          
286 DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 
2011) 348-349. 
287 Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3. 
288 Kate Warner et al, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 65. 
289 Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3(b). 
290 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 3(b). 
291 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1b). 
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In December 2012, s 10 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) was 
amended by the Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Guilty Pleas) Amendment Act 2012 
(SA).292 This revision of the statute meant that while the protection of the 
community received legislative recognition in South Australia it was no longer 
articulated as a ‘primary policy’. However, this was expressly changed with the 
introduction of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA).  Section 3 now provides ‘the primary 
purpose for sentencing a defendant for an offence is to protect the safety of the 
community (whether as individuals or in general).’ 
 
As described above, WA does not list purposes of sentencing. However, s 6(4)(b) of 
the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) does provide that a court must not impose a 
sentence of imprisonment unless ‘the protection of the community requires it’.  
Protection of the community is also granted legislative recognition in Div 2A which 
was introduced in 2012.293 Div 2A sets out what are labelled as the ‘principal 
objectives’ of sentencing where declared criminal organisations are involved. 
These principal objectives include denunciation and protection of the 
community.294 While the protection of the community is not listed as a primary 
purpose in Western Australia, it is still clearly granted a privileged position. 
 
There is widespread recognition of the protection of the community in sentencing 
statutes in Australia. It is also being granted significance as a primary policy of 
sentencing. This is a developing area to watch in respect of sentencing practices 
within Australia. The effect of privileging some purposes of sentencing is an 
important field for future research studies.  
 
3. Principle of Last Resort  
An important inclusion in sentencing legislation is the legislative recognition of the 
common law principle of last resort. The common law principle of last resort 
requires imprisonment to be imposed only when no other penalty can achieve the 
objectives of the law; where no other sanction is appropriate in the 
 
                                                          
292 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(2)(a) ‘In determining the sentence for an offence, a 
court must give proper effect to the following: (a) the need to protect the safety of the community…’ 
293 See Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (WA) which received assent 29 November 2012. 
294 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 9C(2). 
 74 
circumstances.295 In the late 1970s, the Law Reform Commission endorsed the 
principle as the best way to achieve ‘rational and humane sentencing’.296 It was 
also recommended in The Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons 
(‘Nagle Report’).297 The principle first appeared in legislation in 1982 in the Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth).298 Today, it is an embedded sentencing principle. In fact, it has been 
recognised in legislation in all jurisdictions except for the Northern Territory and 
Tasmanian statutes.299 
 
In the federal provision courts are directed not to impose a sentence of 
imprisonment unless satisfied ‘that no other sentence is appropriate in all of the 
circumstances of the case’.300 Similarly, the principle is expressed in the ACT and 
NSW such that a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed ‘if the court is satisfied, 
having considered possible alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate.’301 
The original Victorian provision also adopted this language,302 however, the 
current expression of the last resort principle in Victoria expressly directs the 
court to consider the purposes of sentencing. Section 5(4) of the Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic) provides that a court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment 
‘unless it considers that the purposes or purposes for which the sentence is 
imposed cannot be achieved by a sentence that does not involve the confinement 
of the offender.’ 
 
In Western Australia and South Australia, the last resort principle is qualified by 
the allowance of community protection considerations. For example, s 6(4) of the 
 
                                                          
295 See Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Discussion Paper No 15 (1980) 16; 
Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Penalties, Discussion Paper No 30 (1987) 6. 
296 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Reform Options, Discussion Paper No 10 (1979) 8.  
297 New South Wales, Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons, Report of the Royal 
Commission into New South Wales Prisons (Nagle Report) (1978) 423. See generally David Brown et al, 
‘The Nagle Report – 25 Years on Symposium’ (2004) 16(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 93, 95; 
Women in Prison Task Force, Parliament of New South Wales, Report of the NSW Women in Prison Task 
Force (1985) 122, 126; Maureen Miner and Angela Gorta, Changing Conditions in a Women's Prison 
1972-1984, Research Publication No 11 (NSW Department of Corrective Services, 1986) 6. 
298 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Penalties, Discussion Paper No 30 (1987) 6, 97. See also 
discussion of this in Stewart (1994) 72 A Crim R 17, 23. 
299 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 17A; Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 10(2); Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 5(1); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(a)(i); Sentencing Act 
2017 (SA) s 10; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(4); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(4). 
300 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 17A(1). 
301 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 10(2). See also Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 
(NSW) s 5(1). 
302 Penalties and Sentences Act 1985 (Vic) s 11. 
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Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary 
only where ‘the seriousness of the offence is such that only imprisonment can be 
justified or the protection of the community requires it’.303  
 
4. Current Sentencing Practices 
In the ACT and Victoria there is the legislative recognition to the relevance of 
taking into account ‘current sentencing practice’ in determining an appropriate 
sentence.304 These are established provisions within the sentencing statutes of 
these two jurisdictions. However, in 2008 Freiberg observed, in writing on the 
state of statistical information on sentencing in Victoria, that very little information 
on current sentencing practices has been available to courts.305 Although, the 
Victorian Government created the Sentencing Advisory Council in 2004 and this 
body has been collecting data on sentencing.306The availability of information on 
current sentencing practices in the ACT has also been limited; with this jurisdiction 
only developing a sentencing database in December 2013.307  
 
Once again, this is an aspect of Australian sentencing that is currently changing. 
The appearance of sentencing information systems in Australia and the associated 
change in policy allowing the release of the Office of the Commonwealth Director 
of Public Prosecutions sentencing statistics to a broader audience has meant that 
determining ‘current sentencing practices’ is becoming a viable sentencing 
consideration.308  
 
In terms of federal sentencing, local sentencing practices are not relevant to 
determining an appropriate federal sentence, but federal sentencing practices 
 
                                                          
303 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(4). See also Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 10(2)(b). 
304 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1)(z); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(b). 
305 Arie Freiberg, ‘The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council: incorporating community views into the 
sentencing process’ in Arie Freiberg and Karen Gelb (eds) Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and 
Sentencing Policy (Hawkins Press, 2008) 148, 157. 
306 See, eg, ‘Sentencing Snapshots’ in Victoria State Government, Sentencing Advisory Council (18 
March 2014) < https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/snapshot>. 
307 See ACT Sentencing Database Unit, ACT Sentencing Database (3 December 2013) ACT Supreme 
Court <http://www.courts.act.gov.au/supreme/practitioners/act_sentencing_database_actsd>. On the 
quality of sentencing statistics in the Australian Capital Territory see also ACT Law Reform Advisory 
Council, A Report on Suspended Sentences in the ACT, Report 1 (2010) 7, 25-27. 
308 Cf. Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 535; R v Hasan (2010) 222 A Crim R 306, 318. 
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across Australia are an important consideration.309 In R v Pham, (French CJ, Keane 
and Nettle JJ) stated:  
Part IB of the Crimes Act does not specifically provide for sentencing judges to 
take current sentencing practices into account [but]…it is implicit in Pt IB of the 
Crimes Act that a sentencing judge must have regard to current sentencing 
practices throughout the Commonwealth.310 
The High Court in DPP v Dalgliesh (A Pseudonym)311 held that ‘current sentencing 
practices’ in s 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) was one sentencing factor 
that is to be taken into account in determining an appropriate sentence. It was 
found that it is not a controlling factor over the other relevant factors and it not to 
be treated as something conceptually different.312 
 
5. Principle of Proportionality 
Criminologists and legal academics have provided accounts of the shifts within 
Australia from a utilitarian model to a rehabilitative model to a retributive model 
of punishment.313 Contemporary retributive philosophy is tied into the ‘just 
deserts’ movement;314 with the core policy of ‘just deserts’ theory being that the 
amount of punishment imposed should be proportionate to the level of 
wrongdoing.315 In Hoare v The Queen,316 the High Court stated, 
A basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed 
by a court should never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in the light of its objective 
circumstances.317 
 
                                                          
309 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, [32] (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ) 
310 R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550, 557 (French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ). 
311 (2017) 91 ALJR 1063. 
312 Ibid 1075 (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ); 1077 (Gageler and Gordon JJ). 
313 See, generally Melissa Bull, Punishment & Sentencing: Risk, Rehabilitation and Restitution (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 24 – 35; Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Scholarship in Australia’ (2006-2007) 18(2) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 241, 249, 255; Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation 
Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 63; Mirko Bagaric and Kumar Amarasekara, ‘The Errors of Retributivism’ (2000) 24 
Melbourne University Law Review 124; Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: 
Principles and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 10 – 14; Geraldine Mackenzie and Nigel 
Stobbs, Principles of Sentencing (The Federation Press, 2010) 1 – 4; George Zdenkowski, ‘Sentencing 
Trends: Past, Present and Prospective’ in Duncan Chappell and Paul Wilson (eds), Crime and the 
Criminal Justice System in Australia: 2000 and Beyond (Butterworths, 2000) 161, 162. 
314 See generally Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the 
Principles (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
315 Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of 
Criminals (Rutgers University Press, 1985) 10. 
316 (1989) 167 CLR 348. 
317 Ibid 354. 
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This is the principle of proportionality and it has also received statutory 
recognition within Australia.318 The principle of proportionality is an important 
principle within Australian sentencing319 that has a bearing on the impact of family 
hardship in sentencing as will be seen in the cases analysed in Chapters Four and 
Five. 
 
Adherence to the principle of proportionality in Australia does have a significant 
impact on the approach to determining a sentence. As Preston J has explained: 
It fixes the upper limit because a sentence should never exceed that which can 
be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime 
considered in light of its objective circumstances. It fixes the lower limit 
because allowance for the subjective factors of the case, particularly of the 
offender, cannot produce a sentence which fails to reflect the objective gravity 
or seriousness of the offence or the objectives of punishment such as 
retribution and general and individual deterrence.320 
The rise of retributive justice has also seen a focus upon the circumstances of the 
offence to the detriment of the individual circumstances of the offender on a policy 
level. The study of Australian case law will show that the principle of 
proportionality does impact upon the mitigatory effect of family hardship.  
 
6. Sentencing Factors 
The traditional account of sentencing factors in legislation in Australia has been to 
provide a broad statement that the court is to take account of any aggravating and 
mitigating factors.321 Such an approach did not specify what those factors might be 
and the exercise of the sentencing power was constrained only by common law 
principles. There was then a shift towards providing a non-exhaustive list of 
sentencing factors. Such factors could be found by a sentencing court to be either 
aggravating or mitigating dependent upon the circumstances of the individual case. 
 
                                                          
318 See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(1) (‘…a court must impose a sentence or make an order that is 
of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence’); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(1) (‘A 
sentence imposed on an offender must be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence.’).  
Moreover, within the purposes section of Sentencing Acts a requirement ‘that the offender is adequately 
punished’ incorporates the common law principle of proportionality see R v Scott [2005] NSWCCA 152 
(18 April 2005), [15] (Howie J, Grove and Barr JJ). 
319 Veen v The Queen [No 1] (1979) 143 CLR 458; Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472. 
320 Justice Brian Preston, ‘Principled Sentencing for Environmental Offences- Part 2: Sentencing 
Considerations and Options’ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 142, 142. 
321 See, eg, the approach taken in Victoria and the Northern Territory described below. 
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While factors would be known to be commonly aggravating or mitigating the 
legislature did not seek to lock such determinations into statute.322 
 
Providing a list of matters relevant to sentencing has become a common feature in 
Australian sentencing legislation. It has been adopted in each Australian 
jurisdiction except Tasmania and Western Australia.323 Despite the move towards 
providing legislative recognition to sentencing factors, there is no consistency in 
the ‘look and feel’ of these lists across Australia. There is variation in both the 
format adopted (when setting out listed sentencing factors) and variation in the 
sentencing factors recognised in the legislative lists within each jurisdiction.324   
 
The one common approach that has been adopted is that the lists of factors are all 
acknowledged as being non-exhaustive.325 Accordingly in Australia, it remains the 
practice that judicial discretion in the exercise of determining an appropriate 
sentence is broad and that other relevant non-listed circumstances may be taken 
into account. Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo succinctly describe 
the role of sentencing factors within the sentencing process as follows: 
At the sentencing hearing, the judge is presented with an array of facts (or 
factors) by the prosecution and defendant, all of which are claimed to be 
relevant to the sentencing decision. The judge has the formidable task of sifting 
through these facts and deciding what weight, if any, should be attached to each 
of them. In this exercise, the judge must bear in mind the significance of these 
facts to the justifications or aims of sentencing. Additionally, account must be 
taken of sentencing laws and practice as well as current attitudes of the public 
towards the offence, the offender and punishment.326 
 
                                                          
322 Cf. The current NSW Sentencing Act, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A. Note 
that the first Sentencing Act in NSW did not allocate mitigating or aggravating sentencing factors see 
Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW). 
323 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2), Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33, Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A, Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) ss 5(2) and 6A, Penalties and Sentences 
Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2), Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 11; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2). 
324 This is explained further below. 
325 See reference within the provision to a courts ability to take into account ‘any other relevant 
circumstances’: Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(3); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(2)(s); 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(r); Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 11(2); Sentencing Act 1991 
(Vic) s 5(2)(g). See also ‘in addition to any other matters’: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2); Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(1). 
326 Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (Oxford University 
Press, 5th ed, 2014) 246. 
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Therefore, across Australia the judicial exercise of determining an appropriate 
sentence for an individual offender remains a discretionary and an intuitive 
process (discussed further below).  
 
An interesting feature of the statutory lists of sentencing factors is that the 
language adopted, in respect of consideration to be given to listed factors, is 
generally obligatory. For example, s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) states ‘In 
addition to any other matters, the court must take into account such of the 
following matters as are relevant and known to the court…’.327  Therefore, where 
any of the listed matters in the federal provision are relevant and known, the court 
must take these into account in determining the appropriate sentence to impose 
upon a federal offender. Justices Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne drew attention to 
this language in Wong328 and observed s16A ‘obliges’329 judicial officers to take 
them into account. The other jurisdictions within Australia, which provide listed 
matters, also adopt obligatory language.330  
 
The obligation extends only so far as requiring judges to take those matters into 
account, however, it is for the court to then determine the weight to be attached to 
each matter (if any) and to balance all relevant circumstances in determining an 
appropriate sentence. This process is expressly addressed in New South Wales, 
where the legislation states: 
The fact that any such aggravating or mitigating factor is relevant and known to 
the court does not require the court to increase or reduce the sentence for the 
offence.331  
Therefore, in those jurisdictions where lists of sentencing factors are provided, 
courts must have consideration to any listed factors when they are put before the 
 
                                                          
327 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2). 
328 (2001) 207 CLR 584. 
329 Ibid 610. 
330 The legislation in these jurisdictions states ‘must have regard to…’ see Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 
(ACT) s 33, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A, Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(2), 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2), Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1), 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2). New South Wales is the only jurisdiction that does not use the term 
‘must have regard to…’; nonetheless, s 21A does state that ‘the court is to take into account the following 
matters.’ 
331 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(5). 
 80 
court. In the process of determining an appropriate sentence the court may find 
that a factor is not relevant or that a factor should not be given significant weight.  
 
Moreover, courts have held that lists of sentencing factors are not checklists such 
that each matter is required to be specifically addressed in the sentencing remarks. 
For example, in respect to s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Hunt J in Ferrer-
Esis332 said:  
It should be said that that legislation only requires the sentencing judge to take 
those matters into account; it does not require judges always to refer to each of 
them when explaining the sentence imposed. Indeed, the act of sentencing is to 
a large extent incapable of being fitted into such a straitjacket, and in most 
cases it is unnecessary for the judge to expose the precise reasoning by which 
the ultimate sentence has been reached… It is only where the judge has formed 
a particular view in relation to one or more of these items which would not 
otherwise be apparent in the circumstances of the case that reference should be 
made to the particular items in the judge’s remarks on sentence, so that no 
erroneous conclusion would otherwise be drawn in relation to those 
matters.333 
Despite all of these features, those sentencing factors that do appear in the list are 
being prescriptively recognised as general sentencing factors within that particular 
jurisdiction.   
 
In this context, and because the effect of a sentence upon an offender’s family or 
dependants is not a matter that has conventionally received much attention in 
sentencing discourse, it is significant that the matter has been granted legislative 
recognition and has appeared in some lists as an enumerated matter. Chapter One 
explained the role of 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which houses a list of 
federal sentencing factors. Chapter Three will describe how family hardship came 
to be a listed matter in the federal legislation and in the ACT and in SA.334 
 
(a) Australian Capital Territory 
Chapter 2 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) sets out the ‘Objects and 
important concepts’. The broad objects of the Act are located in s 6. These are 
clearly framed from within an individualised justice framework as they make 
 
                                                          
332 (1991) 55 A Crim R 231. 
333 Ibid 237-238 (Hunt J, Gleeson CJ and Lee CJ at CL agreeing). 
334 Crimes Act 1994 (Cth), Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) and Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 
(SA). From 2017 family hardship was removed from the legislative list of factors in South Australia. 
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explicit reference to providing a range of sentencing options, promoting flexibility 
in sentencing, and maximizing opportunities for sentences to be adapted to 
individual offenders.335 The purposes of sentencing are listed within this chapter in 
s 7 and the meaning of ‘offender’ is defined in s 8. In Chapter 4 ‘Sentencing 
Procedures Generally’ a legislative list of sentencing factors is provided in s 33336 
Family hardship is listed as a sentencing factor in this section337 and this is 
discussed further in Chapter Three. 
 
(b) New South Wales 
Part 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) is entitled ‘Sentencing 
Procedures Generally’. The factors relevant to the determination of an appropriate 
sentence are located within div 1 of this part in s 21A.  The framework set out by 
this section differs from approaches adopted in other Australian jurisdictions. 
Section 21A identifies a number of sentencing factors and specifies whether they 
are either aggravating factors (s 21A(2)) or mitigating factors (s 21A(3)).  
 
A legislative determination of whether a specific factor will have a positive or 
negative effect upon sentence is unique in the Australian context.338 The approach 
taken to mitigating and aggravating factors under the NSW model is that where a 
factor is raised, which is listed within subsection (2) or (3) of the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), the discretion at the hands of the 
sentencing judge is exercised in respect to a determination of relevance and weight 
to be provided to individual factors.  
 
Of the thirteen factors specifically identified as mitigating factors in subsection (3), 
the probable effect of the sentence upon the offender’s family or dependants is not 
listed. Nonetheless, s 21A(1) clearly sets out that the list of matters provided are 
non-exhaustive and that they are in addition to any other matters that are required 
or permitted to be taken into account. Therefore, consideration of family hardship 
 
                                                          
335 See Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 6 (b), (c) and (d). 
336 See Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33. 
337 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1)(o). 
338 The ALRC has since the late 1980s, preferred the traditional approach towards lists of sentencing 
factors (as outlined above) and has not supported a shift towards the NSW model. The Northern Territory 
has taken steps in this direction with the inclusion of s 6A of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) that provides 
a list of recognised aggravating factors. 
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as a factor is governed by the common law and sentencing judges are able to take it 
into account as a mitigating factor under the common law principle.  
 
(c) Northern Territory 
Part 2 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) sets out ‘General principles’ of sentencing. 
There are three sections within this part:  
 Sentencing Guidelines (s 5),  
 Factors to be considered in determining an offender’s character (s 6), and  
 Aggravating Factors (s 6A).339  
Section 5(2) provides a list of sentencing factors that the court must have regard to 
in sentencing an offender. The list ranges from (a) through to (s) and is clearly 
stated to be non-exhaustive.340 Section 6A sets out a statutory list of eight factors 
that may be regarded as aggravating. 
 
The probable effect of the sentence upon the offender’s family or dependants is not 
a listed factor within s 5(2) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT). However, paragraph 
(f) provides that the court must have regard to ‘the presence of any aggravating or 
mitigating factor concerning the offender’. Therefore, consideration of family 
hardship as a factor is governed by the common law and sentencing judges are 
able to take it into account as a mitigating factor under the common law principle.  
 
(d) Queensland 
Section 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) sets out what are described 
as the ‘Sentencing guidelines’ in operation in Queensland. The matters, which are 
identified as guidelines, include a provision on the purposes for sentencing, a non-
exhaustive list of sentencing factors and the express recognition of two general 
sentencing principles. The first of these principles is that imprisonment is a 
sentence of last resort (discussed above).341 The second general principle is an 
interesting addition to the Queensland Act. The legislature has recognised that in 
sentencing an offender the court must have regard to the general principle that ‘a 
sentence that allows the offender to stay in the community is preferable’.342 This 
 
                                                          
339 Sentencing Act 1995 (NT). 
340 Ibid s 5(2)(s) ‘any other relevant circumstance’. 
341 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9 (2)(a)(i). 
342 Ibid s 9 (2)(a)(ii). 
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reference is to a limited form of the broader common law principle of parsimony. 
Its legislative recognition could have important consequences in the sentencing of 
offenders with dependants. 
 
Section 9(2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) provides the list of 
sentencing factors to which the court must have regard. An extensive list is 
provided, from (a) through to (r), however the effect of the sentence upon an 
offender’s dependants is not identified in this list of matters. However, this list of 
matters is not exhaustive. Consideration of this factor by a sentencing court in 
Queensland could arise in respect of paragraph (g) (‘the presence of any 
aggravating or mitigating factors’) and paragraph (r) (‘any other relevant 
circumstance’). Therefore, consideration of family hardship as a factor is governed 
by the common law and sentencing judges are able to take it into account as a 
mitigating factor under the common law principle. 
 
(e) South Australia 
In 2017, South Australia enacted the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). This new Act 
replaced the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). The Attorney-General in his 
second reading speech stated: 
…'The primary purpose for sentencing a defendant for an offence must be the 
protection of the safety of the community (whether as individuals or in general)'. 
Every sentencing purpose and principle in the Act and, therefore, in the 
sentencing process that it controls, must be subject to that overriding 
consideration. The provisions of the Bill emphasise the primacy of this purpose 
at every turn.343 
Consultation for the new Act began with the release of a Discussion Paper in 2015. 
Much of this paper dealt with sentencing options that were under consideration 
(such as Intensive Correction Orders). However, at page 8 it was noted ‘the 
Government is committed to sentencing reform whereby the safety of the 
community must be the paramount consideration in sentencing’.344 Therefore, it is 
apparent the recent reforms were prompted by a political desire to identify a 
 
                                                          
343 South Australia, Hansard, House of Assembly, 16 November 2016, 7884 (J.R. Rau, Attorney-
General). 
344 South Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Transforming Criminal Justice – 
Better Sentencing Options: Creating the Best Outcomes for Our Community, Discussion Paper (June 
2015) 8. 
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primary purpose of sentencing in South Australia and for that purpose to be the 
protection of the community.  
 
The Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) retained a legislative provision setting out a list of 
sentencing factors. This list now appears in s 11 of the Act. Prior to 2017, family 
hardship was a listed sentencing factor in this jurisdiction. How family hardship 
came to be listed and the operation of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) 
will be discussed in Chapter Three. However, family hardship has been omitted 
from the factors set out in s 11 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). Therefore, it is no 
longer a listed factor in South Australia. Consideration of family hardship as a 
factor is governed by the common law and sentencing judges are able to take it 
into account as a mitigating factor under the common law principle. 
 
In introducing these reforms there was no explicit consideration of the omission of 
family hardship from the sentencing factors. In the second reading speech, the 
Attorney-General states that s 11 can be compared with s 10 of the repealed Act. 
No specific acknowledgment was provided for the absence of family hardship. 
However, in discussing ‘General Principles’ in his second reading speech the 
Attorney-General noted the review began with a detailed consideration of the NSW 
Law Reform Commission Report 139.345 This Report had followed the traditional 
NSW approach of marginalising consideration of family hardship.346 The NSW Law 
Reform Commission Report included ‘effect of offender’s family or dependants’ 
under the heading ‘Other factors we recommend not be included’.347 
 
(f) Tasmania 
The minimalist approach taken by the Tasmanian legislature means that it has not 
chosen to address general principles or sentencing guidelines within the 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). This is a unique approach to sentencing legislation in 
Australia. The Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) deals with ‘General Sentencing Powers’ 
that include the types of orders that the court may impose upon an offender. The 
 
                                                          
345 South Australia, Hansard, House of Assembly, 16 November 2016, 7884 (J.R. Rau, Attorney-
General). 
346 This NSW Report and position is discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 
347 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 139 (2013) 94. 
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Act then engages with procedural matters and sets up legislative frameworks that 
govern the operation of sentencing orders that may be imposed in Tasmania.  
 
The lack of a ‘Governing Principles’ part to this Act is a notable omission given the 
broad policy aims set out in the Act’s purposes section. Section 3 of the Sentencing 
Act 1997 (Tas) provides eight broad purposes of the Act. Some of these listed 
purposes are common purposes of sentencing and have been discussed above. 
However, this section states that the purpose of the Act is threefold, namely to: 
 promote consistency in the sentencing of offenders;  
 promote public understanding of sentencing practices and procedures; and 
 set out the objectives of sentencing and related orders.348 
These purposes are indicative of broad sentencing aims or of an underlying policy 
framework in operation in Tasmania.  
 
In 2016 and 2017, some very limited offence349 and offender350 specific sentencing 
factors were introduced into the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), however, providing a 
statutory enumeration of relevant general sentencing factors and formally 
recognising general governing sentencing principles, as has occurred in the other 
jurisdictions, would enhance rather than hinder the listed purposes within the 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). Nevertheless, consideration of family hardship as a 
factor is governed by the common law and sentencing judges are able to take it 
into account as a mitigating factor under the common law principle. 
 
(g) Victoria 
Part 2 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provides the ‘Governing Principles’ for 
sentencing offenders in Victoria. The part is made up of three sections:  
 Sentencing Guidelines (s 5), 
 Factors to be considered in determining an offender’s character (s 6), and 
 Sentence discount for guilty plea (s 6AAA).351  
 
 
                                                          
348 See Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3(c), (f) and (g) respectively. 
349 Sentencing Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016 (Tas). 
350 Sentencing Amendment (Racial Motivation) Act 2017 (Tas). 
351 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 
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Section 5 sets out what are described as ‘sentencing guidelines’.  A short list of 
sentencing factors that a court must consider is provided in s 5(2)(a)–(g) of the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). At paragraph (g) the provision states that the court must 
have regard to ‘the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the 
offender or of any other relevant circumstances’. Therefore, consideration of 
family hardship as a factor is governed by the common law and sentencing judges 
are able to take it into account as a mitigating factor under the common law 
principle. 
 
(h) Western Australia 
Part 2 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) sets out ‘General matters’ of sentencing and 
the first division within Pt 2 houses ‘sentencing principles’. There are four sections 
within Div 1 these are: 
 Principles of Sentencing (s 6), 
 Aggravating Factors (s 7), 
 Mitigating Factors (s 8), 
 Plea of guilty, sentence may be reduced in case of (s 9AA).352 
The principle of proportionality is contained within s 6(1) of the Sentencing Act 
1995 (WA). Section 6(2) sets out that the seriousness of an offence must be 
determined by taking into account the statutory penalty, the circumstances of the 
commission of the offence and any aggravating and mitigating factors.353  
 
Aggravating and mitigating factors are represented in ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing 
Act 1995 (WA). The approach adopted in Western Australia is not comparable to 
the NSW model, which is the only other Australian jurisdiction to address 
aggravating and mitigating factors in explicit sections. In contrast to NSW (which 
provides an extensive list of both aggravating and mitigating factors) the approach 
adopted in Western Australia is to describe or define what an aggravating factor is 
and what a mitigating factor is. For example, s 8(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 
(WA) provides ‘Mitigating factors are factors which, in the courts opinion, decrease 
the culpability of the offender or decrease the extent to which the offender should 
be punished.’ Section 8 then proscribes that a plea of guilty is a mitigating factor (s 
 
                                                          
352 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). 
353  Ibid 6(2). 
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8(2), criminal property confiscation is not a mitigating factor (s 8(3) but see (3a)) 
and assistance to law enforcement can reduce a sentence.  
 
It would therefore be a considerable stretch to describe s 8 of the Sentencing Act 
1995 (WA) as outlining a list of sentencing factors comparable to the lists provided 
in the other jurisdictions. In this respect, Western Australian is similar to Tasmania 
in that the statute does not provide a list of sentencing factors. Nonetheless, the 
Western Australian statute does engage with sentencing principles and the broad 
statutory definition of a mitigating factor means that common law family hardship 
could be taken into account in sentencing an offender in Western Australia. 
 
 
III JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
 
The act of determining an appropriate sentence is a judicial function. In Mohlasedi 
v The Queen, Roberts-Smith JA stated, ‘the imposition of a sentence is an exercise of 
judicial discretion.’354 In Barbaro v The Queen the plurality of the High Court, 
endorsed its earlier statement in GAS v The Queen,355 that ‘…it is for the sentencing 
judge, alone, to decide what sentence will be imposed.’356 In the reflecting on the 
discretion exercised by sentencing judges, Gaegeler J stated: 
…the sentence to be imposed by the court need not be a sentence which is 
uniquely correct. The range of sentences capable of being characterised as of a 
severity appropriate in all the circumstances of a particular offence is set by the 
time-honoured requirement implicit in the section [s16A(1) of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth)]that sentencing discretion “must be exercised judicially, according 
to rules of reason and justice”.357 
Therefore, judicial discretion is a central component of the act of sentencing. 
 
A. Instinctive Synthesis 
 
The High Court has given clear direction on the appropriate approach to 
sentencing within Australia. The High Court has endorsed the ‘instinctive 
 
                                                          
354 [2006] WASCA 267, [23]. 
355 (2004) 217 CLR 198. 
356 Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58, 76. 
357 Ibid 77. 
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synthesis’ approach to sentencing and has rejected approaches that structure 
judicial discretion such as guideline judgments358  or staged approaches to 
sentencing.359 Australia is the only common law country to identify the process as 
an ‘instinctive synthesis’360 approach.361  
  
Justice McHugh has described the ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach as follows:  
By instinctive synthesis, I mean the method of sentencing by which the judge 
identifies all the factors that are relevant to sentence, discusses their 
significance and then makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate 
sentence given all the factors of the case.362 
This means that the act of determining an appropriate sentence is a fluid process, 
rather than a rigid or mathematical one. It is an approach which requires a judicial 
officer to operate in a broad and complex arena, weighing up and balancing 
numerous sentencing factors before making a holistic determination of the 
appropriate sentence for the offender. Chief Justice Allsop of the Federal Court of 
Australia has recently described the Australian approach to sentencing in the 
following terms: 
When…one comes to sentencing, certainty gives way to equality, humanity and 
a regard for the individual. The importance of evaluative assessment by the 
court toward the reaching of just punishment that recognizes the humanity of 
the individual has been a feature of the High Court’s jurisprudence of the last 15 
years.363 
All Australian courts are required to adopt an instinctive synthesis approach to 
sentencing. 
 
The first reference to the term ‘instinctive synthesis’ that has been identified 
within Australia was in 1974, in the Victorian case of R v Williscroft.364 Justices 
Adam and Crockett said: 
 
                                                          
358 See especially Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 612 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and 
622 (Kirby J). 
359 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357. 
360 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 51 and 
449. 
361 Contrasted with structured models such as Federal Sentencing Guidelines established by the United 
States Sentencing Commission see http://www.ussc.gov; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines see 
http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/; Sentencing Guidelines established by the Sentencing Council in the 
United Kingdom see http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/sentencing-guidelines.htm. 
362 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 378. 
363 Chief Justice James Allsop, ‘Values in Public Law’ (Speech delivered at The James Spigelman 
Oration 2015, Sydney, 27 October 2015). 
364 R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292 (‘Williscroft’). 
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Now, ultimately every sentence imposed represents the sentencing judge’s 
instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects involved in the punitive process. 
Moreover, in our view, it is profitless (as it thought to be in Kane’s Case) to 
attempt to allot to the various considerations their proper part in the 
assessment of the particular punishments presently under examination. It is 
sufficient to say that in our opinion the learned Judge did not in the cases 
before him give to the aspects other than reformation the weight that ought to 
have been allotted to them. Or, in other words, he has undervalued the nature 
and circumstances and gravity of the offences of armed robbery and attempted 
armed robbery with the result that we are persuaded that his discretion has 
miscarried (emphasis added).365 
In Wong,366 the High Court approved Williscroft.  
 
In Wong, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ unequivocally supported the instinctive 
synthesis approach. They stated, in their joint judgment, that: 
[the two-stage approach to sentencing] …departs from principle because it 
does not take account of the fact that there are many conflicting and 
contradictory elements which bear upon sentencing an offender. Attributing a 
particular weight to some factors, while leaving the significance of all other 
factors substantially unaltered, may be quite wrong. We say “may be” quite 
wrong because the task of the sentencer is to take account of all of the relevant 
factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of all of them. 
That is what is meant by saying that the task is to arrive at an “instinctive 
synthesis”. This expression is used, not as might be supposed, to cloak the task 
of the sentencer in some mystery, but to make plain that the sentencer is called 
on to reach a single sentence which, in the case of an offence like the one now 
under discussion, balances many different and conflicting features.367 
The Wong decision is instructive on ‘instinctive synthesis’. However, the judgment 
makes clear that the instinctive synthesis approach was not seen as a novel 
approach to sentencing, but rather, an endorsement of the current practice of 
intermediate appellate courts.368  
 
Four years later the High Court confirmed its approval of the instinctive synthesis 
approach to sentencing in Markarian v The Queen369 (‘Markarian’). The plurality 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) held that: 
 
                                                          
365 Ibid 300. 
366 (2001) 207 CLR 584. 
367 Ibid 611. 
368 (2001) 207 CLR 584, 611. Citing R v Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, the joint judgment states, ‘the 
weight of authority in the intermediate appellate courts of this country is clearly against adopting two-
stage sentencing and favours the instinctive synthesis approach.’ 
369 (2005) 228 CLR 357. 
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[f]ollowing the decision of this Court in Wong it cannot now be doubted that 
sentencing courts may not add and subtract item by item from some apparently 
subliminally derived figure…370  
In Barbaro v The Queen,371 French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ, citing the earlier 
decision of Wong,372 reiterated that the appropriate approach to sentencing is not 
a mathematical process. The plurality stated: 
Sentencing an offender is not, and cannot be undertaken as, some exercise in 
addition or subtraction. A sentencing judge must reach a single sentence for 
each offence and must do so by balancing
 
many different and conflicting 
features.373 
Therefore, for over a decade the High Court has unfailingly demanded an 
‘instinctive synthesis’ approach to sentencing in Australia.374  
 
1. Aiming for ‘Reasonable Consistency’ 
In light of complaints about consistency and fairness in sentencing practices, 
attention has been directed to achieving what has been identified as ‘reasonable 
consistency’ in sentencing.  In the classic passage from Wong, Gleeson CJ identified 
this as: 
The outcome of discretionary decision-making can never be uniform, but it 
ought to depend as little as possible upon the identity of the judge who happens 
to hear the case. Like cases should be treated in like manner. The 
administration of criminal justice works as a system; not merely as a 
multiplicity of unconnected single instances. It should be systematically fair, 
and that involves, amongst other things, reasonable consistency. 
Most sentencing of offenders is dealt with as a matter of discretionary 
judgment. Within whatever tolerance is required by the necessary scope for 
individual discretion, reasonable consistency in sentencing is a requirement of 
justice (emphasis added).375 
Nine years later, the High Court in Hili affirmed that the type of consistency that 
courts should be striving for is ‘reasonable consistency’.376 The plurality stated: 
The consistency that is sought is consistency in the application of the relevant 
legal principles. And that requires consistency in the application of Pt IB of the 
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Crimes Act. When it is said that the search is for “reasonable consistency”, what 
is sought is the treatment of like cases alike, and different cases differently. 
Consistency of that kind is not capable of mathematical expression (emphasis 
added).377 
This aim was again endorsed by the plurality of the High Court in Lacey and in 
Barbaro.378 
 
 
 
2. Disapproval of Instinctive Synthesis 
The instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing has been subject to significant 
and sustained criticism from legal academics.379 Academic critique appears to fall 
comfortably within Cyrus Tata’s understanding of the ‘legal rationalist tradition’ 
whose members seek to ‘tame, confine, and structure discretion by recourse to 
rules.’380 For example, Bagaric has been highly critical of the disparities in 
sentencing arising from the broad discretion that is present within the current 
system.381  
 
There has also been judicial critique, however, this stems from a position that the 
instinctive synthesis approach does not reflect the steps taken in arriving at 
sentence. The predominate alternative approach to sentencing is the ‘two stage’ 
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Bagaric and Richard Edney, 'What's Instinct Got to do with it? A Blueprint for a Coherent Approach to 
Punishing Criminals' (2003) 27 Criminal Law Journal 119. 
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approach. The ‘two stage’ approach sees a court first, makes a quantified 
determination of the appropriate sentence and, secondly, the court makes 
adjustments to this figure based on identified aggravating and mitigating 
factors.382 Kirby J has argued that: 
so many judges in Australia, experienced in criminal trials and in sentencing, 
have expressed their disagreement with the approaches derived from 
Williscroft and Young, it is undesirable…for this Court…to impose those 
authorities on sentencing judges throughout the Commonwealth.383 
In Wong, Kirby J had failed to endorse the instinctive synthesis approach,384 and 
four years later, in his dissenting judgment in Markarian,385 he openly supported 
the two-stage approach delivering a strong critique of the joint reasons supporting 
instinctive synthesis.386 Justice Kirby observed that the ‘growing move of federal 
and state legislatures in Australia to spell out specific considerations that are to be 
taken into account in judicial sentencing’387 was an important change, indicative of 
an obligation for ‘sentencing courts and courts of criminal appeal to pay regard to 
aggravating and mitigating factors’,388 and to take adjustments in determining a 
sentence.389 
 
Over the years, the High Court has recognised criticisms to the instinctive 
synthesis approach yet has persistently supported this approach to sentencing. In 
Markarian, McHugh J defended the instinctive synthesis approach and observed: 
Critics of the instinctive synthesis method place too much emphasis on the 
“instinct” and too little on the “synthesis”. The use of the word “synthesis” in 
the context of sentencing identifies the very last part of the process. It 
recognises that, where a variety of considerations, often tending in opposing 
directions, operate in the context of a statutory maximum, there must finally be 
a quantification of the sentence to be imposed. There must be a synthesising of 
the relevant factors.390 
 
                                                          
382 See further, Ian Leader Elliott, ‘Editorial: Instinctive Synthesisers in The High Court’ (2002) 26 
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386 Ibid 406-407. 
387 Ibid 402. 
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389 See generally Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Review 2004-2005’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 355, 
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To further defend the instinctive synthesis approach within the current sentencing 
climate, McHugh J explained, 
One reason why the idea of instinctive synthesis is apparently abhorrent to 
lawyers who value predictability and transparency in sentencing is that they 
see the instinct of a sentencing judge as entirely subjective, personal, arbitrary 
and unconfined. In fact, although a sentencing judge does ultimately select a 
number, it is not from thin air that the judge selects it. The judicial air is thick 
with trends, statistics, appellate guidance and, often enough these days, 
statutory guidance.391 
The ‘trends, statistics, appellate guidance and… statutory guidance’ that McHugh J 
refers to in this passage will be explored later in this Chapter.  
 
Despite global shifts towards structured and standardised sentencing practices in 
the common law world, for example formulaic sentencing guidelines and grids,392 
the Australian sentencing framework has remained firmly wedded to broad 
discretion and instinctive sentencing practices. As has been seen above, this is 
because of the robust defence of an instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing by 
the High Court and their ardent protection of broad judicial discretion. The weight 
of authority and current composition of the High Court, indicates that the 
instinctive approach will prevail for the foreseeable future.  
 
Understanding the instinctive synthesis approach and the broader context of 
Australian sentencing practices is important content for this study. The instinctive 
synthesis approach to sentencing within Australia means that it is impossible to 
quantify the precise reduction provided by sentencing judges who take family 
hardship into account as a mitigating factor. The importance of this feature in 
respect of sentencing appeals is addressed further below.  
 
B. Individualised Justice 
 
If the instinctive synthesis approach describes the method by which judicial 
officers are to reach an appropriate sentence, the principle of individualised justice 
 
                                                          
391 Ibid 388. 
392 Discussed further in Chapter Three are the federal Sentencing Guidelines established by the United 
States Sentencing Commission see http://www.ussc.gov; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines see 
http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/; Sentencing Guidelines established by the Sentencing Council in the 
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 94 
may be described as the goal; Chief Justice Gleeson describing it as the ‘Holy 
Grail’.393 Internationally, the discourse of new penology has classified 
individualised justice as ‘individualized welfare justice’.394 Individualised justice 
recognises that the offender, the offence and the broader circumstances of the case 
are each unique and the sentencing judge needs to tailor the sentence to the 
individual offender.395 In Australia, this approach to sentencing has also been 
called ‘individualised sentencing’.396  
 
The High Court returned to the language of ‘individualised justice’ in 2013 
observing, 
[t]he administration of criminal law involves individualised justice, the 
attainment of which is acknowledged to involve the exercise of a wide 
sentencing discretion.397 
In the same year in the case of Bugmy v The Queen,398 the High Court addressed the 
function of individualised justice in sentencing holding that taking systematic 
discrimination against Aboriginal Australians into account would be contrary to 
individualised justice.399 
 
In 2006, the ALRC in its Same Crime, Same Time Report strongly supported an 
individualized justice approach to federal sentencing in Australia.400 The ALRC 
described the principle as a requirement that the sentencing court ‘impose a 
sentence that is just and appropriate in all the circumstances of the particular 
case.’401 In recognition of the role of individualised justice the ALRC stated: 
Courts have consistently recognised the importance of this sentencing 
principle. For example, in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions, Mahoney ACJ 
stated that ‘if justice is not individual, it is nothing’. Individualised justice can be 
 
                                                          
393 See, The Hon A M Gleeson, 'Individualised Justice - The Holy Grail' (1995) 69 Australian Law 
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395 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 16. 
396 See, eg, Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 16. 
397 Elias v The Queen (2013) 248 CLR 483, 494-495 (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). Cited 
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398 (2013) 249 CLR 571. 
399 Ibid 594 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
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attained only if a judicial officer possesses a broad sentencing discretion that 
enables him or her to consider and balance multiple facts and circumstances 
when sentencing an offender.402 
The ALRC recommended that the principle of individualized justice should be 
acknowledged in federal legislation as one of five fundamental principles that must 
be applied in sentencing.403  
 
The principle of individualised justice has not been widely mentioned by name in 
sentencing remarks, but it is a principle that embodies an approach that judicial 
officers have recognised and defended.404 In 2008, Spigelman CJ of the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in his keynote address to a national sentencing 
conference commented: 
The principle of individualised justice, depends on the elementary proposition 
that the wide variation of circumstances of both the offence and of the offender 
must always be taken into account, so that the sentence is appropriate to the 
individual case. Experience over the centuries has led to the clear conclusion 
that this task is best undertaken by the exercise of a broad discretion by 
individual judges.405 
In 2013, the plurality of the High Court in Elias v The Queen406 expressly 
acknowledged the role of individualized justice in the sentencing process. French 
CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated: 
It is the duty of the judge to balance often incommensurable factors and to 
arrive at a sentence that is just in all of the circumstances. The administration 
of the criminal law involves individualised justice, the attainment of which is 
acknowledged to involve the exercise of a wide sentencing discretion.407 
The principle of individualised justice clearly interconnects with an instinctive 
synthesis approach to sentencing (discussed above), with both principles involving 
the exercise of broad judicial discretion. The approach to determining an 
appropriate sentence is, therefore, a complex mental process requiring judicial 
 
                                                          
402 Ibid. 
403 The other fundamental principles were proportionality, parsimony, totality and consistency, see Ibid 
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Sentencing Conference 2008, Canberra, 8 February 2008) 3; Hon James Spigelman, ‘Consistency and 
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officers to balance numerous variables and impose a sentence upon an individual 
who is operating in a complex reality.  
 
From this framework, it is apparent that there may well be differences (legitimate 
differences) between the circumstances taken into account in respect of one 
offender in contrast to the circumstances taken into account for another offender 
who is being sentenced for the same type of offence. This is because in determining 
an appropriate sentence, regard must be had to many sentencing factors tailored 
to the individual offender and their unique circumstances. 
 
 
IV SENTENCING JURISPRUDENCE 
 
In 1987, Richard Fox identified the scarcity of statistical and descriptive data on 
sentencing as ‘one of the greatest barriers to the achievement of uniformity of 
approach’ in sentencing.408 The emergence of Sentencing Information Systems 
around Australia (discussed below) has seen a shift towards providing greater 
attention to monitoring sentencing practices. These systems have also seen the 
barriers identified by Fox (ie. reliable statistical information on past sentencing 
practices) alleviated. However, as the cases of Hili409 and Barbaro410 highlight, the 
High Court has been very resistant to judicial reliance upon statistical data in 
sentencing. 
 
State and territory governments have been increasingly active in legislating within 
the field of sentencing. The actions of legislatures have largely been in the name of 
implementing a more consistent approach to sentencing. Justice Preston has 
remarked on the impact of this legislative encroachment into sentencing, noting 
that: 
The task [of sentencing] is discretionary, but the discretion is structured. 
Within the last three decades, the degree of structuring has increased…The 
structures include prescribing the maximum (and sometimes the minimum) 
 
                                                          
408 Richard Fox, 'Controlling Sentencers' (1987) 20 Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
218, 230. 
409 Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520. 
410 Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58. 
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penalties that may be imposed for different offences, and the sentencing 
considerations that must be taken into account.411 
As described above, there is an overarching legislative structure to sentencing in 
each Australian jurisdiction that did not previously exist.  
 
Yet, despite the growth in legislation as a principal source of law on sentencing, the 
most dominant characteristic of sentencing in Australia remains that it is an 
exercise of broad judicial discretion.412 There is, however, more that can be done 
within the current framework to alleviate concerns about an uncharted 
‘wasteland’413 of sentencing. Placing greater importance on sentencing principles 
is essential to this.  
 
In Wong, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ emphasised the importance of courts 
setting out sentencing principles guiding the exercise of their judicial sentencing 
discretion.414 In the joint judgment they advised: 
…it may very well be necessary and appropriate for a court, in the course of 
resolving the issues presented by the matter before it, to make explicit the 
sentencing principles that were engaged in the particular matter. Thus, there 
will be cases where, for example, it may be appropriate to conclude that 
sentencers should give chief weight to general deterrence in sentencing for a 
particular kind of offence. Such statements are obviously important in ensuring 
a principled approach to sentencing in future cases.415 
This directive from the High Court is being picked up. For example, in speaking on 
‘Consistency and Sentencing’ at the 2008 national sentencing conference, 
Spigelman CJ remarked that ‘it is these [sentencing] principles… which play a 
critical role in reconciling the principle of individualised justice and the principle 
 
                                                          
411 Justice Brian J Preston, ‘Principled Sentencing for Environmental Offences – Part 1: Purposes of 
Sentencing’ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 91, 91. 
412 Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg, ‘Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic Sentencing 
Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?’ 
(2013) 76(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 265, 265. 
413 In the 1970s Judge Marvin Frankel argued that the ‘evil of unbounded discretion’ evident in 
sentencing in the United States resulted in a ‘wasteland in the law’. The piece remains a seminal work see 
Marvin Frankel, ‘Lawlessness in Sentencing’ in Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian 
Roberts (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (Hart Publishing, 3rd ed, 2009) 237, 
242. Frankel is also acknowledged in Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing: 
Principles and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 15. 
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of consistency.’416 A plurality of the High Court in the decisions of both Hili and 
Barbaro have echoed the call for greater judicial attention to legal principles in 
sentencing.417  
 
This study of family hardship within Australia highlights the importance of paying 
greater attention to the development and use of sentencing factors and principles. 
As the sentiments above highlight, there is considerable support from the 
judiciary, for greater focus upon understanding and explaining approaches to 
sentencing and the interaction between principles and factors. The research 
conducted for this dissertation will assist in the transition towards a more 
sophisticated and nuanced engagement with the role of sentencing factors, 
principles and approaches.  
 
A. Principles of Comity  
 
The rule of comity is widely accepted and applied in Australia by sentencing 
courts.418 Alastair MacAdam and John Pyke observe that ‘[t]his factor will often 
result in decisions being followed even though they are not strictly binding 
because for example the decision is from a different hierarchy of courts.’419 
However, in Farah Constructions,420 attention was drawn to the particular 
importance of the rule when courts are interpreting ‘Commonwealth legislation or 
uniform national legislation’.421 In these circumstances, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ recommended that courts in Australia: 
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…should not depart from decisions in intermediate appellate courts in another 
jurisdiction on the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation or uniform 
national legislation unless they are convinced that the interpretation is plainly 
wrong. Since there is a common law of Australia rather than of each Australian 
jurisdiction, the same principle applies in relation to non-statutory law.422 
 
In the federal sentencing case of Hili, the plurality of the High Court affirmed this 
position. The plurality stated: 
In dealing with appeals against sentences passed on federal offenders, whether 
the appeal is brought by the offender or by the prosecution, the need for 
consistency of decision throughout Australia is self-evident. It is plain, of 
course, that intermediate courts of appeal should not depart from an 
interpretation placed on Commonwealth legislation by another Australian 
intermediate appellate court, unless convinced that the interpretation is plainly 
wrong (emphasis added).423 
In Pham, French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ endorsed Hili and in strong language 
stated: 
It is settled that, in the absence of binding authority from this Court, an 
intermediate appellate court must follow a statement of legal principle by 
another intermediate appellate court unless persuaded that it is plainly wrong. 
It is also settled that a “sentence itself gives rise to no binding precedent.”424 
Chief Justice French, Keane and Nettle JJ underscored that judicial comity should 
enhance the ‘identification and application of relevant sentencing principles’ in 
federal sentencing.425 
 
One area that needs attention, to facilitate an appropriate practice of judicial 
comity, is the quality of sentencing remarks handed down by courts. In 2012, 
Justice Johnson, in his speech at the annual sentencing conference, emphasised the 
rule of comity in Australia and the endorsement of this rule by the High Court. 
However, he advocated to the audience that sentencing remarks and the reasons of 
intermediate appellate courts needed to have sufficient content on the operation of 
judicial discretion and sentencing principles for the rule of comity to operate.426 
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This point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four and Five in the 
discussion of the results of the study of the case law on family hardship. 
 
B. Appellate Review and Broad Judicial Discretion 
 
Determining an appropriate sentence, such as determining the length of a custodial 
sentence or determining the length of a non-parole period, are exercises of judicial 
discretion and accordingly, ‘any appeal against a sentence (whether by the Crown 
or the offender) is an appeal against an exercise of discretion.’427 Judicial officers in 
Australia operate from an instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing and they 
are provided as much flexibility as the system allows. The instinctive synthesis 
approach also means that in determining an appeal an appellate court will not 
have knowledge of a quantifiable reduction for each specific mitigating factors 
provided in sentencing remarks by the court at first instance. Additionally, 
Geraldine Mackenzie and Nigel Stobbs have observed that due to the ‘wide 
variation in the nature and depth of sentencing remarks’ it might not be clear 
whether an error has occurred.428 
 
Throughout Australia, statutes grant appellate courts the power to hear appeals 
against sentence.429 Appeal may be brought by the Crown or by the convicted 
person. The procedural requirements that govern appellant review are also set out 
in legislation in each jurisdiction.430 The state and territory legislative provisions 
governing the right to appeal against sentence are picked up and applied to federal 
offences by the operation of s 68(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).431 It is not 
necessary for the purposes of this study to review these legislative provisions.432  
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The High Court laid down the general common law principles of appellate review 
in 1936 in the case of House v The King433 (‘House’). These principles are deeply 
entrenched and were described in House as ‘established principles’.434 Today they 
are still regarded as ‘well-known principles’435 of general application. For an 
appeal against sentence to succeed it must be established that the exercise of 
discretion by the sentencing judge had miscarried; the Crown or the applicant 
must demonstrate error.436  
 
It is not enough for an appellate court to find that it would have imposed a different 
sentence in the circumstances.437 In Lowndes v The Queen,438 the High court 
emphasised the importance of respecting discretionary judgments.  The Full Court 
of the High Court stated: 
The principles according to which an appellate court may interfere with such a 
discretionary judgment by a sentencing judge are well established… Of 
particular importance in the present case is the principle that a court of 
criminal appeal may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing 
judge merely because the appellate court would have exercised its discretion in 
a manner different from the manner in which the sentencing judge exercised 
his or her discretion. This is basic. The discretion which the law commits to 
sentencing judges is of vital importance in the administration of our system of 
criminal justice.439 
Appellate courts frequently acknowledge that the sentencing judge was in a better 
position than they to make a judgment on sentencing factors including the 
persuasiveness and weight to be attached to material put before the sentencing 
court.440  Therefore, under the common law the discretionary nature of the 
sentencing task is paramount and is rigorously protected within the appellate 
review process.441 
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1. Common Law Principles Governing Appellate Review 
The classic passage on the type of error necessary for appellate review was set out 
in the case of House. Justices Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan described two ways in 
which the exercise of judicial discretion can be found to have miscarried. Their 
Honours stated: 
If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant 
matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into 
account some material consideration, then his determination should be 
reviewed…442 
The error described here is an ‘identifiable error’.443  
 
In House, their Honours went on to observe that there is another type of error that 
may be give rise to a successful appeal. They stated: 
It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in 
his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate 
court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise 
the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance.444 
This form of error was commonly referred to under the grounds of ‘manifestly 
excessive’ or ‘manifestly inadequate’ sentence.445 Recently, the plurality in Barbaro 
v The Queen addressed this type of error and stated: 
The conclusion that a sentence passed at first instance should be set aside as 
manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate says no more or less than that 
some “substantial wrong has in fact occurred” in fixing that sentence.446 
Therefore, an appellate court may intervene where the result (ie. the sentence 
imposed) is shown to be so obviously wrong, unreasonable or unjust.447  
 
The first form of error, where there is an identifiable error, is generally a type of 
error where there is an error of a material fact or an error in legal principle.448 The 
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448 House (1936) 55 CLR 499, 505. 
 103 
second form of error has been described as a ‘residuary category of error’;449 it 
being an inherent error that may not be able to be specifically identified from the 
sentencing reasons. The second form of error has been described by courts as one 
that can be identified as ‘manifest from the sentence imposed’450 and as an error 
where the sentence is ‘so unreasonable or plainly unjust that it bespeaks a 
miscarriage’451 of discretion.452  The second form of error is not easy to prove.453  
 
(a) Outside an appropriate range 
Commonly the Crown or the appellant arguing the second form of error will claim 
that a sentence falls outside of an appropriate range for an offence. However, 
appellate courts are sensitive to the variety of factors that are taken into account 
by judges in sentencing and the difficult balancing exercise that takes place.454 
Thus, a sentence found to be towards the bottom end or upper end of a range of 
sentences that could be imposed will not, for this reason alone, be found to be in 
error. Accordingly, the appropriate range of sentences for an offence has been 
widely construed by appellate courts.455 
 
(b) Failure to give weight to a mitigating factor 
Failure to give any weight or a failure to give ‘significant weight’ to a relevant 
mitigating factor can be regarded as an identifiable sentencing error; the first form 
of error identified in House (see above). Failure for a sentencing judge to consider a 
relevant matter at all (ie. failure to give any weight to a sentencing factor) is an 
easier ground to make out but not commonly available. Failure to give significant 
weight to a sentencing factor can be a difficult ground to make out on appeal. The 
review of the case law supports that it is particularly difficult to argue that 
insufficient weight has been attributed to a particular sentencing factor.456 
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This instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing means that in analysing 
sentencing remarks and sentencing judgments it is not possible to determine the 
precise weight that has been attached to an individual sentencing factor, in fact, 
quantifying the weight attached to a specific factor would be an error.457 The High 
Court has emphasised that when sentencing the judgment being exercised is a 
‘discretionary judgment.’458 In Markarian, McHugh J described the method as one 
where, 
the judge identifies all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discusses 
their significance and then makes a value judgment ...459  
Therefore, the relevance and consideration of sentencing factors is known only 
when judicial officers discuss their significance and articulate in their remarks the 
value judgments they have made in respect to individual sentencing factors.  
 
The appellant needs to demonstrate that a particular sentencing factor failed to be 
considered or was given insufficient weight in its consideration. In Vagh v Western 
Australia,460 McLure JA stated, 
A failure to give adequate weight to a relevant sentencing consideration only 
gives rise to an (express) appealable error if it amounts to a failure to exercise 
the discretion actually entrusted to the Court.461 
For example, failure to refer to a ‘highly relevant factor’ can demonstrate that a 
‘factor was disregarded.’462 But appellate courts do look beyond inadequate 
sentencing remarks to find that ‘the sentence actually imposed demonstrate[s] that 
principle or factor must have been taken into account.’463 And appellate courts can 
grant credit to ‘experienced sentencing judges’ thus holding that it is unlikely that 
they have ignored a relevant sentencing factor.464 
 
 
                                                          
457 See discussion above rejecting a mathematical approach to sentencing. 
458 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 371 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
459 Ibid 378. 
460 [2007] WASCA 17 (19 January 2007). 
461 Ibid [76]. 
462 Stephen Odgers, Sentencing: The Law of Sentencing in NSW Courts for State and Federal Offences 
(Longueville Books, 2nd ed, 2013) 480. 
463 Ibid 481. 
464 Ibid. 
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In Neal v The Queen,465 Murphy J (in his dissenting judgment) cited with approval 
the finding of David Thomas on the effect of mitigating factors in sentencing. 
Murphy J stated: 
A sentence which fails to reflect the presence of recognized mitigating factors 
will, in the general run of cases, be reduced on appeal. (Thomas, Principles of 
Sentencing (1979), p. 47.) 
Where there are statutory lists of sentencing factors, there is at least a duty upon 
the sentencing judge to take into account any of the listed sentencing factors.466  
 
The study of the case law demonstrates that an appeal ground of failing to take into 
account a listed sentencing factor is likely to succeed in circumstances where the 
factor has not been referred to at all in the sentencing remarks.467 The statutory 
lists have made an impact in this context. However, there is no obligation upon a 
sentencing judge to place any real weight upon a listed factor in the process of 
determining an appropriate sentence (this will be discussed further in Chapter 
Three). Therefore, where the matter is referred to, but alleged to have been given 
insufficient weight, sentencing appeals on these grounds remain difficult to prove. 
 
The issue within sentencing appeals of a failure to give sufficient weight to a 
discretionary factor resonates with civil law debates in family law. In Lovell v 
Lovell,468 a family law case dealing with infant custody, the High Court addressed 
the ability of appellate courts to interfere with an exercise of judicial discretion 
where there was a complaint of insufficient weight being given to relevant 
considerations. Latham CJ stated, 
If completely irrelevant considerations have been taken into account and they 
have really affected the decision the case is clear, and the order, though made in 
the exercise of a discretion, should be set aside. Similarly, if relevant 
considerations are plainly ignored the same result follows. But when the 
appellate tribunal is considering questions of weight it should not regard itself 
as being in the same position as the learned trial judge. In the absence of 
exclusion of relevant considerations or the admission of irrelevant 
considerations an appellate tribunal should not set aside an order made in the 
exercise of a judicial discretion… unless the failure to give adequate weight to 
 
                                                          
465 (1982) 149 CLR 305, 319. 
466 Where the statutory provision provides that the listed matters ‘must’ or ‘should’ be taken into account, 
see, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2). 
467 See, eg, Adams v The Queen [2003] WASCA 91 (2 May 2003); Roberts v Johnson [2003] WASCA 
272 (4 November 2003). 
468 Lovell v Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513. 
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relevant considerations really amounts to a failure to exercise the discretion 
actually entrusted to the court.469 
This case has been cited with approval in the context of the exercise of judicial 
discretion in determining sentence.470  
 
These authorities all recognise that a failure to give sufficient weight in 
appropriate circumstances is a basis on which an appeal court may interfere with a 
discretionary order. To adopt the language used by Barton A-CJ in Skinner v The 
King,471 as approved by the High Court in Lacey,472 if the judge has ‘clearly 
overlooked, or undervalued or overestimated, or misunderstood some salient 
feature’,473 a Court of Appeal may review the sentence imposed at first instance. 
David Thomas also found, through his study of the sentencing practices of the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal Criminal Division, that denying credit for 
mitigating factors may occur in exceptional circumstances such as where the need 
for deterrence or where the prevention of further offences was ‘unusually 
compelling’.474 The study of the case law in Chapters Four and Five demonstrates 
that Australian courts have also adopted broad categories where the impact of 
mitigating factors is granted no weight or minimal weight. 
 
 
V CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has provided important context on Australian sentencing law and the 
sentencing process. It has outlined the legislative models that have been adopted 
in respect of sentencing factors in each jurisdiction within Australia. This chapter 
has described the scope that each sentencing statute permits or requires for the 
consideration of sentencing factors. It has explained how family hardship can be 
 
                                                          
469 Ibid 519. 
470 See, eg, Harvey v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 117 (20 May 2005) [19] (Roberts-Smith JA with 
Wheeler JA and Pullin JA agreeing), Chan v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 153 (22 October 2010) [65] 
(Kirby J with Beazley JA and Johnson J agreeing), Dipangkear v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 156 (21 
July 2010) [49] (Whealy J with Hodgson JA and Buddin J agreeing). 
471 Skinner v The King (1913) 16 CLR 336. 
472 Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573. 
473 Skinner v The King (1913) 16 CLR 336, 340, affd Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 
573, 579-580. 
474 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 47-48. 
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taken into account in sentencing in accordance with legislation or the common law. 
A review of the sentencing policies that underpin sentencing in each jurisdiction 
has also been provided and the similarities and differences between the legislative 
models highlighted. This is the context within which the sentencing decision is 
made. It is also the context within which the study of the case law, analysing 
appellate decisions relating to family hardship (across the different Australian 
jurisdictions), took place. The results of the study of the case law will be set out in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter Three, begins to trace the development of sentencing 
jurisprudence on mitigating factors more broadly, and, upon family hardship, 
specifically. Therefore, it teases out the relationship between family hardship and 
the sentencing of an offender. Chapter Three tells the story of ‘family hardship’ 
within Australian Criminal Justice.  It will reveal the early origins of consideration 
of the impact of a penalty upon an offender’s dependants (ie hardship to others). It 
will explain the importance of Thomas’ work and his influence upon how family 
hardship has been understood by common law courts. Chapter Three will then set 
out how the impact of a sentence upon an offender’s family and dependents came 
to be recognised in legislation in Australia in the Australian Capital Territory, 
South Australia and the federal jurisdiction.  
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3. ‘FAMILY HARDSHIP’ AS A SENTENCING FACTOR 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will show that family hardship is a sentencing consideration which 
has deep roots in the common law legal tradition. The historical underpinnings of 
this sentencing consideration have not, to the author’s knowledge, been subject of 
close examination. As explained in Chapter One it is a sentencing factor which is 
frequently identified as illegitimate and irrelevant to mainstream sentencing 
practices. This chapter shows that family hardship is actually an embedded 
sentencing factor within the common law tradition.  
 
Firstly, this chapter begins with a review the way the criminal justice system and 
courts have traditionally approached the effect of an offender’s sentence upon 
families. It explores the origins of judicial consideration of hardship to others in 
early common law sentencing practices. The chapter then studies the emergence of 
sentencing factors (mitigating and aggravating factors) in the common law. It 
explores the path-breaking work of David Thomas and the impact of his 
publication, Principles of Sentencing,475 which set out ‘the sentencing policy of the 
Court of Appeal Criminal Division’;476 the highest appellant court in the England 
and Wales court hierarchy.  
 
This chapter examines Thomas findings on the sentencing practices of English and 
Welsh courts in the 1970s. His review of the court practices in this period 
demonstrates that common law courts had been taking family hardship into 
account in sentencing, but Thomas reported that there was a general reluctance 
from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division towards significant weight being placed 
on what it classified as an: ‘indirect effect of the conviction or sentence’.477 This 
chapter will clarify the influence of this classic piece of work and explain that this 
 
                                                          
475 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970). 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid 211. 
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interpretation was accepted into Australian sentencing practices. It will then 
describe how and when family hardship came to be recognised in legislation 
within Australia. 
 
 
II TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF PUNISHMENT  
 
The criminal justice system has long been aware of the impact of a sentence upon 
an offender’s family and dependants. However, how the criminal justice system has 
accommodated the hardships of an offender’s punishment upon others has shifted 
over time.478 The late 18th and early 19th century practices of imposing punishment 
upon prisoners did not take into account mitigating factors such as the effect that a 
sentence may have upon a prisoner’s dependants. However, the early criminal 
justice system accommodated prisoner’s children in a variety of ways. At that time, 
the system predominately dealt with this issue as a function of the administration 
of sentence.  
 
In the 18th century and 19th century the role of the judge in the common law courts 
was to pass sentence upon the offender. A practice of individualised sentencing (as 
described in Chapter Two) did not exist, however, justice could be tempered to 
accommodate the circumstances of an individual. For example, judges could be 
merciful in their practices and sentences.479 Juries could deliver partial verdicts or 
false acquittals and they could make recommendations for mercy.480 The Crown or 
Governors-General481 could exercise the prerogative of mercy and pardon the 
offender or commute the sentence.482   
 
 
                                                          
478 Simon Bronitt and Wendy Kukulies-Smith, ‘Crime, Punishment, Family Violence, and the Cloak of 
Legal Invisibility’ (2013) 37(3) Journal of Australian Studies 390, 397-398. 
479 The concept of judicial mercy is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
480 J Baker, ‘Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law 1550-1800’ in J S Cockburn (ed), Crime in 
England 1550-1800 (Methuen, 1977) 15, 23, 43, 44. 
481 A Smith, ‘The Prerogative of Mercy, The Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice’ (1983) Public Law 
398, 426.  
482 See further, Richard Fox, 'When Justice Sheds a Tear: The Place of Mercy in Sentencing' (1999) 25 
Monash University Law Review 1, 5, 20-21; A Smith, ‘The Prerogative of Mercy, The Power of Pardon 
and Criminal Justice’ (1983) Public Law 398, 417- 426; Gregory Woods, A History of Criminal Law in 
New South Wales: The Colonial Period 1788-1900 (The Federation Press, 2002) 5-6. 
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A. Pleading the Belly 
 
In colonial Australia, as in England and Wales, the effect of a sentence upon third 
parties was most obviously taken into account in respect of ‘pleading the belly’. 
This practice, operating in the criminal law from at least the 14th century,483 
enabled a woman convicted of felony or treason484 to be reprieved if a jury of 
twelve matrons was satisfied that the prisoner ‘be quick with child’.485 Early 
colonial case law demonstrates the operation of this practice within Australia.486  
Officially the death penalty could be imposed upon the prisoner following the birth 
of the child, although penalties were often not enforced after delivery and women 
were often pardoned.487 Historical accounts identify women soliciting in gaol in 
order to become pregnant and bribery of turnkeys was also common. 488  In writing 
on the operation of the reprieve, Sir Matthew Hale recorded that: 
[t]his privilege is to be allowed but once, for if she be a second time with child, 
she shall not thereby delay execution, but the gaoler shall be punished for not 
looking better to her.489  
In England and Wales, in 1931 the reprieve was entrenched in legislation via the 
enactment of the Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act 1931, 21 & 22 Geo. 5, c 
24.  
 
 
                                                          
483 James Oldham, ‘On Pleading the Belly: A History of The Jury of Matrons’ in Louis Knafla (ed), 
Crime, Police and the Courts in British History (Meckler, 1990) 1, 3. 
484 Sir Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae (Professional Books Ltd, first published 1736, 1971 
ed) vol 2, 413. 
485 Sir Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae (Professional Books Ltd, first published 1736, 1971 
ed) vol 2, 413. See also Simon Bronitt and Wendy Kukulies-Smith, ‘Crime, Punishment, Family 
Violence, and the Cloak of Legal Invisibility’ (2013) 37(3) Journal of Australian Studies 390, 397; J. H. 
Baker, ‘Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law 1550-1800’ in J S Cockburn (ed), Crime in 
England 1550-1800 (Methuen, 1977) 15, 44; E Burford and S Shulman, Of Bridles and Burning: The 
Punishment of Women (St. Martin's Press, 1992) 108. 
486 See, eg, R v Davis [1789] NSWKR 5 
<http://www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_case_law/nsw/cases/case_index/1789/r_v_davis/ >; R v 
McGregor and Maloney [1834] NSWSup C 13 
<http://www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_case_law/nsw/cases/case_index/1834/r_v_mcgregor_and_
maloney/>. See also the case of Ann Davis discussed in Gregory Woods, A History of Criminal Law in 
New South Wales: The Colonial Period 1788-1900 (The Federation Press, 2002) 24. 
487 See Sir Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae (Professional Books Ltd, first published 1736, 
1971 ed) vol 2, 413-414. See generally W.J. Sheehan, ‘Finding Solace in Eighteenth-Century Newgate’ in 
J S Cockburn (ed), Crime in England 1550-1800 (Methuen, 1977) 229, 243. 
488 W.J. Sheehan, ‘Finding Solace in Eighteenth-Century Newgate’ in J S Cockburn (ed), Crime in 
England 1550-1800 (Methuen, 1977) 229, 243. 
489 Sir Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae (Professional Books Ltd, first published 1736, 1971 
ed) vol 2, 413. 
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B. Children Accommodated in Gaols 
 
In colonial Australia, there were various forms of punishment imposed by courts 
these included, ‘capital punishment, flogging, imprisonment, reductions of rations, 
transportation, pillory, work in gaol gangs, and work in irons.’490 Officially, female 
prisoners with dependent children who were sentenced by the courts did not have 
the suffering of their children taken into account; however, the system did 
accommodate the continued relationship between mother and child. For example, 
children resided with their imprisoned mothers in gaol (in England and in colonial 
Australia).491   
 
Some female prisoners transported to Australia on convict ships could bring their 
children with them. In his study of convict women in Van Diemen’s Land (1803- 
1829), Phillip Tardif found that ‘children were normally permitted to accompany 
their mothers on the ships’.492 This view is supported by data from the convict 
ships and also supported in accounts on historical practices of this time.493 For 
 
                                                          
490 Brent Salter, ‘Beyond the Rudimentary and Brutal: Procedure, Evidence and Sentencing in Australia’s 
First Criminal Court’ (2009) 33 Criminal Law Journal 87, 99. Noting that, in Australia, flogging was not 
restricted to men until 1817 see John Braithwaite, 'Crime in A Convict Republic' (2001) 64 The Modern 
Law Review 11, 20. 
491 See England: Deirdre Palk, '"Fit Objects for Mercy": Gender, the Bank of England and Currency 
Criminals, 1804-1833' (2004) 11 Women's Writing 237, 244; E Burford and S Shulman, Of Bridles and 
Burning: The Punishment of Women (St. Martin's Press, 1992) 108, 161; W.J. Sheehan, ‘Finding Solace 
in Eighteenth-Century Newgate’ in J S Cockburn (ed), Crime in England 1550-1800 (Methuen, 1977) 
229, 236-237. [Sheehan notes that in Newgate wealthy male prisoners could pay for their families to 
reside with them and there were informal practices of permitting families of poorer prisoners to stay 
within the gaol] See Australia: J C Brown, Poverty is not a Crime: The Development of Social Services in 
Tasmania 1803-1900 (Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1972) 23; Lyndall Ryan, 'From 
Stridency to Silence: The Policing of Convict Women, 1803-1853' in D Kirkby (ed) Sex, Power and 
Justice: Historical Perspectives on Law in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1995) 70, 76-77; Carmel 
Benjamin, ‘Prisons, Parents and Problems’ in Sandra McKillop (ed), Keeping People Out of Prison: 
proceedings of a conference held 27-29 March 1990 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991) 165. 
492 See Phillip Tardif, Notorious Strumpets and Dangerous Girls: Convict Women in Van Diemen's Land 
1803-1829 (Angus & Robertson, 1990) 12, 1773 (fn 22).  
493 See generally Phillip Tardif, Notorious Strumpets and Dangerous Girls: Convict Women in Van 
Diemen's Land 1803-1829 (Angus & Robertson, 1990) 12, 1773 (fn 22); David Neal, The Rule of Law In 
A Penal Colony; Law And Power In Early New South Wales (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 1-9 
[reporting on the story of the Kable family]; E Burford and S Shulman, Of Bridles and Burning: The 
Punishment of Women (St. Martin's Press, 1992) 108, 196; JC Brown, Poverty is not a Crime: The 
Development of Social Services in Tasmania 1803-1900 (Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 
1972) 27; Ryan, Lyndall, 'From Stridency To Silence: The Policing Of Convict Women, 1803-1853' in D 
Kirkby (ed) Sex, Power and Justice: Historical Perspectives on Law in Australia (Oxford University 
Press, 1995) 70, 83; Deirdre Palk, '"Fit Objects for Mercy": Gender, the Bank of England and Currency 
Criminals, 1804-1833' (2004) 11 Women's Writing 237, 244-250; Simon Bronitt and Wendy Kukulies-
Smith, ‘Crime, Punishment, Family Violence, and the Cloak of Legal Invisibility’ (2013) 37(3) Journal of 
Australian Studies 390, 397. 
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example, the Bank of England engaged in a practice of providing ‘donations’ to 
convict women scheduled for transportation to Australia with additional payments 
to single women with dependent children.494 Moreover, Tardif observed that there 
was a period in England when permission was automatically granted to children 
less than seven years of age seeking transport with their convict mothers.495 
Records from the Colonial Secretary’s Correspondence 1822-1855 reveal that 
children generally stayed in the female factory with their mothers until the age of 
three.496 So significant were their numbers that orphan schools were opened in 
Tasmania in 1828 to accommodate the increasing numbers of children of female 
convicts arriving in the Colony.497  
 
C. Petitions of Mercy 
 
By the 19th century, it was common for women with dependent children to petition 
the Crown for mercy. However, this does not appear to have initially been a focus 
of mercy. Court cases from London’s Central Criminal Court, from 1674 – 1913, 
reveal the various shapes that mercy took in the early administration of common 
law justice.498  A general search for the keyword ‘mercy’ within the website of the 
Old Bailey Proceedings Online yielded 16,968 hits and demonstrates common 
aphorisms that appear in the case law in the late 17th century were pleas for 
‘mercy of the King’ and ‘mercy of the Court’ or, in the alternative, ‘mercy of the 
Bench’.499  
 
                                                          
494 See Deirdre Palk’s study of letters and petitions to the Bank of England. Deirdre Palk, '"Fit Objects for 
Mercy": Gender, the Bank of England and Currency Criminals, 1804-1833' (2004) 11 Women's Writing 
237. 
495 Phillip Tardif, Notorious Strumpets and Dangerous Girls: Convict Women in Van Diemen's Land 
1803-1829 (Angus & Robertson, 1990) 12, 1773 (fn 22). See also E Burford and S Shulman, Of Bridles 
and Burning: The Punishment of Women (St. Martin's Press, 1992) 108, 196; JC Brown, Poverty is not a 
Crime: The Development of Social Services in Tasmania 1803-1900 (Tasmanian Historical Research 
Association, 1972) 27, 29. 
496 JC Brown, Poverty is not a Crime: The Development of Social Services in Tasmania 1803-1900 
(Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1972) 23. 
497 Ibid 26. 
498 See the Old Bailey Proceedings Online a database housing over 197,000 proceedings. Tim Hitchcock, 
Robert Shoemaker, Clive Emsley, Sharon Howard and Jamie McLaughlin, Proceedings of the Old Bailey 
London’s Central Criminal Court, 1674 – 1913 (version 7.1, April 2013) The Old Bailey Proceedings 
Online <  http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/index.jsp >. 
499 The search was conducted on 9 May 2014, see  
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/search.jsp?foo=bar&form=searchHomePage&_divs_fulltext=mercy&kw
parse=and&start=0&count=0. See also Tim Hitchcock, Robert Shoemaker, Clive Emsley, Sharon Howard 
and Jamie McLaughlin, Proceedings of the Old Bailey London’s Central Criminal Court, 1674-1913 
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The exercise of mercy by the King was the most prevalent act of mercy.500 This 
form of mercy was commonly described within the early court reports as an ‘Act of 
Royal Grace and Mercy’.501 An exercise of mercy in this form was an instrument of 
the Sovereign.502 It was a means of tempering harsh sentences, of addressing faults 
identified within the system and a measure to accommodate public interests.503 
Such pardons generally arose in this period either through a systematic review of 
the reports or through the granting of general pardons.504  
 
A review of these court cases, from London’s Central Criminal Court, reveals that 
pleas of mercy of the Court were commonly pleas for transportation.505 Thomas 
has described the 18th century as the period in which discretion in the hands of the 
sentencing judge first arose citing the emergence of the judicial grant of a 
conditional pardon to be sentenced to transportation to one of the colonies for a 
term of labour.506  
 
Historian Peter King has identified a similar practice of emerging judicial 
discretion in the 18th century.507 Interestingly in his review of surviving records of 
felony cases in the Essex quarter session (1760-1800) he has observed that judicial 
officers were influenced by mitigating pleas which included statements about the 
impact of a sentence upon the accused’s children.508 He advances the thesis that: 
 
                                                          
(version 7.1, April 2013) The Old Bailey Proceedings Online <  http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/index.jsp 
>. 
500 In the 18th century over 50% of prisoners were pardoned see Clive Emsley, Tim Hitchcock and Robert 
Shoemaker, Punishments at the Old Bailey, (version 7.1, April 2013) Old Bailey Proceedings Online <  
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp#notpunished >. 
501 See, eg, Old Bailey Proceedings Online (version 7.0, 25 Feb 2014), Ordinary of Newgate’s Account, 
March 1685 (OA16850304). 
502 Falling within the second form of mercy outlined above. 
503 See ATH Smith, ‘The Prerogative of Mercy, The Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice’ (1983) Public 
Law 398, 398-399. 
504 Clive Emsley, Tim Hitchcock and Robert Shoemaker, Punishments at the Old Bailey, (version 7.1, 
April 2013) Old Bailey Proceedings Online <  
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp#notpunished >. 
505 See, eg, Old Bailey Proceedings Online (version 7.0, 25 Feb 2014), trial of Mall. Floyd, July 1674 
(t16740717-6).  
506 David Thomas, ‘The Sentencing Process’ in Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson (eds), The 
Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (Oxford University Press, 2002) 473. 
507 Peter King, ‘Decision-Makers and Decision-Making in the English Criminal Law, 1750-1800’ (1984) 
27(1) The Historical Journal 25, 38-42. 
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the relatively light sentences received by convicts in their thirties were 
probably linked to more general sympathies for destitute convicts and their 
innocent families.509 
In King’s examination of 18th century Department of State papers dealing with 
prisoner’s petitions (often with accompanying judicial reports on the case),510 he 
also observed family hardship was relevant. The probable impact upon the 
accused’s dependants (ie. destitution of the family) was raised in character 
references and in petitioner’s pleas,511 and influenced decisions made.512 
 
By the middle of the 19th century there appeared to be broader recognition that the 
role of the judge was to pass sentence upon the offender (as an individual).513 In 
writing on the ‘Province of the Judge’ in the late 19th century, Edward W. Cox 
stated: 
The consideration of the Judge is for the criminal. He has to determine to what 
extent – tempering justice with mercy and consulting the interests of the public 
as well as the character of prisoner – he may properly reduce the penalty. He 
has no power to increase to the slightest extent the severity of the law; he may 
mitigate it to almost any extent.514 
Judicial exercises of mercy in this context and statements in the judgments 
delivered at this time show that judges viewed this practice as a merciful act. 
However, could this period be described as the origins of the judicial exercise of 
mercy or was it rather, as Thomas describes, the beginning of the development of 
judicial discretion and the origins of what we now see as sentencing powers? 
 
In the first edition of the Principles of Sentencing, Thomas observed that there was 
a residual discretion of mercy that the Court of Appeal Criminal Division could 
draw upon to provide leniency to an offender in sentencing when no other 
mitigating factor was appropriate. He stated ‘…and in other cases there may be 
 
                                                          
508 Ibid 41-43. King also identifies ‘post-crime destitution (including family size etc)’ as a factor 
favourable to the accused see Table 3, Factors affecting judicial decision-making, 1789 and 1790, Ibid 
43-44. 
509 Ibid 42. 
510 Ibid 42. 
511 Ibid 44-48, 56. 
512 Ibid 56. 
513 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 6. 
514 Edward W Cox, Principles of Punishment as applied in the Administration of the Criminal Law by 
Judges and Magistrates (Law Times Office, 1877) 19. 
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circumstances of particular hardship not within the general category of mitigating 
factors where the Court may reduce a sentence ‘in mercy’.’515 
 
In the common law jurisdictions, there was a practice of female prisoners with 
dependent children petitioning the Crown for mercy, which if successful set aside 
the sentence of death. The families of offenders, the media and members of general 
public were also able to participate in this process.516 A prominent case in 
Australia, with widespread petitioning to the Crown, was the 19th century case of 
murderess Louisa Collins.517 Louisa had been found guilty of murdering her second 
husband and was sentenced to death (suspicion had emerged over the death of her 
first husband, but the charges were not successful on that count).518 Petitions of 
mercy were submitted on behalf of Louisa Collins by over a thousand colonists.519 
Men and women petitioned on the basis of an unsound trial, insanity, gender and 
hardship to Louisa’s children. Louisa at the time of her sentence was a widower 
with seven children; five children were dependent upon Louisa and still living in 
the family home.520 In the last days before her scheduled execution, Louisa made a 
final plea for mercy for her children’s sake to the Governor of New South Wales.521 
Louisa pleaded ‘I beg and implore you… have mercy on me for my child’s sake. I 
have seven children… spare me my Lord for their sake…’ Her plea was not 
successful.522  
 
This part of the chapter has shown ways the criminal justice system of the late 18th 
and early 19th century recognised and accommodated the impact of a sentence 
 
                                                          
515 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970) 199. 
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522 The Louisa Collins case demonstrates the practice of petitioning for mercy in Australia and also 
highlights emerging discussion on meanings of ‘motherhood’ within Colonial New South Wales. See 
generally Wendy Kukulies-Smith and Susan Priest, "'No Hope of Mercy' for the Borgia of Botany Bay: 
Louisa May Collins, the last woman executed in NSW, 1889' (2011) 10(2) Canberra Law Review 144. 
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upon dependants of an offender. This period has also been credited as the period 
when discretion in the hands of the sentencing judge, in the sense that we 
understand it today, first began to emerge.523  As will be shown next, by the late 
19th century there were reported practices within the common law of taking into 
account ‘sentencing factors’ in the act of determining an appropriate sentence. 
 
 
III THE ORIGINS OF SENTENCING FACTORS 
 
In the English common law tradition, the 19th century saw an increase in the 
quantity and in the quality524 of legal literature. In this period, the concept of a 
leading case became popular within the common law legal profession,525 law 
reports were standardised,526 and there was a substantial growth in the writing of 
the legal treatise (across all fields of law).527 These legal treatises sought to ‘set out, 
explain, illustrate, and systematize’528 foundational legal principles in ‘a single 
branch of the law’529 for those practicing in the field. While Sir Carleton Kemp Allen 
queries if it is possible to identity ‘an exact moment of time when the ‘modern’ 
doctrine of precedents may have been said to have established’530 this was an era 
when, after centuries of organic growth, the doctrine reached an identifiable 
form.531 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
523 See David Thomas, ‘The Sentencing Process’ in Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson (eds), The 
Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (Oxford University Press, 2002) 473. 
524 See Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford, 7th ed, 1964) 231. 
525 A.W. B. Simpson, Leading Cases in The Common Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 3-4; A.W.B Simpson, 
‘The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principle and Forms of Legal Literature’ (1981) 48 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 632, 633, 662 – 663. For an example of a treatise drawing upon 
leading cases see John W Smith, A Selection of Leading Cases on Various Branches of the Law with 
Notes (1837-40) cited within A.W.B Simpson, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principle 
and Forms of Legal Literature’ (1981) 48 The University of Chicago Law Review 632, 662. 
526 See Rupert Cross and J Harris, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press, 4th ed, 1991) 24-25, 126; 
Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford, 7th ed, 1964) 231. 
527 A.W. Brian Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 5. 
528 Ibid. 
529 A.W.B Simpson, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principle and Forms of Legal 
Literature’ (1981) 48 The University of Chicago Law Review 632, 633. 
530 Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford, 7th ed, 1964) 232. 
531 Ibid 232 and 362-363. 
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A. Early Legal Treatises 
 
In the late 19th century, Edward W. Cox having served in various judicial roles in 
England532 set out to undertake a remarkable task for the time and developed a 
treatise on sentencing practices. Cox had observed that ‘so many circumstances, 
not admissible at the trial, are to be taken into account for the purpose of 
punishment…’533 Cox was an advocate for an approach promoting greater 
uniformity in sentencing and saw the importance of identifying ‘principles’534 to 
which the judicial mind should be directed to in the determination of sentence.535 
Thus, in 1877, Cox published ‘Principles of Punishment as applied in the 
Administration of the Criminal law by Judges and Magistrates’.536  
 
In the preface to this text, Cox noted that, at the time of writing up this work, this 
subject was new. Cox provided the ‘first comprehensive treatise on sentencing’.537 
He stated: 
I had no guide. I was compelled to grope my way without assistance, for the 
elaborate treatise of BENTHAM was quite inapplicable to the special purpose I 
had contemplated. His great work was designed to assist the law-maker. I 
sought assistance for those who administer the law. He treats the law as it ought 
to be and not of the manner in which the existing law should be carried into 
execution.538 
Cox, therefore, developed a rudimentary scheme of matters for consideration in 
sentencing.539 One hundred years later, another Englishman, David Thomas set out 
to undertake a similar task (discussed below). 
 
 
                                                          
532 Chairman of the Bench of Magistrates; Deputy Assistant Judge at Middlesex Sessions; Chairman of 
the Second Court; Recorder of Falmouth; Recorder of Portsmouth and Commissioner to assist the Judge 
at Assizes, see Edward W Cox, Principles of Punishment as applied in the Administration of the Criminal 
Law by Judges and Magistrates (Law Times Office, 1877) vii-viii. 
533 Edward W Cox, Principles of Punishment as applied in the Administration of the Criminal Law by 
Judges and Magistrates (Law Times Office, 1877) viii-ix. 
534 Ibid xiv. 
535 See discussion of the importance of judicial discretion and advocacy for an ‘approach to uniformity’, 
Ibid xvii-xviii. 
536 Ibid. 
537 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 6. 
538 Edward W Cox, Principles of Punishment as applied in the Administration of the Criminal Law by 
Judges and Magistrates (Law Times Office, 1877) xv. 
539 Ibid xviii. 
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In Cox’s text we can see the origins of the judiciary developing principles of 
sentencing and identifying, and cataloguing, relevant sentencing factors or 
considerations. Cox stated: 
It is necessary to premise that I contemplated nothing more than to submit 
suggestions. I designed only an endeavour to trace certain principles, or to be 
more accurate, certain considerations, that might possibly assist the Judge or 
Magistrate in approximating to a just determination in punishments…540 
Cox’s work demonstrates the use of sentencing factors in late 19th century 
sentencing practices. For example, the text documents that considerations such as 
the ‘antecedents of the convict’,541 which were not admissible at trial, were raised 
at sentence and were taken into account by judges in order to determine an 
appropriate sentence.542 Moreover, Cox highlighted that there was a diverse range 
of considerations that could affect the sentence which were taken into account by 
courts.543  
 
In Chapter Seventeen of this work, Cox addressed ‘Mitigation of Punishment’.544 He 
noted that most offences in England, at this time, were statutory offences with 
penalties fixed by the statute.545 However, he stated, 
…the statute law invariably declares the extent of the punishment to be inflicted 
for the particular offence. It does not limit the minimum of punishment. 
Thus is the Judge invested with a large power to mitigate the legal penalty 
attaching to the crime in the abstract. Although simple larceny is punishable 
with imprisonment for two years, the Judge is permitted to mitigate that 
penalty to any extent he may deem to be required by the circumstances of the 
particular case.546 
This is a clear statement of the scope of judicial discretion within this period.  
 
Significantly, the impact of a sentence upon a convict’s family was not mentioned 
within the chapter dealing with ‘Mitigation of Punishment’. Cox’s model provided 
that where inquiries were made for the purposes of mitigation, the court was to 
consider only the circumstances of the crime and the character of the criminal. 
 
                                                          
540 Ibid xv-xvi. 
541 Ibid ix. 
542 Ibid viii-ix. 
543 Ibid ix. 
544 Ibid viii-ix. 
545 Ibid 157. 
546 Ibid 157. 
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Recognition of the potential impact of a gaol sentence upon a convict’s wife and 
children did appear in Chapter Twelve ‘Crimes of Violence’547, in the context of 
commentary on sentencing for the offence of wife-beating. Cox had stated that in 
sentencing for ‘ordinary cases of assault’548 a judge should be concerned with the 
‘future protection of the injured party and of the public.’549 However, in wife-
beating cases, he noted that ‘the Judge must look beyond this to their future.’550 
This feature, of taking into account the potential impact of a sentence upon an 
offender’s wife and children, was identified as one of the principles of 
punishment551 in respect of wife-beating offences.   
 
Cox presented quite a detailed discussion of the problems that arose at sentencing. 
He noted that in respect of wife beating cases, parties often continue to live 
together and that wives frequently refused to give evidence.552 Cox’s second 
principle of punishment, identified for wife-beating, applied where the husband 
must be punished for the past offence, but the court was aware that the prisoner 
would then continue to live with his wife. After observing that the husband’s 
incarceration will just as greatly affect his wife and children as it will the offender, 
Cox observed that the approach to sentencing would be to bind the convict in 
recognizance to be of good behaviour instead of imposing a greater penalty.553 
Taking the impact of a sentence upon a convict’s family into account in the context 
of wife-beating is a narrow consideration of the impact of a sentence upon families 
and dependants. Moreover, the consideration of this factor also arose in the 
context of an offence committed within the family and there was clearly an 
underlying policy of maintaining the family unit. Nonetheless, there was scope of 
reductions in sentence in the late 19th century because of hardship to dependants. 
 
 
                                                          
547 Ibid 93-113 (Chapter XII). 
548 Ibid 103. 
549 Ibid. 
550 Ibid 103. 
551 Identifying ‘principles of punishment’ is the approach taken by Cox throughout the text. 
552 Ibid 103. 
553 Ibid 104. 
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Another specific recognition of hardship upon third parties arose in the context of 
sentencing young offenders for crimes of wantonness.554 Here, Cox documented 
the impact of a sentence upon an offender’s wider family (not dependants). He 
noted that a pecuniary penalty for such crimes, ‘punishes the parents, brothers and 
sisters and not the culprit’555 and in such circumstances, he advocated for placing 
the convict on recognizance or a sentence of whipping.556 
 
There are no other references to the impact of a sentence upon an offender’s family 
within Cox’s 1877 text. Within the chapter ‘Character of the Criminal’,557 the 
consideration of a convict’s sex was discussed, however, there was no 
acknowledgment of women’s caring responsibilities nor of any likely grant of 
leniency because of consequences for the families of female convicts.558 The late 
19th century has been credited as a period, in England, when the masculinisation of 
crime and imprisonment began. Ann Aungles notes that ‘in the 1870s the male: 
female ratio of imprisonment was roughly 3:1 and by the 1920s it was 40:1.’559 
In this period of the criminal law, legally, the husband had subsumed the wife’s 
legal identity so that at law the husband and wife were one person. Any 
punishment of a male would, therefore, punish his dependants (ie. wife and 
children).560 
 
Thomas has also identified that a review of early 20th century case law of the Court 
of Appeal Criminal Division reveals that the Court was operating from existing 
precedents.561 Thomas stated: 
…the Court began its task with the assumption that there already existed a body 
of principle, which it was the Court’s duty to articulate and expand.562 
 
                                                          
554 Ibid 36-39. 
555 Ibid 37. 
556 Also referred to by Cox as ‘birching’, see Ibid 33-39. 
557 Ibid 130-148 (Chapter XV). 
558 The tasks of women are listed as washing, sewing and cooking, see Edward W Cox, Principles of 
Punishment as applied in the Administration of the Criminal Law by Judges and Magistrates (Law Times 
Office, 1877) 145. 
559 Ann Aungles, The Prison and the Home: A Study of the Relationship Between Domesticity and 
Penalty, The Institute of Criminology Monograph Series No 5 (1994) 36. 
560 The husband and wife were one person at law until the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act 
1870. 
561 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 6-7. 
562 Ibid 7. 
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An examination of Cox’s early treatise on punishment and research on early case 
law of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, clearly highlights the operation of 
sentencing factors to mitigate penalty in the late 19th century. It shows a 
movement within the profession to map out the operation of these sentencing 
principles in particular matters.  The text indicates that there was scope for 
reductions in sentence because of the likely impact of a sentence upon family and 
dependants in the late 19th century. Cox’s text evinces that there was, at least, a 
practice within the courts of taking this factor into account in specific contexts. 
 
B. Modern Legal Treatises 
 
A century later, family hardship was recognised as a legitimate mitigating factor by 
Thomas. Thomas first published this text ‘Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing 
Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division’ (‘Principles of Sentencing’)563 in 
1970. It has been credited by Nigel Walker as the ‘first full-length book’ on 
sentencing.564 Walker described sentencing law in this period as ‘uninteresting in 
its simplicity’565 with very ‘little real case law’,566 to readers of the Criminal Law 
Review. He disdainfully remarked that Thomas’ text was ‘an attempt to make sense 
of the decisions and dicta’567 of the Court and that Thomas ‘attributed a good deal 
more sense and consistency to the appellate court than the latter deserved.’568  
 
Others have been much more respectful of his work. For example, AWB Simpson 
has described Thomas’ text as a writing up of an oral tradition which ‘publishes in 
comprehensive literary form the customary laws of the criminal appeal in England 
for the first time.’569 Sir Leon Radzinowicz (Professor at the Institute of 
Criminology in Cambridge) described the work as, 
 
                                                          
563 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970). 
564 Nigel Walker, ‘The English Sentencing System*’ [1971] Criminal Law Review 576, 576. 
565 Ibid. 
566 Ibid. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Ibid. 
569 A.W.B, Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law (Hambledon Press, 
1987) 379. 
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... a clear guide to the principles and considerations which shape the thinking of 
judges, but which have not hitherto been easily accessible either to lawyers or 
the public.570 
Thomas’ study took place during a period of transition for the Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division which moved away from tariff sentencing and towards an 
‘individualized’ approach.571 Walker, remarking on the pressure upon the Court for 
uniformity, stated: 
Conditioned by newspaper editorials and television discussions, sentencers 
became increasingly self-conscious, and instead of lecturing the offender began 
to justify themselves in the eyes of the Sunday Express.572 
Yet, despite his critique of ‘conjuring’ involved in presenting a consolidated text of 
principles,573 Walker acknowledged the appearance of the text in courtrooms in 
1971 and its clear influence.574 He has argued that Thomas’ work was ‘…not so 
much a description as a rationalization: few sentencers thought so clearly. Read as 
a description, however, it was very persuasive, and within a few years had become 
a fair account of the way in which many – even most – judges claimed to reason.’575 
Cyrus Tata has described Thomas as one of the two ‘most influential sentencing 
scholars of our time’.576 
 
Thomas’ text was pioneering in the field as it identified principles of sentencing (as 
espoused by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division), consolidated these principles, 
and presented them clearly in a single text. Incredibly, the study behind the text 
 
                                                          
570 Sir Leon Radzinowicz, ‘Foreword’ in David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy 
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574 Nigel Walker, ‘The English Sentencing System*’ [1971] Criminal Law Review 576, 576. See also 
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575 Nigel Walker, Why Punish? (Oxford University Press, 1991) 156 (see footnote 6). 
576 Cyrus Tata, ‘Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the Discretionary Decision 
Process’ (2007) 16(3) Social & Legal Studies 425, 434. 
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involved a review of ‘more than ten thousand judgments’577 of the Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division over a period of approximately fifteen years.578 Austin Lovegrove 
has described Thomas’ study as ‘…the only substantial attempt to offer an account 
of the legal considerations that do or should more or less consciously exercise the 
minds of judges as they apply sentencing policy in individual cases.’579 The 
Principles of Sentencing has had a marked impact upon Australian sentencing 
practices. Kate Warner has reported, ‘Thomas’ Principles of Sentencing remains the 
most often cited sentencing text in Australian courts with some 378 citations.’580 
 
1. Thomas’ Categorisation of Mitigating Factors 
With the emergence of sentencing factors in the late 19th century so too came 
recognition of the potential impact of a sentence upon an offender’s family as one 
such sentencing factor. As a result of his research, Thomas identified the more 
common mitigating factors taken into account in sentencing by the Court of 
Appeal.581 Thomas defined four categories of mitigating factors under the common 
law. These were: 
 
1. the age and history of the offender; 
2. the circumstances leading to the commission of the offence; 
3. the indirect effect of the conviction or sentence; and 
4. the behaviour of the offender since the commission of the offence.582 
 
He noted that mitigating factors rarely were argued before the Court in isolation 
and that it was not possible to identify a tariff for any one factor falling within 
 
                                                          
577 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) xiii. 
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579 Austin Lovegrove, The Framework of Judicial Sentencing: A Study in Legal Decision Making 
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580 Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Scholarship in Australia’ (2006-2007) 18(2) Current Issues in Criminal 
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581 See David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970) 171, 198. 
582 See David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970) 171 - 198; David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy 
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these categories.583 However, he stated that it was ‘possible to examine some of the 
more common factors and identify the circumstances under which they are most 
likely to be effective.’584  
 
In the first edition of the Principles of Sentencing, Thomas observed that there was 
a residual discretion of mercy that the Court of Appeal in England and Wales could 
draw upon to provide leniency to an offender in sentencing when no other 
mitigating factor was appropriate. He stated ‘…and in other cases there may be 
circumstances of particular hardship not within the general category of mitigating 
factors where the Court may reduce a sentence ‘in mercy’.’585 As will be seen in the 
studies of the Australian case law the relationship between mercy and family 
hardship has been repeatedly tested before the courts. This relationship is the 
subject of substantive analysis in Chapter Six.   
 
Thomas’ reference to a residual category of mercy did not appear in the second 
edition where instead Thomas focused on developing his established four 
categories of mitigating factors. The third category: ‘the indirect effect of the 
conviction or sentence’,586 listed above, is the category of mitigating factors that 
dealt with circumstances of hardship. The circumstances of hardship which were 
identified by Thomas were: 
a. the effect of the sentence on the offender’s family;587 
b. the loss of career and other indirect hardships;588 and  
c. additional hardships in prison.589  
 
The first type of indirect effect (a) dealt with the impact of a sentence upon third 
parties. Thereby, Thomas granted recognition to this factor in his ground-breaking 
study. The following two types (b and c) dealt with the impact of the sentence 
upon the offender.  
 
 
                                                          
583 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970) 171. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Ibid 199. 
586 Ibid 211. 
587 Ibid 211-214. 
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The consideration of hardship factors by courts (more broadly and not just in a 
sentencing context) was widely known at this time. As legal historian and theorist 
AWB Simpson has observed, before the term was popularised by Ronald 
Dworkin,590 ‘the expression ‘hard case’, … used to mean a case in which the 
application of the law caused hardship.’591 Referencing the legal adage ‘hard cases 
make bad law’, Simpson noted that hard cases are those cases that provoke 
sympathy and distort the law.592 If this legal adage was representative of the 
mainstream approach to the role of hardship factors within the law at this time, 
then one would expect to see hardship factors falling within the domain of a 
judicial exercise of mercy.593 It is, therefore, significant that Thomas recognised 
family hardship as a category of ‘mitigating factors’. This was an important 
classification.  
 
Thomas was engaged in a normative process. Thomas cemented family hardships 
place as a mitigating factor in sentencing under the common law.  But he observed 
that generally the Court of Appeal Criminal Division did not take the effect of an 
offender’s sentence upon family members and dependants into account in 
sentencing. Thomas noted that:  
[t]he Court has stated on many occasions that the hardship caused to the 
offender’s wife and children is not normally a circumstance which the sentencer 
may take into account (emphasis added).594 
Thomas provided the case of Lewis595 heard by the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division in 1972 as an example of this practice.  
 
The Lewis case dealt with a burglary offence. In Lewis the offender bought an 
appeal against his sentence of three and a half years. The Court stated that it had 
been urged:  
to take into consideration the unhappiness and the distress that his misdeeds 
have brought upon his dependants. That alas is something which is an 
 
                                                          
590 See, eg, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 4th ed, 1984) 81-130. 
591 A.W.B Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 3. 
592 Ibid 3 [footnote 4]. 
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594 Ibid 211. 
595 That citation adopted by David Thomas for this case was Lewis 20.11.72, 2660/A/72 see David 
Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division 
(Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 211. 
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inevitable consequence of crime, and it is something which the Court cannot 
regard as a mitigating circumstance.596  
Noting the language of the Court in the extract above, the Court held that the effect 
of a sentence upon an offender’s family is not regarded as a mitigating 
circumstance but rather an ‘inevitable consequence of crime’. Thomas could easily 
have adopted this language in his text and not have identified family hardship as a 
mitigating factor. But Thomas did recognise, ‘the effect of the sentence on the 
offender’s family’ as a mitigating factor at sentence and placed it under the 
category of ‘the indirect effect of the conviction or sentence’.597 
 
In his commentary, to further support the view that this was not a factor that was 
frequently taken into account by the Court of Appeal, Thomas cited the case of 
Sherlock598 and the case of Ingham.599 Sherlock and Ingham were both heard before 
the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in 1974. In Sherlock, a 32-year-old man was 
sentenced to imprisonment and appealed this sentence. The Court was made 
aware that his wife had recently given birth and that this couple had previously 
lost a child. The Court stated: 
this Court is very sensitive…to the distress and hardship which sentences of 
this nature must necessarily bring upon the family, friends and relations of 
convicted persons; but this is one of the penalties which… convicted persons 
must pay.600  
Similarly, in the Ingham case the Court once again refused to regard family 
hardship as a mitigating factor. The facts of Ingham were that the appellant’s wife 
was suffering depression caused by the appellant’s imprisonment and she was said 
to be in an ‘advanced state of pregnancy’.601 Thomas in his text noted that, 
[t]he Court refused to interfere, saying that ‘imprisonment of the father 
inevitably causes hardship to the rest of the family… part of the price to pay 
 
                                                          
596 Lewis 20.11.72, 2660/A/72 cited within David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing 
Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 211. 
597 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
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when committing a crime is that imprisonment does involve hardship on the 
wife and family, and it cannot be one of the factors which can affect what would 
otherwise be the right sentence.602  
In light of this body of case law, how did Thomas classify and reconcile this 
consideration as a mitigating factor? 
 
Thomas describes the approach by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in these 
cases as a ‘policy’.603 Importantly, looking at the way that Thomas has described 
and discussed this matter within his text, Thomas does not find that ‘the effect of 
the sentence on the offender’s family’ is not a mitigating factor. In fact, he clearly 
identifies it as one. In effect, he is observing that there is a ‘policy’ (or practice) of 
the Court of Appeal of not according this factor significant weight. Thomas also 
identified what he termed ‘three recognizable exceptions’604 to this policy position. 
He noted that ‘none [of these exceptions] is automatically applied’.605 Therefore 
the approach would be to put the matter before the Court and the Court would 
then consider the plea in mitigation on the merits of the individual case.  
 
The three exceptions identified by Thomas, as a result of his study, were: 
 ‘where the degree of hardship suffered by the family is exceptional, and 
considerably more severe than the deprivation suffered by a family in 
normal circumstances as a result of the imprisonment’;606 
 where the offender is the mother of young children (particularly in relation 
to less serious offences);607 and 
 ‘where both parents are imprisoned simultaneously, or other family 
circumstances mean that the imprisonment of one parent effectively 
deprives the child of parental care.’608 
All of the case law cited by Thomas, within the second edition of the Principles of 
Sentencing, in support of these exceptions, is dated from 1971 to 1977. 
 
 
                                                          
602 Ibid 211-212. 
603 Ibid 212. 
604 Ibid 212. 
605 Ibid 212. 
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In the first edition of Principles of Sentencing (published in 1970) Thomas had also 
identified and acknowledged this policy in respect of the effect of a sentence upon 
an offender’s family.609 He clearly held that this was a mitigating factor. Moreover, 
it was common enough to grant specific recognition in this text. But, he found that 
there was a policy or attitude of the Court to not accord this mitigating factor 
weight.610  
 
His position at this time was that gender was a relevant factor at sentencing. 
Thomas stated that, 
[t]he attitude of the Court to this factor, at least so far as male 
offenders are concerned…. [was that] they ought to have thought 
about the difficulties to their wives and children…before they ever 
started out on this kind of criminal enterprise.611 
He then noted that ‘[t]his policy is subject to exceptions in extreme cases and there 
is some evidence of a marked difference in the Court’s approach to the effect of the 
sentence on the offender’s family where the appellant is a woman.’612 The principle 
of hardship to third parties under the common law was evidently not well 
developed in Thomas’ eyes at this time. He noted that the case law could be 
interpreted in different ways.613 
 
Gender appeared to have an impact on the effectiveness of the plea. However, 
Thomas noted that the cases dealing with female offenders were also generally 
matters dealing with trivial offences. In two cases dealing with the procuring of an 
abortion by female offenders the Court had refused to mitigate a sentence on the 
basis of family circumstances.614 Thomas noted that two general principles could 
explain the Courts practices, namely that: 
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1. ‘mitigating factors have proportionately less effect in relation to more 
serious offences than to less serious ones’;615 and 
2. ‘a particular emphasis on deterrence…justifies ignoring mitigating 
factors’.616 
Where these circumstances were not present, Thomas thought ‘the Court will 
normally consider family circumstances in the case of female offenders.’617 
 
As seen above, by the second edition Thomas’ position on the role of gender had 
shifted. He had qualified his earlier general position of leniency to women in 
respect of family hardship pleas and had identified that being the mother of young 
children, particularly when coupled with convictions for less serious offences, did 
generally result in a reduction in sentence. This practice was regarded as one of 
the exceptions to the policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division of not 
normally taking family hardship into account. 
 
2. The Legacy of Thomas for Family Hardship 
What role Thomas’ work has had in defining and shaping sentencing law is an 
important consideration. In the early 20th century, sentencing was a practice 
conducted by judicial officers, but decisions made on sentencing were considered 
to have no precedential value.618 This position has changed both in the UK and in 
Australia with appellate courts finding that sentencing decisions could be ‘wrong 
in principle’.619 
 
Martin Wasik has professed that Thomas both discovered and shaped the law of 
sentencing as a discipline.620 The influence of Thomas’ work upon the discipline is 
 
                                                          
615 Ibid 191. 
616 Ibid. 
617 Ibid. 
618 Martin Wasik, ‘Going Around in Circles? Reflections on Fifty Years of Change in Sentencing’ (2004) 
Apr Criminal Law Review 253, 259. 
619 Martin Wasik, ‘Going Around in Circles? Reflections on Fifty Years of Change in Sentencing’ (2004) 
Apr Criminal Law Review 253, 260-261; Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2005) 35-36. See also ‘Chapter One, Sentencing Jurisprudence’. 
620 Martin Wasik, ‘Going Around in Circles? Reflections on Fifty Years of Change in Sentencing’ (2004) 
Apr Criminal Law Review 253, 259. 
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widely acknowledged.621 Alec Samuels, reviewing the second edition of the 
Principles of Sentencing in the Modern Law Review, remarked, 
Whether judges were consciously applying principles and we did not know 
about it, or whether they were unconsciously applying principles, or whether 
David Thomas rationalising ex post facto, making “principles” out of a 
haphazard myriad of isolate instances, bringing order out of chaos, we do not 
know. What is certain is that in recent years the judges have frequently 
consulted the first edition, openly or surreptitiously, and thus for the first time 
in history some sort of systematised and systematic communication of 
information has gone out to the judiciary.622 
As it was observed in Chapter Two, the extent of Thomas’ contribution to the field 
of sentencing means that his work is regarded today as a secondary source of 
law.623  
 
A review of the judgments of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division immediately 
following the publication of the Principles of Sentencing illustrates a clear practice 
of referencing the Principles of Sentencing on family considerations as a mitigating 
factor.624 For example, in R v Sumners the Court of Appeal considered Thomas’ 
commentary on family considerations.625 The headnote for this reported case 
provided ‘Family Circumstances – Whether a Mitigating Factor – Exceptional 
Circumstances’.626 Highlighting that it was still an unresolved matter as to whether 
this was a mitigating factor or not under the common law.  
 
In R v Sumners,627 the Court of Appeal Criminal Division found that an offender 
who had been convicted of theft (in breach of trust) should have his sentence 
reduced from four to three years as his wife was undergoing a serious operation 
 
                                                          
621 See, eg, Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 
2005) 31-36; Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Scholarship in Australia’ (2006-2007) 18(2) Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 241, 243. 
622 Alec Samuels, ‘Review: Principles of Sentencing: The sentencing policy of the Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division. Second Edition. By David Thomas’ (1979) 42(5) The Modern Law Review 598, 598-
599. 
623 See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 
24. 
624 See R v Sumners (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 13; R v Franklyn (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 65; R v Vaughan 
(1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83; R v Haleth (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 178. 
625 R v Sumners (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 13 referencing David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The 
Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 212. 
626 R v Sumners (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 13, 13 
627 Ibid. 
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and their four teenage boys would be left without parental supervision.628 The 
Court held  
…having heard what Mr Baughan has had to say about the special family 
circumstances – the family, as in many other cases, are the principal sufferers – 
we find it possible to accede to his plea and, as an act of mercy, to reduce the 
sentence from four years to three years.629 
It appears that the Court found that there were special circumstances (falling 
within the third exception identified by Thomas, see above).  However, there is 
also a clear reference to ‘an act of mercy’, which was not strictly necessary under 
Thomas’ approach to family considerations as a mitigating factor.630 
 
In 1981 in R v Franklyn,631 Thomas’ text was cited as a reference on the point of 
family considerations as mitigating factors.632 Here the headnote for the case was 
‘Mitigating – Family Circumstances – Single Parent Family Deprived of Parental 
Care by Imprisonment of Offender – Whether a Relevant Consideration.’633 In this 
case, the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence on the basis of children being 
deprived of parental care. The male offender was a sole parent of four children (5, 
10, 13 and 16 years of age) who had assaulted a police officer occasioning actual 
bodily harm. The children had reacted badly to foster care and had returned to the 
family home with the eldest child taking responsibility for raising his siblings.634 
The Court stated: 
That situation cannot last very long. In short, unless this man is let out fairly 
quickly, the chances are that the community will be left with a delinquent 
family. I do not suppose even the police officer who was assaulted would like 
that to happen. This Court does not.635 
Finding ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’ the appeal was successful, and the 
sentence was reduced from six months to twenty-one days thus enabling the 
 
                                                          
628 Ibid 14. 
629 Ibid 14. 
630 See discussion above and see David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the 
Court of Appeal Criminal Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 211-212. In the first edition Thomas had 
noted that reliance on mercy could occur when no other mitigating factor applied, see David Thomas, 
Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (Heinemann, 
1970) 199. 
631 (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 65. 
632 R v Franklyn (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 65, 65. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid, 66. 
635 Ibid. 
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offender’s immediate release from custody.636 There was no reference to the term 
‘mercy’ in this judgment. 
 
In R v Vaughan637 and R v Haleth638 both heard before the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division in 1982, the Principles of Sentencing was once again cited as a reference 
for the judgment.639 These two cases also dealt with children being left without 
parental care. Janet Vaughan had been convicted of three offences of handling 
stolen money (with eighteen further offences taken into account at sentence).640 
Her husband was also a party to the crimes and had been sentenced to 
imprisonment. The Court said that the sentence of nine months’ imprisonment 
imposed upon her was appropriate, ‘[b]ut there is an extra circumstance here, 
which in mercy and compassion this Court finds compelling…’.641 Some of their 
children suffered from health and mental disabilities and the Court found that this, 
coupled with the absence of both parents and the current care arrangements 
(friends and neighbours) was not satisfactory having regard to the ‘welfare of the 
children’.642  
 
Mr Haleth had been convicted of affray (involving violence) and sentenced to 
twelve months’ imprisonment.643 The offender’s wife and son suffered from a 
kidney disease, his wife had died from this disease ‘not very long after he 
committed the offence’.644 The Court received evidence from a consultant 
paediatrician that it was not in the son’s interests that he suffers the anxiety 
arising from the imprisonment of his father.645 The Court stated, 
We think that the time has come when the mercy of this Court can be shown to 
this appellant so that he can go home to look after his boy. It is upon this 
ground alone, that we see fit to bring about his immediate release.646 
The sentence was suspended for two years.647 
 
                                                          
636 Ibid. 
637 (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83. 
638 (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 178. 
639 R v Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83,83; R v Haleth (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 178, 178. 
640 R v Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83, 83. 
641 Ibid 84. 
642 Ibid. 
643 R v Haleth (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 178, 178. 
644 Ibid 179. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid. 
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A review of these cases illustrates that none of these cases directly cited case law 
as authority for the approach to mitigating the sentence on the basis of the impact 
of the sentence upon dependants nor for mitigation of sentence where children 
will be without parental care. The Principles of Sentencing was cited as a reference 
in all of these cases which demonstrates that the text played a key role in shaping 
the development of the common law. 
 
‘Mercy’ appears to be significantly tied into grants of leniency in sentencing in 
these cases. In three of the four cases reviewed, the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division references ‘mercy’ as a justification for a reduction in sentence when 
dealing with hardship to an offender’s family. What is not clear is whether there is 
clear acknowledgment by the Court of what could be identified as a ‘sentencing 
principle’ of taking family hardship into account in exceptional circumstances. In 
the cases discussed above, there was no express recognition that family hardship 
can only be taken into account in exceptional circumstances as a principle of 
sentencing. Rather, the sentencing principle in that form appears to have been 
promoted by Thomas.648 
 
Family hardship is a sentencing factor which has been raised in pleas in mitigation 
before courts and this is evidenced in our earliest common law court records. 
Family hardship was recognised by Thomas as a legitimate sentencing factor but 
was marginalised by him by the addition of an exceptional circumstances 
qualification. Deterrence and rehabilitation were privileged by Thomas in his 
analysis of the policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. The materialisation 
of the policies of a court and the resulting development of a principle of sentencing 
that hardship to offender’s families will only be taken into account in sentencing in 
exceptional circumstances have had a long-lasting legacy.649 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
648 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 211. 
649 As will be seen in the study of the Australian case law in Chapters Four and Five. 
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C. Examples of Family Hardship Being Disconnected from Sentencing 
 
The approach of courts operating under the common law has been to approach 
this issue with a keen awareness that distress, hardship and other forms of 
suffering by dependants are an inevitable outcome of crime, and of punishment. As 
such the common law has not granted broad recognition to this matter as a 
mainstream sentencing factor that would routinely be relevant to the process of 
determining an appropriate sentence. In fact, the potential severity of the impact of 
a sentence upon dependents and enormity of the issue has led to its sidelining. For 
example, in 1980 the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in R v Stanley,650 identified 
that the suffering of children and spouses is routine and common place and if 
leniency was granted on this basis the courts ‘would be altering sentences 
regularly’.651  Within the common law legal tradition there have been overt 
reforms to restrict consideration of family hardship at sentencing. 
 
In the USA approaches to limit judicial discretion in sentencing include mandatory 
minimum sentences, fixed term sentences, sentencing guidelines and sentencing 
grids.652 These approaches have limited, or in some circumstances removed, 
consideration of family hardship. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, 
have deemed that ‘family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant.’653 
For specific offences the guidelines state that, ‘family ties and responsibilities and 
community ties are not relevant in determining whether a sentence should be 
below the applicable guideline range.’654 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also 
expressly prohibit consideration of gender as a sentencing factor.655 The 
 
                                                          
650 (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 296 
651 R v Stanley and Others (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 296, 299. 
652 See, eg, New York’s ‘Rockefeller Drug Laws’, California’s ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out Laws’ and 
Minnesota’s ‘Sentencing Guidelines…determined through a sentencing “grid”’ see Marc Mauer, Cathy 
Potler and Richard Wolf, ‘Gender and Justice: Women, Drugs, and Sentencing Policy’ (Research Report, 
The Sentencing Project, November 1999) 6. 
653 See, eg, §5H1.6. ‘Family Ties and Responsibilities (Policy Statement)’ of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual available in the current version, see United States Sentencing Commission, 2013 
USSC Guidelines Manual (1 November 2013) United States Sentencing Commission 
<http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/index.cfm>. 
654 See, eg, §5H1.6. ‘Family Ties and Responsibilities (Policy Statement)’ of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual available in the current version, see United States Sentencing Commission, 2013 
USSC Guidelines Manual (1 November 2013) United States Sentencing Commission 
<http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/index.cfm>.  
655 §5H1.10. ‘Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status (Policy 
Statement)’ of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual available in the current version, see United 
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Minnesota sentencing guidelines have removed consideration of family hardship 
by limiting consideration of sentencing factors to those that relate to ‘aspects of the 
offence and criminal history.’656 Therefore, deeming the impact of a sentence upon 
dependants would fall outside of the legislative framework of relevant sentencing 
factors. 
 
Barbara Koons-Witt described that the effect of such reforms was: ‘factors that 
were once relevant in the sentencing decisions of women (eg. pregnancy, mother, 
and primary caregiver) were no longer supported by the changes in the sentencing 
laws’657 in those jurisdictions. However, the extent to which courts have 
conformed with such guidelines and the scope of the exclusion of consideration of 
family hardship in actual sentencing practices in these jurisdictions is a field of 
current research.658  
 
In their efforts to promote greater consistency in sentencing,659 England and Wales 
have also established a system of sentencing guidelines.660 These guidelines are 
 
                                                          
States Sentencing Commission, 2013 USSC Guidelines Manual (1 November 2013) United States 
Sentencing Commission <http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/index.cfm>. 
656 Barbara Koons-Witt, 'The Effect of Gender on the Decision to Incarcerate Before and After the 
Introduction of Sentencing Guidelines' (2002) 40 Criminology 297, 298. 
657 Barbara Koons-Witt, 'The Effect of Gender on the Decision to Incarcerate Before and After the 
Introduction of Sentencing Guidelines' (2002) 40 Criminology 297, 298. 
658 It has been suggested that guidelines may be being ignored and that leniency to women may be 
occurring earlier in the court processes through unreviewable police or prosecutorial practices or via 
sentencing bargaining see Barbara Koons-Witt, 'The Effect of Gender on the Decision to Incarcerate 
Before and After the Introduction of Sentencing Guidelines' (2002) 40 Criminology 297, 302-305, 306, 
317. See also William Berry III, ‘Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States’ in Julian Roberts 
(ed), Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 247, 250-259; Aron 
Zimmerman, 'Home Alone: Children of Incarcerated Mothers in New York City Under the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws' (2005) 12 Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 445, 456-458; Supriya Sarnikar, Todd 
Sorensen and Ronald Oaxaca, ‘Do You Receive a Lighter Prison Sentence Because You Are a Women? 
An Economic Analysis of Federal Criminal Sentencing Guidelines’ (Discussion Paper No 2870, Institute 
for the Study of Labor (IZA), June 2007) 27, 31-32. 
For general commentary on the impact that guidelines and grids have had on women offenders in the 
United States of America, see Myrna Raeder, 'Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, 
and other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' (1993) 
20 Pepperdine Law Review 905; Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson, 'The Role of Gender in a Structured 
Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines' (1994) 85 Criminal Law & Criminology 181; Sean Berberian, 
'Protecting Children: Explaining Disparities in the Female Offender's Pretrial Process, and Policy Issues 
Surrounding Lenient Treatment of Mothers' (1999) 10 Hastings Women's Law Journal 369. 
659 See Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) s 120(11)(b); Sentencing Council for England and Wales, 
About Guidelines (2016)  https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/about-sentencing/about-guidelines/. 
660 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) s 120. 
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published by the Sentencing Council.661 The system of sentencing guidelines in 
England and Wales is very different to the approach adopted in the USA. As John 
Anderson describes: 
the guidelines produced are designed to be as comprehensive as possible in 
narrative form and may cover establishing the basis for sentencing; factors 
influencing sentence for the offence; sentence ranges and starting points; and 
aggravating and mitigating factors to take into consideration.662 
Although, Andrew Ashworth has defended the reforms by noting that these 
guidelines are not tramways663 and discretion to depart from the guidelines has 
been retained.664 Nonetheless, as Hudson has observed the general experience in 
both the USA and England and Wales has been that, ‘“parity in treatment” in 
practice has meant more imprisonment of women.’665 
 
An examination of the guidelines in England and Wales reveals that family 
hardship has been granted some, limited, recognition in specific circumstances. For 
example, in the Definitive Guideline for Burglary Offences being the ‘sole or 
primary carer for dependent relatives’,666 is recognised as a ‘personal mitigation 
factor’667 and the guideline instructs that ‘in some cases, having considered these 
factors, it may be appropriate to move outside the identified category range.’668  
 
Provisions such as s 166 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) also retain a courts’ 
broader discretion to take mitigating factors into account where ‘in the opinion of 
the court, [they] are relevant in mitigation of sentence.’ Therefore, in England and 
Wales a sentencing judge may find that family hardship is a relevant sentencing 
 
                                                          
661 The Sentencing Council ‘is an independent, non-departmental public body of the Ministry of Justice’, 
see Sentencing Council for England and Wales, About Us (2016) 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/about-us/> 
662 John Anderson, ‘Standard Minimum Sentencing and Guideline Judgments: An Uneasy Alliance in the 
Way of the Future’ (2006) 30 Criminal Law Journal 203, 219. 
663 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Sentencing in Theory and Practice: The English Guidelines Experience’ (Speech 
delivered at the ANU and NJCA Conference: Sentencing from Theory to Practice, Canberra, 8 February 
2014). 
664 See Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) s 125(1). 
665 Barbara Hudson, ‘Doing Justice to Difference’ in Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (eds), 
Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch (Oxford University Press, 
1998) 224, 248. See also Barbara Hudson, ‘Punishment, Poverty and Responsibility: The Case for a 
Hardship Defence’ (1999) 8(4) Social & Legal Studies 583, 587-588. 
666 Sentencing Council, Burglary Offences (2011), 5. 
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factor in determining an appropriate sentence as it is a sentencing factor under the 
common law. 
 
In contrast to these two examples from common law jurisdictions, Australia has 
not embraced an approach of adopting sentencing guidelines (of the type 
described above) or sentencing grids. Chapter Two explained that the broader 
model adopted by legislatures within Australia has been to provide a list of 
sentencing factors within sentencing legislation.  While there is variance in the 
specific features of the Australian legislative models’ all jurisdictions acknowledge 
that statutory lists of sentencing factors are not exhaustive.  
 
Chapter Two explained that the most prescriptive approach in Australia is that 
some legislative provisions highlight for judicial officers the sentencing factors that 
a court should take into account when determining an appropriate sentence when 
such factor ‘is relevant’ and ‘known to the court’. Significantly, and in contrast to 
the approaches adopted in England and Wales and in the USA where family 
hardship has been sidelined as an irrelevant sentencing factor, within Australia, 
some parliaments have stepped in and recognised that the probable effect of an 
offender’s sentence upon family and dependants is a sentencing factor that should 
be taken into account. 
 
 
IV ‘FAMILY HARDSHIP’ IN SENTENCING LEGISLATION 
 
Family hardship has been explicitly listed as a sentencing factor to be taken into 
account in Australian legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia 
and the federal jurisdiction.669 How this came to be and the policy reasons behind 
this legislative action will be explored in this part. It will examine when and how 
family hardship came to be recognised in statutes within Australia. This part will 
also demonstrate that listing family hardship as a sentencing factor in legislation 
was a notable and significant inclusion.  
 
 
                                                          
669 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1)(o); Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(n). 
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A. The Road to Legislative Recognition 
 
In 1978, the same year the Nagle Report was published,670 the Law Reform 
Commission (later to be the Australian Law Reform Commission) received Terms 
of Reference from the Attorney-General, Peter Durack, which outlined his concern 
for: 
… (c) the desirability of ensuring that offenders against a law of the 
Commonwealth are treated as uniformly as possible throughout the 
Commonwealth in respect of the sentences imposed on them; 
(d) the need for a review of laws of the Commonwealth and the Australian 
Capital Territory, with particular reference to the questions –  
(i) whether principles and guidelines for the imposition of sentences of 
imprisonment should be formulated; and 
(ii) whether existing laws providing alternatives to imprisonment are 
adequate; …671 
The Commission’s examination into sentencing ran for ten years and during this 
time it produced four discussion papers, an interim report and a final report.672  
 
George Zdenkowski, who was one of the Commissioners in Charge of the 
Reference,673 has described the Commission’s work as the ‘first major 
comprehensive review of sentencing law in Australia.’674 In its Interim Report the 
Commission stated: ‘[d]espite eight decades of Australian Federation, this is the 
first study of Federal crime and its punishment in Australia.’675 This is a 
remarkable situation however, as explained in Chapter One, at this time in 
Australian sentencing, ‘emphasis…[had] been… on integrating Federal offenders 
into the local State machinery of criminal justice.’676 There was no single statutory 
 
                                                          
670 New South Wales, Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons, Report of the Royal 
Commission into New South Wales Prisons (Nagle Report) (1978). 
671 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Interim Report, Report No 15 (1980) xvii. 
672 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Reform Options, Discussion Paper No 10 (1979); Law Reform 
Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Discussion Paper No 15 (1980); Law Reform 
Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Interim Report, Report No 15 (1980); Law Reform 
Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987); Law Reform Commission, 
Sentencing: Penalties, Discussion Paper No 30 (1987); Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 
44 (1988). 
673 See Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987); Law Reform 
Commission, Sentencing: Penalties, Discussion Paper No 30 (1987). 
674 George Zdenkowski, 'Sentencing’ in Freckelton, I and Selby, H (eds), Appealing to the Future: 
Michael Kirby and His Legacy (Thomson Reuters, 2009) 751, 752. 
675 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Interim Report, Report No 15 (1980) xxi. 
676 Ibid xxiv. 
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body of federal sentencing law nor were there entrenched federal sentencing 
practices.677  
 
The reference and the resulting research and reforms marked the beginning of a 
move towards greater transparency in sentencing within Australia. The most 
apparent shift came in the consolidation of sentencing laws and procedures into a 
single body of sentencing provisions. In the federal arena, the legislature did not 
introduce a sentencing statute, instead pt 1B was introduced into the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) via the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1989 (Cth). Part 1B 
contained federal sentencing provisions and it did clearly set out a separate federal 
sentencing framework.678 
 
Alongside the process of consolidating existing sentencing provisions into a single 
source of sentencing provisions, a significant inclusion into pt 1B included the 
introduction of a provision containing a list of sentencing factors in the form of s 
16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Section 16A(2) was housed within div 2 
entitled ‘General Sentencing Principles. The section listed thirteen matters that 
‘must… where relevant and known’,679 be taken into account by a sentencing court 
when determining the appropriate sentence to impose upon a federal offender. 
‘[T]he probable effect of a sentence or order under consideration would have on 
any of the person’s family or dependants’680 appeared within this list of sentencing 
factors.  
 
The explanatory memorandum for the Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 
1989 acknowledged the significance of the inclusion of this matter into the new 
federal section. The memorandum stated: 
Subsection (2) contains a number of matters that must be taken into account by 
a court when selecting a sentence, if relevant… The subsection in part gives 
statutory recognition to matters already taken into account by courts when 
sentencing (eg the character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental 
 
                                                          
677 See comments of Justice Weinberg ‘The Labyrinthine Nature of Federal Sentencing’ (Keynote address 
presented at Federal Crime and Sentencing Conference 2012, Canberra, 11 February 2012) 
<http://njca.com.au/program/federal-crime-and-sentencing-conference-2012/>, 2-3. See also Law Reform 
Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Interim Report, Report No 15 (1980) xxiii. 
678 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Discussion Paper No 70 
(2005) 7-8. 
679 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2). This significance of these terms is closely examined below. 
680 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p). 
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condition of the person), but it also highlights certain matters including the 
circumstances of the victim and the probable effect of the sentence on the 
offender’s family or dependants (emphasis added).681 
Family hardship was a common law sentencing factor, however, as the explanatory 
memorandum makes clear, there was a clear intention to draw attention to this 
factor in the sentencing of federal offenders.  Studies of sentencing theory have 
found that during this period ‘humanity in sentencing’682 was not popular and 
accordingly family hardship was generally not seen as a conventional sentencing 
consideration.  
 
Judicial attitudes, at the time, were not receptive to legislative intervention.683 The 
Law Reform Commission’s National Survey of Judges and Magistrates conducted in 
1979, found that ‘the overwhelming majority (249 or 91.1%) of respondents are 
opposed, or strongly opposed, to legislative principles and guidelines.’684 The 
legislative reforms were expected to lead to greater consistency in sentencing, 
however, across the Australian jurisdictions, the most favoured method within the 
judiciary for promoting consistency was via ‘decisions of appeal courts laying 
down principles of sentencing and informal discussion and consultation among 
judicial officers themselves.’685 Nonetheless, the Commission favoured giving 
statutory form to established common law principles and practices686 and the 
reforms went ahead. 
 
1. Federal Legislation 
A federal sentencing provision with a list of sentencing factors came about because 
of the work of the Australian Law Reform Commission. One of the 
recommendations the Commission made in its Final Report was for a federal 
sentencing provision setting out a list of sentencing factors. It recommended that 
the list of factors should be ‘prescribed in relevant legislation dealing with federal 
 
                                                          
681 Explanatory Memorandum, Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 1989 (Cth) 7. 
682 A phrase used by Austin Lovegrove to describe the role played by personal mitigation and mercy in 
sentencing see Austin Lovegrove, ‘Putting the Offender Back Into Sentencing: An Empirical Study of the 
Public’s Understanding of Personal Mitigation’ (2011) 11 Criminology and Criminal Justice 37, 38-39. 
683 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Interim Report, Report No 15 (1980) 
Appendix B, 371. 
684 Ibid Appendix B, 428. 
685 Ibid Appendix B, 372. 
686 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Penalties, Discussion Paper No 30 (1987) 8. 
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and ACT criminal trials’.687 The Commission saw the inclusion of a list of factors 
relevant to sentencing as a tool to ‘promote consistency in approach by sentencers 
…’688 It specified that there was considerable variation in what kind of information 
judicial officers considered relevant to sentencing with some judges holding 
‘certain kinds of information as always relevant to sentencing, while others may 
not.’689 
 
The Commission had initially proposed to limit the factors relevant to sentencing 
to those matters listed in legislation.690 But in its Final Report the Commission 
advocated for a highly permissive approach to listing sentencing matters. It did not 
promote a list that prescribed an order of priority nor did it promote a list that 
predetermined matters as either aggravating or mitigating.691 Moreover, the 
Commission recommended that a statutory list of sentencing factors should be 
open-ended. It stated a sentencing court should not be ‘obligated to consider all, or 
any of the matters in the list’.692 The type of consistency that the Commission 
promoted was, thus, one of providing a consistent framework or common ground 
for sentencing principles, while still maintaining an underlying practice of broad 
judicial discretion and individualised justice.693 
 
‘Hardship to others’694 was identified in the ALRC Discussion Paper as a mitigating 
factor at sentencing that was ‘currently used’.695 This factor was identified in the 
paper under the broader classification of ‘Effect of the sanction’.696 As discussed 
above, Thomas had classified it under a group he called ‘Indirect Effects of the 
Conviction or Sentence’.697 The same type of hardships was captured by each 
classification see Table 5. 
 
                                                          
687 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 91. 
688 Ibid 91 (emphasis added). 
689 Ibid 89. 
690 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 29. 
691 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 90. 
692 Ibid 91. 
693 The Commission called for the provision of a ‘common standard by which to evaluate individual 
decision making’, see Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 89. 
694 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 31. 
695 Ibid 30. 
696 Ibid 31. 
697 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 211. 
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Table 5 Comparison of Hardship Classifications 
 
Indirect Effect of Conviction or Sentence 
(David Thomas) 
Effect of the sanction 
(ALRC) 
‘The effect of the sentence on the offender’s 
family’698 
‘Hardships to others  
(distress, reduced financial circumstances and 
deprivation of emotional support)’699 
‘Loss of career and other indirect hardships’700 
(ie. flowing from the offence such as injuries 
suffered by offender) 
‘Indirect consequences of conviction  
(loss of or inability to obtain similar 
employment, loss of pension rights, 
cancellation or suspension of trading or other 
licences, diminution of educational 
opportunities or the possibility of 
deportation)’701 
‘Additional hardships in prison’702  
(ie. ill heath, physical disability) 
‘Hardships to the offender 
(physical or psychological injuries or 
infirmities, additional hardships in prison)’703 
 
 
The Discussion Paper, therefore, recognised family hardship as a mitigating factor 
in sentencing practices in Australia in the 1980s. However, as stated above in the 
Discussion Paper the Commission proposed to limit the role of sentencing factors 
and it tentatively proposed704 to remove the family hardship because it did not fit 
within a just deserts theory of sentencing.705 
 
The ALRC in Report No 44 was unambiguous in its recommendation for the 
inclusion of the impact of a sentence upon third parties within a new legislative list 
 
                                                          
698 Ibid. 
699 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 31. 
700 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 214. 
701Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 31. 
702 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 215. 
703 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Procedure, Discussion Paper No 29 (1987) 31. 
704 Ibid 35. 
705 Ibid 34-35 
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of sentencing factors.706 The sentencing factor was described in the Report as 
follows: 
Recommendations 
170 List of facts relevant to sentencing. 
… the categories of facts relevant to sentencing should not be closed but should 
at least include … 
 the impact on third parties of a particular sanction, for example, 
distress, reduced financial circumstances and deprivation of emotional 
support for the offender’s family.707 
The Report acknowledged that the inclusion of family hardship would stretch the 
scope of relevant sentencing matters beyond factors related to the offender and 
his/her conduct.708 Indeed, it was expressly recognised that the inclusion of family 
hardship as a listed sentencing matter would be controversial709 but stated that it 
had been warned in submissions that there were ‘potentially destructive results if 
the impact of punishment on third parties, especially the family of the offender, 
was ignored.’710 
 
The description adopted for family hardship (above) in the Report also placed the 
mitigating factor in very general terms. As will be explained in Chapter Four, 
judicial officers, operating under the common law have a long-standing practice of 
dismissing both financial hardship upon third parties and emotional hardship 
inflicted upon third parties as relevant because these are forms of routine suffering 
to be expected as a result of imposing a sanction. Courts have stated that such 
forms of hardship to others are irrelevant to the act of determining an appropriate 
sentence to impose upon an offender.711 What is important in the Report is that the 
Commission, in its classification of family hardship, was endorsing a broader 
approach to the consideration at sentencing. 
 
 
                                                          
706 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 89-92. 
707 Ibid 90. 
708 Ibid 92. 
709 Ibid. 
710 Ibid. 
711 See, eg, Moore v Fingleton (1972) 3 SASR 164, 167; Sullivan v The Queen [1975] Tas SR 146 (NC), 
146. 
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The Report also recommended that ‘motherhood’ should be recognised when 
sentencing federal offenders. The Report stated: 
152. Motherhood. A factor which should carry considerable weight in the 
sentencing decision is being the mother of a young child. Only in exceptional 
circumstances, which constitute a real concern for the safety of others, should 
such parent be imprisoned.712  
Recommendation 152 was not picked up by the new provisions but consideration 
of the impact upon a young child would certainly have been covered by s 
16A(2)(p). During the 1980s, common law jurisdictions were often gender blind in 
their sentencing reforms and research. For example, Renate Mohr has critiqued the 
work of the Law Reform Commission of Canada in its reports on sentencing 
reform.713 She stated: 
Symptomatic of gender-neutrality in sentencing reform efforts is research that 
consists of constructing our thinking around men rather than women and men, 
research that involves the gathering of information with regard to one sex and 
treating it as if it applied to both sexes…714 
It is, therefore, notable that family hardship and the impact of sentencing on 
women were recognised and addressed by the ALRC.715 
 
(a) The resulting federal legislative provision 
The resulting federal provision, which provided a list of sentencing matters, was s 
16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The section commenced with the following 
words: 
In addition to any other matters, the court must take into account such of the 
following matters as are relevant and known to the court: …716 
The terminology that was adopted for the federal provision was not as permissive 
as the ALRC had envisaged in Report No 44. The use of the word ‘must’ instead of 
‘may’ indicates an obligatory rather than permissive requirement.717 In Wong, 
 
                                                          
712 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) l, 124-125. 
713 Renate Mohr, ‘Sentencing as a Gendered Process: Results of a Consultation’ (1990) 32 Canadian 
Journal of Criminology 479, 480. 
714 Ibid 479. 
715 The Discussion Paper to the Report had identified that ‘the factors listed as mitigating sentence in the 
Commission’s Discussion Paper 29 are broad enough to take into account pregnancy, the particular 
difficulties of single supporting parents and other issues and problems of particular relevance to female 
offenders’, see Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Penalties, Discussion Paper No 30 (1987) 180. 
716 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2). 
717 D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 
2011) 346. 
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Justices Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne examined the language of s 16A and the 
types of matters listed within that section.718 The joint judgment observed that s 
16A ‘obliges the sentencer to take all of them into account and effect must be given 
to that legislative command.’719  
 
Moreover, in Wong, Chief Justice Gleeson (in his critique of the use of guideline 
judgments for federal sentencing) stated: 
This is a risky undertaking when there is a federal statute which spells out in 
detail the matters to be taken into account by a sentencing judge. The statute is 
important both for what it says and for what it does not say.720 
The High Court in Wong engaged carefully with the importance of s 16A and the 
significance of the language used within this provision.  As set out above, the 
majority in Wong emphasise the importance of courts sentencing federal 
offenders, giving effect to the ‘legislative command’721 of the sections in pt 1B.722  
This stance by the High Court has been maintained. For example, later in the case 
of Barbaro, Gaegeler J723 observed that the inclusion of the phrase ‘[i]n addition to 
other matters’ demonstrated ‘implicit contemplation of that statutory language… 
that other matters might be required to be taken into account, either by another 
statute or by the common law.’724 This is a clear reference to the fact that the 
legislative lists of factors were not exhaustive.  
 
Interestingly, Report No 44 had identified that there was dissent within the 
Commission regarding the introduction of a legislative list of sentencing factors 
and foresaw the above attention to legislative language.725 The President, Justice 
Elizabeth Evatt, and the Deputy President, Mr J Greenwell, both expressed concern 
that ‘courts would be obliged to have regard to the language of the legislation’.726 
The High Court’s approach to the restatement of common law principles into 
 
                                                          
718 (2001) 207 CLR 584. 
719 Ibid 610. 
720 Ibid 597. 
721 Ibid 610. 
722 Ibid 597 (Gleeson CJ); 609-610 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
723 In his dissenting judgment. 
724 Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58, 77. See also El Karhani (1990) 51 A Crim R 123, 131 
(Kirby P, Campbell and Newman JJ). 
725 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 91. 
726 Ibid 91. 
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legislative provisions in Premier Automatic Ticket Issuers Ltd v Federal Commission 
of Taxation727 gave weight to their fears.728 The arguments made by the President 
and Deputy President were that greater consistency could be achieved through the 
development of common law principles rather than exercises in statutory 
interpretation.729 However, while the High Court has drawn attention to the 
language of the legislation, sentencing courts around Australia have been reluctant 
to give this language much weight.  
 
It has been established that the legislative intent to give prominence to the effect of 
any sentence upon third parties in the federal arena was deliberate. This then 
raises the question of why a sentencing factor that had been placed on a clear 
statutory footing has being given so little judicial attention. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Five, the approach to s 16A(2) by courts exercising 
federal jurisdiction has been inconsistent. On its face, s 16A(2)(p) appears to be a 
clear statement of principle. However Australian courts sentencing federal 
offenders have not consistently approached the word ‘must’ within s 16A(2).730 As 
such, the legislative intent to give prominence to this sentencing factor and to 
extend the scope of sentencing considerations beyond traditional practices has not 
been realised. 
 
(b) Support for family hardship whether or not exceptional 
The ALRC received its second review into federal sentencing in July 2004. In the 
Discussion Paper released the following year the ALRC had in its list of proposals a 
reform to s 16(A)(2) included: 
… (p) the probable effect that any sentence option or order under consideration 
would have on any of the offender’s family or dependants, whether or not the 
circumstances are exceptional; and…731 
 
                                                          
727 (1933) 50 CLR 268. 
728 In this case Dixon J stated ‘The criterion, which the Legislature has now adopted and established, was 
formulated by the Courts… So far as it lacks precision or is uncertain in its application, the cause is to be 
found in the powerlessness of the Courts to do more than state a wide general proposition and to apply it 
as each case arose. The statement of the proposition was not a definition, but rather an explanation of 
principle. No doubt, as the language of the statute it must receive a more literal application.’ See 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 91. 
729 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 91. 
730 See further Chapter Five. 
731 Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Discussion Paper No 70 
(2005) 10, 82 and 577. 
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The proposal was, not only, to maintain support for family hardship as a listed 
sentencing factor, but to endorse the original legislative intention to have this 
recognised as a general sentencing consideration rather than one which arises only 
in exceptional circumstances. 
 
The Discussion Paper noted: 
The weight to be given to this factor would be a matter for the court’s 
discretion. For example, it may be that certain effects on family and dependants 
would not warrant a modification in the sentence or order imposed. On the 
other hand, other effects may be sufficiently serious – even if not strictly 
exceptional – to warrant a modification in the sentence or order imposed when 
considered in the light of other relevant factors. The effect of dependants 
should include financial, social, and psychological effects.732 
In the Report the ALRC maintained support for the impact of a sentence upon third 
parties as a listed federal sentencing factor. 733 The ALRC acknowledged that family 
hardship is listed at s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), but observed: 
‘[h]owever, some courts have read this paragraph down to allow consideration of 
this factor only in exceptional circumstances.’734 It openly stated that ‘[i]n the 
ALRC’s view, courts have taken an unnecessarily restrictive approach to this 
sentencing factor, but it is a matter on which the common law can develop.’735 The 
ALRC is unambiguous in its position that ‘a court should be able to consider the 
likely impact of a sentencing option on an offender’s family or dependants whether 
or not the circumstances are exceptional.’736 Moreover, the ALRC has been 
consistent in cataloguing a broad class of potential hardships (financial, social and 
psychological) upon an offenders family or dependents.  
 
2. South Australian Legislation 
In South Australia the general principles of sentencing arose out of the common 
law.737 The first specific Sentencing Act in South Australia was the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). Part 2 of the CL(S)A set out: ‘General Sentencing 
 
                                                          
732 Ibid 80. 
733 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No 103 (2006) 30-31 [Rec 6-1],188-190. 
734 Ibid 188. The following cases are cited as support for this finding: R v Ceissman (2001) 119 A Crim R 
535, [36]; R v Sinclair (1990) 51 A Crim R 418, 430.  
735 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No 103 (2006) 190. 
736 Ibid. 
737 For a treatise of early sentencing law in South Australia see Mary Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in South 
Australia (The Lawbook Company in association with the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980). 
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Provisions’. ‘General sentencing powers’ were contained within pt 2 div 2 of the 
CL(S)A and included s 10 setting out a list of sentencing factors. Section 10 came 
into operation on 1 January 1989. At this time family hardship was for the first 
time listed in an Australian statute as a sentencing factor. As described above, it 
then appeared in the list of sentencing factors introduced into the federal Act. 
 
Section 10 commenced by stating: 
 A court, in determining sentence for an offence, should have regard to such of 
the following matters as are relevant and known to the court: …738  
The South Australian legislature recognised fifteen sentencing factors ((a)–(o)) in s 
10.739 The list was non-exhaustive.740 Section 10 did not use the term ‘must’ (which 
would appear in the federal provision, s 16A(2)) but, it did employ the term 
‘should’. The section adopted the phrase ‘relevant and known to the court’ as the 
qualifier for the consideration of listed sentencing factors,741 which is similar to the 
approach adopted in the federal provision (see above) and the ACT provision 
(discussed below). 
 
Family hardship was listed at paragraph (n). The language used was very similar to 
the language that would be adopted in the federal provision. Compare: 
 ‘the probable effect any sentence under consideration would have 
on dependants of the defendant’: Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 
1988 (SA) s 10(1)(n); and 
 ‘the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration 
would have on any of the person’s family or dependants’: Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p) and Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) 
s 33(1)(o). 
 
Influenced by the treatise of Thomas and the suggested change of policy742 from 
the England and Wales Court of Appeal Criminal Division, South Australian courts 
had recognised family hardship as a mitigating sentencing factor in the 1970s and 
 
                                                          
738 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1) (Reprint No 1, 1 July 1991). 
739 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1). 
740 Ibid s 10(1)(o) (‘any other relevant matter’). 
741 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2). 
742 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 212; Mary Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in South Australia (The 
Lawbook Company in association with the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980) 81. 
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1980s. Mary Daunton-Fear’s treatise on Sentencing in South Australia,743 published 
in 1980, acknowledged ‘hardship to the defendant’s relatives and dependants’744 
Interestingly, with respect to family hardship, she stated: 
Until recently the mainstream of judicial authority seemed to flow in favour of 
the proposition that hardship likely to be caused to the defendant’s relatives 
and dependants is not a mitigating factor although it might be a ground on 
which the Crown would exercise clemency.745 
Her opinion of sentencing practice in South Australia was that the appellate courts 
had a practice of leaning towards mercy.746 She acknowledged that family hardship 
had a mitigatory impact in the South Australian decisions of Brady v Wright 747 
(1974) and in R v Wirth748 (1976).749  
 
In her treatise Daunton-Fear questioned whether the only relevant hardship 
should be that caused to the defendant (clearly influenced by the normative theory 
that the relevant sentencing factors were those relating to the offence or the 
offender).750 However, she reasoned that a family hardship plea was a ‘plea for 
mercy’ and on this basis, a court should not be precluded from considering 
hardship to others (as opposed to hardship to the offender) as a ground for 
‘leniency’.751 She stated that ‘courts should restrict their clemency to cases were 
the degree of hardship is extreme and there is a strong likelihood that the offender, 
and only the offender, could relieve that hardship.’752 
 
The case law in South Australia (common law) prior to the commencement of the 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) did see family hardship as a mitigating 
 
                                                          
743 Mary Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in South Australia (The Lawbook Company in association with the 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980). 
744 Ibid 79-83. 
745 Ibid 79. See also Mary Daunton-Fear, ‘Sentencing in South Australia: Emerging Principles’ (1980) 7 
The Adelaide Law Review 41, 57. 
746 Mary Daunton-Fear, ‘Sentencing in South Australia: Emerging Principles’ (1980) 7 The Adelaide Law 
Review 41, 41-42. See Webb v O’Sullivan [1952] SASR 65, 66. 
747 (1974) 62 LSJS 44 (14 January 1974). 
748 (1976) 14 SASR 291. 
749 These cases are examined in detail in Chapter Four. 
750 Family hardship was placed under the broader heading of ‘The personal circumstances of the 
defendant’ in her treatise. See Mary Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in South Australia (The Lawbook 
Company in association with the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980) 66. 
751 Mary Daunton-Fear, ‘Sentencing in South Australia: Emerging Principles’ (1980) 7 The Adelaide Law 
Review 41, 58. 
752 Ibid. See also Mary Daunton-Fear, Sentencing in South Australia (The Lawbook Company in 
association with the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980) 83. 
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sentencing factor. In 2011, the Attorney-General for South Australia described the 
original provision as setting out ‘established common law principles of 
sentencing’.753 However, there is an open question as to whether family hardship 
was operating as a mitigating factor (a potential relevant sentencing factor to be 
balanced against other relevant factors in the process of determining an 
appropriate sentence) or as a factor that was relevant to the courts exercise of 
judicial mercy (able to be taken into account in the courts discretion provided the 
degree of hardship was extreme). 
 
In South Australia, there have been no official recommendations to remove family 
hardship as a listed sentencing factor in the late 20th century and early 21st 
century. In 2000, the Taken In Report produced by the South Australian Women’s 
Legal Service noted its support of the inclusion of s 10(1)(n) of the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) stating that family hardship was a ‘worthy 
consideration’754 and was a ‘vital and legitimate part of a defence council’s 
submission to the court before sentencing’.755 The Report did highlight three 
problems with the consideration of family hardship at sentencing in South 
Australia.  First it identified that the matter was often arising late in court 
proceedings. Second, the Report identified problems with judicial assessment of 
‘probable effect’. Third, it saw difficulties arising when this factor was balanced 
against deterrence.756  
 
A pertinent observation made by the Taken In Report was that: 
It may be the case that Section 10 sustains a perception of different treatment, 
but it does not necessarily indicate that women are receiving fair treatment 
overall.757 
The Report cautioned that ‘[t]his consideration alone cannot be relied upon to 
deliver justice to women who have dependants or to ensure the welfare of 
children.’758 The relationship between family hardship and gender equality will be 
discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 
                                                          
753 South Australia, Hansard, House of Assembly, 24 March 2011, 3117 (J.R. Rau, Attorney-General). 
754 Women’s Legal Service (SA) Inc, Taken In, When Women with Dependent Children Are Taken Into 
Custody: Implications for Justice and Welfare (2000) 51. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Ibid 52. 
758 Ibid 52. This position is endorsed by the results of the case study in Chapter Four.  
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Section 10 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) was amended in 2012 
via the Criminal Law (Sentencing)(Guilty Pleas) Amendment Act 2012 (SA). This 
reform saw the deletion of the original s 10, replaced by a new s 10 now entitled 
‘Sentencing Considerations’. Nonetheless, many of the listed sentencing factors 
remained the same. The legislative recognition of ‘the probable effect any sentence 
under consideration would have on dependants of the defendant’ was untouched 
in both its text and location (paragraph (n)).   
 
(a) Legislative change post 2012 
There were two changes that took place in these 2012 reforms, which are worth 
noting. First, an amendment was made to the introductory language of s 10. 
Second, express recognition within the Act was granted to common law sentencing 
principles. The passage at the beginning of the new s 10 stated: 
In determining the sentence for an offence, a court must have regard to such of 
the following factors and principles as may be relevant:759 
The 2012 reforms brought about the insertion of s 9E into the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). Section 9E provided greater context for the list of 
sentencing factors provided in s 10. Section 9E was entitled, ‘Purpose and 
application of Division’ and stated, ‘[e]xcept where the contrary intention appears, 
this Division qualifies rather than displaces the common law principles in relation 
to sentencing.’760As explained in Chapter Two, in 2017 South Australia introduced 
the new Sentencing Act 2017 (SA). Family hardship is not a listed sentencing factor 
in South Australia.761 
 
3. Australian Capital Territory Legislation 
In Cotter v Corvisy,762 Refshauge J remarked on the changes that have taken place in 
respect of the encroachment of legislation in the field of sentencing within the 
Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’). Justice Refshauge reflected on former 
 
                                                          
759 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1). 
760 See Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Guilty Pleas) Amendment Act 2012 (SA) s 5; Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 9E. 
761 The study of the case law for this dissertation was conducted up to December 2011. Therefore, the 
impact of these recent legislative reforms is beyond the scope of this study. 
762 Cotter v Corvisy (2009) 185 A Crim R 560. 
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practices where it was once possible to impose a sentence without reference to 
legislative provisions. He then observed: 
Those days have changed, but change was not quick in coming. In 1988, just 
before self-government, Part XII (Sentences) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) 
consisted of merely 12 sections of 8 pages. It was not until 1993 that there was 
a statutory prescription of the purposes for which sentences may be imposed. 
Since then, of course, this jurisdiction, following other jurisdictions which have 
introduced significant sentencing regimes [various sentencing Acts listed] … 
has enacted the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005. That Act consists of 147 sections 
and a Dictionary of 48 terms defined in it… Despite the complexity of the 
legislative regime, there is still room for the application of common law 
principles of sentencing … This combines to produce complexity in sentencing 
and the need for sentencers to be careful when engaging in this process to 
ensure that they comply with the obligations to be found in statute and in 
common law.763 
There have been a number of reforms in the field of sentencing in the ACT. 
 
(a) The law pre self-government 
Self-Government occurred in the ACT in 1989. Prior to Self-Government, the 
Commonwealth had responsibility for the law of the Territory.764 At this time, the 
majority of the sentencing provisions were located in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), 
which applied to the ACT by an Ordinance of the Territory.765 As observed by 
Refshauge J in the passage above, there were only a small number of sentencing 
provisions within this Act.  
 
A key feature of this period in the ACT was that imprisonment rates were low,766  
particularly compared to those imposed in other Australian jurisdictions. For 
example, in 1979 the imprisonment rate in the ACT was recorded as 16 per 100, 
000 of the population. In comparison, the New South Wales rate was 76 per 
100,000 and South Australia 56 per 100,000. The national average was recorded as 
65.4 per 100,000.767 The length of sentences imposed by judicial officers in the 
ACT, in this period, were short. For example, in 1975 to 1978 ‘two thirds of 
 
                                                          
763 Cotter v Corvisy (2009) 185 A Crim R 560, [4]-[7]. 
764 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Reform Options, Discussion Paper No 10 (1979) 9. 
765 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (As amended in its application to the Australian Capital Territory by 
Ordinances of the Territory) See <http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1900-40/19870211-
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766 See Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Reform Options, Discussion Paper No 10 (1979) 18-22. 
767 Data are drawn from Figure 9 ‘Australian Imprisonment Rates (February 1979)’ sourced from the 
Australian Institute of Criminology. See Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Reform Options, 
Discussion Paper No 10 (1979) 18. 
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all…sentences were for a period of less than 6 months and… about 80% were for a 
period of less than a year.’768 
 
The Territory did not have its own prison and offenders were incarcerated in New 
South Wales’ prisons.769 ACT sentencing practices were strongly guided by the 
common law principle of last resort. This principle had prominence in sentencing 
practices, rather than just ‘lip service’, because incarceration occurred interstate. A 
direct consequence of the reliance upon NSW prisons was that there is entrenched 
recognition of hardship factors in sentencing practices in the ACT. For example, the 
federal Law Reform Commission in Discussion Paper No 10 (June 1979) observed 
that the low imprisonment rate was attributable to the ‘general attitude of the 
judicial officers who pass sentence on offenders.’770 The Discussion Paper stated: 
…judges and magistrates are well aware of the deficiencies of the contemporary 
N.S.W. prison system, and of the hardships imposed by “transporting” A.C.T. 
residents to N.S.W. to be imprisoned. They therefore seek, wherever possible, 
to avoid prison sentences except as a necessary last resort.771 
The hardships that were recognised were the personal hardships to offenders who 
would serve their sentences away from family and friends and the hardships this 
would impose upon their families.772  
 
(b) The recognition of hardship in sentencing legislation 
Section 429A(1) was the first provision providing a list of sentencing factors for 
the ACT. This provision was introduced in 1993 and at that time it contained an 
extensive, (a) to (w), list of sentencing factors.773  The Explanatory Memorandum 
to the Crimes (Amendment) Bill (No 2) 1993 (ACT), which proposed s 429A, stated 
that: 
Punishment of criminal offenders has traditionally been an area which allows 
judges and magistrates to exercise great discretion. Whilst it is important to 
preserve that flexibility in regard to individual cases, it is also important to 
ensure that as far as possible there is consistency in approach to punishment 
and that the penalties in themselves are fair. This Bill sets out factors which, 
where relevant, must be considered by the court in determining the sentence. … 
 
                                                          
768 Law Reform Commission, Sentencing: Reform Options, Discussion Paper No 10 (1979) 20. 
769 Ibid. 
770 Ibid 19. 
771 Ibid 22. 
772 Ibid 22-25, 62. 
773 See Crimes (Amendment) Act (No 2) 1993 (ACT) s 5. 
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While the lists are not intended to be exhaustive, they are intended to provide 
useful guidelines to both sentencers and legal practitioners.774 
The passage of the Crimes (Amendment) Act (No 2) 1993 (ACT) therefore marked a 
major shift in the legislative framework of sentencing provisions in Territory. Also 
notable is that one of the underlying policy concerns of the legislature at this time 
was to encourage ‘consistency in approach to punishment’.775 
 
Alongside the list of sentencing factors in s 429A, the legislative reforms enshrined 
the principle of last resort (s 429C) and the principle of just deserts (s 429(1)). 
Section 429(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) gave recognition to two purposes of 
sentencing; although they were not labelled as such at this time, but rather, as 
‘important considerations’776 relevant to the determination of a just and 
appropriate sentence. These purposes were rehabilitation and reparation.777 It was 
not until 1998 that the legislature provided a dedicated purposes provision of the 
kind with which we are now familiar in Australia (see Chapter Two).778 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum for the Crimes (Amendment) Bill (No 2) 1993 
(ACT) remarked that s 429A set out a list of factors that should be taken into 
account in sentencing, in light of the principles expressed in s 429 (see above, just 
deserts, rehabilitation and reparation).779 That the section was ‘not intended to be 
an exhaustive list’ was emphasised in the Explanatory Memorandum.780 Directly 
following this comment, the notes on the introduction of s 429A, stated:  
Nor is it intended to exclude the common law principles which govern the 
relevance of the listed factors. Depending on the circumstances, certain of those 
factors may be either mitigating or aggravating (for example, consumption of 
drugs or alcohol) (emphasis added).781 
The meaning of the first sentence in the above passage is significant to determining 
what the legislature had in mind when it introduced this list of sentencing factors; 
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including the extent to which they envisaged hardship to others being taken into 
account in sentencing. 
 
A possible interpretation of the legislative intent is that when operating under the 
new s 429A, a judge or magistrate determining whether ‘the probable effect that 
any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the person’s 
family or dependants’782 is relevant to the determination of sentence, would do so 
having regard to the common law principle of family hardship. Thereby they would 
find that it is only relevant in exceptional circumstances. However, 
notwithstanding the legislature’s caveat in the Explanatory Memorandum, ACT 
courts have not found that this to be the legislative intent (discussed in Chapter 
Four). 
 
One argument to support the ACT practice is that if limiting the operation of family 
hardship been the intended approach, a simpler and clearer position would have 
been expressly to provide the limitation to exceptional circumstances within the 
legislative provision (s 429A(1)(m)). As outlined above, this limitation was not in 
the federal drafting of this sentencing factor because as I have argued the federal 
legislature was not contemplating such a limitation to the operation of the factor in 
federal sentencing.  
 
The inclusion of the passage within the Explanatory Memorandum of the ACT does 
raise an interesting question in respect of what the legislature had in mind in 
respect to the ACT reforms. The ACT provision came into effect after the South 
Australian provision, it is likely that the ACT reforms were to some extent 
mirroring the South Australian reforms. As mentioned above, South Australian 
Courts were quick to conclude that s 10(1)(n) did not change the law. For example. 
in Adami, King CJ, Legoe and Bollen JJ had held that ‘the probable effect any 
sentence under consideration would have on dependants of the defendant’ under s 
10(1)(n) was only relevant if it was exceptional hardship.783  
 
 
                                                          
782 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 429A. 
783 Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88, 90 (Legoe J), 92 (Bollen J, King CJ agreeing). 
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Yet, while the comments in the Explanatory Memorandum on s 429A of the Crimes 
Act 1990 (ACT) permitted the same argument to be applied by courts that s 429A 
called for a restricted approach to the ‘relevance’ of family hardship as a 
sentencing factor, this did not occur. The ACT has been the jurisdiction that has 
embraced the greatest changes to sentencing following the inclusion of the factor.  
 
The ALRC reports on sentencing reform to the federal and Australian Capital 
Territory sentencing laws led to extensive reforms to sentencing laws and policies 
in other Australian jurisdictions.784 The result of these reforms was  
the enactment of separate statutes on sentencing, through the mid 80s and early 
90s, in each jurisdiction within Australia. The sentencing frameworks which were 
implemented across Australia were outlined in Chapter Two.  
 
(c) Renumbered but not amended 
In 2002, the section which listed sentencing factors became s 342(1) of the Crimes 
Act 1900 (ACT). This section listed more than twenty sentencing factors. At 
paragraph (j), ‘the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration 
would have on any of the person’s family or dependants’ was listed. The list of 
matters also included recognition of hardship to the offender. Section 342(1)(m) 
listed as a sentencing factor: ‘whether the recording of a conviction or the 
imposition of a particular sanction would be likely to cause particular hardship to 
the person’.785 These were now long-standing sentencing factors in the ACT.786  
 
Because of the practice of interstate imprisonment, discussed above, these two 
hardships (which were given legislative recognition in the Territory) were 
historically significant sentencing factors in the ACT. This history of detailed 
factors could help to explain the low custodial sentencing rates in the ACT. 
Certainly, the appearance of hardship in the list of sentencing factors in the ACT 
was not locally controversial. 
 
                                                          
784 Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders (1978-88) (23 August 2010) 
Australian Law Reform Commission <http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/sentencing-federal-offenders-
1978-88>. 
785 In the current Act the sentencing factor is found within s 33(1)(r) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 
(ACT) which states ‘whether the recording of a conviction or the imposition of a particular penalty would 
be likely to cause a particular hardship to the offender’. 
786 R v Wilson [2002] ACTSC 14 (7 March 2002) [33]. 
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In 2004, the Standing Committee on Community Services and Social Equity for the 
ACT Legislative Assembly handed down its report, ‘The Forgotten Victims of 
Crime: Families of Offenders and their Silent Sentence’.787 The Report 
recommended greater support for the family unit788 and the Committee were 
attracted to the idea of ‘recognising the importance of families in their own 
right.’789 The Committee recommended that the new ACT prison (the Alexander 
Maconochie Centre) have facilities for young children to reside with a primary 
caregiver.790 
 
The current sentencing statute in the ACT is the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 
(ACT).  The Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) came into effect on 2 June 2006.791 
The Act was a consolidating Act; prior to its enactment the sentencing provisions 
in the ACT were located within several different legislative instruments. Despite 
going through various amendments,792 the language of the original paragraph in s 
429A(1)(m) was carried through into s 342(1)(j) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and 
then into s 33(1)(o) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). 
 
Section s 33(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) commences by stating, 
In determining how an offender should be sentenced (if at all) for an offence a 
court must consider whichever of the following matters are relevant and 
known to the court…793 
The phrase ‘a court must consider whichever of the following matters are relevant 
and known to the court’ is comparable to the language of the federal provision. The 
meaning of the phrase ‘relevant and known to the court’, which was also employed 
in the federal provision, is discussed in more detail below.  
 
 
                                                          
787 Legislative Assembly Standing Committee on Community Services and Social Equity, Parliament of 
the Australian Capital Territory, The Forgotten Victims of Crime: Families of Offenders and their Silent 
Sentence, Report 6 (2004). 
788 Ibid v, xii-xxii, 27-29. 
789 Ibid 27. 
790 Ibid 60-62. 
791 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 2. See, also, ACT Government, Notification Statement (2 
December 2005) A.C.T. Legislation Register <http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2005-
58/notification.asp> 
792 See Crimes (Amendment) Act (Number Two) 1993 (ACT); Crimes (Amendment) Act 1998 (ACT); 
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2001 (ACT) s 43. 
793 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1). 
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Section 33(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) contains a list of twenty-
seven factors; (a) through to (za). At paragraph (o) ‘the probable effect that any 
sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the offender’s family 
or dependants’ is listed. The drafting of this sentencing factor is identical to the 
federal provision.  Over the various developments within the sentencing 
provisions in the ACT, this sentencing factor has not been altered from its original 
form nor was it ever removed from statute. 
 
B. Resistance to Legislative Recognition 
 
The Commonwealth, the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia remain 
the only jurisdictions to incorporate hardship to an offender’s family and 
dependants into their legislative list of sentencing factors. As described in Chapter 
Two, Tasmania and Western Australia have not adopted a practice of including a 
legislative list of sentencing factors. But what of the other jurisdictions? Did they 
consider legislative recognition of this sentencing factor in this period of reform? 
And if they did, on what basis did they reject its legislative recognition?  
 
As a social issue within Australia there has been recognition in numerous 
government reports, law reform commission reports and policy documents of the 
serious consequences of the imprisonment of a parent upon dependent children. 
Aungles classified the reports produced in the 80s as ‘framed within the “family 
crisis” model’794 focusing on rehabilitation and ‘an examination of the way 
domesticity could be used to reduce the level of recidivism’.795 The reports of this 
era focused on prison related programs such as counselling services, improved 
communications (ie. mail, telephone and prison visits) and funding for volunteer 
support groups. The reports did not focus upon reforms to sentencing laws or 
practices. Aungles argues that the outcome of this work was of an ‘ad hoc and 
limited nature.’796 This next part looks at occasions when Australian jurisdictions 
have turned their attention to family hardship and its role or recognition 
sentencing legislation.  
 
                                                          
794 Ann Aungles, The Prison and the Home: A Study of the Relationship Between Domesticity and 
Penalty, The Institute of Criminology Monograph Series No 5 (1994) 105. 
795 Ibid. 
796 Ibid106. 
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1. Rejected in Queensland 
As described in Chapter Two, in Queensland, s 9(2) of the Penalties and Sentences 
Act 1992 (Qld) provides the list of non-exhaustive sentencing factors to which the 
court must have regard. Family hardship is not a listed factor in this jurisdiction. It 
would appear the Queensland Legislature has focused more on minimising the 
impact of sentences upon dependants rather than permit an amelioration of the 
sentence itself. 
 
Since 1989, female offenders have been able to request young children stay with 
them at the Brisbane Women’s Correctional Centre.797 In November 1998, the 
Queensland Attorney-General, Matt Foley, and the Minister for Women’s Policy, 
Judy Spence, established a ‘20 member all-female’798 taskforce to address the 
impact of the Criminal Code upon women.799 The Taskforce considered the ‘impact 
of the sentencing regime on women and sentencing options.’800 The Taskforce 
specifically addressed, ‘[s]hould the needs of female offenders be taken into 
account on sentence?’801 The Report raised two issues: 
1. That the PSA [Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)] be amended to provide 
that where a court wishes to impose a custodial sentence in relation to persons 
with dependants, it be required to examine non-custodial options such as 
periodic detention orders and increase the use of intensive correction orders. 
2. That the use of home detention as a direct sentencing option be examined.802 
The Report stated: ‘the majority of submissions…supported the notion that the 
court and the corrective services system should take into consideration whether 
the offender is a caregiver of children.’803 The Taskforce reported that it ‘generally 
 
                                                          
797 See Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, A 
Report into Children of Imprisoned Parents, Report No 12 (1997) 24-25. 
798 Susan Currie and Sally Kift, ‘Women Surviving as Victims in the Criminal Justice System in 
Queensland: Is Revictimisation Inevitable?’ (1999) 15 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 
57, 57. 
799 Explanatory Memorandum, Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2000 (Qld) 1; Queensland and Taskforce 
on Women and the Criminal Code, ‘Women and the Criminal Code’ (Report of the Taskforce on Women 
and the Criminal Code, Office of Women's Policy, February 2000) xi. 
800 Ibid 391. 
801 Ibid 395. 
802 Ibid 396. 
803 Ibid 397. 
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supports the notion that the sentencing court should take into consideration the 
fact that the female offender is a mother, subject to certain qualifications.’804  
 
Interestingly, this general support did not translate into a recommendation that a 
court be required to take family hardship into account as a sentencing factor. The 
Taskforce expressly noted concerns with taking that approach and appeared to 
have been swayed on this point by submissions from the Women’s Policy Unit at 
the Department of Corrective Services.805 In the Report a number of extreme 
examples for why caution should be applied to any approach to list the sentencing 
factor are cited. These examples were: 
…evidence would need to be placed before the sentencing court as to the 
offender’s family dynamics. It would not be appropriate to sentence to home 
detention an offender who was abusing her children. Further, should a man 
with dependant children who has killed the children’s mother be entitled to a 
sentence which would take account of his responsibilities as a father? The 
Taskforce also considers that other relationships might need to be taken into 
consideration, such as care for elderly parents.806 
None of these considerations would, in fact, be detrimental to legislative 
recognition of family hardship as a sentencing factor.   
 
A sentencing court would always be required to consider the particular 
circumstances of the case, the offender and potential the impact on dependants to 
determine what weight be ascribed to this sentencing factor. Judicial officers are 
well placed to consider evidence on offender’s personal circumstances and to 
balance a variety of sentencing options. This is the foundations upon which the 
instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing operates.  
 
Legislative recognition of a sentencing factor and classification that the factor 
‘should be taken into account’ does not mean that the factor must be accorded 
significant weight by the sentencing court. This nuanced point seemed to be 
completely overlooked by the taskforce and instead they turned their attention to 
 
                                                          
804 Ibid 398. 
805 Ibid. 
806 Ibid. 
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‘how the correctional system presently deals with prisoners who are mothers’807 
and called for further research on alternative sentencing options.808 
 
Increasing focus on human rights may give rise to reform in Queensland. In 2006 
the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Commission highlighted children’s rights as a 
core issue in its report on Women in Prison.809 The Commission stated: 
2. Children’s needs are inadequately addressed. The Queensland Government 
explicitly acknowledges that the best interests of children are paramount, but 
this is not reflected in sentencing decisions affecting women, or in the 
treatment of women and their children in prison. Legislative reform is 
recommended to ensure the best interests of children are considered, both in 
sentencing and in the prison system.810 
As a result, recommendation 57 provided:  
That section 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1991 be amended to include 
the principle that the best interests of the child be a factor to be considered 
when sentencing a person with a dependent child.811 
To date, s 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1991 (Qld) has not been amended. 
 
2. Repeatedly Raised for Consideration in New South Wales 
In NSW, the question of whether to incorporate hardship upon an offender’s 
dependants within a list of mitigating factors has arisen for consideration several 
times.  Yet, taking into account the probable effect of a sentence upon an offender’s 
dependents has never appeared in a list of sentencing factors in NSW. 
 
From the early 1970s, female offenders in this jurisdiction could stay with their 
baby in a prison hospital until the child was twelve months old.812 The Nagle 
Report noted that this rule operated rigidly and recommended there be greater 
scope for the exercise of discretion in its application.813 Subsequently Mother and 
 
                                                          
807 Ibid. 
808 Ibid. 
809 Anti-Discrimination Commission (Qld), Women in Prison (Report, Anti-Discrimination Commission 
Queensland, 2006) 
810 Ibid 5. 
811 Ibid 14 and 123 (Recommendation 57). 
812 Maureen Miner and Angela Gorta, Changing Conditions in a Women's Prison 1972-1984, Research 
Publication No 11 (NSW Department of Corrective Services, 1986) 24. See also Betty Hounslow, Annie 
Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, Children of Imprisoned Parents (The Family and 
Children’s Services Agency, Ministry of Youth and Community Services of New South Wales, 1982) 98. 
813 New South Wales, Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons, Report of the Royal 
Commission into New South Wales Prisons (Nagle Report) (1978) 369. 
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Baby Units were formally established in 1979.814  These units began to close the 
following year.815 Reporting in 1982, after the closure of Blaxland House (the last 
operating Mother and Baby Unit in New South Wales) the Children of Imprisoned 
Parents Report stated that the reason for the suspension of the unit was ‘murky 
and disputed.’816 It was reported that the unexpected closure impacted upon 
women offenders who had anticipated use of the unit at sentencing.817 
 
In 1982, the Children of Imprisoned Parents Report recommended the immediate 
reopening of the Mother and Baby Units.818 Then in 1985, the NSW Taskforce on 
Women in Prison recommended re-opening Mother and Baby Units and advocated 
for greater attention to be paid to the sentencing of mothers and impact on 
dependent children.819 The following year the Mother and Baby Units did not 
reopen. Instead the Prison (Amendment) Act 1986 (NSW) was passed to amend the 
Prisons Act 1952 (NSW) to include s 29(2)(c) which enabled mother’s of young 
children absence from their sentence, 
for the purpose of enabling the prisoner to serve her sentence with her child or 
children in an appropriate environment determined by the Commission—such 
period as may be specified in the permit.820  
It was not until 1996, that this jurisdiction saw a return to the accommodation of 
children in prison (via Full Time Residence Programs and Occasional Residence 
 
                                                          
814 Betty Hounslow, Annie Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, Children of Imprisoned Parents 
(The Family and Children’s Services Agency, Ministry of Youth and Community Services of New South 
Wales, 1982) 99. 
815 See generally Betty Hounslow, Annie Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, Children of 
Imprisoned Parents (The Family and Children’s Services Agency, Ministry of Youth and Community 
Services of New South Wales, 1982) 99-104; Maureen Miner and Angela Gorta, Changing Conditions in 
a Women's Prison 1972-1984, Research Publication No 11 (NSW Department of Corrective Services, 
1986) 5, 24-26, 41. 
816 Betty Hounslow, Annie Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, Children of Imprisoned Parents 
(The Family and Children’s Services Agency, Ministry of Youth and Community Services of New South 
Wales, 1982) 101. 
817 Ibid 101-102. 
818 Ibid 109. 
819 Women in Prison Task Force, Parliament of New South Wales, Report of the NSW Women in Prison 
Task Force (March 1985) 118-120, 124, 202-218. 
820 Prisons Act 1952 (NSW) s 29(2)(c). 
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Programs).821 The practice of permitting mothers of young children an absence 
from their sentence also continued in the form of ‘Local Leave Permits’.822 
 
Interestingly, the Children of Imprisoned Parents Report in 1982 recommended 
recognition of the impact of a sentence upon dependants as a sentencing 
consideration in New South Wales.823 The Report stated: 
i) That the defendant’s responsibility for children, the needs of those children, 
and the likely effect of a prison sentence on the family, be taken into account as 
considerations in sentencing, by both lawyers and judges 
ii) That these factors be considered with a view to awarding a non-custodial 
sentence, wherever possible to a person with dependent children. 
iii) That pre-sentence reports be required to investigate the situation of the 
defendant’s children, assess the likely effect of imprisonment, and report to the 
court on these matters. 
iv) That the practice of preparing reports on social circumstances be resumed 
by the Public Soliditor’s social worker, and be considered as a legitimate 
function of her position. (error in original).824 
The NSW Women in Prison Task Force recommended that the principle of last 
resort be given recognition in NSW sentencing legislation so that it would become 
a ‘canon of sentencing practice’825 and be less likely to be ignored or merely 
granted lip service in NSW sentencing practices in respect of women.826 
 
In 1995, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) considered 
whether to include a list of sentencing factors in its statute.827 The Commission 
 
                                                          
821 Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, A Report 
into Children of Imprisoned Parents, Report No 12 (1997) 11; Legislative Council, Parliament of New 
South Wales, Interim Report: Issues Relating to Women, Select Committee on the Increase in Prisoner 
Population (2000) 97. See generally Madeline Loy, 'A Study of the Mothers and Children's Program in 
the NSW Department of Corrective Services' (Paper presented at the Women in Corrections: Staff and 
Clients Conference, Adelaide, 31 October - 1 November 2000). 
822 See Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) s 26. See generally Madeline Loy, 'A Study 
of the Mothers and Children's Program in the NSW Department of Corrective Services' (Paper presented 
at the Women in Corrections: Staff and Clients Conference, Adelaide, 31 October - 1 November 2000). 
823 Betty Hounslow, Annie Stephenson, Julie Stewart and Jane Crancher, Children of Imprisoned Parents 
(The Family and Children’s Services Agency, Ministry of Youth and Community Services of New South 
Wales, 1982) 162. 
824 Ibid 162. 
825 New South Wales Women in Prison Task Force, Report of the NSW Women in Prison Task Force 
(March 1985) 126 (Recommendation 50). 
826 Ibid 126. 
827 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 79 (1996) x. 
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stated that it did ‘not support the reduction to statutory form of common law 
principles relating to sentencing’.828 The following reasons were provided: 
1. It is likely to stultify development of the law… Inevitably it would be constrained 
by literal application of the words and purposes of the statute, thus 
compromising the desirable flexibility and evolutionary nature of the common 
law discretion and its ability to adapt to changing societal values. 
2. The common law of sentencing is not generally in need of restatement. Even if it 
were, an attempt to ‘reform’ it is likely to fail. 
3. We are not convinced the recent legislative attempts in other Australian 
jurisdictions add anything to the common law… 
4. In practice, statutory listing is likely to make sentencing a more time-consuming 
exercise without clear gain. Counterproductively, it may increase the grounds on 
which the sentence may be appealed, or encourage judicial officers to comply by 
using a formula…829 
The first listed reason was a concern that had been shared by the ALRC;830 but, as 
we have seen in the discussion above, it was a concern that was overcome in that 
forum.  
 
The second reason and third reasons with the value of hindsight, were astute 
observations of the judicial reaction to legislative attempts to reform sentencing in 
this period. To support this reason, the NSWLRC had referenced the failed attempt 
by the ALRC to remove ‘general deterrence’ as a sentencing matter in 1988.831 The 
NSWLRC were very conscious of judicial resistance to change. In respect to family 
hardship as a mitigating factor, in the Discussion Paper it noted that statutory 
reforms in South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and Federal statutes 
appeared to have ‘reversed the common law position’832 but they identified that 
sentencing courts in South Australia and Western Australia ‘have not interpreted 
the provisions in this way.’833 
 
The NSWLRC then stated in its Report that family hardship was one of two 
sentencing factors where there had been repeated calls for reform.834  The Report 
 
                                                          
828 Ibid 333. It had earlier stated this position in the Discussion Paper, see New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, Sentencing, Discussion Paper 33 (1996) [2.7-2.12]. 
829 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 79 (1996) 333-334. 
830 Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 91. 
831 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 79 (1996) 332 (footnote 30). See 
generally R v Paull (1990) 20 NSWLR 427, 434; El Karhani (1990) 51 A Crim R 123, 126 – 131.  
832 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Discussion Paper 33 (1996) [5.114]. 
833 Ibid. 
834 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 79 (1996) 335. 
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stated ‘[i]t was suggested that the common law was unduly harsh and that a more 
acceptable approach is possible under s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)’.835 
These were clearly calls for a similar list of sentencing factors to appear in NSW 
and for family hardship to appear on that list in the form of the federal provision. 
The NSWLRC reported that it found (through consultations) that courts had 
interpreted s 16A(2)(p) narrowly (eg. the West Australian federal sentencing case 
of R v Sinclair836)  and in its Report stated: 
…the common law is inherently more capable of dealing with questions of 
hardship in a flexible and evolutionary manner than would be any attempted 
statutory form.837 
It is unclear from the Report whether the NSWLRC was supportive of reforms but 
thought that listing the factor in legislation would not bring change or if it was not 
persuaded by calls to reform to family hardship.838 It is significant that family 
hardship was discussed in the Discussion Paper and the Report. The factor was 
clearly being debated and on the political agenda. 
 
In 1997, the Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues handed down 
its report on children of imprisoned parents839 one of its ‘key conclusion’ was that: 
A sentence of imprisonment on a primary carer of children should only be 
imposed when all possible alternatives have been exhausted. The courts should 
always seek community-based alternatives, particularly in the case of offenders 
who have committed non-violent offences.840 
However, the Report did not contain a sophisticated engagement with sentencing 
law or principles. The Report stated: 
Clearly, the issue of the impact of gender and motherhood on sentencing 
requires further research and analyses before firm conclusion can be drawn.841 
The Committee did reject perceptions, said to be held by the community, that: 
‘mothers who are imprisoned should relinquish their rights as parents’; ‘mothers 
 
                                                          
835 Ibid. 
836 (1990) 51 A Crim R 418. 
837 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 79 (1996) 335. 
838 The Discussion Paper had stated ‘…there are some circumstances in which being female is clearly 
relevant to sentence. Considerations of pregnancy and the needs of very young children are obvious 
examples.’ See New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Discussion Paper 33 (1996) 
[5.47]. 
839 Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, A Report 
into Children of Imprisoned Parents, Report No 12 (1997). 
840 Ibid iii 
841 Ibid 37. 
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who offend should consider the consequences… before they engage in offending 
behaviour’; and that this matter is not the community’s responsibility.842 The 
Committee emphasised in their report that the dependent child is ‘innocent of any 
wrongdoing’843 and that access to contact and a relationship with a parent is a 
‘right of the child’.844 There have been no identifiable changes in legal policy 
because of this report. 
 
In July 2000, the Legislative Council Select Committee on the Increase in Prisoner 
Population handed down an Interim Report on ‘Issues Relating to Women’.845 The 
Committee did not recommend legislative reform but did recommend: 
4.88 That, as a matter of urgency, the Attorney General direct the Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales provide ongoing education and training to 
judicial officers about the location, purpose and process of entry into the 
Department of Corrective Services Mother’s and Children’s program. That 
education should emphasise that irrespective of the existence of the program, a 
woman with dependent children and a woman who is pregnant, should only 
ever be imprisoned as a matter of last resort.846 (emphasis added) 
The Committee’s recommendation did not engage directly with sentencing reform 
and sought to frame the matter as correctional management issue. 
 
In 2002, NSW introduced its provision which set out a list of sentencing factors, s 
21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).847 The section 
contained 10 sentencing factors ((a)-(j)). The NSWLRC has stated that the 
provision was ‘substantially based on s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)’848 
however, a comparison of the two sections suggests that it was loosely based on s 
16A. The federal section contained 13 sentencing factors. Consideration of other 
offences that are required or permitted to be taken into account (16A(2)(b)); 
guilty pleas (s16A(2)(g)); co-operation with law enforcement agencies (s 
16A(2)(h); and family hardship (s16A(2)(p) did not appear in the original s 21A of 
the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). The section was subject to 
 
                                                          
842 Ibid. 
843 Ibid. 
844 Ibid. 
845 Legislative Council, Parliament of New South Wales, Interim Report: Issues Relating to Women, 
Select Committee on the Increase in Prisoner Population (2000). 
846 Ibid 45. 
847 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (General Sentencing Principles) Act 2002 (NSW) 
Schedule 1. 
848 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 139 (2013) 71. 
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reform almost immediately and a new s 21A was introduced in 2003.849 The 
reforms included a separation of sentencing factors from sentencing purposes850 
and reworked s 21A to set out a list of aggravating factors ((a)-(n)) and a list of 
mitigating factors ((a) – (m)). Guilty pleas and co-operation with law enforcement 
were picked up in the new lists of factors851 but family hardship and taking other 
offences into account were not acknowledged in the new lists. 
 
In 2006 the Standing Committee on Law and Justice handed down a Report on 
community based sentencing options in rural and remote New South Wales.852 The 
Committee recognised throughout its report that community based sentencing 
options benefited an offender’s family.853 The types of benefits recognised included 
the importance of the offender staying with the family when there are children 
impacted (noting the responsibility of childcare is often carried by female 
offenders);854 continued income for the family where the offender is employed and 
reduced use of social security support;855 the family of the offender do not need to 
visit the offender in prison which in rural communities can be particularly difficult 
and require long distance travel.856 The Standing Committee found: ‘the 
unavailability of the full range of community based sentencing options in many 
parts of NSW results in inequitable access to sentencing options for offenders in 
rural and remote areas.’857 
 
The Report recognised that rural and remote areas have higher rates of 
imprisonment than metropolitan offenders.858 It identified disadvantaged groups 
in rural areas which suffer from both a lack of community-based sentencing 
options and have difficulty accessing any available community-based sentencing 
 
                                                          
849 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW). 
850 Ibid Schedule 1 (s 3A). 
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852 See Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Parliament of New South Wales, 
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options. Three of these identified groups were Aboriginal women,859 female 
offenders,860 and sole parents.861 In addressing each of these disadvantaged groups 
the Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice recognised the 
serious impact upon dependent children of the incarceration of a care giver.862 But 
it did not go deeper than this in its report and it did not recommend changes to s 
21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 
 
In 2008, the New South Wales Attorney-General asked the Sentencing Council to 
‘examine the practices of courts’863 and legislative provisions in respect to the 
current principles and ‘practices governing reductions in sentence’.864 The Council 
released its report in August 2009.865 The Council stated that the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) was ‘silent in relation to the relevance of 
hardship to family or dependants as a mitigating factor, and it accordingly falls to 
be considered in accordance with the common law.’866 The Council recognised that 
family hardship was a listed sentencing factor in the federal legislation.867 Yet, after 
reviewing the approach that had been taken to this mitigating factor in the New 
South Wales federal sentencing case of R v Togias,868 the Council stated that s 
16(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be read as ‘requiring the presence of 
‘exceptional hardship’ in order for it to be taken into account’.869  The Council 
concluded that: 
In these circumstances the Sentencing Council does not see any need for 
the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act to be amended to include a 
reference to hardship of this kind, to achieve harmony with 
Commonwealth legislation.870 
The Chairperson of the NSW Sentencing Council was the Hon James Wood AO QC.  
During his time on the bench Wood CJ at CL supported a narrow interpretation of 
the common law principle of family hardship (see Chapter Four).  
 
                                                          
859 Ibid 50-51. 
860 Ibid 57-58. 
861 Ibid 61-62. 
862 Ibid 50-51, 57-58, 61-62, 99 
863 New South Wales Sentencing Council, Reduction in Penalties at Sentence, Report (2009) [1.1]. 
864 Ibid. 
865 New South Wales Sentencing Council, Reduction in Penalties at Sentence, Report (2009). 
866 Ibid [4.41]. 
867 Ibid. 
868 (2001) 127 A Crim R 23. This case is discussed in Chapter Five. 
869 New South Wales Sentencing Council, Reduction in Penalties at Sentence, Report (2009) [4.43]. 
870 Ibid [4.44]. 
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In 2013, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission handed down a report on 
sentencing it did not support listing family hardship.871 The Hon James Wood was 
the Chairperson and Lead Commissioner for this report.872 The Report stated that 
‘the common law position is that a court should not give substantial weigh to the 
effect of any sentence upon third parties unless the circumstances are exceptional.’ 
The New South Wales case of R v Edwards873 was provided as authority for this 
position (discussed further in Chapter Four) and it was claimed that ‘the common 
law in NSW on this matter is well known and including this factor in the proposed 
provision would be redundant and could cause confusion.’874 
 
3. Family Hardship a Women’s Issue in Victoria 
In Victoria, in 1981 the Minister for Community Welfare Services received a Report 
of the (interdepartmental) Committee to Consider the Admission of Infants to 
Prison.875 This Report resulted in legislation to permit children (up to the age of 
four) to reside with imprisoned parents.876 Victoria also had a formal policy in 
1988 from the Victorian Office of Corrections which acknowledged ‘the importance 
of maintaining parent-child relationships’877 and best interests of the child.878 
Remarkably, at this time it was ‘the only Australian state whose policy…[did] not 
exclude fathers from applying to have their child(ren) residing with them: the 
policy refer[ed] throughout to “parents” …’879 Mother and Children programs are 
still in operation in Victorian prisons. The policy has, however, changed since its 
early introduction. The ability to have children reside in a prison applies only to 
 
                                                          
871 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 139 (2013). 
872 Ibid xii. Note that the Hon James Wood was the Chairperson for the NSW Law Reform Commission 
from 2006 – 2014. 
873 (1996) 90 A Crim R 510. 
874 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report 139 (2013) 94. 
875 Cited in Carmel Benjamin, ‘Prisons, Parents and Problems’ in Sandra McKillop (ed), Keeping People 
Out of Prison: Proceedings of a Conference held 27-29 March 1990 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 
1991) 165, 167. 
876 See, eg, Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) s 31. 
877 Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, A Report 
into Children of Imprisoned Parents, Report No 12 (1997) 25. 
878 Ibid. 
879 Ibid 25. See also Rosemary Woodward, Families of Prisoners: Literature Review on Issues and 
Difficulties, Occasional Paper No 10 (Australian Government Department of Family and Community 
Services, 2003) 23. 
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female offenders who are pregnant or mothers and primary carers of pre-school 
children.880 
 
The early sentencing statutes in the 1980s in Victoria did not engage with 
sentencing purposes, principles and sentencing factors.881 A list of sentencing 
factors first appeared in Victorian legislation in 1991.882  Interestingly, family 
hardship as a sentencing factor was part of the dialogue in the lead up to the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) although it did not appear in the Act as passed.  
It is reported that there was dissatisfaction within the community and legal 
profession with the sentencing regime in operation in Victoria in the 1980s.883 In 
October 1985, the Victorian Sentencing Committee received a term of reference on 
sentencing.884 Interestingly the terms of reference specified the Committee 
consider: 
…3. The impact of custodial and non-custodial sentences and the length of such 
sentences on… (vii) the offender and his family. 
…4. The impact of remission, pre-release, parole, temporary leaves and other 
sentence shortening practices on… (vi) the offender and his family.…885 
 In 1987, the Victorian Sentencing Committee released a discussion paper on 
sentencing law and sentencing practice in Victoria with the aim to offer ‘options for 
reform’.886 Throughout Australia, at this time there was attention upon the role of 
judicial discretion in sentencing and concerns about resulting ‘unjustified disparity 
in the sentencing of offenders’.887 At the time, the governing legislation was the 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1985 (Vic).  
 
While the terms of reference to the committee were not expressed in gender 
neutral language (see above ‘offender and his family’). The Discussion Paper 
 
                                                          
880 Justice and Regulation, Victoria State Government, Pregnancy and Childcare (2017) Corrections, 
Prisons and Parole 
<http://www.corrections.vic.gov.au/home/prison/going+to+prison/pregnancy+and+childcare/>. 
881 Penalties and Sentences Act 1981 (Vic) and Penalties and Sentences Act 1985 (Vic). 
882 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2). 
883 Victorian Sentencing Committee, Sentencing (Report, Victorian Attorney-General Department, April 
1988) Vol 1, 1. 
884 Ibid Vol 1, iv. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Victorian Sentencing Committee, Discussion Paper (April 1987) 9. 
887 Ibid 6. 
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flagged the sentencing of women was one of the issues for consideration.888 Family 
hardship was recognised in the Discussion Paper as one of the examples of 
mitigating factors that a sentencing court must consider and weigh up in the 
determination of an appropriate sentence. The paper stated: 
Mitigating factors of the offender such as the offender’s age and personal 
history, the offender’s general character and reputation in the community, 
absence of prior convictions, the circumstances leading to the commission of 
the offence, e.g. provocation, domestic or emotional stress, financial difficulties, 
an alcohol or drug dependency, the indirect effect of the conviction or sentences 
on the offender’s family or loss of career. In addition the offender’s behaviour 
since the commission of the offence is relevant, e.g. genuine remorse, assistance 
to the police, payment of compensation to the victim. (emphasis added)889 
The Discussion Paper flagged that: 
The courts have become somewhat ambivalent in their approach to the 
sentencing of women. For a very long time it was considered that the fact that 
the offender was female and had the care of young children was a mitigating 
factor that would be taken into account when passing sentence. More recently, 
however, the Court of Criminal Appeal observed: 
“…In some circumstances the sex of the offender may be a relevant 
consideration: in others it may not.’890 
The Discussion Paper went on to look at ‘chivalry’ towards woman offenders in the 
US. While the Discussion Paper did not discuss leniency to women further, it did 
make the connection that family hardship was a ‘special consideration’891 for 
women rather than one that could apply to men and women.  
 
In 1988, the Victorian Attorney-General’s Department published the Report of the 
Victorian Sentencing Committee. The Report drew upon the work of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission.892 The Report recommended that the Penalties and 
Sentencing Bill include a statutory list of mitigating factors.893 The Committee 
acknowledge that the ALRC included the ‘effect of the sanction’ as a type of 
mitigating factor894 and explained that the consequences of a sentence ‘ought’895 to 
 
                                                          
888 Ibid 8. 
889 Ibid 38. 
890 Ibid146. This passage was repeated in the Final Report see Victorian Sentencing Committee, 
Sentencing (Report, Victorian Attorney-General Department, April 1988) Vol 1, 372. 
891 Victorian Sentencing Committee, Discussion Paper (April 1987) 148; 182. 
892 See, eg, Victorian Sentencing Committee, Sentencing (Report, Victorian Attorney-General 
Department, April 1988) Vol 1, 259 
893 Ibid Vol 2 (Summary of Recommendations – Sum 10). 
894 Victorian Sentencing Committee, Sentencing (Report, Victorian Attorney-General Department, April 
1988) Vol 1, 260. 
895 Ibid 266. 
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be taken into account by courts and that ‘such factors should be capable of 
mitigating a sentence imposed by the court.’896 
 
The Report recommended family hardship be specifically acknowledged in statute 
as a matter a ‘court must be taken into account’.897  In Volume 2 of the Report, after 
the Summary of Recommendations the Report set out a draft Penalties and 
Sentencing Bill. In this draft bill, under the heading ‘Mitigating Factors’, s 9 
appeared. Section 9(1) of this bill set out a list of mitigating sentencing factors 
‘which a court must consider whether one or more of the following factors are 
present and, if so, may reduce the sentence according’.898 Sentencing factors were 
listed in paragraphs (a) through to (o). Sub-section (2) stated: 
(2) In determining sentence a court must take account of – 
(a) any indirect effect which the sentence may have on the offender of his or 
her dependents including –  
(i) damage to the offender’s future employment or career; and  
(ii) financial or emotional damage to the offender’s dependents; and 
(b) if contemplating a monetary penalty, the financial circumstances of the 
offender.899 
 
Therefore, family hardship was expressly endorsed by the Victorian Sentencing 
Committee. It was placed as a stand-alone provision under s 9 rather than under 
the general list of sentencing factors in sub-section 1. This was a position that was 
not taken up by the Victorian Government. 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has set out how family hardship came to be a listed sentencing factor 
in statute in three jurisdictions in Australia. Identifying this factor in legislation 
(‘the probable impact of the sentence upon an offender’s dependants’) as a listed 
 
                                                          
896 Ibid. 
897 Victorian Sentencing Committee, Sentencing (Report, Victorian Attorney-General Department, April 
1988) Vol 2, Sum-12. 
898 Ibid Vol 2 (the draft bill is printed at the end of this volume). 
899 Ibid Vol 2 (no page number, tacked on to end of vol 2 after Summary of Recommendations. 
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and legitimate sentencing factor, was an important development in the law with its 
inclusion being both deliberate and informed. This chapter has highlighted that the 
language employed in the legislative provisions is prescriptive language. In all 
three of the jurisdictions, the legislature has provided that a court must take this 
matter into account in sentencing where it is relevant and known. Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five will explore how this drafting has been interpreted by courts.  
 
The role that these lists of sentencing factors play and the importance placed on 
listed factors by judicial officers is an important issue, which has received little 
academic attention. The legislative expression of the principle requires the court to 
take this factor into account.900 The threshold provided within the statutory 
provision is that the hardship to the offender’s family and dependants must be 
‘relevant and known’. This phrase has been discussed above and judicial 
approaches to this listed factor will be presented in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
 
Judicial perspectives on these gradual legislative encroachments upon judicial 
discretion (and ultimately judicial powers) undoubtedly accounted for the 
lacklustre judicial response to the appearance of listed sentencing factors. The 
courts have generally placed little importance on legislative lists of sentencing 
factors.901 Studies on sentencing in Australia in the early 80s have identified over 
two hundred sentencing factors.902 Therefore, significant visibility and legitimacy 
was granted to those principles that were given legislative form. It follows that 
those sentencing factors that were listed within legislation could have gained 
validity from the explicit reference to them as these were sentencing factors that 
the legislature believed should be taken into account in the determination of 
sentence. In a matter immediately after the federal reforms Rowland J of the 
Western Australian Court of Appeal observed that the family hardship was 
included in the list of sentencing factors and that in sentencing State offenders it 
 
                                                          
900 The threshold provided with the legislation is that the factor must be ‘relevant and known’. This phrase 
that has been discussed above and the Court’s interpretation of the phrase will be presented in Chapter 
Four. 
901 See further Chapter Four and Chapter Five which contains analysis of the case law post the 
introduction of legislative lists of sentencing factors. 
902 See Joanna Shapland, Between Conviction and Sentence: The Process of Mitigation (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981) 55; Roger Douglas, ‘Sentencing’ in Legal Studies Department, Guilty, Your Worship: 
A Study of Victoria’s Magistrates’ Courts (La Trobe University, Monograph No 1, 1980) 55, 62. 
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was considered only in exceptional circumstances; he saw this reform as 
something different from the earlier position, and pointed out that the language of 
s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act was obligatory (‘must’).903  
 
Similarly, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, in a matter immediately 
after the federal reforms, observed that s 16A(2) contained a list of sentencing 
factors,904 and commented that family hardship was a ‘novel inclusion’.905 But as 
will be seen from the results of the study of the case law (Chapters Four and Five) 
family hardship was not embraced as a sentencing factor of general relevance. 
Chapter Four demonstrates that Australian courts have followed the common law 
sentencing practices of the English and Welsh courts and, accordingly, its policy as 
stated by Thomas was accepted into Australian sentencing practices.  
  
 
                                                          
903 Oancea (1990) 51 A Crim R 141, 155. 
904 El Karhani (1990) 51 A Crim R 123, 128. 
905 Ibid 135. 
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4. THE STATE AND TERRITORY STUDY OF FAMILY 
HARDSHIP 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the outcomes of the state and territory study into family 
hardship.  A methodical and systematic study of the sentencing case law on family 
hardship in Australia was conducted for this dissertation.906 The study dealt with 
both first instance sentencing remarks and appellate court decisions of superior 
courts throughout Australia. Nonetheless, as indicated in Table 1, in Chapter One, 
there were very few first instance sentencing remarks identified through the 
‘exhaustive shepardizing’ approach adopted for the study of the case law. The 
purpose of this study was to isolate the consideration of a specific mitigating factor 
(family hardship) and to trace the development of sentencing principles related to 
this sentencing factor.907  
 
As described in Chapter Three, family hardship has been a listed sentencing factor 
in legislation in the Federal jurisdiction and in South Australian and the Australian 
Capital Territory. The legislative articulation of family hardship is: ‘the probable 
effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the 
person's family or dependants’.908 Whilst most Australian states and territories 
have not specifically identified this factor in sentencing legislation, the impact of a 
sentence upon an offender’s family and dependants may be taken into account as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing under the common law.909  
 
 
 
                                                          
906 See Chapter One ‘Method for Study of the Case Law’. 
907 As explained in Chapter One, this study does not seek to provide results on the number of times family 
hardship has been raised for consideration in sentencing decisions in each jurisdiction. 
908 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p) and Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1)(o). Very similar 
language is adopted in South Australia see Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(n) – ‘the 
probable effect that any sentence under consideration would have on dependants of the defendant’.  
909 See Chapter Three. 
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The aim of the study of the case law was to identify sentencing principles and the 
prevailing practice in respect of family hardship as a mitigating factor in each state 
and territory within Australia. This chapter will set out the results of the state and 
territory study and present the key findings of the qualitative analysis of this body 
of case law.  The research questions, addressed by the study of the state and 
territory case law, were: 
 
 How have courts historically dealt with family hardship under the 
common law? 
 Where family hardship has received legislative recognition, has this 
affected judicial sentencing practice? 
 What are the influential cases on family hardship in Australia and what 
influence have these had on sentencing principles and practice?910 
 
There were four key findings: 
 
Finding 1: Body of Cases that Meaningfully Engage with Family Hardship 
In accordance with the method adopted for this study (see Chapter One), a 
body of case law was identified in Australia. The table of cases that 
meaningfully engaged with family hardship as a mitigating factor in each 
jurisdiction is one of the outcomes of this study and is available in Appendix 
A. The number of citations each case received throughout Australia is also 
an important outcome of this study and these data are represented below 
and in the tables within Appendix A.  
 
Finding 2: Reveal the Development of Sentencing Jurisprudence on Family 
Hardship 
Through a systematic and qualitative analysis of case law on family 
hardship within Australia, this study has revealed the development of 
sentencing jurisprudence on family hardship. These findings are set out in 
this Chapter. 
 
 
                                                          
910 See Chapter One ‘The Research Questions’. 
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This Chapter also explains that a result of the study of the case law was the 
identification of legal narratives in the law. Prominent legal narratives were 
mercy and gender and these narratives added confusion and tension within 
superior courts as to the appropriate role of family hardship in sentencing.  
The relationship of family hardship with mercy and gender is considered in 
more detail in Chapter Six. A review of the research literature in Chapter Six 
highlights that gender and mercy are intimately connected with family 
hardship as a sentencing factor and are held to be the source of controversy 
regarding judicial consideration of family hardship at sentencing. 
 
Finding 3: Identification of Cases with a High Juristic Status  
By studying the arguments presented to superior courts, as expressed in 
the sentencing remarks and judgments, the place and relevance of hardship 
to family and dependants in sentencing can be revealed. Horizontal and 
vertical checks have been conducted for each case included within the 
study.911 Therefore, as a result of this research, this chapter presents where 
adversarial debate has focused its attention and identifies influential cases 
in the Australian common law jurisprudence.  
 
The identification of particular state and territory approaches to family 
hardship as a mitigating factor under the common law was another 
important outcome of the qualitative analysis of the case law. The results of 
this analysis are set out below. Chapter Five also looks at these findings in 
the context of the body of federal case law on family hardship.  
 
Finding 4: Evaluation of the Impact of Legislative Recognition 
In Chapter Three, I demonstrated that the inclusion of family hardship as a 
sentencing factor was a deliberate move by the legislatures to affect and 
adjust judicial sentencing practices. The adoption of a legislative list of 
factors was seen as an approach that would encourage greater consistency 
in sentencing. An important question that this study of the case law sought 
 
                                                          
911 See discussion of the method adopted for this study in Chapter One. 
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to address is whether legislative recognition of this factor did, in fact, affect 
judicial sentencing practice.  
 
In the first part of this chapter the jurisdictions of South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory will be discussed. The analysis of the federal 
jurisdiction has been separated out to the next chapter (see Chapter Five). 
This separation of analysis enables reflection upon the state and territory 
sentencing practices and permits comparison with the federal sentencing 
practices on family hardship. The findings of this study in relation to the 
evaluation of the impact of legislative recognition will be addressed in 
Chapter Five. 
 
 
II FAMILY HARDSHIP: LISTED IN LEGISLATION 
 
A. South Australia 
 
South Australia was the first jurisdiction to list family hardship in the legislative 
list of factors, therefore, this part of the chapter commences with an analysis of the 
South Australian case law. The study of family hardship in South Australia resulted 
in the analysis of 52 cases (see Appendix A). All of these cases were appellate court 
judgments. The gender of the offender raising family hardship was a male in 84% 
of these cases and female in only 16% of the cases. 
 
The study of the case law has revealed that the most influential case on family 
hardship within Australia is the South Australian case of R v Wirth.912 This case 
received 102 citations and has been picked up in all state and territory 
jurisdictions as well as the federal jurisdiction. This case and development of the 
common law within South Australia, prior to the legislative recognition of family 
hardship as a sentencing factor and after, is discussed below.  
 
The examination of the South Australian case law reveals that until the legislature 
listed family hardship as a sentencing factor, within South Australia, courts 
 
                                                          
912 (1976) 14 SASR 291, 293-294 (‘Wirth’). 
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approached family hardship on the basis that in exceptional circumstances family 
hardship may mitigate what was otherwise a just sentence. Family hardship, in 
these early cases, was seen as a feature of sentencing which involved an exercise of 
the residual discretion of mercy rather than as a sentencing factor to be taken into 
account in determining an appropriate sentence. 
 
1. Early Case Law in South Australia 
The analysis of the early case law of South Australia identified cases ranging from 
1969 – 1987. The study of the case law, prior to the passage of the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), identified twelve cases which explicitly engaged with 
family hardship’s relationship to sentencing. These were all appellate court 
decisions concerning a primary offender and 73% of these cases involved a male 
appellant. Therefore, it would be wrong to think that traditionally family hardship 
was raised only in the sentencing of female offenders. The early cases dealt with 
whether family hardship should be taken into account in sentencing. The case law 
also dealt with when in the sentencing process it arose.  
 
The earliest case in this jurisdiction identified by this study was the High Court 
decision of Cobiac v Liddy (1969).913  The appellant was a 72-year-old male who 
was charged with driving offences whilst intoxicated. The issue before the High 
Court was whether discretionary powers conferred upon a court to take into 
account mitigating factors when a ‘person is charged before a court of summary 
jurisdiction’,914 could be exercised when a person is charged under s 47 of the Road 
Traffic Act 1961-1967 (SA). In obiter, Chief Justice Barwick, Kitto and Owen JJ915 
queried whether the fact that the offender lived with and cared for his 86-year-old 
sister, fell within the sentencing factors of ‘character’ or ‘antecedents’.916 They 
accepted that, ‘having regard…to the fact that to send the appellant to gaol would 
subject him to distress by reason of his being thereby prevented from caring for his 
aged sister…’917 it was a relevant factor. Therefore, the joint judgment found that it 
was a relevant consideration because of its impact upon the offender; the hardship 
 
                                                          
913 (1969) 119 CLR 257. 
914 Offenders Probation Act 1913-1963 (SA) s 4(1). 
915 Justice McTiernan did not address the offender’s care for his sister in his judgment. 
916 Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257, 265. 
917 Ibid. 
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upon the offender arising from him not being able to live with and care for his 
sister. This approach framed the sentencing consideration in terms of a traditional 
approach to sentencing in which the sentencing factors were tied to either the 
offence itself or the offender.  
 
In Cobiac v Liddy, Justice Windeyer (in a separate judgement) commented on the 
role of mitigation within the criminal justice system. He stated: 
The whole history of criminal justice has shewn that severity of punishment 
begets the need of a capacity for mercy. 
… 
This is not because mercy, in Portia’s sense, should season justice. It is that a 
capacity in special circumstances to avoid the rigidity of inexorable law is of the 
very essence of justice. Therefore, I do not think it should be said that the 
Parliament of South Australia has done by implication what it certainly has not 
done explicitly, namely removed the offence in question from within the 
purview of the Offenders Probation Act.918 
While using the terminology of mercy, Windeyer J was speaking to the importance 
and role of mitigating factors in sentencing. He was supporting the continued role 
and importance of judicial discretion in sentencing. 
 
Justice Windeyer found that all of the circumstances considered by the magistrate 
at sentence including ‘the circumstances of his aged sister being dependent on 
him’919 were matters he was entitled to take into account at sentencing. However, 
it is not clear from his judgment that he accepted hardship to third parties as a 
sentencing factor. Rather, he appeared to view these impacts as hardship to the 
offender in consequence of hardship to the family. Thus, for example, Justice 
Windeyer went on to describe this sentencing factor in the context of the 
importance of the appellant’s ‘good behaviour’ to his sister. Justice Windeyer 
stated that he thought this factor had the potential to fall under a broad definition 
of ‘antecedents’.920  Therefore, Windeyer J’s analysis of this circumstance, like the 
traditional approach taken by Barwick CJ, Kitto and Owen JJ, considered the factor 
by analysing its impact upon the offender. 
 
 
                                                          
918 Ibid 269. 
919 Ibid 276. 
920 Ibid 276 – 277. The South Australian courts later found that ‘antecedents’ did not encompass family 
hardship see Jones v Morley (1981) 29 SASR 57, 60-61); Jones v Morley (1981) 29 SASR 62, 64. 
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The following table shows the number of ‘hits’ Cobiac v Liddy received within this 
study. It shows the case has a reasonable citation record in family hardship 
matters in South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia and in Federal sentencing 
matters.  
Table 6: Citations to Cobiac v Liddy Within the Study 
 
Jurisdiction SA CTH ACT NSW NT QLD TAS VIC WA 
Number of 
citations 
5 3 - - - - - 3 4 
 
To see these results within the context of the broader study see Appendix A. 
 
In 1972, in Jarrett v Samuels,921 the impact of a custodial sentence upon the female 
offender’s dependants was in issue before the Supreme Court of South Australia. At 
sentencing, expert evidence had been provided of the impact a custodial sentence 
would have upon her sick child. The Chief Summary Magistrate stated: 
The question of the effect that a term of imprisonment to be served by the 
mother would have on the child is a matter which is not appropriate for 
consideration by the court imposing sentence but may be considered by the 
Governor in Executive Council in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy.922  
The appellant appealed the custodial sentence imposed upon her for fraud offences 
by a summary court.  
 
On appeal, Mitchell J endorsed the position of the Chief Summary Magistrate. 
Mitchell J stated: 
This is a matter which it would seem to me is very proper to be considered by 
the proper authorities in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, but it is not a 
matter which I or any other court can take into account.923 
Justice Mitchell, therefore, did not see family hardship as a sentencing factor but as 
a factor relevant to the Executive’s exercise of the prerogative of mercy.  
 
 
                                                          
921 (1972) 4 SASR 78. 
922 Jarrett v Samuels (1972) 4 SASR 78, 80. 
923 Ibid. 
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Two years later,924 Bray CJ heard an appeal against sentence in Moore v 
Fingleton925 where he also found that mercy is a matter for the Crown and not a 
court. In line with the High Court’s traditional analysis in Cobiac v Liddy,926 Bray CJ 
stated that sentencing factors must relate to the offender or the crime whereas the 
impact on dependants was a ‘circumstances peculiar to someone else’.927 Thus it 
was not a matter to be considered alongside sentencing factors. 
 
In Moore v Fingleton, the appellant had been sentenced to six months 
imprisonment with hard labour for stealing two suits (valued at approx. $140).928 
She was pregnant, had a dependent eight-year-old son and a 10 month-old 
daughter who had spina bifida and required full time care from her mother.929 
While accepting that there were socially beneficial outcomes in taking into 
consideration the impact of the sentence upon her dependants, Bray CJ 
emphasised in his judgment that this was a matter for the Executive and that the 
duty of the court was to ‘mete out even-handed justice.’930 So again family hardship 
was cast as an issue to be potentially calling for mercy rather than as a sentencing 
factor to be considered within the sentencing exercise. 
 
(a) The most influential case on family hardship  
As mentioned above, this study has identified Wirth as the most influential case on 
family hardship in Australia. Wirth was also identified by this study, as the most 
cited case within South Australia with twenty-five citations (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7: Citations to Wirth within the Study 
 
Jurisdiction SA CTH ACT NSW NT QLD TAS VIC WA 
Number of 
citations 
25 12 3 24 4 1 3 13 17 
 
 
                                                          
924 Jarrett v Samuels was heard 13 October 1970. Moore v Fingleton was heard 1 June 1972. 
925 (1972) 3 SASR 164. 
926 (1969) 119 CLR 257. 
927 (1972) 3 SASR 164, 168. 
928 Ibid 164. 
929 Ibid 166. 
930 Ibid 170. This relationship between equality and mercy is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
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The facts of the case in Wirth were unique and it is curious that this was the case 
which gave rise to deeper consideration of the role of family hardship in 
sentencing. In this case, the appellant was a bank teller who had been convicted of 
larceny. He had borrowed money, using his parent’s house and mother-in-law’s 
house as security, to make restitution to the bank for his offence. He was sentenced 
to two concurrent terms of two years imprisonment with hard labour, which 
meant that he would be unable to service the loan and his family members would 
lose their homes.  
 
In Wirth, none of the members of the Full Court of the Supreme Court found that 
these were circumstances that should have been taken into account. Importantly 
both Bray CJ and Wells J, Sangster J agreeing, identified that, in the circumstances 
of this case, the hardship would not have been caused but for the additional acts of 
the offender.931 Chief Justice Bray likened the circumstances to ‘vicarious 
atonement for crime’ where the offender attempted to use the generosity of others 
to ‘in effect…purchase leniency.’932 
 
However, it is the judgment of Justice Wells in Wirth, which has attracted judicial 
attention on the issue of family hardship. Justice Wells agreed with both Bray CJ 
and Sangster J that the appeal should be dismissed. But, he delivered a separate 
judgment to address a ‘principle of public importance’,933: 
When (if ever), and to what extent (if at all), should the hardship caused 
directly or indirectly, by a proposed sentence of imprisonment, to the family of, 
or to others closely associated with, the offender be taken into account by the 
Court in mitigation of the sentence?934 
In his well-known response to this question, Well J stated: 
Hardship to spouse, family, and friends, is the tragic, but inevitable, 
consequence of almost every conviction and penalty recorded in a Criminal 
Court. Again and again, sentencing judges point out that convicted persons 
should have thought about the likely consequences of what they were doing 
before they did it – I am, of course, addressing myself to the more serious 
crimes in which some form of premeditation, wilfulness, or intent, must be 
proved. It seems to me that courts would often do less than their clear duty – 
especially, where the element of retribution, deterrenct, [sic] or protection of 
society is the predominant consideration – if they allowed themselves to be 
much influenced by the hardship that prison sentences, which from all other 
 
                                                          
931 Ibid 293-294 (Bray CJ) and 295 (Wells J). 
932 Ibid 294. 
933 (1976) 14 SASR 291, 294. 
934 Ibid 295. 
 184 
points of view were justified, would be likely to cause those near and dear to 
prisoners. 
But it has been often remarked that the strength of our law lies in the 
willingness of judges, when applying a principle, not to carry it past the point 
where a sense of mercy or of affronted common sense imperatively demands 
that they should draw back. So it is proper that I should here add that, in my 
opinion, hardship likely to be caused by a sentence of imprisonment under 
consideration ought to be taken into account where the circumstances are 
highly exceptional, where it would be, in effect, inhuman to refuse to do so.935 
Justice Wells was clearly expressing a general position on the role of family 
hardship in sentencing. He spoke of the application of principles at sentencing but 
held that it was important that sentencing judges in the application of principles 
should not do so in a manner where a ‘sense of mercy or of affronted common 
sense imperatively demands that they should draw back’.936 Thus, for Wells J in 
Wirth, family hardship arose as a consideration after the application of sentencing 
principles, in what has in later case law been described as a residual discretion of 
mercy. 
 
This examination of the early case law in South Australia reveals that the Supreme 
Court of South Australia did appreciate that there was a practice of mitigating 
sentences in exceptional circumstances because of hardship to dependants in 
England.937 In Wirth,938 Bray CJ commented more extensively on the practice of the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal Criminal Division and Thomas’ commentary in 
Principles of Sentencing. Chief Justice Bray noted that, despite differences in the 
governing legislation on the grounds for appeal, the family hardship decisions may 
‘reflect a general change of policy’939 by that Court. Drawing upon his position in 
Moore v Fingleton, Bray CJ favoured a strong separation between the role of the 
Crown and the courts. But he conceded that in ‘extreme cases’ it may be 
appropriate for a court to take family hardship into account in sentencing but that 
he could not ‘envisage circumstances in which it would be logical to do so’.940 In 
 
                                                          
935 Ibid 296. 
936 Ibid. 
937 See Moore v Fingleton (1972) 3 SASR 164, 169 (Bray CJ); Tame v Fingleton (1974) 8 SASR 507, 511 
(Walters J). 
938 (1976) 14 SASR 291, 293-294. 
939 Ibid 293. 
940 Ibid 294 
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Wirth, Bray CJ expressly rejected the suggestion that family hardship was a 
sentencing factor that could carry more weight in the sentencing of women.941 
 
In the early 1980s in the case of R v Spiers,942 a Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
South Australia once again considered the issue of the role of family hardship. The 
male offender had been convicted of two counts of possession (of Indian hemp). 
The judge imposed a suspended sentence and the Attorney-General appealed this 
sentence. The male offender had a young wife (18 years of age) and a newly born 
child who at the time of sentence was in hospital in the intensive care unit because 
of a small jaw and cleft palate.  
 
In Spiers, the Court dismissed the appeal (2:1). Justice Wells remarked: 
All one can say with confidence is that the comprehension and insight of an 
experienced trial judge may, once in a while, lead him, rightly, to suspend when 
all the impersonal canons of sentencing seem to unite in declaring that a 
custodial sentence is called for. Such a suspension may be called for, in my 
judgment and experience, where to ignore the compassionate features would 
clearly be to destroy, and to acknowledge them would just as clearly be to 
promote strongly, the rehabilitative force of a primary sentence. But, I repeat, 
the circumstances must be extraordinary, and the trial judge must be confident 
that the proposed order would have the effect just referred to.943 
Consistent with the approach taken by Wells J, Mitchell ACJ held there was no error 
in the sentence imposed. As to the role and place of family hardship the 
approaches of the two Judges are quite similar.  
 
In Spiers, Wells J placed family hardship as arising beyond, or after, the normal 
sentencing deliberation involving the weighing of sentencing factors. Justice Wells 
equated family hardship to an exercise of compassion.944 Similarly, Mitchell ACJ 
saw family hardship as outside the normal consideration of sentencing factors and 
expressed it as falling within the province of mercy. This point was clearly made 
quoting R v Osenkowski945 with approval: ‘[t]here must always be a place for the 
exercise of mercy where a judge’s sympathies are reasonably excited by the 
circumstances of the case.’ Acting Chief Justice Mitchell found: 
 
                                                          
941 Ibid 293. 
942 R v Spiers (1983) 34 SASR 546 (Mitchell ACJ, Wells and Sangster JJ) (‘Spiers’). 
943 Ibid 551. 
944 Ibid 550. 
945 (1982) 30 SASR 212. This case is not a family hardship case. 
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I have no doubt that that was the view taken by the learned sentencing judge 
having regard to the matters which I have mentioned, namely the fact that the 
respondent had married; that he and his young wife had the shared problem of 
a very sick baby; and that the respondent had a job which appeared to be 
secure.946 
Spiers illustrates well the narrow scope for sentencing appeals in Australia and the 
respect provided to the judicial intuition of sentencing judges (discussed in 
Chapter Two above).  
 
Justice Sangster, in dissent, stated that ‘there can be no doubt that the respondent 
was extremely fortunate to receive such undeservedly lenient treatment’.947 He 
also cited R v Osenkowski and accepted, following Wirth, that in ‘extreme cases a 
court can take into account the effect of the sentence on the offender’s family.’948 
On the facts of this case, he thought there was ‘only just-sufficient material’949 for 
the sentencing Judge to take into account potential family hardship. 
 
In summary, the examination of the early case law of South Australia highlights 
that appellate courts were reluctant to accept family hardship as a sentencing 
factor and were influenced by the traditional approach to sentencing which 
provided that matters which were relevant considerations in the act of 
determining a sentence were those matters that were connected to the 
commission of the crime or matters that directly impacted upon the offender.950 
However, they did accept direction from the UK towards (what was described as a 
‘policy’951) of taking family hardship into account at sentencing in exceptional 
cases. Albeit in these early cases the Supreme Court of South Australia saw family 
hardship as arising after the weighing of sentencing factors, and, therefore, as an 
exercise of judicial mercy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
946 Ibid 549-550. 
947 Ibid 553. 
948 Ibid 554. 
949 Ibid. 
950 See Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257; Jarrett v Samuels (1972) 4 SASR 78; Moore v Fingleton 
(1972) 3 SASR 164, 168 (Bray CJ); Tame v Fingleton (1974) 8 SASR 507, 511 (Walters J); Amuso 
(1987) 32 A Crim R 308, 314. 
951 See, eg, Amuso (1987) 32 A Crim R 308, 313. 
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2. Case Law After Recognition of Family Hardship in Legislation 
On 1 January 1988, the South Australian Parliament enacted the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) (‘CL(S)A’). As described in Chapter Three, the new 
sentencing statute provided a list of sentencing factors which a court should take 
into account when sentencing an offender. Section 10(1) commenced with the 
following: ‘A court, in determining sentence for an offence, should have regard to 
such of the following matters as are relevant and known to the court.’952 Family 
hardship was identified in this list at paragraph (n): ‘the probable effect any 
sentence under consideration would have on dependants of the defendant’.953  
 
Immediately following the passage of the CL(S)A the case of Adami954 came before 
the Supreme Court of South Australia. In this case two brothers (convicted for 
cultivating between 16 000-32 000 Indian hemp plants) appealed against the 
severity of their sentence. The ground of appeal put before the court was that the 
court, at first instance, had failed to take into account the effect of imprisonment 
upon their businesses and consequently the effect upon their families due to their 
inability to provide financially for their families.955  
 
The circumstances of this case were that the two brothers each commenced a 
family business whilst they were on bail. An analogy could be drawn between this 
and the circumstances in Wirth where the Court had rejected the ability of an 
offender to mitigate a sentence when the offender had engaged in additional acts 
while awaiting trial which were the basis for the hardship claim. In Adami, the 
brothers had commenced businesses post offending, which they then sought to rely 
upon as the basis of a hardship claim. 
 
Justice Legoe mentioned that the businesses had been commenced ‘while on bail 
and awaiting trial’,956 however, he dismissed the appeal on the basis that the 
sentencing judge had considered family hardship but came to the decision it was 
 
                                                          
952 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1). See also, the title to s 10 which was ‘Matters to 
which a sentencing court should have regard’. 
953 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(n). 
954 Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88. 
955 Ibid 91. 
956 Ibid 90. 
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not appropriate to suspend the sentence. Justice Bollen (King CJ agreeing) engaged 
directly with the timing of the commencement of the businesses and specified that 
where one engages in additional acts which form the basis for the hardship s/he 
cannot claim the effect of the sentence upon dependants falls within the threshold 
of ‘exceptional’.957 
 
The Adami case is significant because the Supreme Court of South Australia took 
this early opportunity to comment upon the new CL(S)A and did so specifically in 
respect to the impact of s 10(1). Justice Legoe stated that the matters listed in the 
legislative list of sentencing factors were factors that had always been sentencing 
considerations. He stated: 
It is obvious from a fair and proper reading of the section in the context of this 
particular Act, that the discretionary powers of the sentencing court are left to 
the general law as laid down in the cases enunciating numerous principles of 
sentencing.958 
Justice Bollen (King CJ agreeing) agreed with Legoe J that the Court had always 
taken the listed matters into account.  
 
Justice Bollen (King CJ agreeing) focused on the use of the term ‘relevant’ in s 10(1) 
and said that it ‘must mean “relevant to the case at Bar”’.959 On this basis, he 
rejected the appellants’ argument that s 10(1)(n) changed the law and held: 
[t]he probable effect of a sentence on dependants is still relevant only in 
exceptional cases. The section does not change the law on this point. Moreover, 
s 10 is no more than a section which declares what has always been the law.960 
In Adami, the Supreme Court of South Australia, rejected the argument that the 
listing of family hardship in s 10(1)(n) of the CL(S)A changed the law. Interestingly 
the Court did so without discussing mercy or the history of the earlier South 
Australian cases that this study has revealed focused upon compassion and mercy. 
 
The Adami case was the second most influential case in South Australia (after 
Wirth) with 17 citations. The case has been used as a shield to claims that family 
hardship under s 10(1)(n) is a valid sentencing factor regardless of whether there 
 
                                                          
957 Ibid 92. 
958 Ibid 90. 
959 Ibid 92. 
960 Ibid. 
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are exceptional circumstances. The study of the case law has revealed that this 
case has been picked up by family hardship cases in other jurisdictions (see Table 
8). 
 
Table 8: Citations to Adami within the Study 
 
Jurisdiction SA CTH ACT NSW NT QLD TAS VIC WA 
Number of 
citations 
17 8 1 3 3 1 - 3 1 
 
Reliance upon Adami in other jurisdictions is discussed further below (in the 
qualitative analysis in each state and territory). 
 
(a) But, listed as a sentencing factor… 
Importantly, in 1997, Perry J in Bates v Police,961 qualified the position taken in 
Adami. In Bates, an appeal before a single judge, the appellant argued that the 
sentencing magistrate had ‘erred in failing to consider whether the circumstances 
of the appellant and the offence were such that they provided a basis for the 
imposition of a penalty other than a term of imprisonment.’962 The 23-year-old 
offender had been convicted of three traffic charges arising out of one act 
(unregistered, uninsured and disqualified driving). He was a repeat offender with 
two previous convictions.963 He was unemployed and had been caring for his 
sister’s two young children while she was imprisoned. When his sister had 
committed suicide in custody Bates, at the age of 19, had become the sole carer for 
the children. There was no other family who could care for the children if he was 
imprisoned.964 
 
At sentencing the magistrate had stated, ‘the effect of the sentence on the persons 
reliant on an offender should be given less weight than some other factors in 
sentencing.’965 Justice Perry found this was an error and that under s 10(1) of the 
 
                                                          
961 (1997) 70 SASR 66 (‘Bates’). 
962 Ibid 68. 
963 Ibid 67-68. 
964 Ibid 68. 
965 Ibid. 
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CL(S)A none of the listed factors ‘must necessarily be given less weight than other 
factors appearing in the other subparagraphs.’966  
 
Justice Perry cited the position in Adami that a court can take the impact upon 
dependants into account in exceptional cases, but held that: 
Properly understood, I do not think that the explanation of the principle which 
appears in that passage is at odds with s 10(n) of the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing)Act.  Although regard will be had in all cases to the effect of the 
imposition of a custodial sentence on dependants of the defendant, it will only 
have a significant effect on penalty if the effect which it has in that respect in 
the particular case is out of the ordinary.967 
This interpretation of Adami, was cited with approval and adopted by Doyle CJ 
(Martin and Besanko JJ agreeing) in R v Carpentieri968 (see below). 
 
In Bates, Perry J found that the magistrate had erred in failing to give sufficient 
recognition to family hardship in this case.969 Justice Perry was influenced by his 
decision the year earlier in the federal case of Walsh v Department of Social 
Security970 (‘Walsh’). This federal case had involved the sentencing of a husband 
and wife who had three young dependent children (there was also evidence 
provided that the children suffered from severe asthma which had previously 
required hospitalisation).971 Justice Perry observed that s 10(1)(n) was 
indistinguishable from the federal provision in s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth).972  
 
Justice Perry was influenced by the importance of human rights in his framing of 
the scope of s 10(1)(n) and s 16(2)(p). In his judgment in Bates he cited, in full, his 
comments on this from Walsh, stating: 
Various international instruments which have been entered into by Australia 
emphasise the protection by the society and the State of the family as the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society, and preservation of the rights of 
children. Although such international instruments do not form part of 
Australian law, they serve to underscore the importance of provisions such as s 
16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act, which, where possible, should be construed and 
 
                                                          
966 Ibid. 
967 Ibid 69. 
968 (2001) 81 SASR 164, [19] (‘Carpentieri’). 
969 Ibid 71. 
970 (1996) 67 SASR 143. 
971 Ibid 70. 
972 Examined further in Chapter Five. 
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applied consistently with them. So that while we should always bear in mind 
the principles which find expression in relevant international instruments, 
particularly those which have to do with human rights, recourse to them in this 
case is hardly necessary, as s 16A(2)(p) of the Act is clear and unambiguous in 
its terms.973 
Therefore, the approach laid down in Bates by Perry J saw family hardship as a 
sentencing factor. This was premised upon the placement of this factor, under the 
legislation, as a listed sentencing factor. What was not openly acknowledged in his 
judgement was that this moved consideration of family hardship away from mercy 
(which falls at the end of the exercise of the sentencing discretion) and, instead, 
positioned it as a factor that arose for consideration in sentencing alongside other 
sentencing factors. Albeit, he retained the view that the factor would only carry 
significant weight in exceptional cases stating: 
Although regard will be had in all cases to the effect of the imposition of a 
custodial sentence on dependants of the defendant, it will only have a 
significant effect on penalty if the effect which it has in that respect in the 
particular case is out of the ordinary.974 
In 2001, in Carpentieri975, a Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia 
endorsed Perry J’s reading of Adami. 
 
In Carpentieri, Doyle CJ (Martin and Besanko JJ agreeing) observed that the CL(S)A 
had not changed the law. He said: 
Section 10(1) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) directs that a 
sentencing court should have regard to a number of matters including the 
probable effect of any sentence on dependants of an offender. That section has 
been interpreted as not altering the common law principles…976 
As to the application of sentencing principle, Doyle CJ said: 
I accept the submission by Mr Wells that, at common law and under the 
Sentencing Act, a court must have regards to the probable effect of a sentence 
on the dependants of the defendant. In this case the relevant effect is the effect 
on Mrs Carpentieri. However, the effect of the cases referred to is that ordinary 
hardship to a defendant will not be a reason to mitigate or reduce a penalty, but 
in exceptional cases that hardship may be a reason to do so. I consider that 
Perry J accurately summarised the position in Bates v Police… That is the 
approach that I would take in this case.977 
 
                                                          
973 Ibid 70. 
974 Ibid 69. 
975 Carpentieri (2001) 81 SASR 164. 
976 Ibid 167. 
977 Ibid 168. 
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In light of the analysis of the earlier case law in South Australia and the approach 
that had been adopted by the Supreme Court of South Australia (see above), 
accepting family hardship as a sentencing principle was a substantive change in 
approach. While, the Court maintained the position that family hardship only 
carried significant weight at sentencing in exceptional circumstances, it is 
significant, that family hardship shifted from a consideration that arose as part of 
the courts’ discretion to exercise judicial mercy (after all relevant sentencing law 
had been applied) to a consideration that arose as part of the sentencing exercise 
as a sentencing factor to be balanced against other sentencing considerations. As a 
matter of law, after the introduction of the CL(S)A family hardship had moved from 
a factor outside of sentencing law to a factor falling within sentencing law. The 
theoretical importance of this, has not been acknowledged by the Supreme Court 
of South Australia. 
 
In Carpentieri, Doyle CJ (Martin and Besanko JJ agreeing) held that, in the 
circumstances of this case, the impact upon Mrs Carpentieri did not meet the 
threshold of ‘exceptional’ hardship. Mr Carpentieri had been convicted of 
producing and possessing cannabis for sale; he had grown 25 plants and possessed 
in excess of 10kg of cannabis.978 The court found that the seriousness of the 
offences, the prevalence of the offences in the jurisdiction and the need for a 
deterrent punishment979 supported the need for a custodial sentence.  
 
The study of the case law has revealed that Bates and Carpentieri have good 
citation records in South Australian hardship cases. However, in stark contrast to 
Adami, these judgments have not been picked up in other jurisdictions (see Table 
9). Nor has the federal case of Walsh (which influenced Perry J’s analysis in Bates) 
had significant recognition. Of course, Bates, Carpentieri and Walsh arise in the 
context of family hardship being a listed sentencing factor in legislation at the time 
of sentencing. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
978 Ibid 165. 
979 Ibid 173. 
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Table 9: Citations to Bates, Carpentieri and Walsh within the study 
 
Jurisdiction  SA CTH ACT NSW NT QLD TAS VIC WA 
Number of 
citations within 
the study 
Bates 
 
10 1 - - - - - - - 
Carpentieri 14 - 1 - - - 1 - - 
Walsh 2 4 - - - - - 4 - 
 
 
(b) Judicial discussion of the rationale  
In Neill v Police,980 Doyle CJ, in an appeal against a sentence imposed in the 
Magistrate’s Court, clarified the rationale behind taking family hardship into 
account in sentencing. This judgment has a high juristic status in South Australia 
(with 11 local ‘hits’, see Table 10 below). Chief Justice Doyle observed that family 
hardship does not ‘control the outcome’981 of a sentence. He found it was a 
sentencing factor that may be taken into account alongside other relevant 
sentencing factors.   
 
A reading of the family hardship case law highlights that there was ongoing 
paranoia within the profession about creating a special class of offender, and 
judgments were quick to direct that taking family hardship into account did not 
mean that where dependants would be impacted an offender could not be 
sentenced to imprisonment.982  Why this sentencing factor has triggered such 
panicked responses (of an ‘all or nothing’ scope) when other sentencing factors 
have not been treated in this manner is worthy of deeper academic attention. 
 
In Neill v Police, the Chief Justice stated that family hardship is not just an ‘act of 
mercy to the offender’ but a sentencing factor that is taken into account ‘out of 
consideration of the welfare of the family, and society’s interest in their welfare’.983 
He emphasised the importance of providing the court with sufficient information 
 
                                                          
980 [1999] SASC 270. 
981 Ibid [24]. 
982 See, eg, Milosevski v Police [2000] SASC 342 (16 October 2000) [14]; Willis v Police [2006] SASC 
245 (15 August 2006) [41]. 
983 Ibid. 
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to consider fully this factor (and drew specific attention to the shortcomings in the 
evidence before him).984  
 
Ten years later, both of these points, were repeated by Justice Kourakis in R v 
Buckskin.985 Justice Kourakis also spoke of the need for sentencing judges to 
balance the public interest in the welfare of the children against ‘the need to 
protect the community through the enforcement of the criminal law.’986 In 
particular, he drew attention to the sentencing purposes of punishment and 
deterrence.987 This study has revealed that judicial attention to the relationship 
between family hardship and deterrence was a common practice in Australian 
family hardship cases. This is also a relationship worthy of deeper academic 
analysis. 
 
3. Cases with High Juristic Status 
As described in Chapter One, in focusing solely on one sentencing factor and by the 
manual collection of case citations (ie. a process of ‘exhaustive shepardizing’ 
conducted only on the issue of family hardship) the study identified cases of high 
juristic status in each jurisdiction for this mitigating factor. There were eight cases 
in the study of South Australia which recorded 10 or more citations. 
 
  
 
                                                          
984 Ibid [25]. 
985 [2010] SASC 138 (12 May 2010) [110]-[111]. 
986 Ibid [111]. 
987 Ibid [109]. 
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Table 10: High Juristic Status Cases in South Australia 
 
Case Name Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 
119 CLR 257 
15 
3 - - - - 5 - 3 4 
R v Wirth (1976) 14 
SASR 291 
102 
12 3 24 4 1 25 3 13 17 
R v Moffa (No 2) (1977) 
16 SASR 155 
16 
3 1 - 1 - 4 1 - 6 
Amuso (1987) 32 A 
Crim R 308 
13 
2 1 - - - 3 1 3 3 
Adami (1989) 42 A 
Crim R 88 
37 
8 1 3 3 1 17 - 3 1 
Bates v Police (1997) 
70 SASR 66 
11 
1 - - - - 10 - - - 
Neill v Police [1999] 
SASC 270 (16 June 
1999) 
11 
- - - - - 11 - - - 
R v Carpentieri (2001) 
81 SASR 164 
16 
- 1 - - - 14 1 - - 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
The study of the case law after the passage of the CL(S)A reveals that despite 
strong judicial consensus that s 10(1) did not change the common law, the 
recognition of family hardship in the legislative list of sentencing factors did have 
an impact on the approach taken to this sentencing factor. In South Australia, after 
the judgment in Bates, the approach to family hardship moved away from 
dismissive statements that the impact of a sentence upon an offender’s dependants 
was not relevant to sentencing unless the circumstances were exceptional. In its 
place, the judicial approach to family hardship shifted to accepting that this was a 
sentencing factor but stating that it was to be balanced against other 
considerations and was only to carry significant weight in exceptional 
circumstances.  
 
The practical impact of this change in approach should not be underestimated. 
Family hardship was generally accepted988 as a reason for the mitigation of a 
sentence and the focus of the courts was upon the weight to be attached to this 
 
                                                          
988 There were exceptions to this see, eg, Field v Police [2009] SASC 354 (20 November 2009) [29] 
where Gray J stated: ‘It has long been accepted that hardship to dependents of a defendant is not generally 
to be taken into account in the defendant’s favour…’. However, cases that presented the principle in this 
manner were in the minority and the study of the case law highlighted that these cases were not cited in 
later decisions. 
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factor.989 Guided by individualised justice the South Australian courts have 
recognised that this process is dependent upon the unique circumstances990 of 
each case.991 
 
B. Australian Capital Territory 
 
The study of family hardship in the Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’)involved the 
analysis of 12 cases. Two of these cases were first instance sentencing remarks and 
ten cases were sentencing appeals. The gender of the offender raising family 
hardship was a male in 83% of these cases and female in only 17% of the cases. 
 
1. Early Case Law in the Australian Capital Territory 
The ACT is a small jurisdiction and, accordingly one would expect limited case law. 
The study uncovered only one decision, that engaged substantively with family 
hardship as a sentencing principle, prior to the introduction of the legislative list of 
sentencing factors (including family hardship) in the 1993 reforms.992  
 
As noted in Chapter Three, self-government for the ACT was obtained in 1989. The 
ACT Court of Appeal commenced in 2002. In this jurisdiction, ‘[p]rior to the 
creation of the Court of Appeal, appeals lay to the High Court (from 1934 until 
1977) and then to the Federal Court of Australia (from 1977 until 2002).’993 This 
history may account for the limited case law identified by this study.  
 
 
                                                          
989 See, eg, R v Ivic [2006] SASC 8 (19 January 2006); R v Richards [2006] SASC 60 (30 March 2006); 
Thompson v Police [2009] SASC 150 (21 May 2009) [22]; R v Buckskin [2010] SASC 138 (12 May 
2010) [31] (sentencing remarks from the sentencing judge) and see [40], [110]; R v Marikar [2010] 
SASCFC 36 (24 September 2010) [4] (sentencing remarks from the sentencing judge) and see [45], [49]; 
R v Ohmer [2011] SASCFC 44 (18 May 2011) [17], [21]; R v Marrone [2011] SASCFC 78 (20 July 
2011) [18]; 
990 See, eg, R v Richards [2006] SASC 60 (30 March 2006) [49] (Sulan J); R v Hill [2011] SASCFC 109 
(14 October 2011) [41]. 
991 As explained in Chapter Three, the South Australian legislature has now removed family hardship 
from the statutory list of sentencing factors. 
992 See Chapter Three. 
993 ACT Government, General Information about the ACT Court of Appeal (20 January 2012) ACT 
Supreme Court 
<http://www.courts.act.gov.au/supreme/act_court_of_appeal/general_information_about_the_act_court_o
f_appeal>. Jurisdictions to hear appeals from the Territories was granted to the Federal Court via Federal 
Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(b) and 28(5), see discussion of this conferral of jurisdiction in 
R v J (1982) 45 ALR 331, 340. 
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The case of R v J (1982),994 is the earliest ACT case that was identified by this study.  
This was a Crown appeal from the Supreme Court of the ACT to the Federal Court 
of Australia, against a suspended sentence imposed upon an male offender who 
had been convicted of incest and indecent assault upon his step-daughter.995 The 
appeal was bought before Toohey, Gallop and Davies JJ and they all agreed that the 
dependence of the family upon the offender and the impact that the custodial 
sentence would have upon the family unit were the principal considerations at 
sentence which led to the imposition of a suspended sentence by the trial judge.996 
 
Justices Toohey and Gallop, in separate judgments, found that the Crown appeal 
should be dismissed. The consideration of family hardship in this case arose in the 
context of an offence committed within the family. Justices Toohey and Gallop both 
rejected the claim that there was a principle of law that incest convictions should 
result in an immediate custodial sentence.997 This case can be seen as indicative of 
the operation of an underlying policy within the common law of maintaining the 
family unit. Justice Toohey commented on the ‘importance of rehabilitating the 
family’,998 an approach under the common law that had been identified by Cox in 
his treatise (see Chapter Three).  Justice Toohey J found that the impact of the 
sentence upon the family unit (and in particular upon the victim of the offence who 
was also a member of this family unit) was the justification for the suspended 
sentence imposed.999  
 
Justices Toohey and Gallop did not find error in the significant weight that had 
been accorded to the impact of the offender’s sentence upon his family and 
dependants. Justice Toohey held: 
The learned sentencing judge was called upon to strike a balance between a 
number of competing considerations and he had a broad discretion in arriving 
at a result which would, as far as possible, achieve that balance. It was an 
unenviable task. It is not enough for this court to say that it would have reached 
a different result.1000 
 
                                                          
994 (1982) 45 ALR 331. 
995 Ibid 332. 
996 Ibid 333 (Toohey J), 342-343 (Gallop J), 345 (Davies J). 
997 Ibid 335 (Toohey J), 342 (Gallop J). 
998 Ibid 335. 
999 Ibid 337-338. 
1000 Ibid 339. 
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Similarly, Gallop J deferred to the broad discretion of the trial judge. He noted that 
the: 
trial judge had a distinct advantage…. in seeing and hearing the offender give 
evidence on oath, asking him questions himself, assessing his demeanour and 
attitude to the crime.1001  
Justice Gallop also remarked that the trial judge had detailed evidence from a 
social worker, a psychiatrist and offender’s wife.1002  
 
In dissent, Davies J held that while it was clearly appropriate to take the interests 
of the family into account in determining sentence,1003 too much weight was 
accorded to this consideration and in his view some prison time was required. He 
stated, 
…it is an effect, though an unfortunate one, of the system of criminal justice that 
a criminal’s family, though innocent of his crimes, may be harmed by the 
sentence of imprisonment which he is called upon to serve.1004 
Davies J found that a sentence of three years with a twelve-month non-parole 
period was appropriate; citing and following the reasoning in the NSW case of R v 
H1005 that, ‘… regrettably, it is often the family that suffers for a parent’s crime and 
the necessary punishment that must follow’.1006  
 
The case of R v J1007 indicates that in the ACT, family hardship was seen as a 
sentencing factor. All three judges in this case accepted that it was appropriate to 
take family hardship into account at sentencing. The difference of opinion between 
the judges was in the weight to be attached rather than the approach to be taken. 
There was no indication that the factor arose only in the context of the exercise of 
judicial mercy. 
 
2. Case Law After Recognition of Family Hardship in Legislation 
As explained in Chapter Three, in 1993 family hardship was listed as a sentencing 
factor in the ACT and was set out in s 429A(1)(m) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT): 
 
                                                          
1001 Ibid 343. 
1002 Ibid. 
1003 Ibid 345. 
1004 Ibid 347. 
1005 (1980) 3 A Crim R 53. 
1006 R v H (1980) 3 A Crim R 53, 66 (Moffitt P) cited in R v J (1982) 45 ALR 331, 347 (Davies J). 
1007 R v J (1982) 45 ALR 331. 
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‘The probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on 
any of the person’s family or dependants’. In 2002, the provision was renumbered 
without amendment to s 342(1)(j) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). No cases were 
found by this study on the consideration of the first numbered family hardship 
provision in s 429A(1)(m). The 2004 case of Craft v Diebert1008 was the first case 
identified that engaged with the judicial interpretation of s 342(1)(j) of the Crimes 
Act 1900 (ACT). 
 
Craft v Diebert1009 was a Crown appeal against a periodic detention order imposed 
upon a male offender (Diebert) convicted of drug cultivation and possession 
offences. Diebert was the primary carer for his 15-year-old son who suffered from 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.1010 At first instance the Magistrate, who 
imposed an immediate custodial sentence, had not given much weight to the 
impact of a custodial sentence upon the offender’s son. She stated that she hoped 
that his son would not be left without parental supervision but that hardship to an 
offender’s family is ‘[p]art of the price to pay when committing an offence’1011 and 
that it ‘generally cannot be one of the factors which can affect what would 
otherwise be the just and appropriate penalty.’1012 
 
The offender appealed to the Supreme Court and the sentence was varied on 
appeal with a periodic detention order imposed. The Crown then appealed to the 
ACT Court of Appeal. The Crown appeal was successful, and the Judge’s resentence 
was overturned on the basis that ‘appealable error was not demonstrated’1013 and 
the decision of the Supreme Court was ‘substitutive rather than corrective of 
error’.1014 Despite permitting the appeal, Crispin P and Connolly J in a joint 
judgment expressly rebuked the DPP’s submission that regard should be had to 
family hardship only in exceptional cases and that the inclusion of the factor within 
s 324(1)(j) did not change the common law.1015  
 
                                                          
1008 [2004] ACTCA 15. 
1009 Ibid. 
1010 Craft v Diebert [2004] ACTCA 15, [22]. 
1011 Ibid [32]. 
1012 Ibid. 
1013 Craft v Diebert [2004] ACTCA 15, [11] (Crispin P and Connolly J). 
1014 Ibid [73] (French J) (Crispin P and Connolly J agreeing [1]). 
1015 Mr Refshauge SC appeared for the Crown in this case and would later become Refshauge J. 
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President Crispin and Connolly J rejected the submission that the traditional 
common law approach identified by the Crown (the principle as set out by the 
Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Sinclair1016) applied. President 
Crispin and Connolly J stated, 
With very great respect to their Honours, we must say that we are quite unable 
to accept that a legislative requirement to take such a factor into account can be 
transliterated into a prima facie requirement to ignore it merely because that 
would reflect the approach previously recognised at common law.1017 
This represented a significant judicial acknowledgment of the impact of the 
legislative reforms in the ACT and the role statutory provisions should have in 
guiding sentencing discretion.1018 
 
Their Honours did acknowledge the relationship between family hardship and 
deterrence. Their Honours noted that the requirement to adequately punish an 
offender and deter others may leave little scope for leniency on the basis of the 
impact of the sentence upon families and dependants, however, they emphasised 
that such claims did not amount to a legal principle. 1019 President Crispin and 
Connolly J stated: 
However, such an observation should not be misconstrued as a legal principle 
which, in our opinion, could not be accommodated within the language of s 342 
of the Crimes Act, let alone the perhaps more broad discretion provided by s 6 
of the Periodic Detention Act.1020 
The observations made by Crispin P and Connolly J in Craft v Diebert1021 were 
obiter. Yet, as the analysis of the case law demonstrates, their obiter statements 
have been influential in this jurisdiction. 
 
Craft v Diebert1022 was later followed by Refshauge J in three decisions.1023 Justice 
Refshauge recognised the approach taken in the ACT Court of Appeal to family 
 
                                                          
1016 (1990) 51 A Crim R 418, 430 (discussed in detail below see ‘Western Australia). 
1017 Craft v Diebert [2004] ACTCA 15, [9]. 
1018 See, especially, Craft v Diebert [2004] ACTCA 15, [1]. 
1019 Craft v Diebert [2004] ACTCA 15, [10]. 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 [2004] ACTCA 15. 
1022 Ibid. 
1023 Cotter v Corvisy (2009) 185 A Crim R 560; R v Ashman [2010] ACTSC 45; Butler v Vickers [2011] 
ACTSC 134. 
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hardship and the binding nature of this upon a single judge.1024 For example, in 
Cotter v Corvisy, an appeal from the Magistrates Court where one of the grounds 
claimed was that the Magistrate had failed ‘to have regard to the likely effect of the 
sentence upon the appellant’s dependants, as required by s 33(1)(o)’,1025 Refshauge 
J stated: 
[t]he common law appears to have allowed a very limited role for the effect of a 
sentence on the offender’s dependants… The ACT Court of Appeal, by which, of 
course, I am bound, has taken a somewhat different course…1026  
His Honour then cited the passage (noted above) from Craft v Diebert1027 and 
further stated: 
On the basis of these authorities, then, it seems to me that the approach that 
should be taken is that the effect of a sentence on the family and dependants of 
the offender should be taken into account, but will only result in any significant 
leniency where the effect is more severe or prejudicial than the inevitable and 
usual consequence of the imposition of a proper sentence or where it will not 
overwhelm the proper statutory purpose for which the sentence should be 
imposed.1028 
There was no evidence within the study of this statement of principle being picked 
up and applied in other cases within the ACT. 
 
In the same month (August 2004) that the Craft v Diebert1029 appeal was handed 
down the ACT Court of Appeal also delivered the judgment in R v SP.1030 This was a 
case dealing with sexual intercourse between a teacher and student. There had 
been delay in bringing the prosecution and this factor coupled with the impact of 
the sentence upon his children (particularly those not born at the time of the 
offence) led the trial judge to impose a wholly suspended sentence.1031 
 
                                                          
1024 See, especially, R v Ashman [2010] ACTSC 45, [39]. 
1025 Cotter v Corvisy (2009) 185 A Crim R 560, [21]. 
1026 Ibid [79] – [80]. 
1027 [2004] ACTCA 15. 
1028 Ibid [82]. 
1029 [2004] ACTCA 15. 
1030 (2004) 149 A Crim R 48. 
1031 The sentencing remarks of the trial judge included the following passage ‘In the present case, 
however, there are, in my view, exceptional circumstances, and I do not accept that the need for general 
deterrence must include consideration of all of the other factors referred to in the Crimes Act and 
ultimately require me to take a step which is likely to have a seriously detrimental impact upon the lives 
of this man’s three innocent children, all of whom have been born since this incident, his new partner, and 
the two further children to whom he relates as a step-father and who were also born since this incident. 
Sadly, no one can undo the psychological harm that has been done to the complainant and taking a course 
which risks harming a number of children would only compound the damages caused by his wrongful 
conduct’, see R v SP (2004) 149 A Crim R 48, 68. 
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The Crown appealed the sentence and one of the submissions put by the DPP was 
that hardship to the offender’s family had been accorded too much weight and was 
not sufficient to justify a suspended sentence. Giles J found that family hardship 
was a ‘principal factor which appears to have influenced the primary judge.’1032 
Giles J stated that it was ‘no doubt a relevant consideration to take into account’ 
but that, 
[m]ost offenders have family ties and third party relationships which would be 
disturbed if time in custody is served. In my opinion, it was appellable error to 
elevate that circumstance to a critical level in the sentencing process.1033 
However, Giles J found no support from the other judges, Higgins CJ and Gray J, on 
this view.  
 
Chief Justice Higgins found that all relevant matters were considered by the 
sentencing judge.1034  However, Higgins CJ found that a wholly suspended sentence 
was not appropriate and that ‘general deterrence was given too little weight, 
resulting in a manifestly inadequate overall sentence.’1035 In dissent, Gray J found 
that consideration of family hardship was appropriate.1036 He found that it was a 
combination of factors that led to the suspended sentence and overall, Gray J was 
not satisfied that error had been established.1037 This case demonstrates judicial 
support for consideration of family hardship as a mitigating factor where relevant. 
R v SP has not been picked up in other jurisdictions nor has it been cited in other 
ACT cases within this study.  
 
Within this jurisdiction, the purposes of sentencing feature prominently in the 
sentencing remarks and judgments. The purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence 
were the most frequently discussed sentencing purposes in the body of family 
hardship cases identified by this study. Rehabilitation was expressly mentioned in 
eight of the twelve family hardship cases raised by this study. Deterrence was 
mentioned in seven of the twelve family hardship cases. 
 
                                                          
1032 R v SP (2004) 149 A Crim R 48, 68. 
1033 Ibid 68-69. 
1034 Ibid 51. 
1035 Ibid. 
1036 Ibid 57. 
1037 Ibid 61. 
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(a) Human Rights Act 2004 
The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) has also played a role in this jurisdiction in 
legitimatising consideration of family hardship factors at sentence. For example, 
Refshauge J in his sentencing remarks for R v McLaughlin1038 stated: 
I have taken into account also the fact that Ms McLaughlin is the carer for her 
children. Section 11 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) as well s 33 of the 
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) both mandate that I have regard to these 
matters and that I take into account what was said by the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa in M v The State [2007] ZACC 18, namely that there is a right for 
the interests of the children to be taken into account even in cases of serious 
offending.1039 
The offender’s progress in rehabilitation (post the offence) carried significant 
weight alongside her potential to continue to be a good mother and a suspended 
sentence was imposed.1040 
 
3. Cases with High Juristic Status 
In the ACT, the sentencing remarks and judgments primarily cite the legislative 
provision (ss 341(1)(j) and 33(1)(o)). In this Territory, there has not been a heavy 
reliance on case law regarding family hardship from other Australian jurisdictions 
nor has there been a general practice of referencing earlier case law from within 
the Territory. The ACT table (in Appendix A) demonstrates that there were no 
cases in this jurisdiction with more than 10 citations. Craft v Diebert1041 was the 
most frequently cited case on family hardship within the ACT. However, as seen 
from Table 11, it only received citation in three out of the 10 cases that followed it 
and, most notably, these were all judgments from the one judge (Refshauge J).1042 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1038 R v McLaughlin (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Refshauge J, 7 
August 2009). 
1039 Ibid 6. See also reference to this passage in R v Ashman [2010] ACTSC 45, [40] (Refshauge J). 
1040 Ibid 6-8. 
1041 [2004] ACTCA 15. 
1042 Cotter v Corvisy (2009) 185 A Crim R 560; R v Ashman [2010] ACTSC 45; Butler v Vickers [2011] 
ACTSC 134. 
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Table 11: Cases with High Juristic Status in the Australian Capital Territory - 
NIL 
 
Case Name Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Craft v Diebert [2004] 
ACTCA 15. 
3 - 3 - - - - - - - 
 
The ACT Table (in Appendix A) also highlights that the case law on family hardship 
in the ACT has also not been picked up by other Australian jurisdictions. 
Interestingly the ACT has referenced case law from South Australia1043 (which has 
a similar legislative provision). However, the South Australian courts have not 
looked to the practice of ACT courts in respect of their interpretation of their 
legislative provision. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The approach in the ACT to family hardship has been to accept family hardship as a 
sentencing factor. The matter must be ‘relevant and known to the court’ and the 
Supreme Court of the ACT has been critical of submission made on the basis that 
this factor was not taken into account where there has been minimal or no 
evidence before the sentencing court.1044 The consideration of family hardship in 
this jurisdiction has not been focused on whether to give regard to the factor or 
not, but rather, the question of the weight to be attached to this sentencing factor. 
This study of the case law had revealed that the dominant approach in the ACT is 
that family hardship is a sentencing factor that is to be balanced against other 
relevant sentencing factors in the context of the individual circumstances of the 
case.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1043 R v Adami (1989) 51 SASR 229; R v Carpentieri (2001) 81 SASR 164. 
1044 See Cotter v Corvisy (2009) 185 A Crim R 560, [77]; Moh v Pine [2010] ACTSC 27, [38]; Butler v 
Vickers [2011] ACTSC 134, [44], [64]. 
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III FAMILY HARDSHIP UNDER THE COMMON LAW 
 
A. Queensland 
 
The study of the case law on family hardship in the Queensland resulted in the 
analysis of twenty-three cases. Only one case is a first instance sentencing remark; 
the remaining cases were all appellate decisions before the Queensland Court of 
Appeal. The earliest cases identified in this Australian study of family hardship 
were both located in Queensland. The earliest case was a sentencing appeal from 
the 1955 and the second earliest was a sentencing judgment from 1966 (both 
cases discussed in detail below).1045 The gender of the offender raising family 
hardship was a male in 48% of these cases and female in 52% of the cases.  
 
1. Historical Narrative of Family Hardship 
The earliest identified Australian cases dealing with family hardship as a 
sentencing factor, across all jurisdictions, were Queensland cases. These cases 
were the 1955 case of Mill v Scott; Ex parte Mill1046 and the 1966 case of R v 
Jany.1047 The case of Mill was an appeal brought by the police sergeant against an 
inadequate sentence imposed upon Scott, a 28-year-old male labourer who had 
been convicted of assault upon his stepchild.1048 In the first instance, the 
Magistrate identified that due to a loss of Scott’s earning capacity, a custodial 
sentence, ‘would… impose a further hardship both on the child in question, the 
wife and other children’ within the relationship.1049 A fine was then imposed with a 
warning to Scott that should he come before the court again the maximum penalty 
would be imposed.1050  
 
The appeal against sentence was heard before a Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland. Chief Justice Macrossan found that the impact of a sentence upon the 
 
                                                          
1045 See Mill v Scott; Ex parte Mill [1955] St R Qd 210; R v Jany [1966] Qd R 328. 
1046 [1955] St R Qd 210 (‘Mill’). 
1047 [1966] Qd R 328 (‘Jany’). 
1048 Mill [1955] St R Qd 210, 218 and 220. 
1049 Ibid 213. 
1050 Ibid. 
 206 
offender’s family was not a relevant sentencing factor in the circumstances. Chief 
Justice Macrossan (Mansfield SPJ agreeing) held: 
The reason given by the stipendiary magistrate for refraining from imposing 
the sentence… which he rightly said was warranted, was one which should not 
have affected his determination of the appropriate penalty. In my opinion, if an 
offender has committed an offence which clearly should attract a sentence of 
imprisonment, he should not be relieved of that penalty because the infliction 
of it may cause adverse conditions for other people.1051 
Justice Hanger agreed with Macrossan CJ (Mansfield SPJ agreeing) that the 
sentence imposed was inadequate. However, Hanger J found that the magistrate 
should not have been influenced to the extent that he was by family hardship. 
 
In Mill, on the question of family hardship as an appropriate mitigating factor 
Hanger J noted its potential to mitigate a sentence. Justice Hanger stated: 
I am not prepared to say that in no case can the impact upon other persons of 
punishment of an offender constitute a determining factor… But I think that 
such cases would be rare, and that the present is not one of them.1052 
Justice Hanger, therefore, left open the availability of the impact of the sentence 
upon third parties. 
 
The contrast between the way the factor was described by the Chief Justice, (‘he 
should not be relieved because…[it] may cause adverse conditions for other 
people’1053)compared to Hanger J (‘I am not prepared to say that in no case can the 
impact upon other persons…’1054) is important. The Chief Justice’s position is 
indicative of a traditional approach to sentencing which provided that matters 
which were relevant sentencing factors in the act of determining an appropriate 
sentence were those matters that were connected to either the commission of the 
crime or matters that directly impacted upon the offender. As discussed above, this 
approach guided the Supreme Court of South Australia in its early case law on 
family hardship.1055 In Mill, the Chief Justice’s reasoning that the sentence should 
not be mitigated because of an impact on ‘others’ highlights that the impact of 
 
                                                          
1051 Ibid 219. 
1052 Ibid 222. 
1053 Ibid 219. 
1054 Ibid 222. 
1055 See Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257; Jarrett v Samuels (1972) 4 SASR 78; Moore v Fingleton 
(1972) 3 SASR 164, 168 (Bray CJ); Tame v Fingleton (1974) 8 SASR 507, 511 (Walters J); Amuso 
(1987) 32 A Crim R 308, 314. 
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punishment upon third parties was considered by his Honour to be outside of the 
attention of the courts. This case highlights that there was tension, at this time, as 
to the role of family hardship as a mitigating factor at sentencing. 
 
Ten years later, in the case of Jany the question before the Queensland Court of 
Appeal was whether the impact of a sentence upon an offender’s family could have 
a significant mitigating effect where a serious offence had been committed.1056 The 
appellate, was a 37-year-old single mother of a very young child (a 15 week-old 
baby). While working as a real estate agent, she had been convicted of stealing 
approximately £8,500 from, ‘44 people during a period of two years and three 
months’.1057 The sentencing judge had found that the serious and calculated nature 
of the offence and the prolonged period of dishonesty weighed against a lesser 
sentence and sentenced her to three years imprisonment with hard labour.1058 The 
sentencing judge in his remarks had drawn upon the principle of equality, stating 
that he would not grant leniency to Jany because ‘she was female and had a 
child.’1059 
 
One of the grounds of appeal raised before the Queensland Court of Appeal was 
that the sentencing judge had ‘departed from principles… [as he had] ignored the 
fact that the applicant was the mother of a very young illegitimate baby.’1060 This 
ground was evidently subject to detailed consideration. The judgment of Lucas J 
sets out in great detail the policy and practice of the State Children Department.1061 
As a result of consideration of this material, he held: ‘that it is by no means 
inevitable, or even, … probable, that the applicant will, as a result of the sentence 
imposed upon her, be permanently parted from her child.’1062  
 
In Jany, Lucas J (Gibbs and Hart JJ agreeing) found that the correct principles had 
been applied in this case. This principle appeared to be that where a serious 
 
                                                          
1056 [1966] Qd R 328. 
1057 Ibid 329. 
1058 Ibid 329 and 330 (citing remarks of the sentencing judge), 332 (Lucas J, with whom Gibbs and Hart 
JJ agreed). 
1059 Ibid 330. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid 330-331. 
1062 Ibid 331-332. 
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offence has occurred, family hardship will not result in significant leniency unless 
it is an extreme family hardship. It is clear from the judgment of Lucas J that he 
found a period of time in state care for a young child was not extreme hardship, 
while inevitable or probable permanent separation from a child could be.1063 
 
Much like Hanger J’s comments in Mill, Lucas J observed that situations such as the 
one that arose in this case were very rare.1064 Interestingly, on the application of 
principle, Lucas J emphasised the importance of formal equality. Justice Lucas 
(Gibbs and Hart JJ agreeing) stated: 
…but it is not to be thought that a different standard of sentencing is necessarily 
appropriate when the offender is the mother of an illegitimate child of tender 
years.1065  
This case pre-dated the common law authorities from the England and Wales1066 
which had found that a young child being left without parental care was a relevant 
sentencing factor.1067  
 
This study of family hardship identified that Jany was the only early case which 
was picked up and cited in another jurisdiction. The results of this study of family 
hardship revealed that Jany was cited by Chief Justice Bray in two South Australian 
judgments: Moore v Fingleton (1972) and R v Wirth (1976).1068 In Moore v 
Fingleton (discussed above) Bray CJ observed that there were scant authorities 
within the Australian case law on family hardship,1069 he then looked overseas to 
the case law of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division and observed that this court 
had taken an approach that was different to that adopted by the Queensland Court 
of Appeal in Jany. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1063 Ibid 332. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Discussed in Chapter Three. 
1067 See, eg, Fels 25.7.72, 5421/C/71DA cited within Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing 
Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 213.  
1068 See Moore v Fingleton (1972) 3 SASR 164, 168 and R v Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291, 293. 
1069 Moore v Fingleton (1972) 3 SASR 164, 168. 
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(a) Case Law in the 1990s 
There was no further case law identified by this study that dealt with this 
sentencing principle until the case of Tilley.1070 Tilley was a case that dealt with a 
serious offence. Anne Marie Tilley was convicted of two counts of official 
corruption identified through the Fitzgerald Inquiry. She had been sentenced to a 
head sentence of five years imprisonment with a recommended parole after 
serving 14 days due to the hardship that would result upon her two and a half-
year-old daughter.1071 The co-offender, the father of her child, had also been 
sentenced to imprisonment. The Crown appealed the recommendation and the 
reliance given to personal circumstances.1072 
 
In Tilley, Cooper and Thomas JJ, in separate judgments, commented on the nature 
of the balancing act involved in sentencing. Justice Thomas stated: 
The aspects of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation are, for present 
purposes, the main purposes of the sentencing exercise. The object of the 
sentencing discretion is to strike a proper balance between these factors. Here 
we have a clear conflict between the first two factors which cry out for a heavy 
sentence and the third factor of rehabilitation and her personal circumstances 
which go in favour of some mercy or mitigation… 
Mention has been made of the hardship that would result in view of the fact 
that she would be parted, if a greater custodial term were imposed, from her 
two and half-year-old daughter. Courts, of course, take account of such matters 
in a number of ways but are not overwhelmed by them. It is well recognised 
that very often a prison sentence will result in equal hardship to persons other 
than the offender. In the case of a male, his wife and children may be the ones 
who suffer because they lose a father and a person who provides financial 
support. In the case of a female, it may mean the temporary loss of a mother. It 
is common that hardship or stress is shared by the family of an offender but 
that may be an inevitable consequence if the offender is to be adequately 
punished. An offender cannot shield himself under the hardship he or she 
creates for others, and courts must not shirk their duty by giving undue weight 
to personal or sentimental factors.1073 
The social attitudes towards gender roles of the times are evident in Thomas J’s 
judgment; perceiving that if the offender is male the family would suffer financial 
loss, while if the offender is female the family would lose a ‘mother’.  
 
Similarly, Cooper J addressed the balancing act involved in determining an 
appropriate sentence. Justice Cooper stated: 
 
                                                          
1070 (1991) 53 A Crim R 1. 
1071 Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1, 3 and 5. 
1072 Ibid 6. 
1073 Ibid 3. 
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The public interest is promoted by preserving wherever possible a family 
unit…Rehabilitation and preservation of a stable family environment are both 
relevant and important to the process of sentencing. However, as the law 
presently stands, they are but two factors which are required to be balanced 
against the needs for deterrence and retribution. The function of the court is to 
impose a sentence having regard to the total criminality of the conduct taking 
into account all relevant factors including circumstances of mitigation personal 
to the offender. 
In the instant case the effect upon the respondent and her child of separation, 
distressing though it may be, cannot by itself displace the other factors of 
deterrence and retribution having regard to her culpability and the criminality 
of the offence to which she has pleaded guilty when the process of sentencing is 
undertaken.1074 
Therefore, Thomas and Cooper JJ, accepted that family hardship was a relevant 
mitigating sentencing factor and there was expressed requirement that the level of 
hardship suffered by families needed to be exceptional for it to be a relevant 
mitigating factor. Both judges held that the error identified was in the weighting 
attached to this factor. In contrast, de Jersey J, while in agreement with the orders 
proposed by Cooper and Thomas JJ, expressly rejected that family hardship was a 
relevant mitigating factor.1075 
 
Tilley is a key case in Queensland. Significantly, in the judgments of both Thomas 
and Cooper JJ’s the instinctive approach to sentencing is adopted. Both judges 
explained the process of sentencing involving a careful consideration the purposes 
of sentencing and other relevant sentencing factors.1076 The relevant sentencing 
factors in the case and the process involved in determining a sentence were 
expressly discussed in judicial remarks. This approach to family hardship and 
sentencing depicts the dominant approach by the Court in the 1990s. 
 
In 1995 in Tho Le and Diem Mac Le1077 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered 
whether pregnancy was a relevant mitigating factor in sentencing. The issue of 
family hardship and pregnancy arose in respect to the application for leave to 
appeal the sentence imposed upon Diem Mac Le. She was convicted of heroin 
trafficking and was in a de facto relationship with the principal offender (Tho Le). 
At sentencing, Tho Le was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment and Diem Mac 
 
                                                          
1074 Ibid 6. 
1075 Ibid 5. 
1076 Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1, 3 (Thomas J) and 6 (Cooper J). 
1077 (1995) 83 A Crim R 428 (‘Le & Le’). 
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Le was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Diem Mac Le was seen to be ‘a 
minor yet willing player’1078 in the commission of the drug offences. The evidence 
before the court showed that she had received payment for the drugs on two 
occasions and acted as a driver for the principal (upon the loss of his licence).  
 
At the time of sentencing, Diem Mac Le was a mother to an eight-year-old daughter 
and was eight months pregnant.1079 The father of the unborn child was the 
principal offender Tho Le.1080 Diem Mac Le had been disowned by her family when 
she was 16 years old at the time of her first pregnancy.1081 Thus, it appeared that 
she had no external support for the care of her children, although this 
circumstance was not expressly addressed in the judgments of the Queensland 
Court of Appeal. 
  
Citing the South Australian case of Adami (discussed above),1082 Pincus JA stated at 
common law there was authority that ‘the effect of a sentence of imprisonment on 
dependants is not taken into account in fixing the length of sentence.’1083  He then 
reflected upon the then recent High Court decision in Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v Teoh1084 and the requirement to take into account the Rights of a 
Child Convention1085 in exercising discretion in respect to a decision about 
deportation for drug offending (under administrative law). Article 3.1 of the Rights 
of the Child Convention provides: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies the best interests of the child shall be of primary 
consideration. 
Pincus JA reasoned that ‘the Article refers explicitly to courts: the doctrine of Teoh 
prima facie applies to Queensland courts sentencing offenders’.1086  
 
                                                          
1078 Ibid 434. 
1079 Ibid 430. 
1080 Ibid 434. 
1081 Ibid. 
1082 He also cited the federal case of Tan Hai Huat (1990) 49 A Crim R 378, 390-391 heard before the 
Western Australian Court of Appeal. See Le & Le (1995) 83 A Crim R 428, 430 (Pincus JA). 
1083 Le & Le (1995) 83 A Crim R 428, 430. 
1084 (1995) 183 CLR 273 (‘Teoh’). 
1085 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 
(entered into force 2 September 1990) Art 3.1 cited in Le & Le (1995) 83 A Crim R 428, 431 (Pincus JA). 
1086 Le & Le (1995) 83 A Crim R 428, 431. 
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The problem Pincus JA identified with this position was that the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 required that children’s rights be the 
‘primary consideration’ and this was at odds with the language of the Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). Therefore, Pincus JA found that Teoh was inapplicable to 
sentencing courts, but he held that under the common law Queensland courts took 
into account the effect of a sentence upon an offender’s young children as a 
mitigating factor.1087 Examining all of the relevant sentencing factors in the case 
Pincus JA found that while the sentence imposed upon Diem Mac Le was not 
lenient there was no error identified.1088 
 
Justice Thomas (Williams J agreeing) delivered a separate judgment. Like, Pincus 
JA, he also found that family hardship had been adequately taken into account in 
determining the four-year-sentence of imprisonment with a recommendation for 
parole after eighteen months.1089 Regarding family hardship at sentencing he 
endorsed the approach taken in Tilley1090 (a case in which he had presided over, 
see above). In Le & Le, Thomas J expressed the principle from Tilley as follows: 
While these matters evoke sympathy the hardship or stress shared by the 
family of an offender cannot be allowed to overwhelm factors such as 
retribution and deterrence.1091 
The Queensland Court of Appeal, therefore accepted that at common law family 
hardship was a mitigating sentencing factor. The weight to be attached to this 
factor depended upon the other sentencing factors in a particular case and the 
relationship of the purposes of sentencing with the offence committed.1092  
 
b) The influence of de Jersey CJ 
In 2004, de Jersey CJ who had argued that family hardship was not a mitigating 
factor in his judgment in Tilley1093, presided over R v D’Arrigo; Ex parte A-G 
 
                                                          
1087 Ibid. 
1088 Ibid. 
1089 Ibid 434. 
1090 Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1. 
1091 Le & Le (1995) 83 A Crim R 428, 434. 
1092 See Clarke (1996) 90 A Crim R 1,7-8; Barton & Bridges (1997) 95 A Crim R 228, 234; R v Costi 
[2001] QCA 404 (25 September 2001);  
1093 Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1, 5. 
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(Qld).1094 The offender was convicted of dangerously operating a motor vehicle 
causing death. At the time of the offence, he was the sole and primary carer of his 
16 month-old daughter. 1095 The sentencing judge took into account family 
hardship as a mitigating factor and imposed a sentence of three years’ 
imprisonment suspended after one day in custody.1096 The Attorney-General 
appealed this sentence on the ground that it was manifestly inadequate. 
 
Chief Justice de Jersey (Mc Pherson JA agreeing) found that ‘the learned sentencing 
Judge’s sentencing discretion plainly and starkly miscarried.’1097 Chief Justice de 
Jersey endorsed the approach taken to family hardship by the Western Australian 
Court of Appeal in R v Boyle (1987),1098  the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal in R v Edwards (1996)1099 and the Northern Territory Court of Criminal 
Appeal in Arnold v Trenerry (1997)1100 (all cases are discussed below). This 
approach is that family hardship can only be taken into account in exceptional or 
extreme circumstances.1101 
 
Remarkably, de Jersey CJ used the offender’s reliance upon child care facilities 
during the working day against him. He stated: 
In the present case it is not as if the child would be left without care. Care will 
be provided in the usual way through the Department of Family Services. It is of 
some relevance to note also that the child is in the care of others during the day 
while the respondent is at work.1102 
This is an ‘out of touch’ judicial remark exhibiting a bias against formal child care 
equating it to care by ‘strangers’. The offender’s use of formal child care was not 
relevant to the impact a custodial sentence may have upon his dependent child.  
 
From his judgment in Tilley it is clear that de Jersey CJ did not accept family 
hardship as a mitigating sentencing factor.1103 In D’Arrigo, de Jersey CJ’s judgment 
 
                                                          
1094 [2004] QCA 399 (26 October 2004) (‘D’Arrigo’). 
1095 Ibid 4-5. 
1096 Ibid 2. 
1097 Ibid 9. 
1098 (1987) 34 A Crim R 202. 
1099 (1996) 90 A Crim R 510. 
1100 (1997) 142 FLR 229. 
1101 D’Arrigo [2004] QCA 399 (26 October 2004) 6. 
1102 Ibid 6. 
1103 Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1, 5. 
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discloses that he ascribed to classical sentencing theory that saw an impact upon 
third parties as falling outside of relevant sentencing considerations. The Chief 
Justice stated, ‘[t]he circumstances of the child do not, in short, put the case into 
the extraordinary category where the interests of third parties may prevail.’1104 
This suggests that rather than conceding that family hardship was a mitigating 
factor in D’Arrrigo, de Jersey CJ acceptance that it was a circumstance that could 
impact upon a sentence in exceptional circumstances was supported by the 
doctrine of mercy.1105 
 
In D’Arrigo, McMurdo P delivered a separate judgment. In accordance with the 
long-standing approach of the Queensland Court of Appeal, she found that family 
hardship was a mitigating sentencing factor. President McMurdo stated: 
The innocent 16 month old child is likely to suffer emotionally with the 
respondent’s incarceration. In a case where imprisonment may, but will not 
necessarily, be imposed a factor like this may well persuade a judicial officer 
not to impose a sentence of actual imprisonment.1106  
Unfortunately, McMurdo P did not cite any authorities in her judgment, however, 
her approach to family hardship clearly aligned with that expressed in Mill, Jany 
and Tilley.1107 She found the error was in the weight attached to family hardship in 
the circumstances of the case. President McMurdo stated: 
The matters which impressed the learned sentencing Judge were to the 
respondent’s credit but could not overcome the important sentencing 
principles requiring general and personal deterrence in this serious example of 
dangerous driving causing death. A significant period of actual custody has to 
be imposed despite any resulting hardship likely to be rendered to his young 
child.1108 
McMurdo P agreed with the order imposed by the Chief Justice, but her judgment is 
an importance stance against altering the Court’s approach to family hardship as a 
sentencing factor. 
 
 
                                                          
1104 D’Arrigo [2004] QCA 399 (26 October 2004) 8. 
1105 See Chapter Six. 
1106 D’Arrigo [2004] QCA 399 (26 October 2004) 12. 
1107 Mill [1955] St R Qd 210; Jany [1966] Qd R 328; Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1. 
1108 D’Arrigo [2004] QCA 399 (26 October 2004) 12. 
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Following the D’Arrigo, a blended middle-ground approach emerged. This 
approach was explained by Atkinson J in R v Chong; Ex parte A-G (Qld).1109 Justice 
Atkinson stated: 
There is authority for the proposition that the hardship caused to an offender’s 
children by imprisonment may be taken into account of in the exercise of 
sentencing discretion but only in certain circumstances. It is then one of many 
factors to be taken into account.1110 
This approach in Queensland is a middle-ground position which sits between two 
divergent approaches to family hardship in which family hardship is either: 
 a mitigating factor at sentencing where the court is to determine 
how much weight is to be attached to the factor balancing it against 
the other relevant factors and purposes of sentencing; or 
 it is not a mitigating factor, but it can be taken into account as an 
act of judicial mercy in extreme or exceptional circumstances. 
To hold that family hardship is a sentencing factor but one that only triggers when 
there is exceptional family hardship is an unprincipled compromise between the 
above two approaches. 
 
This study of the common law has revealed that this ‘compromise’ approach to 
family hardship has been widely adopted. In this sense, in Australia, family 
hardship has been acknowledged at common law in a number of jurisdictions as a 
sentencing factor albeit a ‘special breed’ of sentencing factor which only arises 
where a threshold of exceptional circumstances is met. It is argued in Chapter Six 
that this position has been adopted because of a lack of judicial attention to the 
scope of mercy at sentencing. 
 
c) Push back 
In 2008 in Chong, Justice Atkinson J (Keane and Fraser JJA agreeing) delivered a 10 
page judgment carefully considering the question of family hardship as a 
mitigating factor. In this case the indigenous offender lived on Mornington Island 
and had been convicted of unlawful wounding and breaching an intensive 
correction order. She was sentenced to two and a half-years’ imprisonment with 
 
                                                          
1109 R v Chong; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2008) 181 A Crim R 200 (‘Chong’). 
1110 Ibid [29]. 
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court-ordered parole on that day of sentence.1111 The victim of the offence was the 
offender’s mother, and there was a history of violence within the family.1112 The 
offender had seven dependent children and was breastfeeding her youngest 
child.1113 The Attorney-General appealed against the sentence imposed stating it 
was manifestly inadequate. 
 
Justice Atkinson carefully reviewed the earlier case law from the Queensland Court 
of Appeal on family hardship. The judge also considered the role of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 and the judgment of Pincus JA in 
Le & Le (discussed above). Justice Atkinson agreed with Pincus JA that under the 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) the rights of a child were not a primary 
consideration at sentencing. The judge also agreed that this did not preclude family 
hardship from being a sentencing factor and Atkinson J cited s 9(2)(r) of the 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) which permitted courts to have regard to 
‘any other relevant circumstances’.1114 Atkinson J expressed the opinion that there 
is a ‘strong argument for the law reform recommended by the Anti-Discrimination 
Commission of Queensland… to include this factor explicitly’1115 as an enumerated 
matter in the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). 
 
In respect to the offender being a member of an Indigenous community and family 
hardship, Atkinson J (Keane and Fraser JJA agreeing) acknowledged the relevance 
of the following factors: 
 her imprisonment will necessarily mean her removal to the mainland far 
away from her children and particularly the baby and thus any practical 
means of maintaining personal contact to them through visits or 
maintaining breastfeeding of the baby;1116 
 the likely adverse impact on the children with regard to their attendance at 
school, [is] a particularly important factor in remote Indigenous 
communities where, as government reports show, the absentee rate from 
school is much higher than in the rest of the community.1117 (formatting 
and dot points added) 
 
                                                          
1111 Chong (2008) 181 A Crim R 200, [3]. 
1112 Ibid [5]-[8]. 
1113 Ibid [28]. 
1114 Ibid [31]-[34]. 
1115 Ibid [33]. The Anti-Discrimination Commission’s Report and Recommendations were discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
1116 Ibid [36]. 
1117 Ibid [41]. 
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It is argued that the principle as explained by Atkinson J in Chong foreshowed a 
return to the Tilley approach in Queensland.  
 
The results of the ‘exhaustive shepardizing’ study of the case law indicates that 
Chong has had some recognition in Queensland (see Table 12) with five citations 
(noting that this study of the case law stopped at the end of the 2011 calendar 
year). The study showed that this case had not been picked up in other Australian 
jurisdictions. 
 
Table 12: Citations to Chong within the Study 
 
Jurisdiction QLD CTH ACT NSW NT SA TAS VIC WA 
Number of 
citations 
5 - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Therefore, the study of the case law has revealed that following D’Arrigo the 
blended middle-ground approach has had some prominence in Queensland. 
Judicial officers, although treating family hardship as a sentencing factor, have 
restricted the scope for family hardship in sentencing, requiring exceptional 
circumstances to be established before it is to come into consideration in 
determining an appropriate sentence. This has meant that judicial officers have 
found that family hardship is rarely a relevant sentencing consideration.1118  
 
The practice in this jurisdiction has not, however, been consistent. There is also 
evidence of some judicial officers continuing to express the principle in line with 
Tilley; that family hardship is undoubtedly a sentencing factor, and the court must 
determine what weight to attach to the matter in the circumstances of the 
particular case. As explained above, it is argued that the decision in Chong1119 
marked a return of the Queensland Court of Appeal to the Tilley approach to family 
hardship at sentencing.1120 Further academic study of the use and scope of family 
 
                                                          
1118 See, eg, R v Stewart [2008] QSC 208 (25 August 2008); R v Jovic [2008] QCA 278 (12 September 
2008); R v Haddad [2009] QCA 143 (28 May 2009);  
1119 Chong (2008) 181 A Crim R 200. 
1120 R v Wakefield (2008) 187 A Crim R 514; R v Haugland [2009] QCA 46 (6 March 2009); Bedeau 
[2009] QCA 43 (6 March 2009); R v Nuttall; Ex parte Attorney-General [2011] 2 Qd R 328;  
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hardship in specific courts in Queensland is required to shed further light on which 
approach is more common in Queensland’s first instance sentencing practice. 
 
2. Cases with High Juristic Status 
There were three cases in Queensland that received 10 or more citations (see 
Table 13). The case with the highest number of local citations was D’Arrigo with 
eleven citations. In fact, all but one of the cases (identified by the process of 
‘exhaustive shepardizing’) that followed the D’Arrigo decision cited this case. 
Although as discussed above (in the qualitative analysis of the case law) the 
sentencing principles in respect to family hardship have not been consistently 
expressed in this body of case law. The cases of Le & Le and Tilley were also 
frequently cited in the Queensland case law with nine and eight citations 
respectively. Tilley is the only case from Queensland which has had broad 
interjurisdictional interest (see Table 13 and ‘Cases with Cross-Jurisdictional 
Influence’ below). 
 
Table 13: High Juristic Status Cases in Queensland 
 
Case Name Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim 
R 1 
16 3 1 1 1 8 - 1 1 - 
Tho Le and Diem Mac 
Le (1995) 83 A Crim R 
428 
11 1 1 - - 9 - - - - 
R v D’Arrigo; Ex parte A-
G (Qld) [2004] QCA 399 
(26 October 2004) 
11 - - - - 11 - - - - 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
Queensland has the earliest case law addressing the question of family hardship at 
sentencing. These cases pre-dated Thomas’ publication of the Principles of 
Sentencing.1121 The question of whether family hardship is a mitigating sentencing 
factor has been debated in the Queensland Court of Appeal. This study of the case 
law in Queensland shows that, overall, the Tilley approach to family hardship has 
 
                                                          
1121 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970). 
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been the dominant approach by the Queensland Court of Appeal.  This approach 
sees family hardship as a sentencing factor that is to be balanced against the other 
relevant sentencing factors to determine an appropriate sentence. The weight to 
be attached to the factor is determined by the sentencing judge by taking into 
account all of the circumstances of the case, the other relevant factors and the 
purposes of sentencing.  
 
However, the Queensland Court of Appeal has not approached family hardship at 
sentencing with consistency. In 2004, a comprise approach appeared in this 
jurisdiction. This approach took on board the exceptional circumstances threshold 
(which had arisen family hardship was considered under the judicial exercise of 
mercy) alongside the view that family hardship was a sentencing factor. This 
created a special breed of sentencing factor one that arose for consideration only 
when exceptional circumstances were established. Then, and only then, was 
sentencing judge to take family hardship into account in determining an 
appropriate sentence and weight it against the other relevant considerations.   
 
B. New South Wales 
 
The study of the case law on family hardship in New South Wales resulted in the 
analysis of 70 cases. Seven of these cases were first instance sentencing remarks, 
while the remaining cases (63 cases) were all appellate decisions before the New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. The gender of the offender raising family 
hardship was a male in 55% of these cases and female in 45% of the cases. Despite 
the large number of cases identified the approach to family hardship has been 
more settled within New South Wales than in most of the other state and territory 
jurisdictions. 
 
1. Historical Narrative of Family Hardship 
The early cases in New South Wales highlight that the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal endorsed wide discretion in the hands of sentencing judges.1122 
 
                                                          
1122 H (1980) 3 A Crim R 53; Anderson (1987) 32 A Crim R 146; R v Carlton (Unreported, New South 
Wales Supreme Court, Carruthurs J, 14 April 1989); R v Roberts (Unreported, Supreme Court of New 
South Wales Criminal Division, Hunt J, 31 August 1989). 
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The first significant case dealing with family hardship in this jurisdiction is T1123 
decided in 1990. As demonstrated in Table 14 below, this case has a high juristic 
status in New South Wales; being cited in 23 subsequent superior court decisions 
within New South Wales.  
 
The offender in T, was 38-year-old man employed in the Royal Australian Air 
Force. He was married with two children. One of the children was the young victim 
of the sexual assault offences.1124 The sentencing judge imposed an ‘effective head 
sentence…[of] 14 years penal servitude’1125 and the offender sought leave to 
appeal the severity of the sentence.  
 
One of the grounds of appeal raised was whether insufficient weight had been 
given to the offender’s forfeiture of his service gratuity and retirement pay upon 
imprisonment.1126 It was argued before the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal that, ‘in failing to take into account the hardship which the loss of the 
gratuity and retirement pay would cause the applicant’s family’1127 the sentencing 
judge had erred. Justice Allen held: 
I do not consider that his Honour did err in that regard. It is only in 
circumstances of exceptional hardship to the applicant’s family that the court 
will take into account that hardship in mitigation of sentence. The hardship 
must be so “extreme” – going so far beyond the sort of hardship which 
inevitably results to a family when the breadwinner is imprisoned, that “a sense 
of mercy or of affronted common sense imperatively demands that they (the 
sentencing judges) should draw back”: Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202 applying 
Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291.1128 
Allen J found that the error had occurred in the sentencing judge giving insufficient 
weight to the offender’s ‘pleas of guilty and thereby forfeiting his gratuity and 
retirement pay.’1129 In T, Campbell J also found error. However, he held that loss of 
valuable pension rights was a mitigating sentencing factor (citing David Thomas’ 
Principles of Sentencing1130). 
 
                                                          
1123 T (1990) 47 A Crim R 29. 
1124 Ibid 36. 
1125 Ibid 35. 
1126 Ibid 40. 
1127 Ibid. 
1128 Ibid. 
1129 Ibid. 
1130 Ibid 32 citing David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 214. 
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The following year in R v Dib1131, Allen J in the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal had the opportunity to comment further on family hardship at sentencing. 
This case also has a high juristic status in New South Wales, see Table 14 below. 
The case was an appeal brought against the severity of sentence. The male offender 
had been convicted of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and was 
sentenced to six years with a non-parole period of four and a half years.1132  
 
Allen J (Meagher JA and Badgery-Parker J agreeing) accepted the appeal and 
resentenced the offender to three years’ imprisonment.1133 Relevant to this finding 
was the offender’s care for his 18-year-old handicapped son (the court noted that 
his wife was also in poor health).1134 Allen J stated: 
It is obvious from the material before the Court that if the son Fadi is deprived 
of the care of his father extreme hardship is likely to be suffered by him. There 
is no other person to whom he has the necessary bond to enable the care which 
he is given to go not merely to his physical comfort but also to such peace of 
mind that is possible for him to have. 
The relevant law was stated in T… [his Honour cited the passage from T 
extracted above]  
… I consider that the present is one of those very exceptional cases and that the 
hardship which Fadi would suffer is relevant to the sentence which should be 
imposed upon the applicant. It must frankly be acknowledged that the taking 
into account of the hardship to a person other than the offender is anomalous. 
It cannot be justified by any principle of sentencing. Its jurisdiction is humanity, 
and that alone.1135 
It is clear from Allen J’s comments in Dib, that he did not consider family hardship 
to be a legitimate sentencing factor. Rather, family hardship was an anomaly, a 
consideration that raised the court’s compassion and family hardship could receive 
recognition at sentencing as a grant of mercy. 
 
In 1992 in R v Kirby,1136 the Court heard an appeal against the severity of a sixteen 
month custodial sentence imposed upon the mother of a young child. Debra Kirby 
 
                                                          
1131 R v Dib (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Meagher JA, 
Allen J and Badgery-Parker J, 13 September 1991). 
1132 Ibid 1. 
1133 Ibid 7. 
1134 Ibid 6. 
1135 Ibid 7. 
1136 R v Kirby (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Wood, Allen 
and Abadee JJ, 12 May 1992). 
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was in a stable de facto relationship and the child was under the care of its father 
and grandmother during Kirby’s imprisonment.1137 Before the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal it was argued that the sentencing judge had given 
insufficient weight to ‘rehabilitation’, ‘motherhood’, and that the custodial sentence 
was ‘likely to deprive the mother of an opportunity of nursing the child… and to 
deprive the child of the opportunity of being nursed by the mother.’1138  
 
Justice Abadee (Wood and Allen JJ agreeing) dismissed the appeal and found no 
error. Justice Abadee (Wood and Allen JJ agreeing) said: 
Even assuming that the hardship to the family principle was applicable, a 
matter on which I express no firm view – it appears that such principle was 
considered and taken into account by his Honour when imposing the sentence 
that he in fact did impose. As to the relevant hardship principle, see the 
discussion of it by Allen J in the case of Regina v T (Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 
March, 1990 unreported).1139 
The Court acknowledged the sentencing judge also had had regard to the potential 
for Kirby to receive a leave of absence from prison under s 29(2)(c) of the Prisons 
Act 1952 (NSW) which enabled a mother of young children ‘to serve her sentence 
with her child in an appropriate environment determined by the Commission’.1140 
However, in Kirby, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal left open the 
question of whether or not a sentencing judge should take into consideration the 
possible exercise of Executive Discretion.1141 
 
The study of the case law conducted for this dissertation reveals that in the 1990s 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal was consistent in its application of the 
principle. The principle, as laid down by Allen J in T,1142 was that sentencing courts 
were able to consider family hardship in exceptional circumstances in mitigation of 
sentence; but that hardship ‘must be so “extreme” …that “a sense of mercy or of 
affronted common sense imperatively demands that they (the sentencing judges) 
 
                                                          
1137 Ibid 4. 
1138 Ibid 10. 
1139 Ibid 5. 
1140 Ibid 5-9. 
1141 Ibid 6. See also comments in Tiki, where the court did not form an view on this question, Tiki 
(Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Finlay and James JJ, 24 
August 1994). 
1142 (1990) 47 A Crim R 29. 
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should draw back’.1143 The Court, therefore saw family hardship arising at 
sentencing under judicial compassion or mercy.1144   
In the appellate case law in this period the issue before the court was whether 
there were exceptional circumstances in the circumstances of each individual case. 
Nuanced principles as to what amounted to exceptional circumstances were not 
developed, rather the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal extended 
considerable discretion to sentencing judges. 
 
In 1996, in Edwards1145 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that 
the principle as expressed in Wirth,1146 Boyle,1147 T1148 and Adami1149 was not 
limited to family members.1150 The female offender in Edwards had pleaded guilty 
to unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter.1151 The victim of the offence was a 
married man which Edwards had been in a relationship with. In determining 
sentence, the sentencing judge (Simpson J) had recognised that family hardship in 
exceptional circumstances can mitigate a sentence.1152 At sentencing, Simpson J 
had said: 
Where the sufferer from the imprisonment is not a member of the family of the 
person undergoing imprisonment, it seems to me that the option for mercy is 
perhaps more readily available. Whether that is so or not, I am satisfied that the 
circumstances of Keith warrant the taking of a most unusual course, one which 
would otherwise not be warranted, nor even contemplated.1153 
 
                                                          
1143 Ibid 40 (Allen J). 
1144 See, eg, Hatton and Perdicaro (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Gleeson CJ, Ireland J and Lee AJ, 3 November 1992); R v Sarca (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Wood J, Gleeson CJ and Sheller JA, 11 May 1993); R v 
Kerr (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Kirby P, Badgery-
Parker J and Loveday AJ, 12 November 1993); R v Niga (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and Ireland J, 13 April 1994); Tiki (Unreported, 
Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Finlay and James JJ, 24 August 1994); 
Alexander (1994) 78 A Crim R 141, 145; R v Leslie (1995) 21 MVR 208; (Unreported judgment, 
Supreme Court of NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Grove, Abadee and Simpson JJA, 10 March 1995); 
Maslen and Shaw (1995) 79 A Crim R 199, 209; R v Hakim (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Cole JA, Smart and James JJ, 5 September 1996); R v Rowe [1996] 
NSWSC 467 (3 October 1996). 
1145 Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510. 
1146 R v Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291. 
1147 Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202. 
1148 T (1990) 47 A Crim R 29. 
1149 Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88. 
1150 Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510, 517 (Gleeson CJ) (James and Ireland JJ agreeing). 
1151 Ibid 511. 
1152 Ibid 515. 
1153 Quoted in Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510, 515 (Gleeson CJ). 
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Edwards was a ‘personal carer’ to 61-year-old ‘Keith’ who was a long-term 
resident in a ‘group home for intellectually handicapped and psychiatrically 
disabled.’1154 Keith was said to be ‘difficult to care for, and dangerous, but the 
respondent had more success in handling him than others before her.’1155 On the 
sole basis of the impact of a full-time custodial sentence upon Keith,1156 the 
sentencing judge sentenced Edwards to three years penal servitude to be served 
by way of weekend periodic detention.1157 The Crown appealed the sentence. 
  
Gleeson CJ (James and Ireland JJ agreeing) accepted a broader reading of the 
principle, finding that a sentencing judge could in exceptional circumstances ‘deal 
leniently with an offender because of the effect which punishment of the offender 
will have upon some third party.’1158 As to Simpson J’s reasoning, Gleeson CJ said 
that the circumstances were not exceptional. He remarked: 
It is not easy to understand how, as a matter of logic, or even as a matter of 
simple mercy, hardship to a member of an offender’s family would have a lesser 
claim upon a court’s attention than hardship to a person for whom the 
respondent was a paid carer… However, in so far as she considered it to be an 
exceptional case because the person affected by the hardship was not a 
member of the offender’s family, then that cannot be justified as a relevant 
basis of exception.1159 
Ultimately, the Court held: 
The objective seriousness of the crime for which the respondent was being 
sentenced, and the importance of even-handed administration of criminal 
justice, meant that Simpson J was in error in permitting the consequence to a 
third party deflect her from imposing the sentence of full-time imprisonment, 
which she plainly indicated she would otherwise have imposed.1160 
As demonstrated in Table 14 below, the study of the case law on family hardship in 
Australia revealed that Edwards has the highest juristic status in New South Wales; 
it also has a very strong cross-jurisdictional influence throughout Australia. In fact, 
it had the second highest cross-jurisdictional influence of the cases identified by 
this study (see Table 14). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1154 Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510, 514. 
1155 Ibid. 
1156 Ibid 512. 
1157 Ibid 510 – 511. 
1158 Ibid 515. 
1159 Ibid 516. 
1160 Ibid 518. 
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Table 14: Citations to Edwards within the Study 
 
Jurisdiction CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Number of 
citations 
14 3 38 1 7 6 1 8 - 
 
 
 
In 1998, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal heard the case of Day.1161 
This case does not have a high juristic status in New South Wales, but it is a 
noteworthy case as in this case Wood CJ at CL delivered the judgment for the 
Court. Chief Justice Wood would later sit as Chairperson and Lead 
Commissioner1162 of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) at 
the time when its report on Sentencing the NSWLRC did not support the listing of 
family hardship in statute.1163 The position of the NSWLRC aligns with the view 
expressed by Wood CJ in Day.  
 
The decision in Day is also noteworthy because it was the beginning of a series of 
cases to come before the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal where the 
court took a consistently restrictive approach to the consideration of family 
hardship and set a high threshold for exceptional circumstances. Day was a widow 
who was raising his three children (aged 15, 13 and 12). He had a gambling habit, 
was unemployed and received a sole parent’s benefit.1164 Day had plead guilty to 
the supply of heroin and the supply of cannabis and had two other offences taken 
into account at sentencing.1165 The sentencing judge had taken into account the 
impact of a custodial sentence upon his dependent children observing that ‘they 
were at a critical time in their development’.1166 
 
 
                                                          
1161 Day (1998) 100 A Crim R 275. 
1162 Ibid xii. Note that the Hon James Wood was the Chairperson for the NSW Law Reform Commission 
from 2006-2014. 
1163 See Chapter Three. 
1164 Day (1998) 100 A Crim R 275, 276. 
1165 Ibid 275. 
1166 Ibid 277. 
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Chief Justice Wood at Common Law (Sheller JA and Newman J agreeing) found that 
in taking this approach at sentencing the sentencing judge ‘fell into appellable 
error.’1167 On the application of the relevant principle, Wood CJ at CL stated: 
…his Honour did not make any reference to the well established line of 
authority that before hardship to third parties, occasioned by a sentence is 
taken into account, it must be “truly exceptional”: Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 
510, that is, so extreme as to lead the court to conclude that: “A sense of mercy 
or of affronted common sense imperatively demands that it be taken into 
account” or where: “it would be in effect inhuman to refuse to do so”…1168 
This statement of principle is very consistent with the earlier position in T,1169 
Dib1170 and Edwards.1171 
 
The Court found that the hardship in this case was not exceptional. This study has 
focused on the expression of sentencing principle and practice and has not sought 
to set out the threshold for exceptional circumstances. In fact, as the Court stated 
in Day, ‘little is gained by a comparison since each [case] was determined upon its 
own facts.’1172 However, as to the approach to family hardship taken in New South 
Wales it is important to recognise the question of whether or not the 
circumstances were exceptional was a completely separate test. At this point, the 
sentencing judge is not taking into account the other relevant circumstances nor 
the purposes of sentencing. For example, in Day, Wood CJ at CL (Sheller JA and 
Newman J agreeing) said: 
The children in this case were not young children. They were, as the 
respondent acknowledged in his evidence, beyond the age at which they 
needed to be collected from school or babysat. None was shown to suffer from 
any form of illness or other disability calling for special care. They had a 
grandmother and an aunt prepared to care for them, in the former case, in their 
own home… They are arrangements of the kind which very many families have 
to make, for a variety of reasons, other than the imprisonment of a primary 
carer.1173 
Thus, the question before the court is what is the potential impact of the sentence 
upon the third party and is this impact exceptional (in the sense that ‘mercy’ or 
 
                                                          
1167 Ibid. 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 T (1990) 47 A Crim R 29. 
1170 R v Dib (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Meagher JA, 
Allen J and Badgery-Parker J, 13 September 1991). 
1171 Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510. 
1172 Day (1998) 100 A Crim R 275, 278. 
1173 Ibid 278. 
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‘affronted common sense imperatively demands that it be taken into account’?1174 
Later in the year, in the case of Cacciola,1175 the Justice Abadee expressly warned 
lower courts, ‘that care should be taken not to find exceptional circumstances 
when none exist.’1176 
 
(a) Family hardship as part of the ‘general mix of subjective matters’1177 
The analysis of the body of cases identified by this study, shows that the case of R v 
X,1178 in 2004, marked the beginning of an alternate expression of principle, 
although this was unlikely to have been the intended effect by Sully J in making his 
remarks on family hardship. Mrs X had been convicted of the supply of heroin (of a 
commercial quantity) sentenced to a suspended sentence for two years. The Crown 
appealed the sentence.1179 
 
Mrs X had raised a number of factors in mitigation of sentence including that she 
was the mother of five children.1180 Sully J (Grove and Bell JJ agreeing) established 
that the sentencing judge had found that the family circumstances of the 
respondent were highly exceptional circumstances.1181 The New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal held that the ‘sentencing Judge fell into manifest error in 
his treatment of the respondent’s family circumstances as “highly exceptional 
circumstances” warranting an additional and discrete measure of leniency.’1182 In 
coming to this position, Sully J stated: 
To have regard to those circumstances as part of the general mix of subjective 
matters is one thing. It is, however, an entirely different thing to isolate those 
family circumstances, characterise them as highly exceptional, and use that 
characterisation as a justification for a discrete and substantial measure of 
leniency added onto the respondent’s entitlements under the general law and 
under the general requirements of sections 22 and 23 of the Sentencing 
Procedure Act [Mrs X received discounts under these section for pleading 
guilty and for co-operation with law enforcement authorities]. It needs to be 
borne in mind, whether or not it be thought steely-hearted to say so, that this 
respondent did what she did with her eyes open; in full knowledge that what 
she was doing was highly illegal; and for profit to herself and her family.1183 
 
                                                          
1174 Ibid 277 (Wood CJ at CL). 
1175 Cacciola (1998) 104 A Crim R 178. 
1176 Ibid 186 (Abadee J). See also comments from Priestly JA at 182 (Kirby J agreeing). 
1177 R v X [2004] NSWCCA 93 (8 April 2004), [24]. 
1178 R v X [2004] NSWCCA 93 (8 April 2004). 
1179 Ibid [3]. 
1180 Ibid [9]-[10]. 
1181 Ibid [22]. 
1182 Ibid [25]. 
1183 Ibid [24]. 
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In making these remarks, Sully J was denying the availability of leniency on the 
basis of a merciful discount for family hardship in this case. However, the comment 
on principle implied that family hardship could be considered as part of a general 
mix of subjective matters at sentencing. 
 
The following month (May 2004) in R v Girard,1184 Hodgson JA (Levine and Howie 
JJ agreeing) cited Sully J’s comments in R v X with approval, and found: 
In relation to the children, in my opinion, this was not shown to be a case falling 
within the category of exceptional circumstances as discussed in Edwards. It is 
certainly a matter of concern, and a matter that can be taken into account as 
one subjective circumstance in assessing the appropriate penalty, that innocent 
children will be adversely affected by the imprisonment of their parents. 
However, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, this is not to be taken 
into account as a specific and particular matter resulting in a substantial 
reduction or elimination of a sentence of imprisonment.1185 
This was a subtle shift in language but an important shift in approach. The New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Girard was prepared to accept family 
hardship as a sentencing factor even where the exceptional circumstances 
threshold had not been reached. More recently, in 2010, the availability of a 
sentencing judge to take into account family hardship as a sentencing factor, in 
absence of exceptional circumstances, but ‘as part of the general factual matrix in 
selecting an appropriate sentence’ was endorsed by the Full Court of the New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Dipangkear v The Queen.1186 
 
The case law of the 2000s, also sheds light on a series of cases where it was argued 
on appeal that the sentencing court had erred in the approach taken with respect 
to s 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).1187 For example, in 
R v Murphy, one of the grounds of appeal was that, ‘His Honour erred in his 
approach to s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act and in failing to find 
special circumstances.’1188 Section 44 provided: 
 
                                                          
1184 R v Girard [2004] NSWCCA 170 (12 May 2004) (‘Girard’). 
1185 Ibid [21]. 
1186 Dipangkear v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 156 (21 July 2010) [40]-[41] (Whealy J) (Hodgson JA 
and Buddin J agreeing). 
1187 See, eg, R v Grbin [2004] NSWCCA 220 (2 July 2004); R v Murphy [2005] NSWCCA 182 (9 May 
2005); Harrison v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 185 (19 June 2006); Roberts v The Queen [2007] 
NSWCCA 112 (20 April 2007); King v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 202 (10 September 2010). 
1188 R v Murphy [2005] NSWCCA 182 (9 May 2005) [13]. 
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(1)  When sentencing an offender to imprisonment for an offence, the court is 
first required to set a non-parole period for the sentence (that is, the minimum 
period for which the offender must be kept in detention in relation to the 
offence). 
(2)  The balance of the term of the sentence must not exceed one-third of the 
non-parole period for the sentence, unless the court decides that there are 
special circumstances for it being more (in which case the court must make a 
record of its reasons for that decision)…1189 
Therefore, the position being argued before the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal was when considering the issue of special circumstances in respect of the 
setting of the non-parole period under s 44(2) the sentencing judge should take 
into account family hardship. This means that looked at in this context, family 
hardship would not change the penalty imposed but could mitigate the ratio of the 
non-parole period to the head sentence. 
 
In 2010, in King v The Queen,1190 Price J (Basten JA and Hall J agreeing) succinctly 
summarised the relevant principles in respect to family hardship at sentencing. He 
stated: 
Hardship to an offender’s family caused by imprisonment is generally an 
irrelevant consideration and can only be taken into account in highly 
exceptional circumstances in justifying a non-custodial sentence: R v Edwards 
(1996) 90 A Crim R 510 at 516. There are circumstances, however, that whilst 
not sufficiently exceptional to justify a non-custodial sentence are sufficiently 
exceptional in a suitable case to justify a finding of special circumstances: R v 
Grbin [2004] NSWCCA 220; R v Murphy [2005] NSWCCA 182.1191 
This shows an approach to family hardship that marginalised it as a factor in the 
determination of an appropriate sentence but that took it into account in respect of 
the terms of the sentence imposed. 
 
2. Cases with High Juristic Status 
Despite the New South Wales study of the case law being made up on seventy 
cases. There were only five cases which recorded 10 or more hits through the 
process of ‘exhaustive shepardizing’. These cases are set out in Table 15 below. 
The cases of Maslen and Shaw (1995)1192 and Edwards (1996)1193 are the only New 
South Wales cases identified by this study with cross-jurisdictional influence.  
 
                                                          
1189 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 44. 
1190 King v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 202 (10 September 2010). 
1191 Ibid [18]. 
1192 Maslen and Shaw (1995) 79 A Crim R 199. 
1193 Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510. 
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Table 15: High Juristic Status Cases in New South Wales 
 
Case Name Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
T (1990) 47 A Crim R 29 29 2 1 23 - 1 - - 2 - 
R v Dib (Unreported, 
Supreme Court of New 
South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal, 
Meagher JA, Allen J and 
Badgery-Parker J, 13 
September 1991) 
11 - - 11 - - - - - - 
R v Niga (Unreported, 
Supreme Court of New 
South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal, 
Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and 
Ireland J, 13 April 1994) 
11 2 - 9 - - - - - - 
Maslen and Shaw (1995) 
79 A Crim R 199 
25 7 - 3 1 - 1 2 11 - 
Edwards (1996) 90 A 
Crim R 510 
78 14 3 38 1 7 6 1 8 - 
 
3. Conclusion 
Early on the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that family hardship 
was a sentencing factor that can only be taken into account in ‘highly exceptional’ 
circumstances. This position was maintained for decades. However, more recent 
case law in this jurisdiction highlights a softening of approach to family hardship. 
An alternate line of authority exists where family hardship, whilst not being 
exceptional, is still able to be considered as part of a general mix of sentencing 
factors. Family hardship has also been seen to be relevant to the question of 
whether special circumstances exist, in terms of the ratio of the head sentence to 
the non-parole period, under s 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 
(NSW). 
 
C. Northern Territory 
 
The case study of family hardship in the Northern Territory involved the analysis 
of 16 cases (see Appendix A). Only one case was a first instance sentencing remark 
the remaining cases were all appellate decisions before the Northern Territory 
Court of Criminal Appeal. There was an even split in the gender of the offender 
raising family hardship in this jurisdiction: male in 50% of these cases and female 
in 50% of the cases.  
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1. Historical Narrative of Family Hardship 
The earliest case identified by the study of the case law for the Northern Territory 
is the 1992 case of Wayne v Boldiston.1194 The indigenous female offender was 
convicted of unlawful assault involving circumstances of aggravation.1195 She was 
sentenced to imprisonment and appealed to the Northern Territory Court of 
Criminal Appeal on the grounds that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The 
offender ‘had grown up in Yuendumu and her first language is Warlpiri.’1196 She 
had one child (aged seven or eight) to her late husband, she remarried and had 
three children (aged five, four and three). She was the primary carer for her four 
children.1197 Her husband was unemployed at the time of her sentencing but had 
‘no experience caring for young children’ and it was put before the court that the 
children ‘would have to be split up amongst relatives’.1198 
 
Justice Mildren, looked to the case law of the Supreme Court of South Australia. He 
stated: 
I am unable to give this factor any weight. Except in exceptional circumstances, 
the effect of a sentence on dependants is not a relevant factor: Adami … I do not 
consider the circumstances here to be exceptional. The fact that the dependants 
affected are those of a woman is not an exceptional circumstance: R v 
Wirth…1199  
This expression of the Adami principle is the restrictive reading of the case which 
Justice Perry would later critique in Bates (1997)1200 (see above). 
 
In 1995, the Full Court of the Northern Territory Court of Appeal heard the case of 
R v Nagas.1201 This case was a Crown appeal against a sentence of 15 months’ 
imprisonment with a five month and 13-day non-parole period imposed upon an 
indigenous female offender. Nagas had been convicted of an offence of grievous 
bodily harm, deprivation of personal liberty and theft of a Tupperware™ container, 
 
                                                          
1194 [1992] 85 NTR 8. 
1195 Ibid 9. 
1196 Ibid 15. 
1197 Ibid. 
1198 Ibid 16. 
1199 Ibid. 
1200 Bates (1997) 70 SASR 66. 
1201 (1995) 5 NTLR 45. 
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personal papers and $47 cash.1202 The sentencing judge had found that she had 
two dependent children (aged five and eleven) who had been sent to Gladstone 
(Qld) to live with relatives during her sentence.1203 He noted that ‘living in 
Gladstone, it would not be possible for the respondent and the children to see each 
other as long as she was retained in gaol’.1204 
 
The Crown submitted that too much weight had been given to the fact that the 
offender was female, a mother of two children, had no criminal record and was 
employed.1205 In Nagas, the Northern Territory Court of Appeal in a unanimous 
decision dismissed the appeal. The Court said that family hardship was ‘a factor 
which could be taken into account’1206 citing the work of David Thomas and the 
case law of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Wirth and Adami).1207 
 
The Nagas, case is also well known in Australia for its judicial comments on 
gender.1208 In its appeal, the Crown had also submitted that: 
the sentencing judge had misdirected himself that the question of general 
deterrence was not as significant as it might otherwise have been because the 
respondent was a female and the incidence of criminal activity of the kind 
charged by females was low.1209 
The Court also rejected this ground and held: 
Whether the reason for leniency to women is predicated upon the lower 
recidivism rate of women, prevalence of a particular type of crime, general 
deterrence, or simply compassion, the principle is well established and his 
Honour was correct to have regard to it in sentencing the respondent.1210 
The Court’s approach to gender was altered in 2009 in Midjumbani v Moore.1211 
 
The study of the case law indicates that within the Northern Territory two streams 
of practice arose. First, some judicial officers accepted a permissive approach, 
consistent with the approach in Nagas, that family hardship was a relevant 
 
                                                          
1202 Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss 181, 196(1) and 210. 
1203 Nagas (1995) 5 NTLR 45, 49. 
1204 Ibid. 
1205 Ibid 53. 
1206 Ibid 53-54. 
1207 Ibid. 
1208 See Chapter Six. 
1209 Ibid 55. 
1210 Ibid. 
1211 (2009) 229 FLR 452. See Chapter Six. 
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sentencing factor under the common law.1212 Second, some judicial officers took a 
restrictive approach to family hardship finding it was only relevant in highly 
exceptional circumstances.1213 Kearney J’s comment in Amagula v White1214 
illustrates this approach when he stated: 
…such hardship should be taken into account only in highly exceptional 
circumstances; it must be sufficiently extreme that “a sense of mercy or of 
affronted commonsense imperatively demands that [the sentencer] should 
draw back, as it was put by Wells J in Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291 at 296…”1215 
Kearney J’s statement of the relevant principle in Amagula v White highlights the 
court aligning with Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia and the 
South Australian approach before Bates1216. 
 
2. Cases with High Juristic Status 
The study of the case law revealed that R v Nagas1217 had the most influence locally 
with 10 citations (see Table 16). This case has not had any influence outside of the 
Northern Territory. Although Nagas does adopt the approach to family hardship 
outlined in South Australia in Adami and Wirth and those cases have had 
significant cross-jurisdiction influence (see below). Another pertinent 
consideration in respect to the interstate influence of Nagas is that Court made 
sweeping comment in respect to leniency to women in sentencing.   
 
In the Northern Territory, Wayne v Boldiston1218 was the only case with a 
noticeable cross-jurisdiction influence, although, this was limited as it was only 
cited in Tasmania and Victoria. Moreover, as seen from Table 16, the number of 
citations Wayne v Boldiston received in these jurisdictions was low. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1212 See, eg, R v Miyatatawuy (1996) 6 NTLR 44; Arnold v Trenerry (1997) 142 FLR 229, 231-232; FG v 
Peach [2003] NTSC 114 (26 November 2003); Currie v Burgoyne [2004] NTSC 10 (15 March 2004);  
1213 Amagula v White [1998] NTSC 60 (7 January 1998); Watt v The Queen [1999] NTCCA 81 (13 
August 1999); R v Martyn [2011] NTCCA 13 (16 November 2011); R v Hancock [2011] NTCCA 14 (18 
November 2011). 
1214 [1998] NTSC 60 (7 January 1998). 
1215 Ibid 10. 
1216 Bates (1997) 70 SASR 66. See also Watt v The Queen [1999] NTCCA 81 (13 August 1999). 
1217 (1995) 5 NTLR 45. 
1218 [1992] 85 NTR 8. 
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Table 16: High Juristic Status Cases in the Northern Territory 
 
Case Name Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Wayne v Boldiston 
[1992] 85 NTR 8 
12 1 - - 3 - - 5 3 - 
R v Nagas (1995) 5 NTLR 
45 
12 2 - - 10 - - - - - 
 
3. Conclusion 
Unlike the experience in Queensland where the tension in the expressed form of 
the common law principle was acknowledged and separate judgments were 
delivered, in the Northern Territory Court of Appeal did not recognise the variance 
in approach to family hardship at sentencing. The most recent case law from the 
Northern Territory predominately adopts the restrictive approach which suggests 
that this jurisdiction has fallen into line with New South Wales, Queensland and 
Western Australia. 
 
D. Tasmania 
 
The study of family hardship in Tasmania consisted of the analysis of 13 cases. 
Three cases were first instance sentencing remarks, while the remaining 10 cases 
were appeals before the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal. The gender of the 
offender raising family hardship was a male in 60% of these cases and female in 
40% of the cases. 
 
1. Historical Narrative of Family Hardship 
The earliest case identified for Tasmania is the case of Sullivan v The Queen 
(‘Sullivan’).1219 Though not reported until 1975, this case was heard in 1972 before 
the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court looked to the approach taken 
by the Supreme Court of South Australia in relation to consideration of family 
hardship factors at sentencing. Chief Justice Green accepted that family hardship 
was a sentencing consideration and considered the approach adopted in Moore v 
Fingleton, where the Supreme Court of South Australia had held that while 
exceptional hardship may justify some leniency, financial hardship was a 
 
                                                          
1219 [1975] Tas SR 146 (NC) (‘Sullivan’) 
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commonplace impact and was not sufficient.1220 The Chief Justice Green stated that 
the impact of imprisonment upon dependants of the offender ‘must not be 
permitted to deter a judge from imposing a sentence of imprisonment if he thinks 
it appropriate.’1221 The other judges, Chambers and Nettlefold JJ, concurred that it 
was a ‘fact of life’ that the imposition of a prison sentence imposes financial 
hardship upon the offender and his family and that ‘the public interest’ required a 
prison sentence to be imposed.1222 
 
Sullivan set the tone for the Tasmanian approach to family hardship. Following the 
direction of the Supreme Court of South Australia, the Tasmanian Court of Criminal 
Appeal accepted that family hardship was a common law sentencing factor. The 
importance placed upon deterrence laid out by the court in Sullivan, meant that 
family hardship factors were given little weight in this jurisdiction when they 
arose in matters that also had a public interest factor, which pushed toward a 
custodial sentence. For example, in 1985, in Cadman v The Queen the Defence 
conceded that ‘the practice of the courts’ showed that if ‘there is a need for a 
deterrent sentence the circumstances of the offender’s family usually will be given 
little weight when determining the appropriate order.’1223   
 
Similarly, in 1990 in Riley v Tilyard, Crawford J cited with approval the approach of 
the Court in Sullivan that where the public interest was held to require a prison 
sentence due to deterrence factors, family hardship carried little weight.1224 In this 
case the indigenous male offender had been convicted of driving under the 
influence and refusing to submit to a breath analysis. He had been sentenced to 
imprisonment. One ground of appeal was that: 
 3. The learned magistrate had failed to attach any or sufficient weight to the 
exceptional and unusual domestic circumstances of the applicant and the likely 
effect of imprisonment upon his family in those circumstances.1225 
 
                                                          
1220 Moore v Fingleton (1972) 3 SASR 164, 167 cited in Sullivan [1975] Tas SR 146 (NC), 146. 
1221 Sullivan v The Queen [1975] Tas SR 146 (NC 1), 146. 
1222 Ibid. 
1223 [1985] TASSC 15, [8]. 
1224 Citing Chamber J and referencing the judgment of Green CJ in Riley v Tilyard [1990] TASSC 86, 
[13] (Crawford J). 
1225 Riley v Tilyard [1990] TASSC 86, [1]. 
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The offender had a lengthy criminal record of similar offences.1226 Justice Crawford 
held that deterrence in this case outweighed the fact that the offender’s wife was 
‘substantially ill’ and that the offender also had six children (aged 5-11 years).1227 
 
The study reveals that from 2000 onwards there was a distinct shift in both the 
consideration and application of family hardship as a sentencing factor. After 2000 
the language of the Supreme Court of Tasmania shifted to statements of ‘general 
principle’ that, ‘the court should have no regard to the impact which a sentence of 
imprisonment will have on the members of an accused’s family.’1228 This body of 
case law, heavily influenced by the Western Australian case of Boyle1229 (discussed 
below), found that family hardship was only relevant in extreme circumstances 
such as where the offender was the sole primary carer or where both parents may 
be imprisoned.1230  
 
However, a qualitative analysis of the case law reveals that there was not a clear 
rejection of family hardship as a mitigating factor by the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania. In contrast, Crawford J in his judgments acknowledged that family 
hardship was a mitigating factor, but he stated it was one that did not carry much 
weight unless there were exceptional circumstances.1231 The phrasing of the 
principle by Crawford J aligned with the South Australian approach to family 
hardship. Crawford J (who presided over Riley v Tilyard, see above) also relied 
upon Boyle in his judgments but he expressed the principle in different terms. 
 
The last case identified by this study, was the case of McCulloch v Tasmania.1232 
One of the judges, Wood J, added to her judgment: ‘…some comments regarding an 
 
                                                          
1226 Ibid [6]. 
1227 Ibid [13]. 
1228 Williams v McLaughlin [2000] TASSC 29 (10 April 2000), [9] (Evans J). However, very similar 
language was adopted in R v Georgiadis [No 5] [2001] TASSC 88 (6 August 2001) [29] (Underwood J). 
R v Georgiadis [No 5] was cited with approval in R v Bullock [2003] TASSC 37 (13 June 2003) [9] 
(Slicer J). 
1229 Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202. 
1230 Williams v McLaughlin [2000] TASSC 29 (10 April 2000); R v Georgiadis [No 5] [2001] TASSC 88 
(6 August 2001); Jordan v The Queen [2002] TASSC 121 (20 December 2002); R v Bullock [2003] 
TASSC 37 (13 June 2003); Oliver v Tasmania [2006] TASSC 95 (17 November 2006). 
1231 Tunks v Taws [2003] TASSC 58 (4 July 2003), [18]; Gibbins v White [2004] TASC 8 (25 February 
2004) [19]. 
1232 McCulloch v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 21 (22 December 2010). 
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aspect of the appellant’s personal circumstances and whether it amounts to a 
mitigating factor.’1233 She explained that the submissions to the Court had argued 
that the Court should not have regard to family hardship as a mitigating factor, 
relying upon the iteration of the principle that a court ‘should not have regard to 
hardship upon a prisoner’s family’.1234 Justice Wood rejected this submission. She 
found that a factor, 
labelled in one case “maternal deprivation”… but which could equally be 
referred to as parental deprivation, is a factor which may be given some weight 
in mitigation depending on the particular circumstances of the individual 
case.1235 
Within Tasmania, family hardship can be seen to have been recognised as a 
sentencing factor albeit one that will not be afforded much weight unless the 
circumstances are exceptional. 
 
2. Cases with High Juristic Status 
This study has revealed that Tasmanian case law on family hardship has not been 
picked up in other Australian jurisdictions (see Appendix A). There were no cases 
in Tasmania that received more than 10 citations. Sullivan and R v Georgiadis [No 
5] had the highest local juristic status with three citations each (see Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Cases with High Juristic Status in Tasmania - NIL 
 
Case Name Total 
number of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Sullivan v The Queen 
[1975] Tas SR 146 
(NC 1) 
3 - - - - - - 3 - - 
R v Georgiadis [No 5] 
[2001] TASSC 88 (6 
August 2001) 
3 - - - - - - 3 - - 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
The approach to family hardship in Tasmania traditionally aligned with the 
common law principle as expressed in South Australia. Despite the appearance of a 
more restrictive expression of the principle in some decisions in period the 2000- 
 
                                                          
1233 Ibid [18]. 
1234 Ibid [19]. 
1235 Ibid [23]. 
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2006, family hardship was still seen as a legitimate mitigating factor in this 
jurisdiction.  
 
The Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal has considered the development of 
sentencing principles in respect to the weight to be attached to this factor.  The 
court has a long-standing position that where the public interest or deterrence 
aspects of a case are strong, family hardship considerations do not prevent a court 
from imposing an otherwise appropriate custodial sentence. The court has also 
found that where the imposition of a custodial sentence will result in parental 
deprivation for the offender’s dependants then family hardship may carry some 
weight. 
 
E. Victoria 
 
The study of family hardship as a sentencing factor in Victoria consisted of the 
analysis of fifty-five cases (see Appendix A). Four of these cases were first instance 
sentencing remarks. The remaining fifty-one cases were appellate decisions before 
the Victorian Court of Appeal. The gender of the offender raising family hardship 
was a male in 69% of these cases and female in 31% of the cases. 
 
1. Historical Narrative of Family Hardship 
The earliest identified Victorian case law within this study were in the 1970s and 
1980s. There were seven cases that fell within this period (1974 – 1988) and all 
seven cases are appellant decisions from the Victorian Court of Appeal. Only one of 
the offenders raising family hardship, in this body of early case law, was a female 
offender.1236 An examination of the case law in Victoria reveals ongoing tension 
within the court as to the proper role of family hardship in sentencing. Whilst 
initially in the 1970’s family hardship was seen as a sentencing factor the study 
reveals a shift toward the concept of a ‘special breed’ of sentencing factor where 
there was a requirement for exceptional circumstances to be established before it 
carried weight at sentencing. Later still, the Court, following Markovic v The 
 
                                                          
1236 Helen Margaret Barnacle in Zampaglione (1982) 6 A Crim R 287. 
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Queen1237 would place family hardship outside of sentencing principles and into 
the realm of a grant of judicial ‘mercy’. 
 
(a) Family hardship as a sentencing factor 
The first Victorian case identified in the case study is R v Mitchell.1238 This was an 
appeal brought by the Attorney-General against a sentence imposed in the County 
Court upon Mr Mitchell.1239  Mitchell had pled guilty to conspiracy (as a party to an 
offence in respect of an elaborate bank fraud) and admitted nineteen prior 
convictions. At first instance he was released upon a $100 bond and condition to 
be of good behaviour for five years.1240  
 
Mitchell was a 32-year-old father with two children (aged seven and four and a 
half years). The sentencing judge had taken into account in mitigation of sentence, 
the minor role Mitchell had in the crime, medical evidence regarding the poor 
health of Mitchell’s wife following the loss of a pregnancy and that the date of the 
last prior conviction was for offending in 1960. The sentencing judge had stated, 
‘When you next see that doctor, you can thank him for that report, because I think 
without it you probably would have served a short sentence.’1241 
 
The Attorney-General appealed this sentence on a number of grounds. One of the 
grounds listed was: 
2. That the learned trial Judge having properly concluded that the offence was 
of such a nature as to ordinarily warrant a gaol sentence was in error in 
concluding that there were circumstances in the case which justified the 
passing of a more lenient sentence.1242 
The Victorian Court of Appeal1243 found that the ‘we cannot agree that the role 
played by Mitchell was a minor role, nor do we take the view that he was nothing 
more than a mere courier.’1244 They accepted that the sentencing judge had taken 
 
                                                          
1237 Markovic v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 510. 
1238 [1974] VR 625. 
1239 Ibid 625. 
1240 Ibid 627. 
1241 Ibid. The sentencing judge had later provided a report to the Victorian Court of Appeal stating, 
‘despite my final remark to the prisoner the question of his wife’s health was a minor factor among those 
which influenced me in deciding the appropriate sentence.’ The Victorian Court of Appeal accepted that 
it was a minor factor, see R v Mitchell [1974] VR 625, 630-631. 
1242 Ibid 628. 
1243 Judgment of the Court per Pape, Menhennitt and Nelson JJ. 
1244 Ibid 631. 
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into account the heath of the offender’s wife as a minor factor but found that ‘in 
dealing with a crime as serious as this one was, we think that was a consideration 
of minimal weight.’1245 Therefore, the court found some of the grounds of appeal 
established and imposed a sentence of 18 months imprisonment with a non-parole 
period of eight months.1246 
 
The sentencing practice approved by the Victorian Court of Appeal was that it was 
for the sentencing court to balance all the relevant sentencing factors, determine 
the weight to be attached to these factors in light of all of the circumstances 
including the impact of the purposes of sentencing, and come to an appropriate 
sentence. In this case deterrence was seen to carry significant weight due to the 
serious nature of the offence and offending.1247 What is important to recognise, is 
that the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Mitchell approached the question of family 
hardship as one of what weight should be attached to this factor rather than 
proposing that it was not a relevant sentencing factor. There was no discussion in 
this case as to whether the hardship upon the wife was exceptional. This approach 
reveals that the family hardship was seen as a valid mitigating factor at sentencing. 
 
Three months later, in that the same year (1974), the Victorian Court of Appeal 
heard R v Polterman.1248 The offender had a lengthy criminal history of dishonesty 
offences.1249 The offender had previously avoided a sentence of imprisonment for 
offences of housebreaking and stealing because the Magistrate had been 
persuaded by his efforts at rehabilitation (including recent marriage). The offender 
had since reoffended and was convicted for ‘eight counts of housebreaking and 
stealing’.1250 He was sentenced to a head sentence of four years with a non-parole 
period of eighteen months. The offender appealed to the Victorian Court of Appeal 
stating: ‘I feel the sentence is far too heavy due to the fact that my wife and six 
months old daughter are now nearly living in poverty.’1251 
 
                                                          
1245 Ibid. 
1246 Ibid. 
1247 This was the eighth ground of appeal and the Victorian Court of Appeal found that this ground had 
been established, see Ibid. 
1248 R v Polterman (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, Adam J, Starke J 
and Crockett J, 2 August 1974). 
1249 Ibid 1. 
1250 Ibid 2. 
1251 Ibid. 
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Justice Adam (Starke and Crockett JJ) agreeing held: 
This Court has so often said when one appeals for mercy on the ground of 
hardship to a wife or family that the accused ought to have had regard to that 
before embarking on a life of crime, and the Court cannot be blamed because it 
deals with an accused on the merits having regard to the gravity of the offence, 
the past circumstances, and so on. The Court is not so inhuman as not to be very 
sorry for those placed in the position of this wife and child because of the 
criminal activities of the husband, but our task is not to yield to pleas based on 
sentiment or emotion. However humane we may be we have a duty to perform, 
and that duty we perform as a Court of Appeal in allowing sentences to stand 
unless we see something has gone wrong in the sentencing… We are only 
concerned that he should have exercised his discretion properly having regard 
to proper considerations and leaving out no proper considerations… 
There is not a tittle of evidence that His Honour Judge Frederico has 
approached this sentence improperly having regard to all relevant 
circumstances, and however much he may have felt for the wife and child in 
this case – he obviously has felt sympathy for them – he has given a sentence 
which he considered in the circumstances, having regard to the prior criminal 
record of the applicant, to be the proper sentence.1252 
The Court found that there were no grounds to revisit the sentence imposed upon 
Polterman; the sentencing judge had taken family hardship into account in 
imposing a sentence but had determined the factor carried very little weight. While 
using the terminology of ‘mercy’, Adam J was focused upon the exercise of 
sentencing discretion within the framework of the law. He was solely concerned 
with the application of sentencing factors rather than a broad discretion to be 
merciful outside of a legal framework. 
 
In 1982, in Zampaglione, the Attorney-General appealed the sentences imposed 
upon Antonio Zampaglione, Salvatore Zampaglione, David Jewell and Helen 
Barnacle for serious drug offences.1253 In respect to the sentence imposed upon 
Barnacle (12 year sentence) the issue of family hardship was raised before the 
Victorian Court of Appeal. The sentencing judge had imposed a lighter sentence 
upon Barnacle than her co-offenders because ‘she was a young woman and the 
mother of a very young child [eight months old]’.1254  
 
On the relevance of ‘gender’ as a sentencing factor, Young CJ and Murray J held: 
 
                                                          
1252 Ibid 2-3. 
1253 (1982) 6 A Crim R 287, 288-289. 
1254 Ibid 310. 
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It may be thought that she should be treated more leniently simply because she 
is a woman but even if that has been the general experience in the criminal 
courts and even if it be appropriate in some classes of case, we see no reason 
why in this type of case any distinction should be made on the grounds of 
sex.1255 
Young CJ and Murray J found that ‘a prison sentence will have a more devastating 
effect upon her than it would have upon others’1256 due to her separation from her 
very young child but held that this consideration cannot be given much weight in 
the circumstances. Therefore, Young CJ and Murray J framed the issues as one of 
‘gender’ and ‘hardship to the offender’ rather than one of ‘family hardship’. They 
found error in the imposition of the sentence, allowed the appeal, and imposed a 
sentence of 15 years upon the offender.1257  
 
Southwell J, in dissent, recognised the relevance of family hardship. In this case he 
was in dissent only in respect to the appeal against Barnacle. Southwell J agreed 
with Young CJ and Murray J with respect to the reasons and orders imposed upon 
the other offenders. In contrast to the other judges, Southwell J found that the 
sentence imposed upon Barnacle of 12 years, ‘was not so low as to warrant the 
interference of this Court.’1258 Justice Southwell recognised the impact of the 
sentence upon the offender and the effect that it would have on her very young 
child (even if the child could spend some time with her in gaol).1259 He found that 
these were factors the sentencing judge was ‘entitled to give considerable 
weight’.1260 In reaching this conclusion he did not discuss the need for exceptional 
circumstances. His views were framed in terms of family hardship being a 
legitimate sentencing factor and an assessment of whether undue weight had been 
attached to this factor. 
 
From these early cases it is apparent that family hardship had been accepted as a 
relevant and legitimate sentencing factor in Victoria. The focus in the cases before 
the Victorian Court of Appeal had been about the weight that could be afforded to 
the factor within the balancing exercise of each individual case. However, through 
 
                                                          
1255 Ibid. 
1256 Ibid. 
1257 Ibid. 
1258 Ibid 313. 
1259 Ibid. 
1260 Ibid 312. 
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the 1980’s there emerged a shift in the approach of the Victorian Courts to how 
family hardship was to be approached. 
 
In 1982, in Marasovic,1261 the Attorney-General brought another appeal against 
sentence on the basis of undue weight given to family hardship. The offender had 
been convicted with stabbing his wife with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The 
sentencing judge was influenced by the impact of a custodial sentence upon the 
offender’s children and imposed a probation order.1262 On appeal the Crown 
argued the sentencing judge had ‘given undue weight to the question of 
rehabilitating the respondent and the family needs of the respondent’s 
children.’1263  
 
In the Victorian Court of Appeal, Kaye J (Booking J agreeing) held that the 
‘heinousness of the crime’, fact that his victim was his wife, the circumstances in 
which it was committed and the need for general deterrence1264 meant that the 
sentencing judge had erred in imposing a probation order. Kaye J found that it is 
regrettable that innocent family members will suffer from the sentence but was 
not persuaded by this.1265 In dissent, McInerney J held that it was open for the 
sentencing judge to be persuaded by considerations of rehabilitation and family 
hardship.1266 
 
The following year (1983) in Pozvek,1267 Starke, Kaye and Booking JJ heard an 
appeal against sentence on the basis of ‘severity of sentence’ and ‘compassionate 
grounds due to family situation.’1268 The offender was 20 years old and the father 
of three young children (aged three and a half years, two and a half years, and nine 
months).1269 The offender’s wife and children were living on $100 a week for food 
 
                                                          
1261 AG v Marasovic (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, McInerney J, 
Kaye J and Brooking J, 16 February 1982). 
1262 Ibid 6. 
1263 Ibid 7. 
1264 Ibid 14. 
1265 Ibid. 
1266 Ibid 10. 
1267 R v Pozvek (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, Starke J, Kaye J and 
Brooking J, 2 September 1983). 
1268 Ibid 4. 
1269 Ibid 2. 
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and clothing and the offender’s wife had been raped while Pozvek was 
imprisoned.1270 Applying a similar policy to that expressed by Kaye J in 
Marasovic,1271 Starke J (Kaye and Booking JJ agreeing) stated: 
It is inevitable that the wife and children of a man who goes to gaol are 
punished very often more than the man himself, but one only has to pause for a 
moment to see that if those with dependents [sic] are given specially lenient 
treatment by the Courts, then the whole appearance of justice would be 
defeated.1272  
Starke J (Kaye and Booking JJ agreeing) found: 
In this case, as I have said, there appears to be no error in the sentencing 
discretion of the learned Judge. Matters that have been really relied upon, 
although distressing, cannot be in my view the basis for allowing an application 
in this Court.1273 
Marasovic and Pozvek, appear as the start of a shift away from accepting family 
hardship as an appropriate sentencing factor. 
 
By 1987, the Victorian Court of Appeal was declaring that family hardship was not 
generally a relevant mitigating sentencing factor. In Power,1274 Young CJ (Kaye and 
Gray JJ agreeing) held: 
Mr Weinberg acknowledged that hardship to Parson’s family and loved ones is 
not normally a circumstance which can lead the Court to reduce a sentence. 
There are, no doubt, some occasions when it is appropriate to do so and we 
were referred to some passages in Professor Thomas’s book on Principles of 
Sentencing… The occasions are rare, and I doubt it is possible to describe them 
in compendious terms. It is sufficient to say that I am satisfied that the present 
is not one of them. 
Mr Weinberg acknowledged that it was a question of degree, and so it must be. 
The hardship to Parsons’ family will certainly be serious, but I do not think that 
it is of a character which would justify the Court in interfering with the 
sentence which the learned Judge passed.1275 
We can see here, just as occurred in other Australian jurisdictions, the influence of 
Thomas’ text upon Australian sentencing practices. However, what is also apparent 
is that the language of the court has moved away from finding that family hardship 
 
                                                          
1270 Ibid 4. 
1271 AG v Marasovic (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, McInerney J, 
Kaye J and Brooking J, 16 February 1982). 
1272 Ibid 5. 
1273 Ibid. 
1274 R v Power (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, Young CJ, Kaye J and 
Gray J, 2 June 1987). 
1275 Ibid 14.W 
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was relevant but not carrying much weight in the circumstances, to a position that 
family hardship was not normally relevant.  
 
By the mid to late 1990s the Victorian Court of Appeal had adopted the approach 
that a sentencing court should have no regard to family hardship, but that ‘this is 
not an absolute rule’1276 and could be departed from in exceptional 
circumstances.1277  
 
(b) Hardship to the offender 
In this jurisdiction there was no controversy in the case law in respect to courts 
taking into account hardship upon the offender (due to separation from their 
children).1278 Under the common law, there was no requirement that such 
hardship be exceptional to be taken into account as a legitimate sentencing factor, 
highlighting the prominence of just deserts sentencing theory.1279 
 
(c) The role of mercy  
The Victorian Court of Appeal, in common with other Australian appellate courts, 
intermittently employed the term ‘mercy’ when discussing the consideration of 
family hardship at sentencing. In the State and Federal sentencing case of 
Carmody,1280  the distinction between taking into account family hardship as a 
sentencing factor and taking into account family hardship as an act of judicial 
mercy was called to the attention of the Victorian Court of Appeal. 
 
The offender, Kim Dung Thi Carmody, was convicted of importing a trafficable 
quantity of heroin (the federal offence) and trafficking in heroin (the state offence). 
 
                                                          
1276 Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202, 205 (Burt CJ). 
1277 See R v Lynch (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal, Winneke P, Hayne and 
Charles JJA, 18 April 1996); R v Yaldiz (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal, 
Winneke P, Hayne JA and Nathan AJA, 4 December 1996); Yates (1998) 99 A Crim R 483; R v Panuccio 
[1998] VSC 300 (4 May 1998); Wall (1999) 105 A Crim R 426; R v Howden [1999] VSCA 130 (16 
August 1999). 
1278 See, eg, R v Ilic [2003] VSCA 82 (25 June 2003) [14] (Callaway JA) (Winneke ACJ and Buchanan 
JJA agreeing); R v Williams [2004] VSC 429 (29 October 2004) [16] (Kellam J); R v Nguyen [2006] 
VSCA 184 (8 September 2006); R v Dooley [2006] VSCA 269 (4 December 2006); R v Nagul [2007] 
VSCA 8 (16 January 2007); R v Esposito [2009] VSCA 277(30 November 2009). 
1279 See Chapter Six. 
1280 (1998) 100 A Crim R 41. 
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Her husband was also charged and convicted.1281 In her application to appeal the 
sentence imposed upon her, Kim Carmody raised new evidence in respect to the 
impact of the sentence upon her four-year-old son. Her son was ‘chronically prone 
to attacks of febrile convulsion’.1282 He had spent some time in prison with the 
offender and coped well but had difficulty upon leaving the prison and living with 
his Aunt.1283 It was accepted by all members of the Court that family hardship 
could only be taken into account in exceptional circumstances.1284 The relationship 
between family hardship as a common law factor and its recognition in legislation 
in the federal statute in this case is explored in Chapter Five. 
 
The Court in Carmody, found that family hardship could not be considered as a 
relevant sentencing factor, however, mercy was warranted. Tadgell JA (Winneke P 
agreeing) held: 
We cannot act as though exceptional circumstances have been shown, for they 
have not been shown. We can, however, show some mercy, tempering the wind 
to the shorn lamb. I think this is a case in which to do it…A similar attitude has 
been taken in the English cases of Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83 and Haleth 
(1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 178. In each of those cases an amendment of sentence 
was made on appeal so as to achieve the immediate release of a prisoner in 
order to allow a sick child or children to be cared for.  
The circumstances here do not, I think, call for the applicant’s immediate 
release, and the seriousness of her offences precludes it. I would propose, 
however, that the applicant’s sentence be shortened, but on the sole ground 
that some mercy is warranted. It is really mercy to the child that is deserved, 
the law having immemorially shown tenderness towards the very young, the 
very old and the sick.1285 
Justice Callaway agreed that mercy was appropriate in the circumstances.1286  
 
This case is a significant judgment by the Victorian Court of Appeal, because it 
shows the court recognising that it has an inherent judicial power to exercise 
mercy. The Court also makes a clear distinction between family hardship as a 
sentencing factor, and leniency imposed (on the basis of mercy to a sick child) after 
the application of sentencing principles governing sentencing practice. 
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1283 Ibid. 
1284 Ibid 45 (Tadgell JA) (Winneke P agreeing), 46 (Callaway JA). 
1285 Ibid. 
1286 Ibid 47. 
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The legal issues before the Victorian Court of Appeal in Holland1287 in 2002 were 
very similar to those in Carmody. This was a husband and wife drug trafficking 
case, where the hardship arising from a custodial sentence imposed upon both 
parents of a seven-year-old child was in issue. The offenders’ daughter (Selby) was 
placed in the care of her grandparents. Limited evidence was put before the court 
at sentencing or on appeal, however, it was submitted to the Court of Appeal that 
this sentence imposed a burden upon the grandparents1288 and that they would 
not be able to care for the child long term.1289 
 
In Holland it was held by all members of the Court that there were no exceptional 
circumstances in respect to hardship upon the child in this case.1290 Batt JA stated: 
I recognise the very considerable burdens that Selby’s paternal grandparents 
are enduring in order to care for her and my sympathy is engaged. But, in the 
end, I do not discern in this case the “imperative demand” of which Wells J 
spoke [R v Wirth]. In the circumstances of this case, the incarceration of both 
parents of one healthy child of seven is not sufficient to constitute exceptional 
circumstances.1291 
Similarly, O’Bryan AJA accepted that Selby was an ‘innocent victim of her parent’s 
offending’1292 however, no exceptional hardship upon her had been demonstrated. 
While in agreement with the other judges, on the expression of the relevant 
principle, Eames JA stated: 
There is always a place for mercy in the sentencing process, but as Callaway JA 
noted in R v Carmody a sentencing judge or magistrate would be failing in his or 
her duty if proper sentencing considerations were overwhelmed by an 
emotional response to the hardship which a sentence would impose upon the 
family of the offender.  
As the cases cited by O’Bryan AJA show, there remains, always, the overriding 
right of the courts to grant such lenience where to do otherwise would offend 
the sense of mercy of the sentencing judge or magistrate. The circumstances in 
which such an outcome would occur where the appeal for mercy relates to the 
impact of a sentence on family or others must, however, be “highly exceptional” 
[citing Wirth] or “clearly exceptional” [citing Carmody].1293 
 
                                                          
1287 (2002) 134 A Crim R 451. 
1288 Ibid 462. 
1289 Ibid 457. 
1290 Ibid 452 (Batt JA), 454 (Eames JA) and 462 (O’Bryan AJA). 
1291 Ibid 452-453. 
1292 Ibid 462. 
1293 Ibid 453-454. 
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This statement by Eames JA was an amalgamation of family hardship as a 
sentencing factor that arose for consideration at sentencing only in exceptional 
circumstances, and family hardship as an issue capable of being considered, after 
the consideration of sentencing principles, when the court found ‘mercy’ was 
warranted.1294 This blending of these two disparate considerations is noteworthy.  
 
In Holland, the underpinnings of a debate (which was to take place in this 
jurisdiction) materialised over whether mercy could be seen as an extension to 
family hardship under the common law. In 2007, a line of authority arose within 
the Victorian Court of Appeal which examined whether there was a residual 
discretion of mercy open to be exercised by a sentencing judge when exceptional 
circumstances were not found in respect to family hardship.1295 In Nagul,1296 
Chernov JA (Maxwell P and Habersberger AJA agreeing) stated: 
…where hardship to the offender’s family cannot be taken into account for 
sentencing purposes because of absence of exceptional circumstances, it may 
be taken into consideration in determining whether mercy should be extended 
to the offender, the exercise of mercy being part of the exercise of the 
sentencing discretion. As King CJ said in R v Osenkowski in an oft cited passage 
cautioning against the circumscription of the sentencing discretion by Crown 
appeals, “[t]here must always be a place for the exercise of mercy where a 
judge’s sympathies are reasonably excited by the circumstances of the case.”1297 
This passage was cited with approval in R v Lane where it was found that it was an 
error to fail to extend mercy even in circumstances where the question of whether 
or not there were exceptional circumstances was borderline.1298 However, in 2008 
in R v NAD,1299 Weinberg JA was deeply critical of the argument that this was a 
valid ground of appeal.1300 Weinberg JA stated: 
It is one thing to reject a false dichotomy between justice and mercy…It is quite 
another to posit a requirement that any judge who sentences an offender must, 
in circumstances similar to those in the present case, in order to avoid 
sentencing error, accord some indeterminate measure of mercy.1301 
 
                                                          
1294 This judicial discretion appeared to be broad and undefined but as stated above in Carmody it was 
thought that compassion for the very young, old and sick could give rise to an exercise of judicial mercy. 
1295 R v Nagul [2007] VSCA 8 (16 January 2007); R v Lane (2007) 176 A Crim R 471. 
1296 R v Nagul [2007] VSCA 8 (16 January 2007). 
1297 Ibid 44. 
1298 R v Lane (2007) 176 A Crim R 471, 467-477 (Cavanough AJA) (Vincent JA and Neave JA agreeing) 
1299 R v NAD [2008] VSCA 192 (26 September 2008). 
1300 Ibid [11]-[15]. 
1301 Ibid [13]. 
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However, the issue was not finally determined in R v NAD as the Victorian Court of 
Appeal accepted fresh evidence and the Crown conceded that this fresh evidence 
established exceptional circumstances in respect to the hardship imposed upon the 
offender’s daughter.1302 Thus the comments of Weinberg JA remained obiter and 
whether there was a residual mercy for family hardship even when exceptional 
circumstances did not exist remained to be determined. 
 
The relationship of family hardship and mercy came to a head in 2010 in the case 
of Markovic v The Queen.1303 The Victorian Court of Appeal sat as a full bench of five 
judges to consider family hardship. The Court described the issues as follows: 
The circumstances in which an offender can legitimately seek an exercise of 
mercy on the ground that his/her imprisonment is likely to cause hardship to 
members of his/her immediate family or other dependants. (In these reasons 
we will refer to third party hardship of this kind as “family hardship”.) 
It has long been the position at common law, that, unless the circumstances are 
shown to be exceptional, family hardship is to be disregarded as a sentencing 
consideration. The contention advanced by each of the present applicants, 
however, was that even if the circumstances of family hardship were not 
adjudged exceptional, a sentencing court could nevertheless be called on to 
exercise – on that ground – what is sought to be characterised as a “residual 
discretion of mercy”. Indeed, Mr Markovic argued that failure to extend 
sufficient “residual” mercy on the ground of family hardship was an appealable 
error.1304 
As this study has revealed, certainly from the mid to late 1980s family hardship 
was seen as a relevant sentencing factor in Victoria only where exceptional 
circumstances were established. Prior to this, the Victorian Court of Appeal had 
accepted family hardship as a legitimate sentencing factor that was to be balanced 
against other sentencing factors; it was a factor that effected appeals in which it 
was found to have been given insignificant weight or undue weight. 
 
In Markovic the Court stated, boldly claimed somewhat inaccurately, that ‘the 
exceptional circumstances test has been adopted throughout Australia as 
governing position at common law’ and that there was a ‘uniform national position 
in relation to sentencing for Commonwealth offences.’1305 The question of whether 
there is a uniform approach to federal sentencing is explored in Chapter Five.   
 
                                                          
1302 Ibid [3] (Nettle JA), [52] (Mandie AJA). 
1303 (2010) 200 A Crim R 510 (‘Markovic’). 
1304 Ibid 512. 
1305 Ibid 514. 
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In Markovic, the Court stated that the case law revealed the following rationales for 
why the exceptional circumstances test was necessary: 
1. It is almost inevitable that imprisoning a person will have an adverse effect 
on the person’s dependants. 
2. The primary function of the sentencing court is to impose a sentence 
commensurate with the gravity of the crime. 
3. To treat family hardship as the basis for the exercise of leniency produces the 
paradoxical result that a guilty person benefits in order than innocent persons 
suffer less. 
4. To treat an offender who has needy dependants more leniently than one 
equally culpable co-offender who has none would “defeat the appearance of 
justice” and be “patently unjust”.1306 
Considering these in turn, rationale 1 is an oft repeated yet hollow claim. It could 
also be argued that it is almost inevitable that imprisoning an offender will have an 
adverse effect upon the offender. This does not prevent a court from taking into 
account at sentencing that the imprisonment will be ‘more burdensome’ for some 
offenders – regardless of exceptional circumstance or not.1307 The only justification 
provided by the Court for accepting hardship to the offender as a mitigating factor 
is that it is a ‘conventional’ issue of mitigation.1308 This is an issue of normative 
theory and as this dissertation has illustrated, such claims are not ahistorical. 
 
Rationale 2 does not prevent family hardship from being taken into account at 
sentencing as a mitigating factor and considered as part of the balancing process. 
This is also a normative claim and the study of the sentencing legislation in 
operation within Australia (see Chapter Two) revealed that a primary purpose of 
sentencing is rarely identified in each jurisdiction.  
 
Underpinning rationales 3 and 4 is the principle of equality. The tension between 
family hardship and equality is explored in Chapter Six where it is claimed that in 
the context of the Australian sentencing model (individualised justice and 
instinctive synthesis) this rationale does not, and should not, have prominence.  
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1307 Ibid 517. 
1308 Ibid. 
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The crux of the Court’s position in Markovic is the application of just deserts 
theory. As explained in Chapter Two this theory provides that the only relevant 
sentencing factors are those that relate to the offender or the offence. In the 
context of just deserts theory family hardship is not seen as a legitimate sentencing 
factor because it involves consideration of third parties. In Markovic we see this 
explicitly when the Court stated: 
As Redlich JA pointed out during the hearing, family hardship is not a mitigating 
factor properly so-called, since it concerns neither the offender nor the 
offence.1309 
The prominence given to just deserts in Markovic is a normative position that 
conflicts with the structure and form of Australian sentencing principles based 
upon individualised justice and instinctive synthesis.  
 
Throughout this chapter my study reveals that family hardship has been accepted 
as a legitimate sentencing factor by Superior Courts in Australia. Despite this, the 
Victorian Court of Appeal sought to marginalise appeals to family hardship by 
casting it beyond normal sentencing considerations. In Markovic, the Court held: 
We have concluded that the established common law position should be 
reaffirmed. Our reasons may be summarised as follows: 
1. Reliance on family hardship – that is, hardship which imprisonment 
creates for persons other than the offender – is itself an appeal for 
mercy. 
2. Properly understood, therefore, the purpose and effect of the 
“exceptional circumstances” test is to limit the availability of the court’s 
discretion to exercise mercy on that ground. 
3. Accordingly, there can be no “residual discretion” to exercise mercy 
on grounds of family hardship where the relevant circumstances are not 
shown to be exceptional. 
4. The effect on the offender of hardship caused to family members by 
his/her imprisonment raises different considerations, to which the 
“exceptional circumstances” test has no application.1310 
The Court stated that the ‘traditional common law approach treats family hardship 
as itself being a question of mercy.’1311 This position is critiqued in Chapter Six. The 
court went on to limit the use of family hardship further by limiting the exercise of 
this ‘Mercy’ to exceptional cases.  
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1310 Ibid 513. 
1311 Ibid. 
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The Court cited the case of Polterman as support for this statement, observing, ‘[a]s 
the Court of Criminal Appeal said in Polterman, reliance on family hardship is an 
“appeal for mercy”’.1312 As explained above, in the analysis of the Polterman 
judgment, the use of the term ‘mercy’ by Adam J was used an a rhetorical flourish 
rather than in the ‘technical’ sense of a discretionary power beyond sentencing 
principles. A full reading of Adam J’s judgment highlights that he was concerned 
with whether the sentencing judge had ‘exercised his discretion properly having 
regard to proper considerations and leaving out no proper considerations’, Adam J 
found: ‘There is not a tittle of evidence that His Honour … approached this 
sentence improperly having regard to all relevant circumstances…’.1313 The case 
law post Markovic shows that in Victorian family hardship is not recognised as a 
sentencing factor. Reductions made to a sentence on the basis of family hardship 
are made by a grant of mercy.  
 
For example, in 2011 in DPP v Gerrard1314 Neave JA, citing Markovic, said: 
Having regard to the additional report, I consider that the deafness of the 
respondent’s wife, her consequent dependence on the respondent and his son’s 
autism amount to exceptional family hardship which must be taken into 
account as a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate term of 
imprisonment.1315 
In taking this approach Neave JA did not follow Markovic which had  removed 
consideration of family hardship as a mitigating sentencing factor. While agreeing 
with Neave JA finding that the sentencing judge’s discretion had miscarried, her 
fellow judges, Redlich JA and Bongiorno JA, both delivered separate judgments and 
pronounced that family hardship was a request for mercy not a sentencing factor. 
Redlich JA stated: 
But his Honour’s sympathies were quite reasonably excited by the personal 
circumstances of the respondent. The respondent’s reliance upon the hardship 
to his family was to be treated by the sentencing judge and this court as a 
request for mercy. The family hardship described by Neave JA does constitute 
exceptional circumstances and justified the exercise of mercy and the 
imposition of a compassionate sentence.1316  
 
                                                          
1312 Ibid. 
1313 R v Polterman (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, Adam J, Starke J 
and Crockett J, 2 August 1974) 2-3. 
1314 DPP v Gerrard [2011] VSCA 200 (30 June 2011). 
1315 Ibid [46]. 
1316 Ibid [56]. 
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Similarly, Bongiorno JA stated: 
In Markovic v R, this Court recently confirmed the long-standing common law 
rule that unless circumstances are shown to be exceptional, family hardship is 
to be disregarded as a sentencing consideration. Even when circumstances are 
exceptional, family hardship is not itself a mitigating factor, though it may form 
the basis of a plea to the residual discretion of the sentencing court to extend 
leniency to the prisoner out of compassion to those who would be affected by 
his or her incarceration.1317 
Illustrative of this clear shift in approach to family hardship, in R v Causer1318, 
Forrest J had held: 
Exceptional circumstances amount to a plea for mercy based upon an 
extraordinary family hardship, consequential upon the imprisonment of the 
accused. The plea must be seen as irresistible so much as it would be inhumane 
to refuse to take such circumstances into account.1319 
This means that Victoria is now in the unique position of seeing family hardship as 
a circumstance that can only be considered at the end point of the process, after 
the application of sentencing principles, via the exercise of judicial mercy. 
 
2. Cases with High Juristic Status 
There were six Victorian cases identified by the study which had a high juristic 
status (see Table 18 below). Significantly, none of these cases have a strong cross-
jurisdiction status. From the 1970’s until 2011 there was very little reference made 
in any other jurisdiction to the Victorian jurisprudence on family hardship. 
Although the case of Markovic v The Queen is undoubtedly a significant family 
hardship case in case as the Victorian Court of Appeal sat as a full bench of five 
judges to consider the issue of family hardship at sentencing. This case was heard 
in 2010 and the study of the case law conducted for this dissertation concluded at 
the end of the calendar year in 2011. Although Markovic was one of the last cases 
included in this study, its impact over twelve months (2011-2012), suggests it 
quickly established itself as the leading case. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1317 Ibid [60]. 
1318 R v Causer [2010] VSC 341 (19 August 2010). 
1319 Ibid [33]. 
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Table 18: High Juristic Status Cases in Victoria 
 
Case Name Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
R v Mitchell [1974] VR 
625 
13 2 - 4 - - - 2 5 - 
Yates (1998) 99 A Crim R 
483 
16 1 - - 1 - - - 14 - 
Carmody (1998) 100 A 
Crim R 41 
29 11 - - - - - - 17 1 
R v Panuccio [1998] VSC 
300 (4 May 1998) 
12 2 - - 1 - - - 9 - 
R v Holland (2002) 134 A 
Crim R 451 
19 2 1 - - - - - 16 - 
Markovic v The Queen 
(2010) 200 A Crim R 510 
11 3 1 - - - - - 7 - 
 
3. Conclusion 
The early case law in Victoria reveals that family hardship was accepted as a 
sentencing factor and courts focused on the weight to be attached to this factor 
when it was raised in sentencing appeals. In the 1980s there was a move away 
from accepting family hardship as a legitimate sentencing factor. The Victorian 
Court of Appeal accepted sentencing judges taking into account hardship to the 
offender but not hardship to others. Despite having a Charter of Human Rights in 
this jurisdiction the study of the case law did not reveal arguments based on 
human rights (as occurred in the Australian Capital Territory, see above).  
 
The Victorian Court of Appeal did accept that family hardship could be taken into 
account under judicial mercy tempering the harsh impact of the law where 
necessary.1320 In 2010 in Markovic,1321 the Victorian Court of Appeal sat as a Full 
Court of five justices to consider the role of family hardship at sentencing and 
whether in the absence of exceptional circumstances judicial officers could resort 
to a residual discretion of mercy. The Court held that taking family hardship into 
account at sentencing was always a plea for mercy; ‘it is only in the exceptional 
case, where the plea for mercy is seen as irresistible, that family hardship can be 
taken into account.’1322 
 
 
 
                                                          
1320 Carmody (1998) 100 A Crim R 41, 45. 
1321 Markovic v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 510, 513. 
1322 Ibid 
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F. Western Australia 
 
The study of family hardship in Western Australia resulted in the analysis of 54 
cases (see Appendix A). All of these cases were appellate court judgments. The 
gender of the offender raising family hardship was a male in 45% of these cases 
and female in 55% of the cases. With the exception of one federal and state matter 
(see Tan Hai Huat1323) the gender of the offender raising family hardship in this 
sample of cases was not a male offender until the 1995 in the case of Hodder v The 
Queen.1324 While this evidence is not determinative it is indicative that family 
hardship was conceived as a gendered issue in this jurisdiction until 2000. 
Thereafter there appeared a much more even spread between the sexes in respect 
to family hardship case law in superior courts. 
 
1. Historical Narrative of Family Hardship 
The earliest case in Western Australia, identified by the study, was Baude De 
Bunnetat from 1985.1325 The case was an appeal against sentence imposed upon 
Gloria Angele Baude De Bunnetat.  The offender had been convicted of bank 
robbery ($1240 cash) and the co-accused was her de factor partner Townsend. 
The sentencing judge held that they were ‘equally culpable and he sentenced each 
to four years and six months imprisonment’.1326 A non-parole period of two years 
and one month was imposed in respect to each sentence. Baude De Bunnetat and 
Townsend were the parents of a young child. 
 
In 1985, Chief Justice Burt believed he was without relevant common law 
principle. However, at this time in Australia, the Queensland Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Tasmania, the Supreme Court of South Australia, the Supreme 
Court of the Australian Capital Territory, the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, and the Victorian Court of Appeal had already ruled upon this subject of 
family hardship as a sentencing consideration. Burt CJ (Brisden and Smith JJ 
agreeing) stated: 
 
                                                          
1323 (1990) 49 A Crim R 378. 
1324 (1995) 15 WAR 264. 
1325 Baude De Bunnetat (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, Burt 
CJ, Brinsden and Smith JJ, 3 December 1985). 
1326 Ibid 2. 
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The applicant does not complain of the minimum term which was imposed 
upon her, but I think it is with respect to that that she has some merit. It may be 
wrong to say that she has merit, but merit I think could be seen within the 
circumstances generally. I see them as being based in the fact that the applicant 
is a mother of a very young child… We are told that while in custody, the child 
can remain with her until it is two years old or thereabouts, and if the mother 
remains in custody thereafter, there will be an enforced separation and some 
arrangements will then have to be made for someone to look after the child 
separated from the mother. That I think is an undesirable thing. I cannot for 
myself see that there is anything to be gained from that effect if it can be justly 
and fairly avoided. If you like, you can say it is a compassionate approach or a 
commonsense approach, but I think the Court – where the facts are there – 
ought to take it, and if it conflicts with some doctrine then we must just put up 
with that, but I cannot see that it does conflict with any principle because there 
is no principle really involved.1327 
Chief Justice Burt (Brinsden and Smith JJ agreeing) allowed the appeal and reduced 
the non-parole period imposed upon Baude De Bunnetat to 12 months.1328 
Although clearly giving weight to the family hardship in this particular case it is 
noteworthy that Burt CJ regarded he was doing so expressly without reliance upon 
any sentencing principle. 
 
Two years later the question of family hardship again came before Chief Justice 
Burt in Boyle.1329 Nadeen Brenda Boyle had been convicted of possession of 
cannabis with intent to sell or supply it to another.1330 She was sentenced to two 
years imprisonment with a 12 month non-parole period.1331 The case was an 
appeal against sentence on the ground that a sentence of imprisonment was a 
punishment of last resort and there were other dispositions that were appropriate 
in all the circumstances of the case.1332 In determining the appeal the Court was 
required to consider whether the impact of the sentence of imprisonment upon the 
offender’s children was a relevant sentencing factor. 
 
Prior to the offence, Boyle had been separated from her husband for some time 
and was the primary carer of four children. Three were their biological children 
aged 18, 17 and 14. Boyle also cared for a 14-year-old foster child. Boyle’s eldest 
daughter was mentally retarded. Her 17-year-old daughter had been employed 
 
                                                          
1327 Ibid 4. 
1328 Ibid 5. 
1329 (1987) 34 A Crim R 202. 
1330 Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) s 6(1). 
1331 Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202, 203. 
1332 Ibid. 
 257 
full-time at a supermarket. The family lived on very limited funds and Boyle had 
stated that the reason for committing the offence was to make money to pay the 
bills.1333 After Boyle’s imprisonment this daughter had stopped working and was 
looking after her elder sister and two younger sisters.1334 The information before 
the court was that: 
 …there is still insufficient money coming into the house to make ends meet. 
The applicant’s parents are funding the shortfall but their resources are very 
limited. The pre-sentence report states that the seventeen-year-old girl is “close 
to breaking point”.1335 
In this context, the question of what was the appropriate role of family hardship at 
sentencing fell to be considered by the full bench of the Western Australia Court of 
Appeal.  
 
This time, citing English authorities and the work of David Thomas,1336 Burt CJ 
(Kennedy and Franklyn JJ agreeing) stated: 
The question as I see it is whether the impact which the sentence of 
imprisonment will have upon the children is a matter which is relevant to the 
decision to be made… As to that I think it must be said that generally speaking 
the answer to that question should be in the negative. The general principle is 
said to be that a sentencing court should have no regard to the impact which a 
sentence of imprisonment will have upon the members of the prisoner’s 
family.1337 
He found that the rule as it applied in England and Wales was not absolute and 
could be ‘departed from in exceptional circumstances.’1338 In particular, he quoted 
the three exceptions identified by David Thomas.1339 Then, looking to South 
Australian case law, Burt CJ stated: 
The Australian authorities would seem to me to reflect the same approach 
although they consistently emphasise that the general principle to which I have 
referred will only be departed from “in extreme cases”: see Wirth (1976) 14 
SASR 291, at 294 per Bray CJ, or, as Wells J expressed it in that case (at 296) of 
the report, when to apply the principle would be “to carry it past the point 
where a sense of mercy or of affronted commonsense imperatively demands 
that they (the sentencing judges) should draw back”1340 
 
                                                          
1333 Ibid 203. 
1334 Ibid 204. 
1335 Ibid. 
1336 Ibid 205.  
1337 Ibid 204-205. 
1338 Ibid 205. 
1339 Ibid. See further Chapter Three. 
1340 Ibid 206. 
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Although on this occasion there was engagement with principle, a careful analysis 
of this case highlights that Burt CJ did not accept the general position that family 
hardship was a mitigating factor. His approach in this case evinces a resort to 
judicial mercy; with a condition precedent to this mercy that a court can grant 
leniency in exceptional circumstances or extreme cases. 
 
In Boyle, Burt CJ held that this was an extreme case and set aside the order and 
proposed to impose a sentence of probation for two years instead of 
imprisonment. The other judges, Kennedy and Franklyn JJ, agreed it was an 
extreme case, they agreed with Burt CJ’s reasons and order.1341 Franklyn J added 
that he found that this was a proper case to provide an opportunity of 
rehabilitation to the offender.1342 
 
In 1994, Stewart1343 a 25-year-old female offender convicted of two counts of 
possession, of cannabis and cannabis resin, with intent to sell or supply was 
sentenced to twenty-two months’ imprisonment. She brought an appeal against 
this sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive.1344 She submitted 
that ‘her personal circumstances and antecedents are such that no term of 
imprisonment should have been imposed…’.1345 At the time of sentencing, the 
offender was three months pregnant and was the mother of three children.1346 
After the imposition of the sentence her eight year old child was cared for by her 
father.1347 Stewart’s twins (who were four and half months old) to her current de 
factor partner were residing in prison with Stewart.1348 
 
Franklyn J followed the approach laid down in Boyle. On the application of family 
hardship at sentencing he stated: 
Generally, hardship caused to an offender’s children is not a circumstance to be 
taken into account. The authorities are clear, however, that it may be taken into 
account when the degree of hardship that imprisonment will involve is 
exceptional or when the offender is the mother of young children, or where 
 
                                                          
1341 Ibid. 
1342 Ibid. 
1343 (1994) 72 A Crim R 17. 
1344 Ibid 18. 
1345 Ibid 20. 
1346 Ibid 19. 
1347 Ibid 20 -21. 
1348 Ibid 18. 
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imprisonment will result in the children being deprived of parental care. In all 
cases, however, it depends on the gravity of the offence and the circumstances 
of the case.1349 
Franklyn J said that he could find little to mitigate the offence observing that even 
though she was in stable relationship and had a seven-year-old daughter it did not 
deter her from offending.1350 He noted that this child was now in the custody and 
care of her father. In a highly problematic, and sceptical, judicial comment he 
stated: 
the pregnancy which gave rise to the birth of the twins and the present 
pregnancy were each entered into after arrest, and, one must assume, with 
knowledge that there was a high probability of a custodial term being 
imposed.1351 
Justice Franklyn, on the circumstances of this case, was persuaded by the 
significance of incapacitation, retribution and deterrence in determining an 
appropriate sentence for the nature of the offence committed. He refused the 
appeal.  
 
Justice Owen agreed with Franklyn J’s reasons and conclusion. In his short 
judgment, Owen J expressly mentioned the purposes of sentencing and their 
relationship to the imposition of an appropriate sentence in this case. He found 
protection of the public (incapacitation) outweighed her personal mitigation. 
Interestingly, Justice Owen accepted the general principles of sentencing as laid 
down by Wallwork J (see below) but said ‘I respectfully differ from him in their 
application in this case.’1352 Owen J found that the ‘sentencing judge had not 
overlooked or undervalued’1353 family hardship in determining an appropriate 
sentence and dismissed the appeal. 
 
Justice Wallwork was in dissent in Stewart. He would have allowed the appeal and 
offered twelve months’ probation. Justice Wallwork was persuaded by the 
offender’s potential for rehabilitation.1354 In his dissenting judgment, Wallwork J 
 
                                                          
1349 Ibid 21. 
1350 Ibid 20. 
1351 Ibid 21. 
1352 Ibid 29-30. 
1353 Ibid 30. 
1354 Ibid 29. 
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focused exclusively on the role of family hardship at sentencing.1355 He relied upon 
the importance of the principle of last resort in sentencing.1356 He canvassed the 
research literature on attachment formation in child psychology.1357 He observed 
the principle had received legislative recognition federally in s 16A(2)(p) of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). He reviewed the Western Australian and South Australian 
case law and found that family hardship may be taken into account as a mitigating 
factor in exceptional cases.1358 In this case, Wallwork J found that the sentencing 
judge had not established that no other sentence was appropriate (ie. principle of 
last resort).1359 Wallwork J found that the sentencing judge had ‘overlooked, or 
undervalued, or underestimated matters personal to the applicant and her three 
young children.’1360 
 
The line of case law in Western Australia post Boyle,1361 reveals a fairly consistent 
application of principle in relation to family hardship. This being: that in 
exceptional circumstances, family hardship should be regarded not as a matter for 
mercy but rather a mitigating factor at sentencing and a failure to consider the 
impact of a sentence upon an offender’s children or undervaluation of this 
principle, in this context, could give rise to an appeal. However, until 1995, the 
development of this principle, within Superior Courts in this jurisdiction, was 
occurring in respect to the sentencing of women. Notably, judicial officers were 
referring to it in shorthand as the ‘position of motherhood’1362 in sentencing.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1355 Ibid 22-29. 
1356 Ibid 23-24. 
1357 Ibid 24-25. 
1358 Ibid 25. 
1359 Criminal Code (WA) s 19A. 
1360 Ibid 28. 
1361 R v Szathmary (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, Wallace, 
Pidgeon and Rowland JJ, 24 May 1989); Wright v The Queen (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western 
Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, Pidgeon, Wallwork, White JJ, 20 August 1992); Thill v Ryan 
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Murray J, 18 December 1992); Madoc v The Queen 
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, Franklyn, Murray and Scott 
JJ, 2 June 1993); R v Stewart (2007) 98 SASR 56; Kennedy v Fox (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia, Owen J, 19 September 1994). 
1362 Kennedy v Fox (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Owen J, 19 September 1994) 12. 
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(a) Family hardship and male offenders 
In 1995, the Western Australian Court of Appeal heard the case of Hodder v The 
Queen1363 which had a male offender and raised the issue of family hardship at 
sentencing. Responding to the gendered nature of the principle’s development in 
this jurisdiction Malcolm CJ looked to a gender-neutral practice called the ‘welfare 
approach’.1364 Rather than drawing upon the court’s established practice in respect 
to family hardship, the welfare approach arose where the court took into account 
prospects of rehabilitation and maintaining the family unit,1365 and was identified 
from a line of cases dealing with sexual offences within the family.1366  
 
Hodder v The Queen was a case dealing with domestic violence and three sexual 
assault offences upon the offender’s wife. The twenty-three-year-old male offender 
was sentenced to two years and eleven months imprisonment. The offender was 
employed, had two children (aged one and five) and his wife was pregnant at the 
time of sentencing.1367 The wife (and victim of the offence) had suffered 
financial,1368 mental and physical health problems1369 since her husband’s 
imprisonment. She had no family support to help with the care of her children.1370 
 
Chief Justice Malcom (Kennedy J agreeing) allowed the appeal against sentence 
and ordered a term of probation. Relying upon the welfare approach, he held: 
…the imposition of the prison sentence in the present case has been to inflict a 
significant punishment upon the victim by depriving her of her breadwinner as 
well as depriving her of the support and assistance she needs from him as the 
mother of young children. 
In my view, of all the cases which have so far come before this Court, this one 
does fall within the exceptional circumstances in which a non-custodial 
disposition was justified.1371 
In light of the severity of the offences committed including that they involved 
physical assaults, were witnessed by the children and included threats to prevent 
reporting, this is highly contentious (for reasons discussed by Murray J in his 
 
                                                          
1363 (1995) 15 WAR 264. 
1364 Ibid 275. 
1365 Ibid. 
1366 Ibid 275-279. 
1367 Ibid 268. 
1368 Ibid 280. 
1369 Ibid. 
1370 Ibid. 
1371 Ibid. 
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dissent). As shown in Table 19 below, this case has been an influential decision in 
Western Australia. 
  
Murray J, in dissent, indicated he would dismiss the appeal. In stark contrast to the 
approach adopted by Malcom CJ, Murray J relied upon family hardship. In his 
judgment he set out the South Australian case law (ie. Amuso and Wirth) and 
outlined the previous case law of the Western Australian Court of Appeal (ie. Boyle 
and Stewart). In consideration of the impact of the sentence upon the offender’s 
wife he found it was not exceptional. He observed that she had friends locally who 
had helped, family who had recently travelled to Western Australia (from the 
eastern States) to assist her for a time, and that she could receive welfare 
assistance from the State.1372 
 
The study of the case law in this jurisdiction identifies that there is a dominant 
approach in Western Australia that family hardship is a mitigating factor only in 
exceptional circumstances. However, there were some obiter comments from 
judicial officers in the 1990s that family hardship should carry significant weight as 
a sentencing factor not only in exceptional circumstances.1373 Albeit even the 
judges who espoused those views (Wheeler and Walsh JJ), determined the cases 
before them, allowing for family hardship, by first finding exceptional 
circumstances.1374  
 
Interestingly, in 2004 this issue was raised again by Wallwork J who, whilst 
agreeing as to the outcome in the case, delivered a separate judgment articulating 
that ‘exceptional circumstances’ ought not to be required before family hardship 
can be considered at sentencing. Justice Wallwork viewed the statutory 
recognition of the factor in the s16A(2)(p) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) not as a change to 
the law per se, but rather, putting into statutory form modern views on 
punishment – a position that Wallwork J believed ought to be reflected and applied 
in a common law context within Western Australia.1375 
 
                                                          
1372 Ibid 287-288. 
1373 Gillespie v Moffitt (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Wheeler J, 18 December 1996); 
Webb v Baldwin (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Walsh J, 17 January 1997) 
1374 Ibid. 
1375 Michael v The Queen [2004] WASCA 4 (22 January 2004) [55]-[57]. 
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In dissenting comments in Hodder v The Queen, Murray J observed that an 
exceptional case is one which is ‘quite out of the ordinary’.1376 This explanation 
was given a very literal reading in a stream of cases in the early 2000s, when 
judicial officers relied upon it in judgments to argue that in the contemporary 
context single parenthood is no longer unusual. For example, Einfeld J in Cooper v 
The Queen stated ‘…it must initially be stated that single parenthood these days is 
not an unusual circumstance.’1377  
 
2. Cases with High Juristic Status 
In Western Australia, Boyle1378 received the highest number of local citations (see 
Table 19). This was also a case with a very strong cross-jurisdictional influence 
being picked up in all other jurisdictions except for the Australian Capital Territory 
and South Australia. H1379 received a high number of citations within Western 
Australia but did not have cross-jurisdictional influence. Stewart1380 had a strong 
influence in Western Australia and also has a good cross-jurisdictional citation 
record with references made to this case in Federal case law and in Queensland 
and Victoria. Stewart had only one appearance in a New South Wales decision.1381 
 
Table 19: High Juristic Status Cases in Western Australia 
 
Case Name Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 
202 
71 10 - 11 4 5 - 9 13 19 
Stewart (1994) 72 A 
Crim R 17 
27 4 - 1 - 3 - - 5 14 
Hodder v The Queen 
(1995) 15 WAR 264 
19 1 - - 1 - - - - 17 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
1376 (1995) 15 WAR 264, 287. 
1377 Cooper v The Queen [2001] WASCA 379 (30 November 2001) [18]. 
1378 (1987) 34 A Crim R 202. 
1379 (1995) 81 A Crim R 88. 
1380 (1994) 72 A Crim R 17. 
1381 See R v Murray [2000] NSWCCA 430 (8 February 2000). 
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In comparison to other Australian jurisdictions, there was a very consistent 
approach to family hardship in Western Australia. The Western Australian Court of 
Appeal found that generally at sentencing regard was not had to the impact of the 
sentence upon the prisoner’s family, but this was not an absolute rule.1382 The 
Court has consistently held that in extreme cases or where exceptional 
circumstances were present, family hardship may be taken into account although it 
is to be balanced against the other relevant sentencing factors, the nature of the 
offence and the relationship with the purposes of sentencing.  
 
As described in Chapter Two, the principle of last resort is an embedded 
sentencing principle in all Australian jurisdictions. It was reflected in legislation in 
Western Australia.1383  The study of the Western Australian case law revealed the 
courts’ application of principle could play a central role in matters where family 
hardship was raised.1384 Where the offenders’ dependants are likely to be affected 
by the imposition of a custodial sentence upon the offender the proper application 
of the principle of last resort means that custodial sentences must only be 
considered when all other sentencing options are not appropriate in the 
circumstances.  
 
 
IV CASES WITH CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL INFLUENCE 
 
This study of the case law on family hardship has identified nine cases with cross-
jurisdictional influence (see Table 20). The Australian Capital Territory and 
Tasmanian are notable because none of the States and Territories picked up case 
law from these jurisdictions, hence these jurisdictions had no case law with cross-
jurisdictional influence. Wayne v Boldiston was the Northern Territory’s most 
significant case with cross jurisdictional influence and R v Mitchell was Victoria’s. 
However, both of these cases were only picked up in three jurisdictions outside of 
their home jurisdiction and, therefore, neither really demonstrate a meaningful 
 
                                                          
1382 Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202. 
1383 Criminal Code (WA) s 19A; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(4). 
1384 See, eg, Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202 (Burt CJ); Stewart (1994) 72 A Crim R 17 (Wallwork J); Hull 
v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 194 (11 October 2005) (Roberts-Smith JA);  
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cross-jurisdictional application. This leaves, seven cases with strong cross-
jurisdictional influence. 
 
Table 20: Cases with Cross-Jurisdictional Influence 
 
Case Name Jurisdiction 
Case Heard 
Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
R v Mitchell 
[1974] VR 625 
Vic 13 2 - 4 - - - 2 5 - 
R v Wirth 
(1976) 14 SASR 
291 
SA 102 12 3 24 4 1 25 3 13 17 
Boyle (1987) 
34 A Crim R 
202 
WA 71 10 - 11 4 5 - 9 13 19 
Adami (1989) 
42 A Crim R 88 
SA 37 8 1 3 3 1 17 - 3 1 
Tilley (1991) 
53 A Crim R 1 
QLD 16 1 3 1 1 8 - - 1 1 
Wayne v 
Boldiston 
[1992] 85 NTR 
8 
NT 12 1 - - 3 - - 5 3 - 
Stewart (1994) 
72 A Crim R 17 
WA 27 4 - 1 - 3 - - 5 14 
Maslen and 
Shaw (1995) 
79 A Crim R 
199 
NSW 25 7 - 3 1 - 1 2 11 - 
Edwards 
(1996) 90 A 
Crim R 510 
NSW 78 14 3 38 1 7 6 1 8 - 
 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter was primarily concerned with the formation of sentencing practices 
and sentencing principles with respect to family hardship in Australia. The 
systematic and comprehensive study of the case law has assessed the role which 
hardship to an offender’s family and dependants, has played in sentencing 
decisions throughout Australia.  An outcome of this study has been to present a 
historical narrative of family hardship as a sentencing factor for each State and 
Territory. From this narrative the study provides a detailed history of the use of 
family hardship in sentencing over time, and across jurisdictions. By so doing the 
study shows how these principles ‘emerged’ and were applied or distinguished. 
 
Courts have expressed that this sentencing factor has played a role in: 
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 the decision of whether to incarcerate an offender; 
 the length of the sentence imposed (although the quantum of impact can 
never be measured in Australia); 
 the length of a non-parole period; and 
 the decision of whether to impose a suspended sentence. 
Unlike the UK, where the common law has evolved funnelled through the work of 
the England and Wales Court of Appeal Criminal Division, in Australia, the courts of 
appeal in each jurisdiction tackled the local debate about the appropriate role of 
family hardship at sentencing in different ways.  The common law of Australia 
remains in a fluid state until the matter is authoritatively resolved by the High 
Court of Australia. The likelihood of referral to the High Court is discussed further 
in Chapter Five. 
 
Because of the nature of the Australian sentencing landscape (with each State and 
Territory being responsible for criminal law and punishment1385) the framework 
through which family hardship is considered is not consistent across all 
jurisdictions. In the ACT and SA, it has been listed matter that must be taken into 
account where relevant and known.1386 In both of these jurisdictions family 
hardship has been recognised as a sentencing factor. Both the ACT Court of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court of South Australia have held that, where relevant, family 
hardship is to be balanced against other considerations. Generally, family hardship 
has been considered to only carry significant weight in exceptional circumstances. 
 
In the remaining jurisdictions the matter may be taken into account at sentencing 
under the common law, although recent case law in Victoria has placed it beyond 
sentencing and as an act of mercy. The study of the State and Territory case law 
confirms an early practice throughout Australia recognising family hardship as a 
‘mitigating factor’ and the related decision by a court to grant a significant 
reduction in light of this factor, only in exceptional circumstances. There is an 
important distinction to be made between the recognition of a factor as a 
mitigating factor and the determining the weight to be attributed to that factor.1387 
 
                                                          
1385 See Chapter Two. 
1386 Although it has now been removed as a listed sentencing factor in South Australia, see Chapter Three. 
1387 In the sense of balancing it against all other considerations not in the sense of assigning it a numerical 
value. 
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Unfortunately some courts have blurred these points querying the place of family 
hardship as a mitigating factor rather than stating that in the circumstances of the 
case before them the factor carries little or no weight.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter Five) will look at the family hardship cases in the 
federal arena. The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides a list of sentencing factors that 
‘In addition to any other matters, the court must take into account… as are relevant 
and known (emphasis added)’. Listed at paragraph (p) is ‘the probable effect that 
any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the person's 
family or dependants.’ Chapter Three highlighted that the listing of this mitigating 
factor was a considered and deliberate inclusion into the federal Act. Chapter Five 
will look at how courts around Australia sentencing federal offenders responded to 
this inclusion and identify if there is a federal sentencing practice in respect to 
family hardship as a mitigating factor.  
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5. THE FEDERAL STUDY OF FAMILY HARDSHIP 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Importantly, for Australian scholarship, this dissertation makes a broader and 
valuable contribution to research into federal sentencing practices in Australia. As 
explained in Chapter One, this study was born out of research into federal 
sentencing law and practice. There has been an ongoing debate in Australia about 
consistency in federal sentencing and whether there is uniformity of treatment in 
the sentencing of federal offenders.1388 Chapter Two described how State and 
Territory courts vested with federal jurisdiction carry out the sentencing of federal 
offenders. As federal offenders can be sentenced in any state or territory of 
Australia it is important that federal sentencing practices are consistent not only 
within jurisdictions but also between jurisdictions. 
 
Just over a quarter of a century ago federal offenders were ‘sentenced in 
accordance with the common law principles that governed sentencing in that 
particular locale.’1389 But in 1989, with the introduction of pt 1B of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) and a distinctly federal set of sentencing provisions, the landscape 
changed.1390 In the last decade the High Court has been applying significant 
pressure upon courts to openly develop a practice of federal sentencing that is 
consistent and distinctively federal in character.1391 Therefore, this dissertation 
has been conducted within a period of rising interest into federal sentencing 
practices. This dissertation makes a valuable contribution to this developing field. 
 
 
                                                          
1388 See further, Wendy Kukulies-Smith, ‘The Quest for Sentencing Consistency in the Federal System’ 
(Paper presented at Sentencing Conference 2010, National Convention Centre, Canberra, 6 February 
2010). See also Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Commonwealth drug offenders, 
Research monograph 38 (June 2014) 1. 
1389 Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Labyrinthine Nature of Federal Sentencing’ (Keynote address presented 
at Federal Crime and Sentencing Conference 2012, Canberra, 11 February 2012); Sir Guy Green, ‘The 
Concept of Uniformity in Sentencing’ (1996) 70 Australian Law Journal 112, 118. 
1390 Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 1989 (Cth). 
1391 Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 527-530; Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58, 70. 
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This Chapter shows that there has emerged a consistent approach to the treatment 
of family hardship; with only the Australian Capital Territory not requiring 
exceptional circumstances before the factor can be taken into account. However, in 
recent years there has been disquiet expressed within several courts of 
intermediate jurisdiction about the reading down of the Commonwealth legislation 
through the application of the common law requirement that the consequences be 
exceptional. 
 
 
II ONE FEDERAL SENTENCING PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE? 
 
The traditional position in Australia, applying judicial comity, was that Courts 
exercising federal jurisdiction should give effect to the policy of their own superior 
courts. In R v Jackson (1972) 4 SASR 81. The Court stated: 
3. He [the State judge] will, when exercising Federal jurisdiction, give effect to 
sentencing policies expressed by superior courts in his own hierarchy, 
particularly if the policies have been expressed with respect to federal offences. 
4. He will, when exercising Federal jurisdiction remember that Australia is one 
country and that policies laid down elsewhere in Australia by superior courts, 
although not technically binding on him, ought to receive very great attention 
by him, as it is desirable that there should be similarity of approach by 
sentencing authorities with respect to Federal offences.1392 
In Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, the High Court accepted that 
‘sentencing practices may not be uniform’.1393 However, common law ‘sentencing 
principles are uniform’1394 throughout Australia. 
 
Due to a lack of empirical data on federal sentencing in Australia discussions about 
consistency in sentencing are grounded in anecdotal evidence.1395 For example, the 
ALRC in its most recent inquiry (Same Crime, Same Time) into federal sentencing 
acknowledged that, 
 
                                                          
1392 R v Jackson (1972) 4 SASR 81, 91-92. 
1393 (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ). 
1394 Ibid 476 (Brennan J). 
1395 See comments by Chief Justice J Spigelman AC, ‘Consistency and Sentencing’ (Keynote Address 
delivered at the Sentencing Conference 2008, Canberra, 8 February 2008); Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The 
Labyrinthine Nature of Federal Sentencing’ (Keynote address presented at Federal Crime and Sentencing 
Conference 2012, Canberra, 11 February 2012); Justice Peter Johnson, ‘Consistency in Sentencing for 
Federal Offences – Challenges for Sentencing Courts in an Evolving Landscape’ (Paper presented at 
Federal Crime and Sentencing Conference 2012, Canberra, 11 February 2012). 
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[d]ue to the relative lack of Australian research, other inquiries have not been 
able to furnish conclusive evidence of inconsistency in sentencing.1396 
Until the recent growth in sentencing information systems there has also been 
scant commentary on the principles and practice governing federal sentencing in 
Australia. Therefore, material on when and how federal sentencing provisions 
differ from a judicial officer’s local practice has not been easily ascertainable. Each 
of these aspects of the federal sentencing system has resulted in concern about a 
disparate application of federal sentencing law across Australia.  
 
Recommendation Three in the Same Crime, Same Time report was a call for 
equality in the treatment of federal offenders throughout Australia.1397 This was 
described in the report as not equality between offenders within a state or 
territory, but rather, ‘broad inter-jurisdictional equality’.1398 Accordingly, the ALRC 
called for a consistent understanding of sentencing principles across all 
jurisdictions. The ALRC recommended: 
The same legislative purposes, principles and factors should apply in 
sentencing adult federal offenders in every state and territory. Inter- 
jurisdictional consistency in determining the sentence of federal offenders 
should be encouraged and supported.1399 
Therefore, having set out above a clear picture of the sentencing principles and 
sentencing practices in all of the Australian states and territories,1400 this chapter 
now presents the outcomes of the study in respect of consideration of family 
hardship in federal sentencing. The purpose of this chapter is to detect if there is 
an identifiable federal sentencing practice within Australia and for the first time, to 
shed light on whether there is consistency in federal sentencing practices 
throughout Australia.  
 
A. The Federal Study 
 
The federal study on family hardship was much narrower than the study of state 
and territory practices.1401 The study of the federal case law only examined case 
 
                                                          
1396 Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, 
Report No 103 (2006) 508. 
1397 Ibid 28 (List of Recommendations…3. Equality in the Treatment of Federal Offenders) 
1398 Ibid. 
1399 Ibid. 
1400 See Chapter Four. 
1401 See ‘Method for Study of Case Law’ in Chapter One. 
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law from the Court of Appeal in each State and Territory. The focus of the federal 
study was to determine if there was a national consistency gap in federal 
sentencing. Therefore, this study was concerned with what the superior courts 
believed were the principles guiding consideration of family hardship in federal 
sentencing.    
 
The federal study consisted of an analysis of 92 cases. There was case law on the 
role of family hardship in federal sentencing in all of the Australian State and 
Territory jurisdictions. The number of cases identified in each jurisdiction is set 
out above in Table 2 (see Chapter One). The body of federal case law on family 
hardship, which arose from the process of ‘exhaustive shepardizing’, is set out in 
the federal table in Appendix A. Similarly, to the state and territory study, the 
federal study does not measure how often courts engage with family hardship at 
sentencing, nor does it examine the likely impact of this sentencing factor. As 
expressed above, the study of the case law is a study of sentencing principles. The 
study reveals what the superior courts in each jurisdiction have upheld as the 
guiding principles governing judicial consideration of family hardship in federal 
sentencing.    
 
1. Federal Cases Heard in the Australian Capital Territory 
This study of the ACT case law revealed that the approach to family hardship at 
sentencing in this jurisdiction was to accept that it was a mitigating factor. In 
respect to family hardship at federal sentencing, the Supreme Court of the 
Australian Capital Territory has found that it is ‘clearly a relevant factor.’1402 
 
The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory has criticised the approach 
taken by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in respect to family 
hardship at federal sentencing only arising in exceptional cases. In DPP v Ka-Hung 
Ip,1403 the Court held: 
The mandate of the Commonwealth Parliament is quite clear: the sentencing 
court ‘must take into account’ the matters set out in subs 16A(2) of the Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth), including ‘(p) the probable effect that any sentence or order 
under consideration would have on any of the person’s family or dependants’. 
 
                                                          
1402 Turyn v The Queen [2007] ACTCA 23 (7 September 2007) [4] (Higgins CJ) (Gray and Connolly JJ 
agreeing). 
1403 [2005] ACTCA 24 (19 July 2005). 
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The contemplated taking into account of such factors must clearly be real and 
must occur in every case in which one or more of those factors exist. There is, 
with respect, simply no warrant for a sentencing court to presume jurisdiction 
to qualify the clear parliamentary command by suggesting, as has been done, in 
R v Hinton (2002) 134 A Crim R 286, 293, that -- The reference in s 16A(2)(p) of 
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)… should be read as if it were [preceded] by the 
words “in an exceptional case”: R v Togias (2001) 127 A Crim R 23. 
Indeed, this court would wish to specially dissociate itself from the reasoning in 
R v Togias which gave rise to that suggestion…  
Of course, what weight a listed factor is to be given is a discretionary matter. In 
many cases, it will not be possible to give a family’s suffering much or any 
weight. But as a matter of the letter and the clear conceptual intendment of the 
Parliament, it must be anxiously considered in every case where it exists.1404 
The ACT is the only jurisdiction to take an approach to s 16A(2)(p) which 
expressly gives effect to the plain meaning of the words of the section. 
 
2. Federal Cases Heard in New South Wales 
This study of the NSW case law revealed that the approach to family hardship at 
sentencing in this jurisdiction was to ‘read in’ a requirement of exceptional 
circumstances into s 16(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The NSW ‘gloss’ to the 
section means that the court will take into account in exceptional circumstances 
only, the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would 
have on any of the person's family or dependants. Given the legislative history, 
examined in Chapter Three, this approach is in direct conflict with the federal 
legislative intent. Given this inconsistency it is important to review how this 
‘exceptional’ qualification emerged in New South Wales. 
 
(a) Development of federal principle in New South Wales 
The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal heard the case of 
Muanchukingkan1405 after the passage in 1990 of pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth). In this case, Wood J delivered the judgment for the Court. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, Wood J did not believe that family hardship was a legitimate 
sentencing factor. In Muanchukingkan, Wood J (Gleeson CJ and Grove JJ agreeing) 
acknowledged that judicial officer’s sentencing federal offenders in New South 
Wales had to give effect to the provisions in pt 1B. Justice Wood said: 
 
                                                          
1404 Ibid [60]-[61]. 
1405(1990) 52 A Crim R 354. 
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With the introduction of Pt 1B into the Crimes Act on and from 17 July 1990, the 
Commonwealth Prisoners Act 1967 was repealed and the Sentencing Act [NSW 
legislation] ceased to have any application to the sentencing in this State of 
convicted federal offenders.1406 
In this matter the male offender was from Thailand and had been convicted for 
importing (as a ‘drug mule’) heroin into Australia.1407 He had ‘two wives and 10 
children to support in Thailand where he worked as a driver.’1408 
 
On the consideration of family hardship in determining the federal sentence, Wood 
J acknowledged that he had to take it into account. Justice Wood (Gleeson CJ and 
Grove JJ agreeing) said: 
In conformity with the Act it is necessary to observe the direction of s 16A(1) to 
make “an order of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence” 
and then to take into account such of the matters in the check list in s 16A(2) 
“as are relevant and known to the court.”1409 
Justice Wood recognised that a sentence of imprisonment upon the offender ‘will 
almost certainly be an occasion of considerable hardship for his family and 
dependants.’1410 He stated: 
The last of these is a matter which traditionally has been regarded as of little or 
no moment in sentencing but notwithstanding the considerable reservation I 
entertain as to its relevance, a sentencing court is now constrained by the 
legislation to take it into account and to expressly acknowledge that it is taken 
into account where appropriate.1411 
Significantly, in 1990 directly following the passage of a set of federal sentencing 
provisions in pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal felt constrained to follow the direction of the legislation.1412  
 
It appears the Court followed this approach in matters heard before Gleeson CJ.1413 
However, in 1997 in the case of R v Herrera1414 a different approach was taken in a 
 
                                                          
1406 Ibid 358. 
1407 Ibid 355. 
1408 Ibid. 
1409 Ibid 359. 
1410 Ibid 360. 
1411 Ibid. 
1412 See also R v Ehrenburg (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Gleeson CJ, Samuels JA and Loveday J, 14 December 1990) 7 (Loveday J) (Gleeson CJ agreeing). 
1413 See eg Van de Heuval (1992) 63 A Crim R 75, 80 (Lee AJ) (Gleeson CJ agreeing) and 81 (Priestley 
JA); R v Dagg (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Gleeson CJ, 
Sully and Bruce JJ, 3 October 1997). 
1414 R v Herrera (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Hunt CJ, 
Smart and Grove JJ, 6 June 1997) (‘Herrera’). 
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matter before Chief Justice Hunt at Common Law.  In Herrera, the offender in this 
case had been convicted of social security fraud (to the value of $90, 073).1415 The 
female offender was sole carer of her four year old son who was living with a 
friend while the offender had been imprisoned.1416 The Court heard fresh evidence 
that the ‘boy’s father (who had previously mistreated him) has now threatened to 
abduct him. He is an unsuitable person to be in contact with the son…’1417. 
 
In Herrera, on the relevance of family hardship in sentencing a federal offender, 
Hunt CJ at CL (Smart and Grove JJ agreeing) said: 
A custodial sentence was therefore inevitable in the present case. There are no 
very special circumstances justifying anything less. The effect of the applicant’s 
incarceration upon her son does not amount to such a circumstance in this case. 
Section 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act requires a judge to take into account the 
probable effect that any sentence under consideration would have upon the 
prisoner’s family or dependents [sic]. That provision does no more than reflect 
the common law, which says that hardship to the prisoner’s family operates in 
mitigation only where it is sufficiently extreme, beyond the sort of hardship 
which inevitably results to a family when a parent is incarcerated, to warrant a 
non-custodial sentence. The additional material put before this Court does not 
take the matter any further, unfortunate though it may be.1418 
This restrictive approach, reading in a threshold for exceptional circumstances, 
was adopted by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal.1419  
 
When Wood J became Wood CJ at CL he maintained the same approach to family 
hardship as Hunt CJ at CL had before him. For example, in 2001, in Ceissman,1420 
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal heard a Crown appeal against a 
three-year sentence of imprisonment that had been imposed upon an Indigenous 
offender convicted of importing a trafficable quantity of cocaine. The sentencing 
judge had taken into account in determining an appropriate federal sentence the 
offender’s youth, early plea of guilty, remorse, caring responsibility for younger 
brother and younger cousin, relatively good prior record, mental health, physical 
health, deprived background (including the death of his parents from drugs when 
 
                                                          
1415 Ibid. 
1416 Ibid. 
1417 Ibid. 
1418 Ibid. 
1419 Herrera has been explicitly cited in R v Schluenz [2001] NSWCCA 314 (10 August 2001); R v White 
[2001] NSWCCA 343 (3 September 2001); R v El Hani [2004] NSWCCA 162 (21 May 2004); R v 
Kertebani [2010] NSWCCA 221 (26 October 2010). 
1420 R v Ceissman (2001) 119 A Crim R 535. 
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he was 11 years of age), ‘trauma of his parent’s death and early exposure to their 
anti-social lifestyle and illicit use of drugs’, and the ‘likely effect of the sentence 
upon his younger brother.1421  
 
Chief Justice Wood at Common Law (Ipp AJA agreeing) found the sentencing judge 
had ‘allowed himself to be unduly swayed by an overly sympathetic view of the 
respondent’s background, and also failed to give proper effect to the need for 
general deterrence.’1422 In respect to the relevance of family hardship in 
determining a federal sentence, Wood CJ at CL (Ipp AJA agreeing) said: 
Whilst this is a matter to be taken into account by reason of s16A(2)(p) of the 
Crimes Act, it is not a provision which alters the common law principle that the 
effect of a sentence upon an offender’s family is relevant only in exceptional 
circumstances: see Adami… 
As Gleeson CJ pointed out in Edwards…there is nothing unusual in sending to 
prison offenders who are breadwinners or who have the responsibility for the 
care and support of children…and Bednarz…where Simpson J observed that the 
common law rule was no meaningless incantation, and that it was essential that 
third party hardship be taken into account only in cases that were truly 
exceptional.1423 
Chief Justice Wood at Common Law did not explicitly address that the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal had previously found that in respect to federal 
sentencing family hardship was a factor to be taken into account (see above).  In 
Ceissman, Wood CJ at CL (Ipp AJA agreeing) found that there was no truly 
exceptional hardship in this case.1424 Justice Simpson, in dissent, found that the 
‘very experienced’1425 sentencing judge was within his powers, and exercise of 
sentencing discretion, to impose the sentence which he had.1426 
 
The case of Togias1427 was a Crown appeal against a three year suspended 
sentence imposed upon a female offender.1428 Nikolitsa Togias was a drug courier 
who had been convicted for importing 1 kg of ecstasy into Australia. At the time of 
sentencing she had recently given birth, and evidence from the Department of 
 
                                                          
1421 Ibid 538-539. 
1422 Ibid 538. 
1423 Ibid 541. 
1424 Ibid. 
1425 Ibid 544. 
1426 Ibid. 
1427 Togias (2001) 127 A Crim R 23. 
1428 Ibid 24. 
 276 
Corrective Services had revealed that there would be delay in access to Mother and 
Baby prison facilities.1429 The sentencing judge had taken this into account at 
sentencing, finding that impact of the delay for an unknown period would be 
inhumane (upon mother and child).1430  
 
In responding to the Crown appeal against a manifestly inadequate sentence, the 
respondent in Togias raised before the Court the United Nations Convention of the 
Rights of the Child 1989.1431 However, Spigelman CJ was highly critical of the 
quality of the arguments put before the Court on this issue. For example, he 
pointed out that: 
the court was not referred to a line of authority in the High Court on the use to 
be made in Australian law of international legal instruments. The court was not 
referred to any authority in which a court anywhere in the world has applied 
treaty obligations in the sentencing process.1432 
On this question, Spigelman CJ said, ‘the court has not received the kind of 
assistance required for the determination, for the first time, of the important 
principles involved.’1433 The other judges, Grove J and Einfeld AJ, agreed on this 
point.1434 
 
The sentencing judge on the consideration of family hardship in federal sentencing 
had understood that the common law threshold of exceptional circumstances 
applied at federal sentencing. He stated that the ‘hardship to the child had to be 
classified as “exceptional” before it could be given substantial weight for the 
purposes of s 16A(2)(p).1435 Chief Justice Spigelman found this to be the correct 
application of the principle of family hardship at federal sentencing. He stated: 
The necessity for such an “exceptional” effect has long been accepted for 
sentencing at common law: see, for example, Edwards… 
The South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal held that legislation in that State 
to the same effect as s 16A(2)(p) did not affect the application of the common 
law principle: Adami ... The Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal came 
 
                                                          
1429 Ibid. 
1430 Ibid. 
1431 Ibid 27-29. 
1432 Ibid 28. 
1433 Ibid 29. 
1434 Ibid 38 (Grove J), 43 (Einfeld J). 
1435 Ibid 25. 
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to the same conclusion with respect to s 16A(2)(p): Sinclair ... This was also the 
conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Victoria: Matthews … 
Courts of Appeal in three States have interpreted s 16A(2)(p) as not altering the 
common law. Exceptional hardship is required. It is important that Courts of 
Criminal Appeal adopt the same approach to the interpretation of national 
legislation … 
If there is to be any change in this position, and that was not put in this case 
even on a formal basis, only the High Court can effect it.1436 
Chief Justice Spigelman noted that the sentencing judge had found that there were 
exceptional circumstances on the facts of this case. Similarly, Grove J, in his 
judgment, noted that exceptional circumstances had been found by the sentencing 
judge who had acknowledged the ‘tenderness of the law towards pregnancy and 
childbirth … on a continuing basis.’1437 Both judges, Spigelman CJ and Grove J, 
found that in the circumstances of this case the sentencing judge should have used 
his discretion to adjourn the act of sentencing permitting the parties to have more 
time to receive material relevant to the act of sentencing.1438  
 
In Togias, the Court, Grove J (Spigelman CJ and Einfeld AJ in agreement on the 
orders1439) allowed the Crown appeal, quashed the sentence imposed and remitted 
the matter back to the District Court. Three separate judgments were handed 
down in Togias, and judicial consensus was only reached regarding the orders 
imposed, namely, that the Crown appeal be allowed. It was held that the sentence 
imposed was manifestly inadequate but for different reasons in each judgment. 
Nonetheless, Togias has been seen as authority for the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal’s endorsement of reading in ‘exceptional circumstances’ into s 
16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).1440 For example, Howie J (Wood CJ at CL 
and Sully J agreeing) in R v Hinton,1441 said: 
It is clear that the reference in s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to the 
“probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on 
any of the person’s family or dependants” should be read as if it were 
 
                                                          
1436 Ibid 26. 
1437 Ibid 32. 
1438 Ibid 24 (Spigelman CJ), 34 and 41(Grove J). 
1439 Ibid 29 and 41. 
1440 See, eg, R v Hinton (2002) 134 A Crim R 286; R v Aller [2004] NSWCCA 378 (5 November 2004); 
Le v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 136 (25 August 2006); Cao v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 273 (11 
November 2009); Sowaid v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 177 (8/8/11). 
1441 (2002) 134 A Crim R 286. 
 278 
proceeded by the words “in an exceptional case”: R v Togias (2001) 127 A Crim 
R 23…1442 
In Le v The Queen,1443 Latham J recognised that a different approach has been taken 
in the Australian Capital Territory but held, ‘In any event, Togias is binding on this 
Court.’1444 Despite the consistent application of Togias, within New South Wales, it 
appears increasingly likely the question of whether family hardship needs to be 
‘exceptional’ to be taken into account will be referred to the High Court (discussed 
below). 
 
3. Federal Cases Heard in the Northern Territory 
This study of the Northern Territory case law revealed that the approach to family 
hardship at sentencing in this jurisdiction was to accept that it was a mitigating 
factor. In respect to family hardship at federal sentencing, the Northern Territory 
Court of Criminal Appeal has, citing Nagas observed that hardship suffered by 
family members when a relative is imprisoned is a common occurrence1445 and 
that ‘such hardship is not normally a circumstance that the sentencing magistrate 
may take into account when sentencing an offender.’1446 Despite the references to 
Nagas, the reasoning is more consistent with the restrictive approach taken in 
Amagula v White1447 (see Chapter Four). The reliance on Nagas, notwithstanding 
the explicit differences on reasoning, highlights that the Court has not 
acknowledged the tension in the principle within its own jurisdiction.  
 
4. Federal Cases Heard in Queensland 
The study of the local Queensland case law (see Chapter Four) revealed that the 
approach to family hardship at sentencing in this jurisdiction has fluctuated over 
time. Early case law highlights the Queensland Court of Appeal treated family 
hardship as a sentencing factor and paid attention to whether the sentencing judge 
had erred in the weight that was attached to the factor. In the early 2000s, 
influenced by the approach taken by Superior Courts in other jurisdictions to 
 
                                                          
1442 Ibid 293. 
1443 [2006] NSWCCA 136 (25 August 2006). 
1444 Ibid [25]. 
1445 See Haruma v McCarthy [2008] NTSC 18 (23 April 2008) [31]; R v Hancock [2011] NTCCA 14 (18 
November 2011) [46]. 
1446 Haruma v McCarthy [2008] NTSC 18 (23 April 2008) [31]. 
1447 Amagula v White [1998] NTSC 60 (7 January 1998). 
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family hardship at sentencing, the Queensland Court of Appeal accepted the 
approach that family hardship was only to be seen by the sentencing judge as a 
relevant sentencing factor if the hardship amounted to exceptional circumstances. 
However, the study of the case showed that after the decision in Chong1448 (2008) 
there was a softening in the expression of the principle in respect to family 
hardship and what could be described as a return to accepting it as a sentencing 
factor generally, and focusing upon the weight attached to the factor and the 
balancing act between it and other sentencing factors raised in the individual case. 
 
The study of the early federal case law reveals that the Queensland Court of Appeal 
respected the plain language and intent of the federal sentencing legislative 
provisions. In Theodossio & Said,1449 the Queensland Court of Appeal found that s 
16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) imposed an obligation upon a sentencing 
judge in federal matters to take family hardship into account where relevant and 
known. The Court said: 
The learned judge was, by s 16A(2)(p), obliged in the circumstances to take into 
account the probable effect of the proposed condition on the child. He said that 
he was satisfied the child would not suffer. We respectfully differ from that 
view.1450 
The approach that family hardship, as a listed federal sentencing factor, was 
required to be taken into account in federal sentencing was followed by the 
Queensland Court of Appeal.1451 Of course, during this time this practice did not 
mean that family hardship was always seen to carry significant weight, it could be 
found to be a matter that carried very little weight in the circumstances of the 
case.1452  
 
The question of whether Queensland should follow the emerging federal practice 
of ‘reading in’ exceptional circumstances into s 16A(2)(p) was considered in R v 
 
                                                          
1448 (2008) 181 A Crim R 200. 
1449 Theodossio & Said (1998) 104 A Crim R 367. 
1450 Ibid 369. 
1451 R v Alvarez [2000] QCA 290 (24 July 2000); R v Edwards [2001] QCA 93 (14 March 2001); R v 
Carter [2005] QCA 402 (3 November 2005); R v Ruha [[2011] 2 Qd R 456 [judgment delivered 9 
February 2010]; Desborough [2010] QCA 297 (25 October 2010); R v Burling [2011] QCA 51 (25 March 
2011). 
1452 See, eg, R v Ruha [[2011] 2 Qd R 456; R v Burling [2011] QCA 51 (25 March 2011). 
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Huston; ex parte Cth DPP.1453 This case involved the sentencing of three offenders 
(75 year old Henke, 65 year old Huston and 58 year old Fox1454) who were 
convicted of conspiring together to defraud the Commonwealth.1455 The 
Commonwealth suffered no loss from the conspiracy but had it succeeded it was 
estimated to have amounted to 4.5 million dollars.1456 The Crown appealed the 
sentence imposed upon each offender arguing each sentence was manifestly 
inadequate.1457  
 
On the sentencing judge’s consideration of family hardship as a sentencing factor, 
the Director of Public Prosecutions argued ‘the sentencing judge should not have 
made any allowance for the effect of the sentence on family without first 
considering whether the circumstances of adverse effect were exceptional’.1458 The 
Court said: 
There is nothing in the terms of s 16A(2) which suggests that the probable 
effect on family or dependants must be exceptional before the factor can 
influence a contemplated sentence. However a uniform line of authority has so 
construed the provision, aligning it with the approach taken under similar 
statutory regimes imposed by state parliaments and at common law…  
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria recently reaffirmed its 
adherence to that principle in Markovic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 105… 
This Court must, obviously, follow the same approach to the construction of s 
16A(2)(p)…1459 
Having found the need to show exceptional circumstances before family hardship 
could be considered the Court found, in this case, there were no exceptional 
circumstances. Thus, the court found error in the approach of the sentencing judge 
on taking family hardship into account.1460 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1453 [2011] QCA 350 (6 December 2011). 
1454 Ibid [4] and [38]-[43]. 
1455 Ibid [1]. 
1456 Ibid [26]. 
1457 Huston had been sentenced to four years imprisonment, Heneke to four and a half years imprisonment 
and Fox to three years imprisonment. 
1458 Ibid [45]. 
1459 Ibid [46]-[51]. 
1460 Ibid [52]-[56]. 
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5. Federal Cases Heard in South Australia 
The examination of the local case law on family hardship in this jurisdiction (see 
Chapter Four), revealed that the Supreme Court of South Australia saw family 
hardship as falling outside of traditional, mainstream sentencing factors and saw it 
having a role in sentencing in exceptional circumstances when the court’s mercy 
was triggered. The study of the early federal case law in South Australia is 
consistent with this finding.1461 After the passage of s 10(1)(n) of the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) the Supreme Court of South Australia in R v Adami,1462 
found that the statutory list of sentencing factors did not change the law in SA, 
namely, that (as had been the case under the common law) family hardship was to 
be taken into account only in exceptional circumstances.   
 
Interestingly all of the South Australian federal cases involved the sentencing of 
federal offenders for social security fraud. In 71% of these cases the gender of the 
offender raising family hardship was female and in 29% of the cases the offender 
was male. The case of R v Cameron & Simounds,1463 was a Crown appeal against 
federal sentences imposed by the District Court of South Australia upon Ms 
Cameron and Mr Simounds for ‘systematic, deliberate and sustained fraud over a 
substantial period of time’1464 against the Commonwealth. Cameron was a sole 
parent to an 11 year old daughter. She was sentenced to two years imprisonment 
but was immediately released.1465 In the Supreme Court of South Australia, King CJ 
(Duggan and Debelle JJ agreeing) did not identify a specific error in the exercise of 
the sentencing judge’s discretion, but held that ‘the immediate release of these 
offenders is so disproportionate to the degree of their offending that it must follow 
that there has been an error in the sentencing process.’1466 King CJ (Duggan and 
Debelle JJ agreeing) did not find that family hardship was not a relevant sentencing 
factor in this case but said that the ‘sustained and deliberate fraud over a period of 
time’ meant that ‘the deterrent purpose of punishment must be paramount. The 
 
                                                          
1461 Vurovecz v Carmen (1982) 100 LSJS 397; Graham v Bartley (1984) 57 ALR 193; Vasin and Scherf v 
The Queen (1985) 61 ALR 70. 
1462 (1989) 51 SASR 229. 
1463 (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, King CJ, Duggan and 
Debelle JJ, 19 July 1993). 
1464 Ibid 3. 
1465 Ibid. 
1466 Ibid 6. 
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necessity of protecting the integrity of the social security system by deterrent 
penalties must take priority over other considerations.’1467 
 
In Walsh v Department of Social Security,1468 Shaun and Melissa Walsh, a married 
couple and parents of three young children (a two year old child, a four and a half 
year old and an eight year old child), were sentenced to imprisonment in the 
Magistrates Court for social security fraud.1469 Mr and Mrs Walsh appealed their 
custodial sentences and in submissions stated the children all suffered from 
asthma and had required ‘hospitalisation on numerous occasions’ and the impact 
of the sentences would mean they were ‘separated from both of their parents’.1470 
Justice Perry acknowledged the decision of R v Cameron & Simounds and the 
importance of general deterrence in sentencing federal offenders for sustained and 
systematic fraud against the Commonwealth.1471 The Court was directed to human 
rights arguments addressing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989 and protection of the family unit,1472 however, Perry J found that 
‘recourse to them in this case is hardly necessary, as s16(A)(2)(p) of the Act is 
clear and unambiguous in its terms.’ Justice Perry held: 
It appears to me that, bearing that provision in mind, either the learned 
sentencing magistrate failed to pay sufficient regard to the effect upon the 
appellants’ three young children of a custodial sentence imposed upon both 
parents, or, on the basis of additional materials which has been placed before 
me for the purposes of the appeal, recognition of the need to have regard to the 
dependant children should result in intervention by way of appeal in a form 
appropriate to ensure that the welfare of the children is adequately protected.  
In all the circumstances, in my opinion, that result would best be achieved by 
allowing the appeal of Melissa Walsh to the intent [sic]that in her case she 
should be given the benefit of a conditional release…1473 
There was no explanation in the judgment as to why Mrs Walsh was best placed to 
care for the children in this case.  
 
 
                                                          
1467 Ibid. 
1468 Walsh v Department of Social Security (1996) 67 SASR 143. 
1469 Ibid 145. 
1470 Ibid 146. 
1471 Ibid. 
1472 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 28 March 1979, [1980] 
ATS 23 (entered into force 13 August 1980) Art 23 and Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 
opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered into force 2 September 1990) Art 3(2). 
1473 Ibid 147. 
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The most recent federal case in South Australia, identified by this study is the 
federal case of R v Berlinksky,1474 Doyle CJ stated that s 16A(2)(p) ‘mirrors s 
10(1)(n)’1475 and on the facts of this case the ‘adverse effect on Berlinsky’s son 
resulting from her deportation, is too speculative for it to be given any weight in 
the sentencing process.’1476 But he did find that the ‘interests of her child call for 
careful consideration, although the decision of the court cannot be affected by the 
risk of deportation.’1477 Chief Justice Doyle, therefore, separated out the 
consideration of family hardship which could be considered, and impact of risk of 
deportation, which could not be considered in determining an appropriate 
sentence.  
 
Justice Bleby agreed with these reasons but delivered a separate judgment 
addressing issues of statutory interpretation of s16A (discussed below). Justice 
Gray was in dissent on the question of whether deportation was relevant to family 
hardship. He found ‘the risk of the parent’s deportation and the probable 
consequent effect on a child is clearly an exceptional circumstance and therefore a 
relevant matter within the meaning of s 16A(2)(p) to be considered when 
sentencing.’1478 It can, therefore, be seen that South Australia has adopted the 
approach of ‘reading in’ exceptional circumstances as a threshold requirement, 
before family hardship can be considered at federal sentencing. 
 
6. Federal Cases Heard in Tasmania 
This study of the Tasmanian case law revealed that the approach to family 
hardship at sentencing in this jurisdiction was to accept that it was a mitigating 
factor. In federal sentencing cases the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal found 
that family hardship was a mitigating factor.1479 Where public interests and 
deterrence carried significant weight in a particular case the local approach to 
family hardship had been that it carried very little weight. 
 
                                                          
1474 [2005] SASC 316 (8 September 2005). 
1475 Ibid [30]. 
1476 Ibid [32]. 
1477 Ibid [37]. 
1478 Ibid [66]. 
1479 Garnsey v Stamford [2002] TASSC 43 (4 July 2002); Elliott v Anstie [2006] TASSC 17 (19 April 
2006); McAree v Barr [2006] TASSC 37 (26 May 2006); Emms v Barr [2008] TASSC 49 (4 September 
2008). 
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In 2002 in Garnsey v Stamford,1480 Underwood J found ‘little mitigatory weight’1481 
in the family circumstances that arose in this case.  The offender had led evidence 
at sentencing that he supported his father who was a gambler, alcoholic and had 
suffered a head injury. It was argued that the offender was the only family member 
in Tasmania who was able to provide support for the offender’s father.1482 
Consistent with the local Tasmanian approach, the Court in Garnsey did not find 
that family hardship was not a sentencing factor. The Court focused on the 
question of weight. Justice Underwood did not cite any federal sentencing cases for 
his statement of principle.1483 While it is not a requirement to do so, it is 
interesting that s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was also not mentioned in 
making a finding in respect to family hardship in a federal sentencing case. 
 
In contrast to Garnsey, the case of Mc Aree v Barr1484 in 2006 engaged with s 
16A(2)(p). The offender was the primary carer for her mother who was 74 years 
old and had multiple complex health problems meaning that she required daily 
care and psychological support.1485 On the role of s 16A(2)(p) at sentencing, Evans 
J said: ‘Courts of Criminal Appeal in three States have held that this provision is 
declaratory of the common law and is not intended to change it.’1486 The decisions 
Evans J relied upon were the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Sinclair,1487 the 
Victorian Court of Appeal in Matthews1488 and the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal in Togias.1489  
 
On the common law principle of family hardship, Evans J said: 
At common law the general principle is that a sentencing court should have no 
regard to the hardship which a sentence of imprisonment will have upon the 
members of an offender’s family as hardship is part of the price to pay for 
committing an offence…This general approach to hardship is not an absolute 
rule and it will be departed from in exceptional cases… Even if established, 
 
                                                          
1480 Garnsey v Stamford [2002] TASSC 43 (4 July 2002). 
1481 Ibid [7]. 
1482 Ibid. 
1483 He cited Hunt CJ at CL’s comments in Maslen and Shaw (1995) 79 A Crim R 199, 209. 
1484 McAree v Barr [2006] TASSC 37 (26 May 2006). 
1485 Ibid [12]. 
1486 Ibid [21]. 
1487 Sinclair (1990) 51 A Crim R 418. 
1488 R v Matthews (1996) 130 FLR 230. 
1489 R v Togias (2002) 132 A Crim R 573. 
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exceptional hardship is not a passport to freedom. It is one of the factors that 
must be taken into account in all the circumstances of the case. In some cases, it 
is entitled to great weight, in others to hardly any weight.1490 
It is plain that family hardship was regarded as a sentencing factor, consistent with 
the Tasmanian state approach. Albeit one that would not be afforded significant 
weight except in exceptional circumstances. In this jurisdiction, the Tasmanian 
Court of Criminal Appeal has had regard to a general common law approach to 
hardship and have used it to inform the interpretation of s 16A(2)(p). 
 
7. Federal Cases Heard in Victoria 
The study of the local case law on family hardship in the state of Victoria revealed 
that there is a long history of considering family hardship as an act of judicial 
mercy (see Chapter Four). Following the introduction of pt1B of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) the Victorian Court of Appeal, in R v Broda,1491 was asked to consider 
whether the appearance of family hardship as a listed factor under s 16A(2)(p) 
meant that it should be taken into account at federal sentencing. The Court was 
directed to the South Australian state case of Adami1492 and the Western Australian 
federal case of Sinclair1493 which held that ‘s16A(2)(p) did not change the common 
law.’1494 However, on this occasion the Victorian Court of Appeal did not express a 
view on this question and left this issue open.1495 The same position was taken the 
year later in R v Bullock.1496 Justice Southwell (Ashley and Harper JJ agreeing) said 
‘[i]t is, accordingly, in my view, unnecessary for this Court, as it was unnecessary in 
Broda, to decide whether to adopt the reasoning in the judgments in Adami and 
Sinclair.’1497 This was clearly seen by the Victorian Court of Appeal not to be a 
simple issue, but rather one that required deeper consideration. 
 
The examination of case law conducted for this study reveals that sentencing 
judges after these cases, were taking family hardship into account in determining 
 
                                                          
1490 McAree v Barr [2006] TASSC 37 (26 May 2006) [21]. 
1491 R v Broda (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, Phillips CJ, Crockett 
and Southwell JJ, 8 May 1992). 
1492 (1989) 42 A Crim R 88. 
1493 (1990) 51 A Crim R 418. 
1494 Ibid 10. 
1495 Ibid. 
1496 R v Bullock (1993) 112 FLR 323. 
1497 Ibid 328. 
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an appropriate federal sentence.1498 The Victorian Supreme Court’s position was 
not expressly stated until the case of R v Matthews.1499 This case was a matter 
dealing with both state and federal theft and fraud offending.1500  The offender 
appealed to the Victorian Court of Appeal against the four-year custodial sentence 
imposed upon him and one of the grounds of appeals was: 
3. [As amended before this Court:] That the learned sentencing judge was in 
error in ruling that in order to take into account the effect of a sentence on third 
parties, the effect had to be exceptional.1501 
On the question, of whether s 16A(2)(p) required family hardship to be taken into 
account as a general sentencing factor at federal sentencing, Chief Justice Phillips 
(Southwell and Hampel AJJA) said: 
At first sight the provision would seem to require the court to take into account 
any hardship. However, there is powerful authority for the proposition that 
hardship is “relevant” only if it is exceptional. In R v Sinclair (1990) 108 FLR 
370 the Court of Criminal Appeal of Western Australia considered this 
provision. Malcolm CJ, with whom the other members of the court agreed, held 
that the inclusion of par (p) in s 16A(2) does not alter the common law, which 
had for long stated that only exceptional hardship was relevant. In my opinion 
this Court should follow the interpretation given to the relevant provision by 
the Western Australian Supreme Court.1502 
The reasoning of the Victorian Court of Appeal, in Matthews, reveals that priority 
was placed on a uniform application of federal law rather than the language and 
intent of the section. The Court took the view that it was highly desirable to follow 
a decision on the interpretation of a Commonwealth statute made by a Full Court 
of Appeal of another State.1503 Therefore, following the decision of the Full Court of 
the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, the Victorian Court of Criminal 
Appeal adopted the approach that exceptional circumstances should be read into s 
16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
 
 
                                                          
1498 See R v Manifold (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Appeal Division Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Crockett, Marks and Hampel JJ, 2 December 1993) and R v Hebaiter (Unreported, Supreme 
Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal, Phillips CJ, Crockett and Southwell AJA, 28 August 1995). 
1499 (1996) 130 FLR 230 (‘Matthews’). 
1500 See Ibid 230-231. 
1501 Ibid 231. 
1502 Ibid 233. 
1503 Ibid. Citing Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Kilpatrick Green Pty Ltd [1992] 2 VR 505, 510 which 
cited with approval R v Abbrederis [1981] 1 NSWLR 530, 542 and R v Parsons [1983] 2 VR 499, 506. 
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In 1998, in the state and federal case of Carmody1504 (examined above see Chapter 
Four) the Victorian Court of Appeal stood by its approach in Matthews.1505 But this 
application of common law principle to the language of s 16A(2)(p) meant that for 
justice to be done the Victorian Court of Appeal turned to ‘mercy’ to take into 
account family hardship. Carmody raised the issue of the impact a custodial 
sentence imposed upon a mother would have upon her young sick child. This 
probable impact was deemed not to rise above the threshold of exceptional, but 
the court held it still could ‘show some mercy’.1506 The study of the federal case law 
in Victoria shows that this approach was followed in a number of decisions.1507 
 
In 2010, the Full Court of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Markovic1508 put a stop 
to the practice of seeing mercy as a fall-back option where the exceptional 
circumstances test was not met. An analysis of the decision in Markovic was 
conducted in Chapter Four. In Markovic the Court found that the ‘traditional 
common law approach treats family hardship as itself being a question of 
mercy’1509 and rejected the argument that there was a ‘residual discretion of 
mercy.’1510 
 
In 2011, in DPP (Cth) v Kieu Thi Bui1511 the Crown appealed a three year custodial 
sentence with an immediate release upon giving $5000 recognisance and agreeing 
to a three year good behaviour bond, imposed upon a female offender convicted of 
importing heroin (as a ‘drug mule’).1512 The offender had raised as a mitigating 
factor at sentencing the impact a custodial sentence would have upon her infant 
twin daughters.1513  The Crown appealed on the basis that the sentence was 
manifestly inadequate. The Crown submitted that the sentencing judge had, 
 
                                                          
1504 (1998) 100 A Crim R 41. 
1505 Ibid 45. 
1506 Ibid. 
1507 R v Thai [2005] VSCA 283 (29 November 2005) [41]. See also R v Reynolds (1999) VSCA 224 (10 
December 1999) [24] acknowledging the availability of mercy albeit not found relevant on the facts of 
this case. 
1508 (2010) 200 A Crim R 510. 
1509 Ibid 513. 
1510 Ibid 532. 
1511 [2011] VSCA 61 (9 March 2011). 
1512 Ibid [3]-[13]. 
1513 Ibid [14]-[16]. 
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wrongly considered whether family hardship combined with the respondent’s 
cooperation with the authorities, constituted exceptional circumstances. The 
correct approach would have been to consider whether family hardship alone 
constituted exceptional circumstances warranting a non custodial disposition. 
The second error is said to relate to her Honour’s failure to assess the issue of 
family hardship on the balance of probabilities.1514 
The Victorian Court of Appeal identified three errors in the approach taken by the 
sentencing judge to family hardship. First, in considering it generally in 
combination with other sentencing factors. Second, in referring to ‘risk’ rather than 
‘probable effect’. Third, that the sentencing judge thought she could rely upon her 
discretion to extend mercy if exceptional circumstances were not made out.1515 
 
The Court observed, that in respect to the third error, her Honour’s sentencing 
decision ‘preceded this Court’s decision in Markovic and accordingly no criticism 
can be made of her Honour.’1516 However, post Markovic, such a view was now 
seen to be ‘wrong in law’;1517 there was no option for a residual discretion of 
mercy. In respect to the second error, the language of s 16A(2)(p) required the 
sentencing judge to consider the ‘probable effect’. The Court said ‘it is an error to 
refer to the existence of exceptional circumstances in the context of family 
hardship in terms of risk. Such matters are to be assessed on the balance of 
probabilities.’1518 
 
In respect to the first error, the Victorian Court of Appeal articulated that 
exceptional circumstances was a threshold requirement that must be met before 
family hardship could be taken into account as a sentencing factor. Ross AJA 
(Nettle and Hansen JJA agreeing) held ‘[f]]amily hardship must – on its own – be 
adjudged to constitute exceptional circumstance before it can be taken into 
account as a sentencing consideration.’1519 As discussed in Chapter Four, this is 
setting ‘family hardship’ out as a special breed of sentencing factor (one that only 
arises in exceptional circumstances) rather than treating it in the usual manner (in 
which all other sentencing factors are treated) and leaving it as a matter to be 
 
                                                          
1514 Ibid [24]-[25]. 
1515 Ibid [28]-[30]. 
1516 Ibid [26]. 
1517 Ibid [30]. 
1518 Ibid [29]. 
1519 Ibid [28]. 
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considered and balanced against other relevant factors and the purposes of 
sentencing.  
 
8. Federal Cases Heard in Western Australia 
The study of the local Western Australian case law on family hardship found that it 
was not considered to be a sentencing factor but in extreme cases or exceptional 
circumstances it may be taken into account (see Chapter Four). As seen from the 
analysis of the case law above, the Western Australian federal sentencing decision 
in Sinclair1520 established the approach that the listing of family hardship in 
s16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) did not change the law and that courts 
should read in a threshold test for ‘exceptional circumstances’ before considering 
this factor in determining an appropriate federal sentence. 
 
Following the introduction of pt1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the Western 
Australian Court of Appeal heard a Crown appeal against a 33-month sentence 
(suspended after two months and upon entering into a recognisance release 
order1521) imposed upon a divorcee convicted of ‘extremely serious’1522 social 
security fraud. The Crown submitted that the sentencing judge had given undue 
weight to family hardship and ‘in particular erred in holding that it [s 16A(2)(p)] 
altered established sentencing principles.’1523 The Western Australian Court of 
Appeal found error in the sentencing judge’s ‘interpretation of the effect of s 
16A(2)(p)’.1524 
 
Sinclair was 32 years old with two dependent children. Her 12 year old son had 
‘serious learning problems as a result of a handicap’ and her daughter suffered 
from ‘serious emotional problems and it was alleged that she had suffered sexual 
abuse, although this was not verified.’1525 The sentencing judge had remarked: 
…s 16A(2)(p) directs that in sentencing you I must - not may or shall but must - 
take into account the probable effect that any sentence or order under 
consideration would have on any of the person’s family or dependants. This is a 
 
                                                          
1520 (1990) 51 A Crim R 418. 
1521 Ibid 419. 
1522 As described by the sentencing judge and held to be an apt description by the Western Australian 
Court of Appeal. See Ibid 423. 
1523 Ibid 426 (see Ground 1(d)). 
1524 Ibid 431. 
1525 Ibid 422-423. 
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new provision which came into operation in July this year and did not exist 
when the chapters on the matter were written in D A Thomas, Principles of 
Sentencing (2nd ed, 1979) or when the decision of Scarse was handed down. 
It also seems to me that the position of the care giver and nurturer must be 
regarded separately from the position of the bread-winner and father figure. 
The daily care giver is absolutely essential in the child’s life it seems to me and 
there is that distinction as well as the fact that this has now been enacted into 
the legislation on a mandatory basis.1526 
The sentencing judge went on to explain the probable impact the sentence would 
have upon the children in this case.1527  
 
Chief Justice Malcolm (Kennedy and Pidgeon JJ agreeing) looked to the Supreme 
Court of South Australia’s approach in Adami1528 to the impact of the introduction 
of s 10(1)(n) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) where the Court had 
held that s 10 did not change the law.1529 With respect to the facts of this case, 
Malcom CJ (Kennedy and Pidgeon JJ agreeing) did not find exceptional 
circumstances as the children’s father had ‘obtained an order for interim custody 
of the children in the Family Court during the applicant’s period of 
imprisonment.’1530 The approach taken in Sinclair, was that s 16A(2)(p) should be 
read as though preceded by the words ‘in exceptional circumstances’. Despite 
submissions made on appeal that the words of the federal provision are clear and 
the statute does not require exceptional circumstances,1531 this has been the 
approach taken to family hardship at federal sentencing in Western Australia. 
 
B. One Federal Approach to Family Hardship? 
 
Courts have a long tradition of interpreting statutes so that they align with 
common law practices. In the interpretation of legislation courts operate under a 
presumption against the alteration of common law doctrine.1532 In 1975, in 
Maunsel v Olins,1533 Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated, 
 
                                                          
1526 Ibid 425. 
1527 See Ibid 426. 
1528 (1989) 42 A Crim R 88. 
1529 Sinclair (1990) 51 A Crim R 418, 430. 
1530 Ibid 431. 
1531 See, eg, Macri v Moreland [2008] WASC 194 (12 September 2008) [24]. 
1532 See DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th 
ed, 2011) 188-194. 
1533 [1975] AC 373. 
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It is true that there have been pronouncements favouring a presumption in 
statutory construction against a change in the common law… Indeed, the 
concept has sometimes been put (possibly without advertence) in the form that 
there is a presumption against change in the law pre-existing the statute which 
falls for construction.1534 
Pearce and Geddes, in commenting on the Australia experience, have observed that 
courts ‘referred frequently to the presumptions and have shown no reluctance to 
apply them.’1535 They noted that the following passage from O’Connor J in Potter v 
Minahan1536 has been cited with approval by the High Court in numerous 
decisions.1537 In the classic passage, O’Connor J stated, 
It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow 
fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of 
law without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any 
such effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their 
widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which 
they were not really used.1538 
In Australia the courts’ response to the legislative innovation to grant broader 
recognition of hardship to others in sentencing, has been to give the legislative 
provisions a ‘strict and narrow interpretation’.1539 This meant reading the 
paragraph down so that it applied only in exceptional circumstances, in line with 
existing common law practices, despite the absence of a reference to ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ within the drafting of any of the provisions. 
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that reading s 16A(2)(p) alongside the common 
law principle of family hardship so that it includes the term ‘only in exceptional 
circumstances’ is not providing relevant context to the statutory expression in 
paragraph (p). It would have been quite easy for the Legislature to narrow the 
statutory expression by including this phrase. Drawing on the language of the High 
 
                                                          
1534 [1975] AC 373, 394. 
1535 Speaking here to the presumption that legislation does not alter common law doctrine and the 
presumption that legislation does not invade common law rights. See DC Pearce and RS Geddes, 
Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2011) 189. 
1536 (1908) 7 CLR 277. 
1537 DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 
2011) 189. 
1538 (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304. 
1539 See the fourth approach identified by Roscoe Pound and described by him as ‘the orthodox common 
law attitude to legislative innovations’ in Roscoe Pound, ‘Common Law and Legislation’ (1908) 21 
Harvard Law Review 383, 385. See also Finn’s observation that ‘judicial treatment of statutes in this 
country fall into Pound’s third and fourth categories (liberal interpretation…, and strict and narrow 
interpretation), Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law’ (1992) 22 University of Western Australia 
Law Review 7, 19. 
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Court in Bui v DPP (Cth),1540 when addressing the question of whether the law as it 
related to double jeopardy on appeals was picked up by s 16A, the Court held that 
to read s 16A in the manner submitted… ‘would be to gloss the text impermissibly 
by introducing a notion for which there is no textual foundation. It would go well 
beyond giving relevant content to any of the expressions found in the section.’1541 
This dissertation posits that the reading in of ‘exceptional circumstances’ should 
also be seen to impermissibly put a gloss on the text going well beyond the relevant 
content (see Bui v DPP (Cth) above). 
 
(a) Federal cases with a high juristic status 
The study of the federal case law revealed that Togias1542 has a very high federal 
juristic status (see Table 21 below). The only case with more federal citations was 
the case of Sinclair1543 and this was only by one ‘hit’. The Western Australian Court 
of Appeal’s statement of principle in Sinclair is the only federal case within this 
study which a has a very strong cross-jurisdictional juristic status (this case was 
examined above). 
 
From the Victorian Court of Appeal, Matthews and Carmody are both federal cases 
with a high juristic status (see Table 21 below). They both have very similar ‘hit’ 
rates in terms of citations in later federal case law engaging with the principle of 
family hardship; with Matthews having 10 ‘hits’ and Carmody 11 ‘hits’. Table 21 
shows that Carmody had a much higher citation rate in later Victorian cases than 
Matthews did. This finding highlights the importance of the relationship between 
mercy and family hardship in Victorian sentencing theory and practice (this 
relationship is discussed further in Chapter Six).  
 
The Full Court decision of Victorian Court of Appeal in case of Markovic,1544 
(dealing with both state and federal offences) is undoubtedly an important case on 
the role of family hardship in sentencing. This case was heard in 2010, therefore, 
the importance of this decision within family hardship case law was not captured 
 
                                                          
1540 Bui v DPP (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638. 
1541 Ibid 651 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
1542 (2001) 127 A Crim R 23. 
1543 (1990) 51 A Crim R 418. 
1544 (2010) 200 A Crim R 510. 
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by this study which examined case law on family hardship in Australia until the 
end of the calendar year in 2011. 
 
Table 21: Federal Cases with a High Juristic Status 
 
Case Name Jurisdiction 
Case Heard 
Total 
number 
of 
citations 
CTH ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Togias (2001) 
127 A Crim R 
23 
NSW 21 16 - 4 - - - - 1 - 
Carmody 
(1998) 100 A 
Crim R 41 
Vic 25 11 - - - - - - 13 1 
R v Matthews 
(1996) 130 FLR 
230 
Vic 15 10 - - 1 - - - 4 - 
Sinclair (1990) 
51 A Crim R 
418 
WA 33 17 3 1 - - 3 3 2 4 
 
 
(b) Is there more to come…? 
As discussed above, appellate courts throughout Australia, except for the Court of 
Appeal in the Australian Capital Territory, have held that if there is to be a change 
to the approach to family hardship in federal sentencing the High Court need to 
effect that change. In 2013, in R v Zerafa,1545 two judges of the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Hoeben CJ at CL and Latham J, found that it was now for 
the High Court to change the interpretation to s 16A(2)(p). Hoeben CJ at CL 
(Latham J agreeing) found: 
In relation to s 16A(2)(p) it is not appropriate for this Court to overrule or 
depart from cases such as Togias and Hinton. As the respondent accepted, the 
“exceptional hardship” approach has been followed in Queensland and Victoria, 
and to a limited extent in South Australia and Western Australia. It is only the 
ACT which has refused to follow that line of authority. As Spigelman CJ 
acknowledged in Togias: 
If there is to be any change in this position, and that was not put in this 
case even on a formal basis, only the High Court can effect it.1546 
In R v Zerafa, Beech-Jones J was in dissent on the issue of the interpretation of s 
16A(2)(p). Justice Beech- Jones stated: 
In my view, the words of s 16A(2)(p) are clear. The secondary materials 
confirm that meaning. The cases that have considered the provision have not 
 
                                                          
1545 (2013) 235 A Crim R 265. 
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reconciled their construction with either. I am satisfied that the construction of 
s 16A(2)(p) which reads the provision as though it was preceded or proceeded 
by the words “in an exceptional case” is plainly wrong…1547 
In 2015, in Elshani v The Queen,1548 the question of whether s 16A(2)(p) should be 
read consistently with the common law was brought back before the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. Once again, Beech-Jones J (in dissent on this issue 
again) found that the line of authority that was being followed was ‘clearly 
wrong’.1549 This view is the position this dissertation has reached after a careful 
analysis of family hardship as a mitigating factor at common law. 
 
In Elshani, Adam J held ‘…in Zerafa, the principle stated by the majority has now 
become too embedded for this Court to reconsider it.’1550 Similarly, Gleeson JA 
held: 
the approach of the majority in Zerafa and the line of authority on which it is 
based, has been consistently followed in this court… 
In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to address the applicant’s contention 
that the decision of the majority in R v Zerafa and the other decision of this 
Court and other intermediate appellate courts that have applied the 
“exceptional hardship” approach to s 16A(2)(p) were wrongly decided. That 
contention would require the Court to be “convinced” that the interpretation of 
s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act in those decisions is “plainly wrong”…1551 
The view of the majority was that if there was to be a change it needed to be 
through direction from the High Court.  
 
Most recently, in 2017, the question has been put back before the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP (Cth) v Pratten (No 2)1552 and Kaveh v The 
Queen.1553 In Pratten (No 2), obiter comments from two judges of the Court 
underscored the growing disquiet about the approach that has been adopted in 
Australia with respect to s16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). In their 
judgments, both Campbell and Adams JJ expressed that Beech-Jones J gave a 
persuasive dissent in Zerafa. Justice Campbell stated: 
 
                                                          
1547 Ibid 299. 
1548 (2015) 255 A Crim R 488. 
1549 Ibid 502. 
1550 Ibid 500. 
1551 Ibid 491. 
1552 [2017] NSWCCA 42 (17 March 2017) (‘Pratten (No 2)’). 
1553 [2017] NSWCCA 52 (24 March 2017). 
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I wish to record, with respect, that there is much to be said for the view 
expressed by Beech-Jones J about the construction of s 16A(2)(p) Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) in R v Zerafa. Given the matter was not argued: the long line of 
contrary authority; and we are but a court of three is not an appropriate case to 
consider departing from the established construction generally agreed in by 
intermediate courts of appeal throughout the Commonwealth.1554 
Similarly, Adams J said: ‘I wish only to add that I too am of the view that there is 
much force in the view expressed by Beech-Jones J in R v Zerafa concerning the 
proper construction of s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).’1555 In Kaveh v The 
Queen, Basten JA commented that ‘there remains a live issue’1556 as to whether the 
standard of ‘exceptional circumstances’ should apply to federal sentencing under s 
16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
 
 
III ISSUES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Section 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provides that the common law of 
Australia applies to courts exercising federal jurisdiction. However, the common 
law applies only if one of three possible circumstances arises. Section 80 provides 
in full: 
So far as the laws of the Commonwealth are not applicable or so far as their 
provisions are insufficient to carry them into effect, or to provide adequate 
remedies or punishment, the common law of Australia as modified by the 
Constitution and by the statue law in force in the State or Territory in which the 
Court in which the jurisdiction is exercised is held shall, so far as it is applicable 
and not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth, 
govern all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in the exercise of their 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters.1557 
One of these circumstances is that the common law applies so far as the laws of the 
Commonwealth are not applicable. The Commonwealth has legislated in respect to 
family hardship as a relevant sentencing factor. In Bui,1558  the High Court held that, 
‘[s]ection 16A applies of its own force to the sentencing of persons convicted of 
offences against Commonwealth laws.’1559 Applying the logic of the High Court as 
espoused in Bui there is no gap to be filled by common law reasoning within the 
 
                                                          
1554 Ibid [162]. 
1555 Ibid [163]. 
1556 Ibid [6]. 
1557 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 80. 
1558 Bui v DPP (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638.  
1559 Ibid 650 (The Court). 
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Commonwealth laws on the question of family hardship. As such the common law 
principles on this matter ought not be picked up and applied to federal offenders. 
 
Therefore, the inclusion of the common law principle of family hardship (alongside 
the language of s 16A(2)(p)) must arise as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
However, this approach is also problematic. In Bui, the High Court citing Johnson v 
The Queen1560 and Hili v The Queen1561 stated: 
It [s 16A] is able to accommodate some judicially-developed sentencing 
principles where such principles give relevant content to the statutory 
expression in s 16A(1) “of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the 
offence”, as well as expressions such as “the need to ensure that the person is 
adequately punished for the offence”, which appears in s16A(2)(k).1562 
In R v Zerafa, Beech-Jones J stated ‘unlike the provisions described in…Hili (ie s 
16A(1) and (2)(k)), s 16A(2)(p) is not drafted at a level of generality that permits 
the accommodation of the principle in Wirth.’1563 
 
 
A. The Meaning of ‘Must Take into Account…as are Relevant and Known’ 
 
The federal provision states at s 16A: 
 (2)  In addition to any other matters, the court must take into account such of 
the following matters as are relevant and known to the court: 
… 
(p) the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would 
have on any of the person's family or dependants.1564 
The presence in the legislation of the word ‘must’ suggests that a listed matter is 
required to be taken into account in sentencing a federal offender,1565 where it 
meets the threshold of ‘relevant and known’. In Wong,1566 Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ stated that ‘[t]o the extent that the matters identified in s 16A(2) are 
relevant and known to the Court, the sentencer must take those into account.’1567 
 
                                                          
1560 (2004) 78 ALJR 616, 622.  
1561 (2010) 242 CLR 520, 528. 
1562 Bui v DPP (Cth) (2012) 244 CLR 638, 651. 
1563 R v Zerafa (2013) 235 A Crim R 265, 294. 
1564 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A. 
1565 Pearce and Geddes provide that ‘must’ prima facie imposes an obligation see DC Pearce and RS 
Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2011) 348-349. 
1566 (2001) 207 CLR 584. 
1567 (2001) 207 CLR 584, 610. 
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The provision, therefore, provides discretion to the court in respect of whether a 
matter is deemed relevant. Once found to be relevant, there is also discretion in the 
weight that can be attached to the matter by the court.  
 
The phrase ‘known to the court’ was considered in the case of R v Olbrich.1568 The 
case concerned the importation of a trafficable quantity of heroin. The issue arose 
as to whether a sentencing court could assume the offender was a principal when 
it had no knowledge as to whether the offender was a ‘principal’ or a ‘mere 
courier’.1569 As Ian Leader-Elliott describes, the High Court found that the ‘offender 
bears the burden of persuasion on factors which would mitigate the penalty.’1570  In 
R v Olbrich, the plurality stated: 
… we reject the contention that a judge who is not satisfied of some matter 
urged in a plea on behalf of an offender must, nevertheless, sentence the 
offender on a basis that accepts the accuracy of that contention unless the 
prosecution proves the contrary beyond reasonable doubt.1571 
The court’s reasoning was that the sentencing judge may not be persuaded (on the 
balance of probabilities) by the evidence of the offender. Therefore the offender 
caries an evidential burden in respect to matters of mitigation. 
 
Appellate courts within Australia have found that family hardship is a ‘relevant’ 
mitigating factor only where exceptional circumstances apply. The Supreme Court 
of the Australian Capital Territory has rejected the view that exceptional 
circumstances can be read into s16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).1572 The 
case law also reveals that the term ‘relevant’ has also been held to mean where 
sufficient evidence has been put before the court. The study of the case law on 
family hardship has highlighted that a lack of evidence presented to the sentencing 
judge in respect to family hardship has been a common complaint in cases by 
appellate courts.1573 The meaning of ‘relevant’ within the identical ACT provision 
was raised in Wilkinson v Bunt1574 where Nield AJ stated that: 
 
                                                          
1568 (1999) 199 CLR 270, 278. 
1569 R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270, 279-280. 
1570 Ian Leader Elliott, ‘Editorial: Instinctive Synthesisers in The High Court’ (2002) 26 Criminal Law 
Journal 5, 7. See v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270, 281. 
1571 R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270, 280 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Hayne and Callinan JJ) 
1572 DPP v Ka-Hung Ip [2005] ACTCA 24 (19 July 2005) [60]-[61]. 
1573 See, eg, R v Togias (2001) 127 A Crim R 23, 25; Pickett v Fox (1993) 112 FLR 345, 348;  
1574 [2011] ACTSC 98. 
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As s 33 subsection (1) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) says, “A court 
must consider whichever of the following matters are relevant and known to 
the court.” If a fact is not known by the sentencing judge or magistrate because 
the offender has not adduced evidence of the fact, then the sentencing judge or 
magistrate could not be expected to take the fact into account in the 
determination of an appropriate sentence for an offence or to inquire as to why 
evidence of that fact has not been adduced.1575  
Although purporting to define relevance, in this context, the case, in fact, dealt with 
what was known. 
 
B. The Meaning of ‘Probable Effect that any Sentence or Order’ 
 
In respect of the federal provision Spigelman CJ observed that ‘[it] is of some 
significance that the Parliament has identified this matter in terms of a “probable 
effect”, not merely a “possible effect”.’1576 However, Spigelman CJ did not explore 
the term “probable effect” further. 
 
In R v Berlinsky,1577 Bleby J commented on the term ‘probable effect’. He said: 
I accept that dictionaries will give a variety of meanings to the word “probable”. 
However, in the context of s 16A of the Crimes Act I consider that the effect to 
be considered is that which is more probable than not or more likely to occur 
than not. If a lesser standard were required, it is likely that the drafter would 
have used the word “possible” rather than “probable”. 
It was therefore necessary for the sentencing Judge to take into account the 
probable effect on the child that the sentence under consideration would have 
on the child.1578 
However, in R v Belinsky, Gray J came to a different view and said that ‘probable’ 
was not as narrow as Bleby J proposed. Justice Gray turned to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the Latin roots of the term and judicial comments by Lord Reid in 
Wagon Mound (No 2) and found that: 
In the context of s 16A(2)(p), a provision obviously intended by the legislature 
to enable the Court to take into account a wide range of circumstances and 
eventualities, the term “probable” is correctly interpreted as including events 
that are possible, in the sense of being credible or having the appearance of 
truth, that is, events that are plausible outcomes, not merely fanciful 
postulations. Such an interpretation provides consistency of approach when 
sentencing.1579 
 
                                                          
1575 [2011] ACTSC 98, [22]. 
1576 R v Togias (2001) 127 A Crim R 23, [10]. 
1577 R v Berlinsky [2005] SASC 316 (8 September 2005). 
1578 Ibid [42]-[43]. 
1579 Ibid [58]. 
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In Burns,1580 Owen J remarked that the ‘section calls for an examination of the 
probable effect of the sentence on the third party, not on the offender.’1581 He said 
that, therefore, evidence of the impact on the offender of her separation from the 
children is ‘quite different consideration to that thrown up by s16A(2)(p).’1582 
 
The case analysis in Chapter Four and Five have highlighted that judicial officers 
when determining an appropriate sentence to impose upon an offender are not 
made aware of the conditions the offender will face in prison. While the conditions 
of the sentence are a matter for the Executive, this presents difficulties in respect 
of sentencing where there is the potential for an offender to have access to a 
Mother and Baby Unit within the prison, but it is unknown at the time of sentence 
whether this will transpire or not. There are also practical issues which impact 
upon the probable effect of a sentence upon an offender’s dependants such as the 
location of the prison, the access the prisoner has to their dependants (particularly 
where children are housed with extended family or friends or placed in foster 
care) and the variable rules governing visiting access and the duration of 
telephone calls.1583 
 
C. Meaning of ‘Family or Dependants’ 
 
Both the federal and ACT provisions expressly reference the impact of the sentence 
upon the offender’s ‘family or dependants’.1584  There is no definition of ‘family’ 
provided within the Dictionary in the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). 
However, within the federal provision the term ‘family’ includes de facto 
partners,1585 a child (as defined by the Family Law Act 1974 (Cth))1586 and an 
extended definition is also provided within s 16A(4)(c).1587 There is no legislative 
definition for the term ‘dependants’ in either jurisdiction. 
 
                                                          
1580 (1994) 71 A Crim R 450. 
1581 Ibid 457. 
1582 Ibid. 
1583 For more information on the kinds of problems that arise, see Shine for Kids Co-operative Ltd, 
Putting Your Child First, A survival guide for carers of children of prisoners, their families and workers 
(SHINE for Kids, 2007). 
1584 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1)(o). 
1585 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(4)(a). 
1586 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 16A(4)(b) and 3 (definition of child); Family Law Act 1974 (Cth) s 4. 
1587 Section 16A(4) provides:  
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It appears that there has been no judicial consideration of either the term ‘family’ 
or ‘dependants’ in case law engaging with the application of either the federal or 
the ACT provisions. This study did not find any cases where the meaning of these 
terms was a fact in issue, nor where the meaning of these terms was raised in 
obiter. 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to isolate the consideration of the federal sentencing 
provision relating to family hardship that on its face appeared to be expressed in 
legislation as a clear and specific mitigating factor. The goal was to trace the 
development of sentencing principles related to this sentencing factor in federal 
sentencing. This chapter has outlined the approach taken in each jurisdiction. The 
approach taken in each state and territory with respect to family hardship has 
influenced the approach taken to deciding federal cases in those jurisdictions.  
 
Superior courts throughout Australia have been conscious to adopt a consistent 
approach to federal sentencing practice and the interpretation of the provisions 
within pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). As discussed above, the exception to this 
is the Australian Capital Territory which has stuck with its local interpretation 
(based on an equivalent provision) and not ‘read in’ a common law threshold of 
‘exceptional circumstances’. If the High Court suggests that the common law ‘in 
exceptional circumstances’ approach is wrong at law in the interpretation of s 
16A(2)(p) then courts exercising federal jurisdiction will be bound to follow that 
approach. This will further embed the Australian Capital Territory Court of 
Appeals reading of s 33(1)(o) and any further legislative reforms at the state and 
 
                                                          
(4)  For the purposes of a reference in this Part to a family, the members of a person's family are taken to 
include the following (without limitation): 
(a)  a de facto partner of the person; 
(b)  someone who is the child of the person, or of whom the person is the child, because of the definition 
of child in section 3; 
(c)  anyone else who would be a member of the person's family if someone mentioned in paragraph (a) or 
(b) is taken to be a member of the person's family. 
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territory level seeking to enhance consideration of hardship should have a positive 
impact. 
 
Immediately after the passage of pt 1B the question was raised before superior 
courts within Australia as to whether s 16A(2)(p) changed the law in respect to the 
consideration of family hardship at sentencing. However, it was quickly decided 
that the listing of family hardship in s 16A(2)(p) did not change the common law 
interpretation and the provision should be read as if preceded by the words ‘in 
exceptional circumstances.’  
 
This position was not reached by a careful consideration of the statutory 
interpretation principles which give effect to the intention of the legislature, 
reflected in the foundational reports of the ALRC, as discussed in Chapter Three. As 
a matter of sentencing principle, reading in ‘exceptional circumstances’ with 
respect to only one mitigating factor in the federal list in pt 1B is an anomaly. 
However, this ‘gloss’ on s 16A(2)(p), save for some recent dissent,1588 has not been 
openly acknowledged by superior courts within Australia. Chapter Six examines 
the secondary literature in the fields of sociology, psychology, criminology and 
legal philosophy to consider whether further light can be shed on why family 
hardship has been seen to be such a controversial consideration in sentencing. 
 
  
 
                                                          
1588 R v Zerafa (2013) 235 A Crim R 265, 299 (Beech-Jones J); Elshani v The Queen (2015) 255 A Crim 
R 488, 502 (Beech-Jones J). 
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6. FAMILY HARDSHIP AND GENDER 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This Australian study of the case law has highlighted that consideration of family 
hardship as a mitigating factor in sentencing is controversial. Underlying the 
tensions present in the use and operation of this sentencing factor is a normative 
question, namely, whether or not it is legitimate for a judicial officer to consider 
the impact of a sentence upon an offenders’ family and dependants. While some 
have lamented the move away from sentencing discretion being aligned only with 
the particular offence and the particular offender,1589 the analysis in Chapter Two 
showed that this is an ahistorical and inaccurate view of sentencing theory and 
practice. From the earliest records of common law sentencing practices courts did 
exercise discretion and take into account the impact of a sentence upon an 
offender’s dependants as discussed above (Chapter Three).1590  
 
There are a variety of justifications that can be made in respect to the 
consideration of family hardship at sentencing. These include: 
 innocent people should not suffer;1591 
 the rights of the child;1592 
 
                                                          
1589 See, eg, Sir Guy Green, ‘The Concept of Uniformity in Sentencing’ (1996) 70 Australian Law 
Journal 112, 113; Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson, 'The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing 
System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines' (1994) 85 Criminal Law & Criminology 181, 207. 
1590 See, eg, Edward W Cox, Principles of Punishment as applied in the Administration of the Criminal 
Law by Judges and Magistrates (Law Times Office, 1877). 
1591 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘First-Time Offenders, Productive Offender, Offender with 
Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders (Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing’ (2015) 78(2) Albany Law 
Review 397, 399, 435-437. 
1592 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 
(entered into force 2 September 1990) Art 3. See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 196; Helen Codd, ‘Prisoners’ Families: Issues in Law and 
Policy’ (2004) 55 Amicus Curiae 2, 6-7; Helen Codd, ‘Through the Looking Glass? Prisoners’ Children 
and Penal Policy’ (2007) 69 Amicus Curiae 3; Helen Codd, In the Shadow of Prison: Families, 
Imprisonment and Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, 2008) 91-100; Vanessa Munro, 'The Emerging 
Rights of Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children' (2002) 14(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 303; 
Helen Codd, In the Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment and Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, 
2008) 164-165; Vanessa Munro, 'Turning Rights from The Outside In: Re-Visiting the Politics of 
Separation in Prison Mothers and Baby Units: CF v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
Another' (2005) 17(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 545; Vanessa Munro, ‘From Mothering Behind 
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 the right to family life;1593 
 impact mitigation.1594 
This chapter will scrutinise the tension between family hardship as a sentencing 
factor and gender.  
 
Two dominant explanations for leniency to mothers have been chivalry theory and 
judicial mercy. These will be explored below alongside the problematic association 
between taking family hardship into account and equal justice. In the 1980s 
Catherine MacKinnon famously argued that the ‘law, structurally, adopts the male 
point of view’.1595 Undoubtedly a lot has happened in the decades since, however, it 
is still necessary to question whether equality claims are actually calling for a swift 
return to equality in relation to male offenders and men’s experience. MacKinnon’s 
words still have resonance in modern day legal systems: 
When it is most ruthlessly neutral, it is most male; when it is most sex blind, it 
is most blind to the sex of the standard being applied. When it most closely 
conforms to precedent, to “facts”, to legislative intent, it most closely enforces 
socially male norms and most thoroughly precludes questioning their content 
as having a point of view at all.1596 
This chapter examines the role equality theory, gender bias, judicial paternalism 
and mercy have played in the understanding of, and justifications for, taking family 
hardship into account. The chapter interrogates if these understandings help or 
hinder a proper understanding of sentencing within Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Bars to Parenting Beyond Barriers? The Right of Family Life and the Politics of Imprisonment’ (2007) 69 
Amicus Curiae 6. 
1593 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 28 March 1979, [1980] 
ATS 23 (entered into force 13 August 1980) Arts 17, 23, and 8. See Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, 
‘First-Time Offenders, Productive Offender, Offender with Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders 
(Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing’ (2015) 78(2) Albany Law Review 397, 432-433; Andrew Ashworth, 
Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 196. 
1594 See Christine Piper, 'Should Impact Constitute Mitigation?: Structured Discretion Versus Mercy' 
(2007) 2 Criminal Law Review 141; Susan Easton, 'Dangerous Waters: Taking Account of Impact in 
Sentencing' (2008) 2 Criminal Law Review 105. 
1595 Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, 1989) 216. 
1596 Ibid 248. 
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II ‘CHIVALRY THEORY’ AND ‘JUDICIAL PATERNALISM’ 
 
It has been widely stated in the research literature that common law courts have 
had a long-standing practice of granting leniency to female offenders when passing 
sentence. Typically, this practice has been described under the terms ‘chivalry 
theory’ or ‘judicial paternalism’.1597 These terms were adopted to describe the 
expectation that male judicial officers acted upon protective assumptions when 
sentencing female offenders.1598 The norms that were seen to be operative in the 
lenient treatment of female offenders at sentencing included that female offenders 
were passive, weaker, submissive and often led astray.1599  
 
In the 1980s, empirical research into the impact of gender in sentencing was 
conducted,1600 the importance of this wave of research was that this was the first 
 
                                                          
1597 See Rita Simon, Women and Crime (Lexington Books, 1975) 49; Kathleen Daly, 'Neither Conflict nor 
Labelling nor Paternalism Will Suffice: Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Gender and Family in Criminal 
Court Decisions' (1989) 35(1) Crime & Delinquency 136, 137; Kathleen Daly, 'Rethinking Judicial 
Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family Relations, and Sentencing' (1989) 3(1) Gender & Society 9, 10; 
Barbara Hudson, Justice through Punishment: A Critique of the ‘Justice’ Model of Corrections (St 
Martin’s Press, 1987) 116, 122; Patricia Easteal, Less than Equal: Women and the Australian Legal 
System (Butterworths, 2001) 30 – 32; Brenda McGowan and Karen Blumenthal, ‘Children of Women 
Prisoner: A Forgotten Minority’ in Laura Crites (ed), The Female Offender (Lexington Books, 1978) 121, 
123; Barbara Koons-Witt, 'The Effect of Gender on the Decision to Incarcerate Before and After the 
Introduction of Sentencing Guidelines' (2002) 40 Criminology 297, 298, 299, 305; Darrell Steffensmeier, 
‘Assessing the Impact of the Women’s Movement on Sex-Based Differences in the Handling of Adult 
Criminal Defendants’ (1980) 26 Crime and Delinquency 344, 349-351; Mary Eaton, Justice for Women? 
Family, Court and Social Control (Open University Press, 1986) 22 – 25; David Farrington and Allison 
Morris, 'Sex, Sentencing and Reconviction' (1983) 23(3) British Journal of Criminology 229, 229; Myrna 
Raeder, 'Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and other Sex-Based Anomalies in the 
Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' (1993) 20 Pepperdine Law Review 905, 917; 
Gayle Bickle and Ruth Peterson, 'The Impact of Gender-Based Family Roles on Criminal Sentencing' 
(1991) 38(3) Social Problems 372, 372; Candace Kruttschnitt, 'Women, Crime and Dependency: An 
Application of the Theory of Law' (1982) 19 Criminology 495, 496; Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson, 'The 
Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing 
of Female Offenders under the United States Sentencing Guidelines' (1994) 85 Criminal Law & 
Criminology 181, 188; Bronwyn Naylor, 'Sentencing Female Offenders in the Magistrate's Court: 
Preliminary Report on a Pilot Study' (Paper presented at the Women and the Law, Canberra, 24-26 
September 1991); Samantha Jeffries and Christine Bond, ‘Gender, Indigeneity, and the Criminal Courts: 
A Narrative Exploration of Women’s Sentencing in Western Australia (2013)23(1) Women & Criminal 
Justice 19, 19-20. 
1598 See generally, Kathleen Daly, 'Structure and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court' 
(1987) 21 Law & Society Review 267, 268; Kathleen Daly, 'Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, 
Work-Family Relations, and Sentencing' (1989) 3(1) Gender & Society 9,10; Barbara Hudson, ‘Doing 
Justice to Difference’ in Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (eds), Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: 
Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch (Oxford University Press, 1998) 224, 228. 
1599 See Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson, 'The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal 
Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines' (1994) 85 Criminal Law & Criminology 181, 188. 
1600 See Carol Hedderman and Loraine Gelsthorpe (eds), Understanding the Sentencing of Women (Home 
Office Research Study No 170, A Research and Statistics Directorate Report, Home Office, 1997) 3. 
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time ‘gender’ was the focus of study. The operation of paternalism and chivalry 
were contested through the work of David Farrington and Allison Morris,1601 
Candace Kruttschnitt,1602 Darrell Steffensmeier,1603 Kathleen Daly,1604 and Mary 
Eaton.1605  For example, Eaton stated, 
…the claims that women offenders receive preferential treatment because of 
their sex are unfounded. When the relevant influences on sentencing are 
adequately considered the differences on grounds of sex are removed.1606 
A central finding within this research literature was that ‘gender-bias’ was not the 
reason for differences in sentences imposed upon offenders. 
 
The research conducted in this period identified that sentencing and the decision-
making processes involved were highly complex processes. Statistics are open to 
misinterpretation when this complexity is overlooked.1607 The research conducted 
in the 1980s identified a variety of variables that were relevant to differences in 
sentencing outcomes between men and women. These identified variables are: 
 circumstances of offending; 
 the gravity of offences committed; 
 type of offences committed; 
 life course factors; 
 age; 
 previous convictions; 
 
                                                          
1601 David Farrington and Allison Morris, 'Sex, Sentencing and Reconviction' (1983) 23(3) British 
Journal of Criminology 229; Allison Morris, ‘Sex and Sentencing’ (1988) Mar Criminal Law Review 163. 
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Controversy' (1984) 21 Research in Crime and Delinquency 213; Candace Kruttschnitt and Donald 
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Gender, Crime and Punishment (Yale University Press, 1994). 
1605 Mary Eaton, Justice for Women? Family, Court and Social Control (Open University Press, 1986). 
1606 Ibid 30. 
1607 Carol Hedderman and Loraine Gelsthorpe (eds), Understanding the Sentencing of Women (Home 
Office Research Study No 170, A Research and Statistics Directorate Report, Home Office, 1997) 3-4 
citing the work of Roger Hood, Race and Sentencing: A Study in the Crown Court (Oxford, 1992). 
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 involvement of other offenders; and 
 family circumstances.1608 
The studies of this era recognised that these kinds of variable (listed above) are 
crucial independent variables at sentencing. However, these studies emerged in 
the disciplines of sociology and criminology, therefore, the researchers understood 
these concepts as statistical ‘variables’ rather than ‘sentencing factors’.  
 
For the purposes of this study of family hardship as a sentencing factor, it is 
significant that ‘family circumstances’ and ‘motherhood’ were identified in this 
research literature as an important variable.1609 But the meaning of this to 
sentencing practices was interpreted in light of the discourses in which the studies 
were situated. For example, Kruttschnitt in her early work saw this as indicative of 
the operation of social control upon women by the legal system.1610 Women with 
dependent children and families received lighter sentences and less control by 
probation officers, whereas, ‘freer women’1611 received harsher sentences and had 
more control imposed on them.1612  
 
Within social science research literature, there has been a failure to recognise 
family hardship as a relevant mitigating sentencing factor. For example, Koons-
 
                                                          
1608 See David Farrington and Allison Morris, 'Sex, Sentencing and Reconviction' (1983) 23(3) British 
Journal of Criminology 229, 230-213, 240-241, 245; Mary Eaton, Justice for Women? Family, Court and 
Social Control (Open University Press, 1986) 11-30; Candace Kruttschnitt, 'Women, Crime and 
Dependency: An Application of the Theory of Law' (1982) 19 Criminology 495, 503-508; Jeanne Flavin, 
'Of Punishment and Parenthood: Family-Based Social Control and the Sentencing of Black Drug 
Offenders' (2001) 15 Gender & Society 611, 622-631; Darrell Steffensmeier, ‘Assessing the Impact of the 
Women’s Movement on Sex-Based Differences in the Handling of Adult Criminal Defendants’ (1980) 26 
Crime and Delinquency 344, 347-349, 354; Darrell Steffensmeier, John Kramer and Cathy Streifel, 
'Gender and Imprisonment Decisions' (1993) 31(3) Criminology 411, 435 and 439; Kathleen Daly, 
‘Gender and Sentencing: What We Know and Don’t Know from Empirical Research’ (1995) 8(3) 
Federal Sentencing Reporter 163, 164-165. 
1609 See, eg, David Farrington and Allison Morris, 'Sex, Sentencing and Reconviction' (1983) 23(3) 
British Journal of Criminology 229, 230-213, 240-241, 245; Mary Eaton, Justice for Women? Family, 
Court and Social Control (Open University Press, 1986) 11-30; Candace Kruttschnitt and Donald Green, 
'The Sex-Sanctioning Issue: Is it History?' (1984) 49(4) American Sociological Review 541, 549; Jeanne 
Flavin, 'Of Punishment and Parenthood: Family-Based Social Control and the Sentencing of Black Drug 
Offenders' (2001) 15 Gender & Society 611, 622-631; Kathleen Daly, 'Discrimination in the Criminal 
Courts: Family, Gender, and the Problem of Equal Treatment' (1987) 66(1) Social Forces 152, 154; 
Kathleen Daly, 'Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family Relations, and Sentencing' (1989) 
3(1) Gender & Society 9, 11. 
1610 Candace Kruttschnitt, 'Women, Crime and Dependency: An Application of the Theory of Law' (1982) 
19 Criminology 495. 
1611 Ibid 507. 
1612 Ibid. See also Gayle Bickle and Ruth Peterson, 'The Impact of Gender-Based Family Roles on 
Criminal Sentencing' (1991) 38(3) Social Problems 372. 
 307 
Witt drawing upon eight separate studies in the 1980s and 1990s, observed that 
women who conform with traditional gender roles are treated leniently at 
sentencing while those who do not are treated more harshly than men.1613 A result 
of her study, comparing sentencing practices in Minnesota pre-guidelines to 
practices post guidelines, was that ‘gender’ did not have a significant influence on 
sentencing.1614 Koons-Witt found that ‘leniency and the chivalrous views of the 
courts appear to be limited to those women with dependent children.’1615 She 
called for further research to understand how motherhood and fatherhood is 
considered by courts.1616  
 
For legal scholarship, a limitation to Koons-Witt’s research findings is that she did 
not acknowledge family hardship as a legitimate sentencing factor, instead 
labelling mitigation on this basis as ‘lenient or chivalrous’ treatment of women. If 
her finding is placed within the context of legal discourse, then she has identified 
the role of family hardship as a common law sentencing factor. Reframing her 
findings, highlights that Minnesota courts were taking into account family hardship 
in sentencing offenders, post the introduction of the guidelines. This is a very 
interesting research finding supporting the continued role of family hardship as a 
central mitigating factor in sentencing despite efforts to marginalise it. 
 
Kathleen Daly was one of the first researchers to draw attention to the gaps 
between studies conducted by sociologists and by legal scholars.1617 Daly’s 
research in the USA included analysis of court proceedings and documents (ie. pre-
sentence reports and sentencing remarks)1618 and interviews with court 
 
                                                          
1613 Barbara Koons-Witt, 'The Effect of Gender on the Decision to Incarcerate Before and After the 
Introduction of Sentencing Guidelines' (2002) 40 Criminology 297, 300, 305-306. 
1614 Ibid 313, 320. 
1615 Ibid 320. 
1616 Ibid. 
1617 See Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime and Punishment (Yale University Press, 1994) 172; Kathleen 
Daly, 'Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family Relations, and Sentencing' (1989) 3(1) 
Gender & Society 9, 11. 
1618 See Kathleen Daly, 'Discrimination in the Criminal Courts: Family, Gender, and the Problem of Equal 
Treatment' (1987) 66(1) Social Forces 152, 157; Kathleen Daly, 'Neither Conflict nor Labelling nor 
Paternalism Will Suffice: Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Gender and Family in Criminal Court 
Decisions' (1989) 35(1) Crime & Delinquency 136, 136; Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime and Punishment 
(Yale University Press, 1994) vii and 177. 
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officials.1619 Influenced by Kruttschnitt’s research, Daly has identified that, ‘court 
officials draw a major distinction between two groups of defendants – those with 
familial responsibilities and those without such responsibilities.’1620 In her early 
research she identified that rather than focusing upon a ‘sex effect’1621 or female 
offender’s dependence upon men, more research attention should be paid to 
‘whether male and female defendants have dependants.’1622  
 
Daly identified that courts took into account the impact of a sentence upon 
‘innocent family members’.1623 Interestingly, her research found that ‘courts 
attached even greater social costs to removing caregivers than wage earners from 
families.’1624 This study of the Australian case law highlighted, that Australian 
courts have also had a general practice of placing limited importance on the 
financial impact upon a family due of the incarceration of a wage earner. 
 
A key outcome of Daly’s empirical research was that she rejected the operation of 
traditional paternalism1625 in sentencing practices and identified that courts were 
acting upon what she classified as ‘familial paternalism’.1626 This was the courts 
protection of families. For example, in the late 1980s, Daly reported: 
These results challenge the commonly held notion that the court protects 
women (female paternalism), and reveal instead that the real object of court 
protection is families (familial paternalism). This distinction between female 
and familial paternalism is illustrated by the following judicial discussion of 
whether a woman who cared for children should be jailed: 
A lot will depend on what will happen to the children. Chances are 
that if there is no one to take care of the children, I won’t punish 
 
                                                          
1619 Kathleen Daly, 'Structure and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court' (1987) 21 Law 
& Society Review 267, 270-272; Kathleen Daly, 'Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family 
Relations, and Sentencing' (1989) 3(1) Gender & Society 9, 12-13; Kathleen Daly, ‘Gender and 
Sentencing: What We Know and Don’t Know from Empirical Research’ (1995) 8(3) Federal Sentencing 
Reporter 163, 163. 
1620 Kathleen Daly, 'Discrimination in the Criminal Courts: Family, Gender, and the Problem of Equal 
Treatment' (1987) 66(1) Social Forces 152, 154; Kathleen Daly, ‘Gender and Sentencing: What We 
Know and Don’t Know from Empirical Research’ (1995) 8(3) Federal Sentencing Reporter 163, 163 
1621 Kathleen Daly, 'Discrimination in the Criminal Courts: Family, Gender, and the Problem of Equal 
Treatment' (1987) 66(1) Social Forces 152, 152. 
1622 Ibid 154. 
1623 Kathleen Daly, ‘Gender and Sentencing: What We Know and Don’t Know from Empirical Research’ 
(1995) 8(3) Federal Sentencing Reporter 163, 163. 
1624 Ibid 163. 
1625 See Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime and Punishment (Yale University Press, 1994) 197. 
1626 Kathleen Daly, 'Structure and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court' (1987) 21 Law 
& Society Review 267, 268, 282-283. 
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the children. I feel no sympathy toward her, but I do feel that the 
children are entitled to sympathy.1627 
Daly, therefore, identified courts taking into account the impact of the sentence 
upon the offender’s dependants at sentencing. Her research evidences courts 
looking beyond just the impact of the sentence upon the offender and even 
selecting the impact on third parties as more relevant to the impact upon the 
offender. 
 
Family hardship as expressed in Australian legislative provisions captures Daly’s 
concept of ‘familial paternalism’. For example, the federal expression of family 
hardship as a mitigating factor provides that courts must take into account ‘the 
probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any 
of the person's family or dependants’.1628 This is familial paternalism. The court is 
to take into account as a mitigating factor the probable impact on this particular 
offender’s dependants. Remembering, it is for the court to determine what weight 
is to be attached to this sentencing factor and how it is to be balanced against other 
sentencing factors.  
 
In her research findings Daly also found that courts frequently justified taking 
familial paternalism into account because the offenders were ‘… more stable and … 
[had] more to lose by getting in trouble again’.1629 Daly observed that courts 
identified that, ‘these defendants have more informal social control in their lives 
and have a greater stake in normative social adulthood.’1630 While not explicitly 
connecting family hardship to the sentencing purpose of ‘rehabilitation’, at this 
point in her work that is what she is describing. Daly’s research findings support 
the proposition of this dissertation that family hardship is a long-standing and 
important mitigating sentencing factor in the common law tradition. Her research 
supports that in the 20th century family hardship was a legitimate consideration at 
 
                                                          
1627 Ibid. 
1628 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(p). 
1629 Kathleen Daly, 'Structure and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court' (1987) 21 Law 
& Society Review 267, 273. 
1630 Ibid 274. 
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sentencing by common law courts. This is so even if it has not been properly 
recognised as such in the research literature.1631 
 
Daly also observed that familial paternalism demonstrated courts recognising and 
taking into account the social costs of punishment when sentencing. She identified 
two reasons why familial paternalism has operated in favour of women more than 
men. These reasons were: 
(1) gender divisions of labor define women, not men, as the primary caregivers; 
and 
(2) the court attaches more importance to caregiving than breadwinning in 
maintaining family life. Thus, those engaged in caregiving (predominantly 
women) are thought to be most deserving of leniency.1632 
By the use of the term ‘leniency’ here, Daly is referring to is ‘mitigation’ in 
sentencing. 1633  
 
Darrell Steffensmeier had reported similar findings after examining the empirical 
research.1634 He found that ‘“chivalrous” treatment of women defendants has been 
greatly exaggerated’.1635 He noted that lack of empirical research prior to the 
1980s on sex differences in the handling of adult defendants. He argued the 
academic supposition had been largely built on assumptions.1636 Steffensmeier 
identified that courts took into account child care responsibilities at sentencing for 
male and female offenders.1637 He hypothesised that ‘as child care had traditionally 
been defined as the responsibility of women, it follows that more allowances… 
would be made for females’ by the courts.1638 
 
                                                          
1631 Berberian also argues that this was a problematic and underdeveloped field of research. See Sean 
Berberian, 'Protecting Children: Explaining Disparities in the Female Offender's Pretrial Process, and 
Policy Issues Surrounding Lenient Treatment of Mothers' (1999) 10 Hastings Women's Law Journal 369, 
371. 
1632 Kathleen Daly, 'Structure and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court' (1987) 21 Law 
& Society Review 267, 282. 
1633 Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime and Punishment (Yale University Press, 1994) 197 and 263. In 
contrast to Mary Eaton and Pat Carlen, Daly argues that familial paternalism does not harm women. She 
claims that the empirical research supports the view that women may benefit at sentencing from caring 
responsibilities but that the research does not support that women without these responsibilities are 
penalised because of this. 
1634 Darrell Steffensmeier, ‘Assessing the Impact of the Women’s Movement on Sex-Based Differences in 
the Handling of Adult Criminal Defendants’ (1980) 26 Crime and Delinquency 344. 
1635 Ibid 354. 
1636 Ibid 345. 
1637 Ibid 350. 
1638 Ibid. 
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A. Reverberations in the Australian Literature 
 
Despite research findings which have debunked the assumption that chivalry or 
judicial paternalism pervade court sentencing practices, the perception of gender 
bias is deeply embedded and persists in the literature. In the Australian literature, 
claims of chivalry and judicial paternalism have been commonly made. For 
example, in the first edition of Fox and Freiberg, a definitive text on sentencing in 
Victoria, it was stated: ‘It is often asserted that the criminal justice system is biased 
in favour of women… In sentencing, this bias is well entrenched.’1639  
 
In the 2009 edition of Ross on Crime, a prominent Australian criminal law text, 
David Ross QC, under the heading ‘women’, stated that: ‘[g]enerally, sentences for 
women are less than for men on equivalent offences.’1640 This broad statement was 
supported by the 1995 case of Nagas.1641 In Nagas, the Court referenced 
assumption that ‘in practice women are commonly treated with less severity than 
men’1642 citing the first edition of Fox and Freiberg. In Nagas, the Northern 
Territory Court of Criminal Appeal stated: 
It is clearly established that allowance is made for the fact that in practice 
women are commonly treated with less severity than men… Whether the 
reason for leniency to women is predicated upon the lower recidivism rates of 
women, prevalence of a particular type of crime, general deterrence or simply 
compassion, the principle is well established.1643 
There was no legislative support, at that time, for the position that ‘gender’ was a 
relevant sentencing factor. In fact, the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ have not appeared 
in any of the lists of sentencing factors in any Australian statutes (see Chapters 
Two and Three).1644  
 
 
                                                          
1639 Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford University 
Press, 1985) 465. 
1640 David Ross, Ross on Crime (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2009) 1236. 
1641 (1995) 5 NTLR 45. This case is discussed in Chapter Four. 
1642 (1995) 5 NTLR 45. 
1643 R v Nagas (1995) 5 NTLR 45, 55 (Gallop, Angel and Thomas JJ). See also D Ross, Ross on Crime 
(4th ed, 2009) 1236. 
1644 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2), Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33, Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A, Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(2), Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 
(Qld) s 9(2), Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1), Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2). 
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In 2009, Riley J in the Northern Territory case of Midjumbani v Moore1645 stated 
that gender is not a relevant matter to be taken into account at sentencing. Justice 
Riley observed that there had been a shift in the approach to gender since the 
decision in R v Nagas. He stated: 
I do not accept that the gender of the offender is, per se, a relevant matter that 
should have been taken into account by his Honour. The submission relied 
upon the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Nagas where their 
Honours made the passing observation that “in practice women are commonly 
treated with less severity than men” and, in that regard, reference was made to 
comments in the first edition of Fox and Freiberg, Sentencing, State and Federal 
Law in Victoria. The second edition of that work revisits the issues and notes 
that the empirical evidence in support of such assertions “is at best equivocal 
and over recent years any biases, if they do exist, are likely to be less 
pronounced.” The learned authors go on to observe that it is now accepted that 
gender alone should not form the basis of differential treatment in 
sentencing.1646 
The latest edition of Ross on Crime1647 retains the reliance upon the assumption 
and continues to reference Nagas.1648 The only caveat to the current edition under 
the heading ‘Women’1649 is the addition of the statement: ‘However, courts often 
say that gender does not reduce a sentence appropriate for the seriousness of the 
crime.’1650  
 
However, there has been a marked general shift in the mainstream Australian 
sentencing texts on gender bias in sentencing. Kate Warner has identified that Fox 
and Freiberg did not maintain their reporting of gender bias. Warner observed,  
‘…in their second edition, Fox and Freiberg report that contemporary judicial 
comment is devoid of any reference to a policy of leniency towards women.’1651 In 
respect of her jurisdiction of study, Warner reported: ‘[a] search of Tasmanian 
decisions found no express reference to a policy or bias or leniency in favour of 
women.’1652 Bagaric and Edney, in their textbook, do not engage at all with gender 
as a sentencing factor, they do, however, identify and discuss family hardship1653 
 
                                                          
1645 Midjumbani v Moore (2009) 229 FLR 452. 
1646 Ibid 459. 
1647 Mirko Bagaric, Ross on Crime (Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2016). Bagaric took over authorship of this 
text for the 6th edition in 2013. 
1648 Mirko Bagaric, Ross on Crime (Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2016) 1389 and earlier Mirko Bagaric, Ross 
on Crime (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2013) 1379. 
1649 Ibid. 
1650 Ibid. 
1651 Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 96. 
1652 Ibid. 
1653 See Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2014) 516-522. 
 313 
(classified as ‘hardship to others’ in their text). In the latest edition of this text, they 
have listed ‘harm to dependants of the offender’ in a table of mitigating 
considerations and ascribed this factor a maximum weight of 20% at 
sentencing.1654 
 
Studies are still being conducted in Australia to demonstrate that variations in 
sentencing outcomes are not due to gendered discrimination. For example, 
Poletti’s study of the sentencing of female offenders in New South Wales identified 
that males (8.6%) were twice as likely as females (4.2%) to be given a full-time 
prison term.1655 However, she rejected the claim that it was due to gender and 
‘unfair discrimination’,1656 observing that ‘men tend to commit more serious 
offences or have a more extensive criminal record’.1657 The identification of valid 
and relevant sentencing factors which justify the lower imprisonment rates of 
women has been a consistent finding in the research conducted both in Australia 
and overseas.1658 
 
 
III UNRAVELLING MERCY AND FAMILY HARDSHIP 
 
A common explanation for taking family hardship into account at sentencing is that 
it is an act of judicial mercy. The judicial exercise of mercy merits much deeper 
consideration than it has received in legal discourse. As Nigel Walker states, 
‘[a]natomists of criminal justice systems usually ignore the tiny organ called 
‘mercy’ or ‘clemency’’.1659  
 
 
                                                          
1654 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2017) 473. 
1655 Patrizia Poletti, ‘Sentencing Female Offenders in New South Wales’ (Sentencing Trends No 20, 
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, May 2000). 
1656 The term used by Poletti in the paper see Patrizia Poletti, ‘Sentencing Female Offenders in New South 
Wales’ (Sentencing Trends No 20, Judicial Commission of New South Wales, May 2000). 
1657 Ibid. 
1658 See, eg, Bronwyn Naylor, 'Sentencing Female Offenders in the Magistrate's Court: Preliminary 
Report on a Pilot Study' (Paper presented at the Women and the Law, Canberra, 24-26 September 1991; 
Barry Godfrey, Stephen Farrall and Susanne Karstedt, 'Explaining Gendered Sentencing Patterns for 
Violent Men and Women in the Late-Victorian and Edwardian Period' (2005) 45 British Journal of 
Criminology 696, 700. 
1659 Nigel Walker, ‘The Quiddity of Mercy’ (1995) 70 Philosophy 27, 27. 
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Under early common law practices the role of the judge was to pass sentence upon 
the offender and notions of individualised sentencing did not exist.1660 However, 
through the doctrine of mercy, justice was tempered to accommodate the 
circumstances of an individual. Mercy could be exercised by the judge, jury or the 
Executive. Mercy, in this sense, was not a sentencing factor; it was a process of 
pardoning as an exercise of compassion or clemency. It was argued in Chapter 
Three that in the 19th century, as sentencing law and practices changed, the courts 
came to recognise a concept of ‘sentencing factors’. Early legal treatise like Cox 
(see Chapter Three) recognised family hardship as a sentencing factor. There were, 
however, no clean lines between the exercise of mercy as a form of compassion at 
sentencing1661 and mitigating effects of sentencing factors.  
 
In the 20th century as the movement to develop an appropriate and principled 
sentencing practice progressed, the role of taking into account the impact of a 
sentence upon an offender’s dependants was displaced from the dominant 
theoretical framework.  While the research literature clearly highlights that ‘family 
hardship’ was a common sentencing consideration in 20th century sentencing 
practices, it was not acknowledged as a mainstream sentencing consideration in 
the scholarly literature.1662  
 
Under a strict ‘just deserts’ approach to sentencing, the impact of a sentence upon 
an offender’s dependants is not a legitimate sentencing factor as it is neither 
relevant to the seriousness of the offence nor the circumstances of the offender. 
Therefore, taking into account the effect of a sentence upon an offender’s family or 
dependants would be a departure from what would otherwise be proportionate or 
just. In contrast, a court could legitimately take into account hardship upon the 
offender (which could include hardship on the offender caused by separation from 
children). Within a 'just deserts' approach to sentencing a judge who takes into 
account the effect of the sentence upon dependants could be administering ‘mercy’ 
 
                                                          
1660 See Chapter Three. 
1661 On the interconnected meanings of ‘mercy’ and ‘compassion’ See Steven Tudor, 'Modes of Mercy' 
(2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 79, 80-81 and 95-98. 
1662 For example, Easton claims that family hardship as a generalised sentencing principle would lead to 
‘absurd and unfair results’ and would ‘stray far from retributivism which focuses on the responsibility of 
the offender for the specific offence’. See Susan Easton, 'Dangerous Waters: Taking Account of Impact in 
Sentencing' (2008) 2 Criminal Law Review 105, 113. 
 315 
when considering hardship upon dependants. Assessed against the ‘just deserts’ 
approach, an exercise of 'mercy' is an act of ‘compassion’ falling outside of 
principled sentencing practice.1663  
 
A. Limited Analysis of the Exercise of Judicial Mercy 
 
There are three forms of mercy recognised as operating within the modern State. 
The first is the form of mercy as it appears in religious dogma: God’s mercy. The 
second form of mercy stems from the sovereign: the royal prerogative of mercy.1664 
The royal prerogative of mercy is a reserve power of the Crown and is, therefore, 
an Executive power.1665 The third form is mercy that may be exercised between 
individuals. Legal philosopher Jeffrie Murphy claims that it is this third form of 
mercy that is exercised by judicial officers.1666 
 
One of the early sources within the criminal law research literature recognising 
and defining ‘judicial mercy’ is Sir Carleton Kemp Allen’s text Aspects of Justice 
published in the 1950s.1667 He accepted that mercy, ‘has always existed in every 
system of law as a matter of humane discretion.’1668 However, he argued that, at 
the time of writing, judicial mercy had become more than charity.1669 
Notwithstanding, the role of broad judicial discretion in sentencing, Allen argued 
that: ‘it is now in many circumstances imperative legally as well as morally’ 
(emphasis added).1670 He observed that the role of judicial mercy within the 
criminal justice system was to restrain excessive harshness1671 and he argued that 
it had ‘become an integral part’ of the criminal justice system.1672  
 
 
                                                          
1663 Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles 
(Oxford University Press, 2005) 165-179. 
1664 See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 
61. 
1665 In Australia, the power is vested in the Queen and exercisable by the Governor General see Australian 
Constitution s 61. Under an exercise of the prerogative of mercy an offender may be freed absolutely or 
conditionally pardoned. 
1666 Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Mercy and Legal Justice’ in Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton,eds, Forgiveness and 
Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 165-169, 179-180. 
1667 Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Aspects of Justice (Stevens & Sons, 1958). 
1668 Ibid 62. 
1669 Ibid 63. 
1670 Ibid. 
1671 Ibid. 
1672 Ibid 64. 
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Jeffrie Murphy has identified that mercy is often used within the criminal law as a 
term ‘to refer to certain of the demands of justice (e.g. the demands of 
individuation)’.1673 He observed that this is problematic because mercy, in this 
sense, is part of the system – it is obligatory.1674 Alternatively, mercy is a 
‘departure from justice’,1675 ‘it is totally different from justice and actually requires 
(or permits) that justice sometimes be set aside.’1676 Murphy favoured 
understanding the concept of judicial mercy as a gift and not duty.1677 
 
B. ‘Mercy’ and ‘Mitigating Factor’ 
 
In 2005 in Sentencing and Criminal Justice, Ashworth observed that within the 
criminal justice system, ‘the absence of clear principle is often converted into the 
language of ‘showing mercy’’.1678 This is a very astute reflection. Research 
literature that does not recognise family hardship as a sentencing factor may, on a 
closer reading, equate aspects of family hardship mitigation with judicial acts of 
mercy.  For example, David Thomas drew attention to judicial mercy in this first 
edition of Principles of Sentencing1679 but, by his second edition the reference to 
‘mercy’ had been removed and categories of mitigating factors qualified.1680 
Jacobson and Hough bundled family hardship into ‘factors that call for clemency’ in 
their study of mitigating factors,1681 unfortunately aligning family hardship with 
notions of clemency and compassion rather than accepting it as an individualising 
sentencing factor.  
 
 
                                                          
1673 Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Mercy and Legal Justice’ in Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton,eds, Forgiveness and 
Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 169. 
1674 Ibid. 
1675 Ibid 167. 
1676 Ibid 169. 
1677 Ibid 169, 180. Robinson has also identified and commented on this confusion in the literature, see 
Robinson, Paul, ‘Mercy, Crime Control, and Moral Credibility’ in Austin Sarat (ed), Merciful Judgments 
and Contemporary Society: Legal Problems, Legal Possibilities (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 99, 
100-101. 
1678 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2005) 177. 
1679 David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing: The Sentencing Policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division (Heinemann, 1970) 199. 
1680 See discussion of David Thomas in Chapter Three. 
1681 Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough, Mitigation: The Role of Personal Factors in Sentencing (Prison 
Reform Trust, 2007) 62. 
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Daly, in reporting her research findings in 1987, claimed that: ‘familied men and 
women may be “bad” parents and thus not deserving of court mercy.’1682 As 
discussed above,1683 in Daly’s research the term ‘mercy’ is used instead of 
‘mitigation’. But Daly was describing the role of ‘familiar paternalism’ as a 
mitigating sentencing factor and, importantly, she was not talking about the 
broader discretion of courts to exercise judicial mercy (operating outside or 
beyond sentencing frameworks). Another way of explaining this, in the context of 
sentencing principles would be to state that – courts have held that bad parents do 
not deserve family hardship mitigation. The sentencing process here would 
involve: (a) considering family hardship as a mitigating factor; (b) determining the 
relationship of that factor to the other sentencing factors relevant in the case; and 
(c) finding that the factor does not receive much mitigating weight in 
circumstances where the children are likely to benefit from the sentence upon the 
offender.  
 
In 2005, von Hirsch and Ashworth modified their proportionate approach to 
sentencing by recognising 'equity factors'.1684 This greater recognition of 
mitigating factors was an important development in sentencing theory. Previously, 
their theoretical account ignored this aspect of sentencing.  What they have called 
'equity factors' are factors which do not go to the seriousness of the offence; some 
examples they provide are very elderly and infirm offenders.1685 Von Hirsch and 
Ashworth, do not address the probable effect of the sentence upon third parties 
but it is a hardship factor which could conceptually fall within their notion of an 
equity factor. Most significantly they refer to humanitarian principles and mercy as 
justification for recognition of these factors in sentencing. Von Hirsch and 
Ashworth observe, 
the subject of equity factors has scarcely been addressed in the sentencing 
literature, and only a handful of articles in the philosophical literature exist on 
the general subject of 'mercy'. We ourselves have not dealt with this topic 
before, and find that we still have not come up with a systematic analysis, 
 
                                                          
1682 Kathleen Daly, 'Structure and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court' (1987) 21 Law 
& Society Review 267, 285. 
1683 See ‘Theory and Judicial Paternalism’ above. 
1684 See Appendix 1 ‘Equity Factors in Sentencing’: Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, 
Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford University Press, 2005) 165-179. 
1685 Ibid 165, 174, 176. 
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comparable to those that we have offered in earlier chapters. What we can only 
offer here is some possible themes for further consideration.1686 
In 2007, Christine Piper entered the debate with an article in the Criminal Law 
Review.1687 Piper argued for the classification and consideration of ‘impact in 
sentencing’.1688 Piper held that impact mitigation included: 
 illness; 
 disability; 
 old age; 
 young offenders; 
 vulnerability; 
 harm from other prisoners; 
 innocent others, especially children;1689 and  
 female prisoners’ due to the current difficulties of the Prison Service in 
accommodating them.1690 
She argued that there is a place for courts to take such mitigation into account in 
sentencing1691 but she was very clear that ‘the merciful exercise of discretion is not 
an acceptable mechanism for taking account of punishment impact.’1692  
 
Ashworth, by the 2010 edition of Sentencing and Criminal Justice,1693 had 
developed his views on mercy in sentencing in several ways. First, he openly 
addressed the judicial use of mercy to reduce a sentence.1694  Second, he 
understood mercy to operate only in a small proportion of cases to ‘take account of 
extraordinary factors relating to the offender’s situation.’1695 In his text, he 
provided the example of Schumann1696 where a woman attempted to kill herself 
 
                                                          
1686 Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles 
(Oxford University Press, 2005) 165. 
1687 Christine Piper, 'Should Impact Constitute Mitigation?: Structured Discretion Versus Mercy' (2007) 2 
Criminal Law Review 141. 
1688 Ibid 
1689 Ibid 143. 
1690 Ibid 141-142. 
1691 Ibid 155. 
1692 Ibid 150. 
1693 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2010). 
1694 The topic of ‘Mercy’ was addressed in Chapter 5 ‘Aggravation and Mitigation’ see Andrew 
Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 190-191. 
1695 Ibid 190. 
1696 [2007] 2 Cr App R (S) 465 cited in Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge 
University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 191. See also Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 201. 
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and her child by jumping from a bridge. After the failed attempt, she kept the child 
alive while waiting for help. Lord Phillips CJ held that the court could, ‘put the 
guidelines and authorities on one side and apply mercy instead.’1697 In England and 
Wales, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) provided that the exercise of 
judicial mercy is something other than the application of sentencing guidelines and 
authorities. 
 
In the second case example, Ashworth provided, Attorney-General’s Reference No. 
11 of 2007,1698 a court reduced a sentence because an offender’s terminally ill 
sister had died. In critiquing the role of mercy in this case, Ashworth stated: 
the judicial use of the concept of mercy suggests that the sentence reduction is 
discretionary…[but,] in principle [the legal issue is,]… is this a factor that should 
or should not be allowed to affect sentence. If the answer is yes, it should then 
be for the court, as with other aggravating and mitigating factors, to assess its 
strength and to give appropriate effect to it. Referring to it as ‘mercy’ suggests a 
broad discretion, and that is only suitable for really extraordinary cases with 
unusual features.1699 
This current approach of separating out mitigating factors from acts of mercy, 
aligns with what legal philosophers (such as Murphy see above) have endorsed.1700 
It also aligns with the Victorian ‘exceptionalism’ in relation to family hardship (see 
Chapter Four). 
 
Ashworth’s current position is that the concept of mercy should be employed only 
for truly extraordinary cases, not for circumstances where compassion is raised 
but the court is actually taking into account a sentencing factor such as hardship to 
the offender.1701 He has maintained his view that taking family hardship into 
account at sentencing departs from principled sentencing practices.1702 However, 
he conceded that if it is thought that a sentencing court should make a reduction 
 
                                                          
1697 Ibid. 
1698 [2008] 1 Cr App R (S) 26 cited in Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge 
University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 191. See also Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 201. 
1699 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2010) 191. 
1700 Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Mercy and Legal Justice’ in Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton,eds, Forgiveness and 
Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 169, 180. Robinson has also identified and commented on this 
confusion in the literature, see Robinson, Paul, ‘Mercy, Crime Control, and Moral Credibility’ in Austin 
Sarat (ed), Merciful Judgments and Contemporary Society: Legal Problems, Legal Possibilities 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 99, 100-101. 
1701 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2015) 201. 
1702 Ibid 196. 
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for family hardship, ‘the question should be faced squarely, without drifting into 
the blancmange of mercy.’1703  
 
If we unravel family hardship as a sentencing factor from judicial mercy, the issue 
becomes, as Ashworth outlined in the quote above a two-step inquiry:  
1. Is it a relevant sentencing factor that should be allowed to affect sentence? 
2. If yes, it is then for the court to assess its weight and give appropriate affect 
to it.  
In regard to the second step, in Australian sentencing practice this is a question of 
determining the weight to be attached to this principle and to balance it against 
other relevant sentencing factors.  
 
It is interesting that Ashworth connects the notion of extraordinary cases with the 
policy developed in the use of judicial mercy. Is this where the exceptional 
circumstances qualification to family hardship emerged? Is it in the mistaken 
interconnectedness of ‘family hardship’ and ‘mercy’ that the requirement for 
exceptional, extraordinary and unusual hardships have arisen? Importantly 
modern-day analysis of ‘mercy’ places it as part of a broader unfettered discretion 
held by judicial officers.1704 It is not simply the merciful exercise of sentencing 
principles. This is a critical distinction. Resort to judicial mercy is a practice of 
pardoning1705 not sentencing. Consideration of family hardship is not an exercise of 
judicial mercy. Family hardship is a legitimate and well-established sentencing 
factor.1706 Indeed, it is an appealable error for a judicial officer to fail to give 
appropriate weight to a relevant mitigating factor.1707 Therefore, as an established 
mitigating factor judicial officers have an obligation to take into account family 
hardship where it is relevant mitigating factor. 
 
 
                                                          
1703 Ibid 197. 
1704 See, eg, Richard Fox, 'When Justice Sheds a Tear: The Place of Mercy in Sentencing' (1999) 25 
Monash University Law Review 1, 4-5. 
1705 For discussion of 18th century pardoning practices see Peter King, ‘Decision-Makers and Decision-
Making in the English Criminal Law, 1750-1800’ (1984) 27(1) The Historical Journal 25, 38-42 
1706 Similarly, Steven Tudor argues that taking an offender’s ill health into account at sentencing is not an 
act of mercy, ‘for it is a well-established legal principle that an offender’s ill heath can be a mitigating 
factor in sentencing.’ In contrast, Tudor argues releasing a terminally ill prisoner from prison for a short 
time so they can die at home is a situation of mercy. See Steven Tudor, 'Modes of Mercy' (2003) 28 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 79, 97. 
1707 See Chapter Two. 
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1. Judicial Mercy in Australian Sentencing Law 
As seen in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, family hardship has been described 
within Australian sentencing remarks and judgments as a merciful approach to 
sentencing. Problematically, in doing so, the sentencing factor is innately de-
legitimatised. As it is not seen as a relevant sentencing factor, but rather, a judicial 
exercise of ‘compassion’ or ‘humanity’. In this context, it can be sinuously 
interpreted as leniency based on gender (as discussed above). Another 
problematic aspect to the language of mercy is that the approach and 
consideration of the impact of a sentence upon offender’s dependants moves 
outside of a legal principled framework and instead falls to the whim of the judicial 
officer. In fact, it is argued that this is where the requirement of ‘exceptional 
hardship’ to third parties arose. 
 
Richard Fox, in his study of the role of mercy in sentencing, perceived family 
hardship as a clear example of ‘pure mercy’.1708 He advised that the sentence 
would need to produce ‘extraordinary hardship’1709 to third parties for courts to 
extend mercy. Interestingly, despite earlier acknowledgement that s 16A(2) of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was an example of a legislative checklist of ‘acceptable 
mitigating factors’,1710 Fox later unquestioningly reported that the listing of 
s16(A)(2)(p) (family hardship) did not alter the common law.1711 Fox stated: 
This is a clear example of mercy as a meta-principle operating outside the 
confines of standard sentencing rules. Even so, to establish such exceptional 
hardship justifying mercy, the defendant must produce ‘cogent evidence’ of 
exceptional hardship.1712 
This analysis is hard to accept in light of the analysis above. Where family hardship 
has been expressly listed in legislation the court is not operating within ‘mercy’ but 
rather taking into account a listed mitigating factor, that flows from the ‘demands 
of individuation’.1713 
 
 
                                                          
1708 Richard Fox, 'When Justice Sheds a Tear: The Place of Mercy in Sentencing' (1999) 25 Monash 
University Law Review 1, 16. 
1709 Ibid 17. 
1710 Ibid 9. 
1711 Ibid 18. 
1712 Ibid 18. 
1713 Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Mercy and Legal Justice’ in Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton,eds, Forgiveness and 
Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 169. 
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The Australian discourse on mercy and family hardship arose within a framework 
where exercises of judicial mercy were understood as falling outside of the 
dominant theoretical account of sentencing practice. In Morrison v Behrooz,1714 
Gray J stated: 
Outside of the principles of mitigation, sentencing authorities have an inherent 
discretion to grant leniency under the doctrine of mercy. In Cobiac v Liddy 
Windeyer J observed: 
The whole history of criminal justice as shewn that severity of 
punishment begets the need for capacity for mercy… This is not because 
mercy, in Portia’s sentence, should season justice. It is that a capacity in 
special circumstances to avoid the rigidity of inexorable law is of the 
very essence of justice.  
In R v Miceli, the Victorian Court of Appeal recognised the doctrine of mercy as 
relevant to the exercise of sentencing discretion and upheld the observations of 
King CJ in R v Osenkowski, where it was observed: 
…There must always be a place for the exercise of mercy where a judge’s 
sympathies are reasonably excited by the circumstances of the case. 
There must always be a place for leniency which has traditionally been 
extended even to offenders with bad records when the judge forms the 
view, almost intuitively in the case of experienced judges, that leniency 
at that particular stage of the offender’s life might lead to reform.1715 
That judicial officers hold inherent power deriving from the common law to wield 
mercy has been widely acknowledged within Australia.1716 As seen in Chapter 
Four, there has been recent judicial analysis in Australia on the role of ‘mercy' in 
sentencing which has been revived in the form of the Victorian ‘exceptionalism’ 
discussed above.1717   
 
 
IV EQUALITY THEORY: SIMILARITY AND DIFFERENCE 
 
There is a very large body of feminist literature on equality and the similarity and 
difference debates are long-standing.1718 The similarity argument (formal equality) 
is that men and women should be treated identically, which Elaine Player states is 
 
                                                          
1714 [2005] SASC 142 (15 April 2005) [42]. 
1715 Morrison v Behrooz [2005] SASC 142 (15 April 2005) [46]-[47]. 
1716 See, eg, Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, First Report, 
Sentencing and Corrections (July 1973) 9; AR v Wood [2008] WASC 119 (18 June 2008), [42]. 
1717 See Markovic v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 510. 
1718 See Lynne Haney, ‘Feminist State Theory: Applications to Jurisprudence, Criminology, and the 
Welfare State’ (2000) 26 Annual Review of Sociology 641, 644-650. 
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based on the ‘liberal conception of strict egalitarianism’.1719 For example, Martin 
Wasik claims that taking family responsibilities into account at sentencing is a 
form of ‘indirect discrimination’1720 since personal mitigation (such as family 
hardship) is available to some defendants but not others and it breaches the 
principle of equality before the law and fair treatment in sentencing.1721 
 
The difference argument (substantive equality) is that men and women are 
essentially different and that this difference must be recognised and taken into 
account. Barbara Hudson has argued that a study of penal policy demonstrates that 
a dominant way the law engages with difference is to ‘…rule differences irrelevant, 
by specifying only a narrow range of factors that are relevant to decision 
making.’1722 However, we ought to be very careful that the legal recognition of 
pregnancy and breastfeeding is not being excluded in the interests of gender 
neutrality precisely because these are aspects of women’s unique experience. 
There is a need to guard against the fact that ‘gender-neutral terms frequently 
obscure the fact that so much of the real experience of “persons”, so long as they 
live in gender-structured societies, does in fact depend on what sex they are.’1723 
 
The operation of family hardship as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of female 
offenders is not unwarranted gender-bias. The operation of this sentencing factor 
to reduce sentences of female offenders occurs because of existing (and unequal) 
social structures operating within Australian society.1724 The impact of sentencing 
is gendered because existing moral relations and social practices in parenting roles 
remain gendered.1725  
 
                                                          
1719 Elaine Player, ‘Women in the Criminal Justice System: The Triumph of Inertia’ (2014) 4(3) 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 276, 280. 
1720 Martin Wasik, ‘Going Around in Circles? Reflections on Fifty Years of Change in Sentencing’ (2004) 
Apr Criminal Law Review 253, 265. 
1721 Ibid. 
1722 Barbara Hudson, ‘Gender Issues in Penal Policy and Penal Theory’ in Pat Carlen (ed), Women and 
Punishment: The Struggle for Justice (Willan Publishing, 2002) 21, 36. 
1723 Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (Basic Books, 1989) 11. 
1724 Ann Aungles, The Prison and the Home: A Study of the Relationship Between Domesticity and 
Penalty, The Institute of Criminology Monograph Series No 5 (1994) 130. 
1725 Susan Sharp, ‘Editorial’ (2006) 1 Feminist Criminology 3, 3-4; Vanessa Munro, 'The Emerging 
Rights of Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children' (2002) 14(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 303, 
313; Susan Sharp and Susan Marcus-Mendoza, ‘It’s a Family Affair: Incarcerated Women and Their 
Families’ (2001) 12(4) Women & Criminal Justice 21, 26; Barbara Myers, et al, ‘Children of Incarcerated 
Mothers’ (1999) 8(1) Journal of Child and Family Studies 11,12; Susan Williams, ‘A Feminist View of 
Mercy, Judgment, and the “Exception” in the Context of Transitional Justice’ in Austin Sarat (ed), 
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To tarnish this sentencing factor because it more frequently mitigates the sentence 
of female offenders is not gender neutrality. In the context of the USA, Daly has 
observed that: 
the problem is that men’s lives and the character of their crimes are taken as 
the norm, against which women are to measure up. Thus, the only way that 
women can be seen to achieve adult status is by “raising” their punishment to 
the male standard. This makes sense only if one assumes that men’s lives and 
crimes – not women’s – ought to be the norm.1726 
The same observation is applicable to the Australian context. 
 
The norm in sentencing is the male offender.1727 The primary reason family 
hardship is controversial within Australian sentencing practices is because it 
considers impacts which have not fallen predominantly within the dominant male 
experience. Clearly, this is not a sufficient justification for excluding it as a 
legitimate sentencing factor. Equal treatment would be satisfied with equal 
treatment of offenders who have primary caring responsibilities for 
dependents.1728 
 
Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson have been leading opponents of special treatment 
for women in the criminal justice system. They have argued that: 
a special treatment approach to criminal sentencing should trouble feminists, 
because it perpetuates damaging stereotypes of female weakness, implying 
moral inferiority that undermines claims to full citizenship and even 
personhood.1729 
However, taking into account the potential impact of sentence upon an offender’s 
dependants need not be seen as ‘special treatment’ for women. The sentencing 
principle can apply to fathers who are primary caregivers and mothers who are 
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1729 Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson, 'The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal 
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primary caregivers. In fact, this study of the Australian case law has demonstrated 
that under the common law it is not a sentencing factor which has been raised and 
considered only in the sentencing of female offenders.1730 
 
The issue of family hardship is one of ‘impact’; taking into account the probable 
impact on an offender’s dependants – not a broad category of offenders but the 
specific offender and not a broad category of dependants but the specific 
individuals who are dependent upon the offender who is being sentenced. The 
weight attached to this consideration will be individualised. This rationale sits 
comfortably within the guiding concept of Australian sentencing practice: 
‘individualised justice’.  
 
By its nature, individualised justice is unequal in application. As explained by 
Myrna Raeder: 
If the effect of imprisonment on children is considered, this does not mean that 
single mothers would automatically be given probation or substantial 
departures. A variety of factors, including the seriousness of the crime and the 
defendant’s culpability, must be considered. In some cases, the gravity of the 
offense and the need to protect the public will outweigh the social costs of 
imprisoning a defendant.1731 
Similarly, Jeanne Flavin has argued that justice should recognise, ‘men and 
women’s many and complex lived social realities and the many forms and 
functions of families.’1732 
 
Declarations that women will have children or try to get pregnant to avoid 
suffering the full force of the sentencing courts powers are routinely made and 
infrequently questioned.1733 Do we accuse men of going out and finding 
employment in a devious effort to avoid a custodial sentence? Claims that taking a 
circumstance of many women’s experience (ie primary responsibility for the care 
of dependants) will result in sentencing disparity are also not frequently 
 
                                                          
1730 See Chapter Four. 
1731 Myrna Raeder, 'Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and other Sex-Based 
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challenged. Such claims mock the integrity of an individualised sentencing system 
and the intelligence of judicial officers,1734 who on a day to day basis are 
professionally required to consider and weigh up a variety of facts in order to 
reach a sound and just determination.  
 
Taking family hardship into account as a mitigating factor can be critiqued as 
providing an unwarranted advantage to the family unit.1735 Such a position can be 
freely acknowledged as a fundamental legal value.1736 The criminal justice system 
is imbued with values. For example, in 2004 in the ACT, the Standing Committee on 
Community Services and Social Equity endorsed a move towards special treatment 
for primary carers: 
The Committee believes that when primary carers are incarcerated (either 
male or female) special attention should be paid to ensuring their relationship 
with their children is not fractured.1737 
This policy privileges the relationship between a primary carer and a child. 
Currently in Australia, this may disproportionately impact (and benefit) mothers 
more than fathers, but the policy is gender neutral and not centred on a male 
experience. As Raeder, aptly states, ‘[i]f more men provided childcare, they too 
would benefit from this factor. The break is given not for being female, but for 
being a caregiver.’1738 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
It is not useful to categorise family hardship as a factor arising from ‘judicial 
paternalism’, ‘mercy’ or ‘gender bias’. This chapter has recommended that family 
 
                                                          
1734 The exercise of professional discretion of other participants in the criminal justice system (ie. police 
officers and prosecution) has not been critiqued to the same degree. 
1735 See, eg, Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson, 'The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: 
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Sentencing Guidelines' (1994) 85 Criminal Law & Criminology 181, 206-208. 
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1738 Myrna Raeder, ‘The Forgotten Offender: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory 
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hardship be recognised as a legitimate sentencing factor which courts should take 
into account when sentencing an offender with dependants. The operation of 
family hardship as a mitigating factor to recognise the probable impact of a 
sentence upon dependent children is lawful and appropriate. If assessed from the 
perspective of the impact of the sentence upon the offender’s dependants, it 
applies equally to men and women and is a legitimate concern.  
 
This sentencing factor may affect the nature of a sentence imposed upon female 
offenders more than male offenders simply because they occupy greater caring 
responsibilities in societies. Categorising family hardship as a gender-biased 
sentencing factor is not helpful and misaligns what this sentencing factor is about. 
Further research work in this area could consider whether it is appropriate to 
categorise family hardship as a factor arising from ‘familial paternalism’1739 or 
whether it could be framed in the context of ‘children’s rights’,1740 and one’s right 
to family life. 
 
Australia retains a practice of individualised justice.1741 Judicial officers are capable 
of taking into consideration complex factual matrixes. The law recognises that they 
can take into consideration economic marginalization, ties to the community, good 
character and social difficulties such as gambling addiction and alcoholism. Judicial 
officers can, and should, consider the circumstances of parenthood and caregiving. 
It is for the sentencing court to determine an appropriate sentence for each 
offender, based on the facts of the individual case and individual offender’s 
circumstances.1742 Therefore, in passing sentence a sentencing court should 
consider:  
 whether family hardship is a relevant sentencing factor in the 
circumstances;  
 
                                                          
1739 A term adopted by Kathleen Daly in 1987 to explain leniency in the sentencing of women, identified 
in her study of sentencing practices in a Massachusetts courthouse, see Kathleen Daly, 'Structure and 
Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court' (1987) 21 Law & Society Review 267. 
1740 See generally Helen Codd, ‘Through the Looking Glass? Prisoners’ Children and Penal Policy’ 
(2007) 69 Amicus Curiae 3, 3-4. 
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‘Punishment, Poverty and Responsibility: The Case for a Hardship Defence’ (1999) 8(4) Social & Legal 
Studies 583. 
1742See institutive synthesis and individualised justice discussion in Chapter Two. 
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 if so, how it is to be balanced against any other relevant sentencing factors; 
and  
 how much weight is to be attached to it. 
 
A judge can take into account all circumstances of the offender that are relevant 
and known to the court in determining an appropriate sentence. Circumstances of 
female offenders are often different, but this is not gender bias or discrimination. If 
a judge attaches different weight to the same circumstances of a male and female 
offender, then we may attribute that to gender bias. However, attributing weight to 
a difference between caregiver and non-caregiver is not the same. 
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7. FINAL COMMENTS 
 
The legal research literature is only just beginning to carefully examine the role of 
sentencing factors. It certainly has not yet dealt seriously with family hardship as a 
mitigating sentencing factor. This research begins to address this gap. As this is an 
emerging field of research and due to the vast gaps in research in this area the 
overall approach adopted for this study has been a mixed method approach. This 
dissertation has addressed the practice governing the use of family hardship as a 
mitigating factor within the common law and it has identified the effects this 
matter has had in sentencing across the Australian sentencing landscape. 
 
The norm through which legal scholars have constructed sentencing law and 
practice is based upon male experiences. Within the research literature the 
experiences of women at sentencing have not been validated. Instead taking family 
hardship into account at sentencing has frequently been mistakenly classified as 
‘mercy’, ‘chivalry’ and ‘judicial paternalism’. Taking into account responsibilities 
for the primary care of children and the probable impact a sentence may have 
upon these children, as a mitigating sentencing factor will result in differential 
gendered outcomes. However, this is because of current social constructions of 
care and perceptions of motherhood. Within Australia, increasing rates of 
imprisonment of women and little social change in the constructions of care giving 
in families within Australian society means that the impact of parental 
incarceration upon children is a manifest social issue which must be addressed. 
 
This dissertation has demonstrated family hardship is a vital mitigating sentencing 
factor. Courts have a long-standing history of taking family hardship into account 
at sentencing under the common law. Despite the emergence of ‘just deserts’ as a 
significant normative framework, courts have continued to take this factor into 
account. This study of family hardship has explored the shifts that have occurred 
which have taken Australia, more than any other common law jurisdiction, 
towards legislative intervention and recognition of family hardship. It has 
examined the difficulties that have arisen in respect of realising acceptance of the 
impact of a sentence upon offender’s dependants in sentencing.  
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The overall purpose of this dissertation has been to trace the way that courts have 
approached this sentencing factor and to contribute to current knowledge. The 
research for this dissertation involved a study of the case law on family hardship 
within Australia. This consisted of a series of jurisdictionally based studies of 
sentencing remarks and appellate judgments to reveal how judicial officers have 
approached family hardship as a sentencing factor. The study of the case law 
confirmed that family hardship arises in sentencing decisions for both male and 
female offenders.  
 
The study of the Australian case law has shed light on the way sentencing 
principles and practice have developed in each jurisdiction and highlighted gaps, 
divergence and localised practices. The study traced the evolution and growth of 
sentencing principle by applying an innovative methodology of ‘exhaustive 
shepardizing”. The methodology exposed, at different times and in different 
jurisdictions the following: 
 recognition of family hardship only if exceptional circumstances exist; 
 no recognition of family hardship within the sentencing process but scope 
for mercy in exceptional cases; and 
 recognition of family hardship as a sentencing factor. 
The study has exposed that although there is, in theory, one common law in 
Australia, there is certainly not uniformity in the approach to family hardship. The 
jurisdictions have to differing degrees and at different points in time placed more 
or less emphasis on the approaches identified above.  
 
Superficially, it may appear that all the jurisdictions, except for the ACT, have a 
common approach to family hardship because they have all been reluctant to allow 
family hardship to be considered alongside other sentencing factors. However, 
Chapters Four and Five have shown that the Australian landscape is much more 
complicated. Appellate courts have drawn upon differing rationales to maintain 
this marginalisation of family hardship. Moreover, these rationales have not been 
consistently espoused and have varied within jurisdictions. Even cases that have 
‘high juristic’ value, as leading cases, can be seen to be in conflict as to the 
rationales adopted.  
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The research conducted for this dissertation involved studies of the role of family 
hardship as a sentencing factor in all jurisdictions in Australia, including the 
consideration of family hardship in federal sentencing. The research therefore 
shed light on federal sentencing practice against the backdrop of state and 
territory sentencing practices. It is the ability to analyse the federal sentencing 
practice in light of identified state and territory practices that makes this study 
particularly important. There has been little research of the influence of state and 
territory practice upon federal sentencing practice and accordingly the extent to 
which this contributes to inconsistent sentencing of federal offenders. By providing 
such analysis this dissertation contributes to current knowledge about consistency 
in federal sentencing practice across Australia. The differences in approach 
between jurisdictions are reflected in the ways the various jurisdictions have 
interpreted the federal provision in s16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The 
conflict between the common law and the plain meaning of the Commonwealth 
statute remains to be determined by the High Court. Recent developments in the 
case law suggest the High Court will soon be called on to determine whether the 
common law ‘exceptional’ qualification applies to federal law.   
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Mill v Scott [1955] St R Qd 210 -  - - - - - - - - 
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McCulloch v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 21 (22 
December 2010) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Oliver v Tasmania [2006] TASSC 95 (17 November 
2006) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Clay v Clay (No 4) [2004] TASSC 145 (7 December 
2004) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Gibbins v White [2004] TASC 8 (25 February 2004) -  - - - - - - - - 
Tunks v Taws [2003] TASSC 58 (4 July 2003) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Bullock [2003] TASSC 37 (13 June 2003) -  - - - - - - - - 
Jordan v The Queen [2002] TASSC 121 (20 
December 2002) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
R v Georgiadis [No 5] [2001] TASSC 88 (6 August 
2001) 
3  - - - - - - - - 
Williams v McLaughlin [2000] TASSC 29 (10 April 
2000) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Ponsford v Wynwood [2000] TASSC 21 (4 March 
1999) 
1  1 - - - - - - - 
Riley v Tilyard [1990] TASSC 86 (9 April 1990) 1  - - - - - - - - 
Cadman v The Queen [1985] TASSC 15 (12 April 
1985) 
1  - - - - - - - - 
Sullivan v The Queen [1975] Tas SR 146 (NC 1) 3  - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
 
Total: 55 cases 
Victorian Family Hardship Cases 
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MGP v The Queen [2011] VSCA 321 (20 October 
2011) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
R v El-Hage (Sentence) [2011] VSC 452 -  - - - - - - - - 
DPP v Gerrard [2011] VSCA 200 (30 June 2011) 1  - - - - - - - - 
Reilly v The Queen [2010] VSCA 278 (22 October 
2010) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
R v Causer [2010] VSC 341 (19 August 2010) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Cowen [2010] VSC 321 (9 August 2010) 3  - - - - - - - - 
Pollard v The Queen [2010] VSCA 156 (18 June 
2010) 
2  - - - - - - - - 
Markovic v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 510 7  3 1 - - - - - - 
R v Esposito [2009] VSCA 277(30 November 2009) -  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Xeba [2009] VSCA 205 (17 September 2009) 2  - - - - - - - - 
DPP v Najjar [2009] VSCA 246 (15 October 2009) 2  1 - - - - - - - 
R v NAD [2008] VSCA 192 (26 September 2008) 4  2 - - - - - - - 
R v Davidson; R v Konestabo [2008] VSCA 188 (23 
September 2008) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
DPP v Toumngeun [2008] VSCA 91(29 May 2008) -  - - - - - - - - 
 377 
Victorian Family Hardship Cases 
Continued L
o
c
a
l 
 
C
th
 
A
C
T
 
N
S
W
 
N
T
 
Q
ld
 
S
A
 
T
a
s
 
W
A
 
R v Ienco [2008] VSCA 17 (14 February 2008) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Lam [2007] VSCA 246 (1 November 2007) 2  - - - - - - - - 
R v Lane (2007) 176 A Crim R 471 4  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Selcuk [2007] VSCA 143 (29 June 2007) 1  - - - - - - - - 
DPP v Coley [2007] VSCA 91 (14 May 2007) 1  - - - - - - - - 
Pandevski [2007] VSCA 84 (2 May 2007) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Jaross [2007] VSCA 68 (21 March 2007) 3  - - - - - - - - 
R v Nagul [2007] VSCA 8 (16 January 2007) 9  - - - - - - - - 
R v Dooley [2006] VSCA 269 (4 December 2006) 3  - - - - - - - - 
R v Nguyen [2006] VSCA 184 (8 September 2006) 5  - - - - - - - - 
R v Luong, Nguyen and Cao [2005] VSCA 94 (29 
April 2005) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
DPP v Lehmann [2005] VSCA 9 (9 February 2005) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Williams [2004] VSC 429 (29 October 2004) 1  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Close [2004] VSCA 188 (7 October 2004) 1  - - - - - - - - 
R v Satalich [2004] VSCA 132 (5 August 2004) -  - - - - - - - - 
DPP v Rzek [2003] VSCA 97 (6 August 2003) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Ilic [2003] VSCA 82 (25 June 2003) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v James, Merett and Mousley [2003] VSCA 13 (14 
February 2003) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
R v Garratt [2002] VSCA 160 (27 September 2002) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Holland (2002) 134 A Crim R 451 16  2 1 - - - - - - 
Orphanides (2002) 130 A Crim R 403 2  - - - - - - 1 - 
R v Fisher [2001] VSCA 164 (19 September 2001) 1  - - - - - - - - 
R v Leesley [2001] VSCA 90 (7 June 2001) 2  - - - - - - - - 
R v La Mude [2001] VSCA 33 (20 March 2001) -  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Howden [1999] VSCA 130 (16 August 1999) -  - - - - - - - - 
Wall (1999) 105 A Crim R 426 -  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Panuccio [1998] VSC 300 (4 May 1998) 9  2 - - 1 - - - - 
Carmody (1998) 100 A Crim R 41 17  11 - - - - - - 1 
Yates (1998) 99 A Crim R 483 14  1 - - 1 - - - - 
R v Pennant [1998] 2 VR 453 3  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Yaldiz (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria 
Court of Appeal, Winneke P, Hayne JA and Nathan 
AJA, 4 December 1996) 
2  - - - 1 - - - - 
R v Pearce (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Callaway JA, Southwell 
and Coldrey AJJA, 19 September 1996) 
-  1 - - - - - - - 
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R v Lynch (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria 
Court of Appeal, Winneke P, Hayne and Charles 
JJA, 18 April 1996) 
3  - - - 1 - - - - 
R v Katsimalis (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Victoria Court of Appeal, Murphy J, King J, Gobbo J, 
14 April 1988) 
3  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Power (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Young CJ, Kaye J and 
Gray J, 2 June 1987) 
3  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Pozvek (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Starke J, Kaye J and 
Brooking J, 2 September 1983) 
4  1 - - - - - - - 
AG v Marasovic (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, McInerney J, Kaye 
J and Brooking J, 16 February 1982) 
3  1 - - - - - - - 
Zampaglione (1982) 6 A Crim R 287 3  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Hall (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Starke J, Anderson J and 
Fullagar J, 15 February 1980) 
3  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Polterman (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Victoria Court of Criminal Appeal, Adam J, Starke J 
and Crockett J, 2 August 1974) 
3  1 - - - - - 1 - 
R v Mitchell [1974] VR 625 5  2 - 4 - - - 2 - 
 
 
 
Total: 52 cases 
South Australian Family Hardship 
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Police v Reid [2011] SASC 210 (1 December 2011) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Pickard [2011] SASCFC 134 (11 November 
2011) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
R v Hill [2011] SASCFC 109 (14 October 2011) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Marrone [2011] SASCFC 78 (20 July 2011) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v D, RHC [2011] SASCFC 31 (21 April 2011) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Bandjak [2011] SASCFC 19 (1 April 2011) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Ohmer [2011] SASCFC 44 (18 May 2011) -  - - - - - - - - 
Marticanaj v The Queen [2010] SASCFC 82 (23 
December 2010) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
R v Marikar [2010] SASCFC 36 (24 September 
2010) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Alexiadis v Police [2010] SASC 182 (30 June 2010) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Buckskin [2010] SASC 138 (12 May 2010) 3  - - - - - - - - 
Stewart v Police [2010] SASC 28 (18 February 
2010) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Field v Police [2009] SASC 354 (20 November 2009) -  - - - - - - - - 
Bush v Police [2009] SASC 318 (7 October 2009) -  - - - - - - - - 
Thompson v Police [2009] SASC 150 (21 May 09) -  - - - - - - - - 
Nattrass v Police [2008] SASC 267 (8 October 2008) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v H, Mg [2008] SASC 264 (3 October 2008) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Beer [2007] SASC 375 (26 October 2007) -  - - - - - - - - 
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Police v Hatty [2007] SASC 180 (21 May 2007) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Stewart (2007) 98 SASR 56 -  - - - - - - - - 
R v M, H [2007] SASC 41 (19 February 2007) -  - 1 - - - - - - 
R v Schaefer and Schiworski [2006] SASC 348 (21 
November 2006) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Willis v Police [2006] SASC 245 (15 August 2006) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Bryden [2006] SASC 203 (13 July 2006) -  - - - - - - - - 
Aylett v Police [2006] SASC 132 (4 May 2006) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Modra [2006] SASC 106 (12 April 2006) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Richards [2006] SASC 60 (3 March 2006) 2  - - - - - - - - 
R v Ivic [2006] SASC 8 (19 January 2006) 3  - - - - - - - - 
R v Gorcilov [2005] SASC 326 (18 August 2005) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Penno [2004] SASC 354 (12 November 2004) 9  - - - - - - - - 
Gorcilov v Police [2002] SASC 45 (11 February 
2002) 
1  - - - - - - - - 
R v Carpentieri (2001) 81 SASR 164 14  - 1 - - - 1 - - 
Milosevski v Police [2000] SASC 342 (16 October 
2000) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Neill v Police [1999] SASC 270 (16 June 1999) 11  - - - - - - - - 
Hemming v Perkins [1999] SASC 212 (3 June 1999) -  - - - - - - - - 
G v Police [1999] SASC 216 (26 May 1999) 1  - - - - - - - - 
Riley v Police [1999] SASC 21 (2 February 1999) -  - - - - - - - - 
Bates v Police (1997) 70 SASR 66 10  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Mangelsdorf (1995) 66 SASR 60 7  - - - - - - - - 
Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88 17  8 1 3 3 1 - 3 1 
Amuso (1987) 32 A Crim R 308  3  2 1 - - - 1 3 3 
R v Rowe (1983) 109 LSJS 291 (21 September 
1983) 
-  1 - - - - - - - 
R v Spiers (1983) 34 SASR 546 -  1 - - 1 - 1 1 5 
Jones v Morley (1981) 29 SASR 62 1  - - - - - - - - 
Jones v Morley (1981) 29 SASR 57 -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Moffa (No 2) (1977) 16 SASR 155 4  3 1 - 1 - 1 - 6 
R v Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291 25  12 3 24 4 1 3 13 17 
Tame v Fingleton (1974) 8 SASR 507 3  - - - - - - 2 - 
Brady v Wright (1974) 62 LSJS 44 (14 January 
1974) 
1  - - - - - - - - 
Moore v Fingleton (1972) 3 SASR 164 1  2 - 1 - 1 2 - - 
Jarrett v Samuels (1972) 4 SASR 78 1  1 - - - - - - - 
Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257 5  3 - - - - - 3 4 
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McLean v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 60 (16 
March 2011) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Juma v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 54 (14 
March 2011) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Mountain v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 161 
(13 August 2009) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Speering v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 266 
(23 Dec 2008) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Western Australia v Wynne [2008] WASCA 195 (26 
Sept 2008) 
-  1 - - - - - - - 
Challis v Davison [2008] WASC 198 (22 August 
2008) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Trajkoski v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 130 
(20 June 2008) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Logan v Kuser [2008] WASC 65 (29 April 2008) -  - - - - - - - - 
Woodley v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 92 (24 
April 2008) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Brown v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 48 (4 
March 2008) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Egan v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 182 (5 
September 2007) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Norton v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 75 (10 
April 2007) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Findlay v Western Australia [2007] WASC 61 (19 
March 2007) 
1  - - - - - - - - 
Anderson v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 25 (5 
February 2007) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Arcari v Christie [2007] WASC 298 (7 December 
2007) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
MoodyJackamarra v Western Australia [2007] 
WASCA 7 (12 January 2007) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Osborne v Fuller [2006] WASC 295 (21 December 
2006) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Western Australia v Skaines (Unreported, Supreme 
Court of Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Roberts-Smith, McLure and Buss JJA, 11 August 
2006) 
4  1 - - - - - - - 
Bolton v Western Australia [2006] WASCA 120 (27 
June 2006) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Hull v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 194 (11 
October 2005) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Western Australia v Bruce [2004] WASCA 226 (18 
October 2004) 
3  - - - - - - - - 
Johnson v Scott & Anor [2004] WASCA 76 (23 
January 2004) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Michael v The Queen [2004] WASCA 4 (22 January 
2004) 
1  1 - - - - - - - 
Roberts v Johnson [2003] WASCA 272 (4 November 
2003) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Smith v The Queen [2003] WASCA 235 (12 
September 2003) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Rechichi v The Queen [2003] WASCA 98 (14 May 
2003) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Adams v The Queen [2003] WASCA 91 (2 May 
2003) 
-  1 - - - - - - - 
Davis v The Queen [2002] WASCA 298 (30 October 
2002) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Dodd v Hoogewerf [2002] WASCA 15 (18 January 
2002) 
1  1 - - - - - - - 
Cooper v The Queen [2001] WASCA 379 (30 
November 2001) 
1  - - - - - - - - 
Day v The Queen (2001) 127 A Crim R 403 (14 
September 2001) 
-  - - - - - - - 1 
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R v ‘Epr’ [2001] WASCA 214 (25 July 2001) -  - - - - - - - - 
Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321 -  - - - - - - 1 - 
Taylor v Fairman [2000] WASCA 121 (5 May 2000) -  - - - - - - - - 
Anderson v The Queen [1999] WASCA 291 (2 
December 1999) 
-  - - - 1 - - - - 
Rogers v The Queen [1999] WASCA 239 (5 
November 1999) 
3  - - - - - - - - 
R v Ottobrino [1999] WASCA 207 (14 July 1999) -  - - - - - - - - 
R v Jeffree [1998] WASCA 22 (13 February 1998) 3  1 - - - - - - - 
Narrier v Fallows (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia, Murray J, 11 April 1997) 
-  - - - - - - - - 
Anderson (1996) 18 WAR 244 8  - - - - - - - - 
Webb v Baldwin (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia, Walsh J, 17 January 1997) 
2  - - - - - - - - 
Gillespie v Moffitt (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia, Wheeler J, 18 December 1996) 
2  - - - - - - - - 
Johnston v The Queen (Unreported, Supreme Court 
of Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Franklyn, Owen and Parker JJ, 13 December 1996) 
-  1 - - - - - - - 
Warrell v Kay (1995) 83 A Crim R 493 1  - - - - - - - 1 
Hodder v The Queen (1995) 15 WAR 264 17  1 - - 1 - - - - 
Kennedy v Fox (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia, Owen J, 19 September 1994) 
1  - - - - - - - - 
Stewart (1994) 72 A Crim R 17 14  4  1  3   5 
Madoc v The Queen (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Franklyn, Murray and Scott JJ, 2 June 1993) 
2  - - - - - - - - 
Thill v Ryan (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western 
Australia, Murray J, 18 December 1992) 
2  - - - - - - - - 
Wright v The Queen (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Pidgeon, Wallwork, White JJ, 20 August 1992) 
3  1 - - - - - - - 
Tan Hai Huat (1990) 49 A Crim R 378  -  - - - - 1 - - - 
R v Szathmary (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Wallace, Pidgeon and Rowland JJ, 24 May 1989) 
6  1 - - - - - - - 
Boyle (1987) 34 A Crim R 202 19  10 - 11 4 5 - 9 13 
Baude De Bunnetat (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal, Burt CJ, 
Brinsden and Smith JJ, 3 December 1985) 
5  - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
